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Researchers Develop A Way To Stop Ransomware By Watching The Filesystem (phys.org)

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Phys.Org: Ransomware -- what hackers use to encrypt your computer files and demand money in exchange for freeing those contents -- is an exploding global problem with few solutions, but a team of University of Florida researchers says it has developed a way to stop it dead in its tracks. The answer, they say, lies not in keeping it out of a computer but rather in confronting it once it's there and, counterintuitively, actually letting it lock up a few files before clamping down on it. "Our system is more of an early-warning system. It doesn't prevent the ransomware from starting [...] it prevents the ransomware from completing its task [...] so you lose only a couple of pictures or a couple of documents rather than everything that's on your hard drive, and it relieves you of the burden of having to pay the ransom," said Nolen Scaife, a UF doctoral student and founding member of UF's Florida Institute for Cybersecurity Research. Scaife is part of the team that has come up with the ransomware solution, which it calls CryptoDrop. "Antivirus software is successful at stopping them when it recognizes ransomware malware, but therein lies the problem," reports Phys.Org. "'These attacks are tailored and unique every time they get installed on someone's system,' Scaife said. 'Antivirus is really good at stopping things it's seen before [...] That's where our solution is better than traditional anti-viruses. If something that's benign starts to behave maliciously, then what we can do is take action against that based on what we see is happening to your data. So we can stop, for example, all of your pictures from being encrypted.' The results, they said, were impressive. 'We ran our detector against several hundred ransomware samples that were live,' Scaife said, 'and in those case it detected 100 percent of those malware samples and it did so after only a median of 10 files were encrypted.'" The University of Florida uploaded a video briefly explaining its software.

49 of 102 comments (clear)

  1. Hey, you can do this too by sonamchauhan · · Score: 4, Interesting

    1. Your main computer (call it 'right brain') automatically takes a 'VM snapshot' of itself at a point in time.
    2. Another computer ('left brain') inspects the VM to check if data files are still accessible
    3. If not, left brain 'diffs' the VM with previous 'known-good' VMs to find the source of the problem
    4. Swap VMs
    5. profit!

    1. Re:Hey, you can do this too by zennyboy · · Score: 1

      Canz I do this whilst maintaining 120FPS in CS:GO?

    2. Re:Hey, you can do this too by greenfruitsalad · · Score: 3, Informative

      ok, 2 years ago (when i first heard about ransomware) i wrote a nagios plugin that through inotify watched for activity on dummy files automatically placed around my directory trees. with that, nagios also watched for out of hours IO load. it had watched for processes hogging io/cpu during the day, i just made it more sensitive at night. plus, i have hourly filesystem snapshots.

      i then tested it with whatever trojan came in my email on a windows7 pc with a samba volume mounted. it detected it straight away.

      this really is a ms windows only problem. any bsd/linux admin has so many tools of protection available that it's virtually a non-issue for us.

    3. Re:Hey, you can do this too by Bristol_92 · · Score: 1

      Also don’t visit queer websites, click on bad links on them or in email and other social media post. And do not open strangers’ messages. Especially if they seem suspicious.

    4. Re:Hey, you can do this too by WallyL · · Score: 1

      Care to share the source? Maybe a github repo or tarball on dropbox or something? I would like to use something like that, but I'm not much of a programmer.

  2. Editorial skills by zennyboy · · Score: 1

    "all of your pictures form being encrypted" Now *that's* what I call editing!

    1. Re:Editorial skills by i.r.id10t · · Score: 1

      Nah, typical of a UF edumakashen

      But hey, at least they have Burrito Brothers close by...

      --
      Don't blame me, I voted for Kodos
  3. Heuristics by The+MAZZTer · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Scaife said. 'Antivirus is really good at stopping things it's seen before [...] That's where our solution is better than traditional anti-viruses. If something that's benign starts to behave maliciously, then what we can do is take action against that based on what we see is happening to your data.

    That's called "heuristics" and AV has been doing that for quite a while now. And attackers will work around this system the same way they work around heuristics... if your system is freely available, they can download and test their ransomware against it until they can escape notice.

    1. Re:Heuristics by D,Petkow · · Score: 1

      omg I logged in just to comment the exact same thing on the exact same passage! It's a pity i dont have mod points to boost your reply up, oh well..

    2. Re:Heuristics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Omg. Amazing indeed.

      On the same note, if I had mod points right now, I would mod you both down for being clueless, while thinking you are the opposite.

      No, your kneejerk reaction that this will be easily defeated just like everything else is unfounded. You haven't read the paper. You haven't thought it through.

      Try harder.

  4. Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by guardiangod · · Score: 3, Insightful

    The software detects the behavior of an application. The detection is probably like 'if a process accesses each image file (OpenFile/CreateFile) , read it, create a new file with "same_name+.encrypted", then delete the original image file.' x 10 times, then that process is likely guilty.

    1. What happens if the malware instead use MapFileView and 10 others potential Win32/kernel32 APIs combination? This quickly become a arms race and is going to be terrible in terms of system overhead, not to mention the time gap between a new method appearing and the detection software catching it.

    2. What about Windows' internal processes that, for example, shadow copy the file? Would the detection software catches it? What about false detection of, say, the disk defragmentation software?

    3. Since the system is already compromised, what stops the malware from detecting the countermeasure and just delete all the files in the system straight out? If that's too obvious, then how about write a random byte per x bytes offset to all files? Even if you killed the malware process, you can't be sure that there no other malware running on the system that can go into revenge mode.

    1. Re:Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Actually, there is a much easier way to defeat this in a wholesale way. They track each process across three indicators (they describe them in their paper). These indicators include an entropy metric and a similarity score (comparing two versions of the same file -- ransomware encrypted file of a previously unencrypted file should look much different). For more details, see the paper. The main issue is that it is per process, so an attacker could simply use multiple processes to achieve an end-goal of extracting a ransom.

      In any case, if a process spawned a process to do a small action (i.e., micro-action so to speak), then it would break their monitoring scheme, because their analysis is constrained to each process. If a single sub-process simply changed a single byte of a file, then it shouldn't look suspicious. However, the total actions of all sub-processes would achieve the primary goal of the main process, and it should be undetectable to their detection mechanisms.

    2. Re:Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by CanadianMacFan · · Score: 2

      I hope if I run an application to convert a bunch of music files from one format to another then their program isn't going to be set off.

    3. Re:Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by Rei · · Score: 4, Informative

      The team isn't very explicit on what they're doing. But if they're doing it in a reasonable manner, it's probably not that naive, as to only look for "sequentially read, encrypt, write, delete" patterns. I think it's more fundamental. No matter what pattern it uses, a piece of ransomware has to fundamentally do the following.

      1) Read the data. So, for each block that there's actual reads of, flag it.
      2) Write data, somewhere, somehow. Can be to a disk, card, even over the net. Writes to disk might be to new files, archives, overwrites, etc. Even if compression is used, the writes have to be a relevant fraction of the size of the data read in.
      3) Somehow invalidate the original block. There are different approaches one can use to invalidate data, and all of them need to be covered.

      The key factors are #1 and #3. A process that just reads blocks isn't a problem. A process that just invalidates original blocks isn't a problem (that can't be ransomware, only deletion... and you can't get a ransom for files that are outright gone). But a process that reads and then later writes over blocks may or may not be a problem. We can divide this down into different scenarios.

      1) Processes that only slowly, randomly, modify things that they've read, only on a limited number of files. These are most likely not a problem.
      2) Processes that do read and write over a large amount of files, but always - in some recoverable form or another - keep an understandable copy of the file around (for example, writing the same file out elsewhere). These are not a problem.
      3) Processes that modify vast numbers of things, without keeping a recoverable copy on hand. Particularly processes that do it quickly. Particularly processes that do it to files that aren't modified frequently. These are most likely a problem.

      There is some level of nuance and heuristics involved here, of course. And another nuance is that this clearly has to be done at the system level, something dug into the operating system everywhere reads and writes are done. It probably needs to modify a number of pieces of system functionality as well to make sure that they don't do anything weird that might unintentionally trigger the heuristics. It might also be wise to break down the file system into monitored and unmonitored segments, where the unmonitored sections are where OS files, temp files, etc tend to be stored, while the monitored sections tend to be user files.

      But the key issue is that - if they're doing this right - they're looking at the fundamental things that ransomware has to do - in particular, reading data blocks, then trying to leave then unrecoverable at some point afterward. The protection software should not interfere when a program reads, but when it tries to invalidate things that it's read - in a manner that triggers the "this is excessive, strange, suspicious behavior" heuristics - then it suspends the application. Because, say, the overwrite behavior of a person using MS Word or Photoshop doesn't look at all like when ransomware does it - no matter what "pattern" they use for their encoding. They could mimic the overwrite behavior of programs like that to avoid the heuristic.... but then it'll take them weeks, months, or even years to get through all of the files on a person's computer, and they'll get caught long before that.

      --
      We also have a halon fire extinguisher. Its always nice to have a fire extinguisher that kills people around.
    4. Re: Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Reencoding music should get your door kicked down and send you to federal pound me in the ass prison.

    5. Re: Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by tusko5 · · Score: 1

      What if the steps are performed by different processes that communicate between them?

    6. Re:Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by CanadianMacFan · · Score: 1

      Well since I'm not going to put FLACs on my iPhone I'm going to have to convert them to something else that will work better on it (and not take up as much space even if I got something that would play them).

    7. Re:Nice try, but with 3 potential problems by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

      Fair enough with FLACs because they are losslessly encoded so you're not going from lossyA to LossyB, I should have made it clearer that lossy to lossy is not nice and risks introducing ugly audio artifacts into the music.

      --
      Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
  5. Re:Meh by freeze128 · · Score: 3

    That exists?!?! Heck, I thought protecting the MBR was a problem that was solved DECADES AGO.

  6. Better yet by CanadianMacFan · · Score: 1

    Just have your files backed up on another computer at your house, on a NAS, or online. If you get ransomware then just nuke the computer and restore everything from your backup. Though if you were to combine both the backup and this then you probably wouldn't lose anything as the few modified files between backups aren't likely to be the ones to be encrypted.

    I wouldn't suggest backing up to a hard drive connected directly to the computer because the ransomware will also encrypt those files too.

    1. Re:Better yet by mlts · · Score: 1

      Bingo. NAS offerings are relatively cheap. Both Synology and QNAP offer both snapshot functionality (useful because someone can cd into the snapshot directory to get their pre-fucked files), as well as backups to external drives, other NAS offerings, or the cloud (encrypted on the client, of course.)

      Then, add a decent backup program like Veeam for Windows which has the ability to mount a share only when it is using it, to narrow down the window that ransomware can trash it, and this not just functions as a backup, but fits the 3-2-1 rule (three copies, two on separate media, one offsite.) I personally like using two backup programs, one for the whole box like Veeam or Time Machine, and one just for documents like Arq.

    2. Re:Better yet by vux984 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Just have your files backed up on another computer at your house, on a NAS, or online.

      Bingo.

      If you get ransomware then just nuke the computer and restore everything from your backup.

      double bingo.

      I wouldn't suggest backing up to a hard drive connected directly to the computer because the ransomware will also encrypt those files too.

      Yes... but that's not nearly going far enough. The vast majority of 'simple' backup systems fail hard on ransomware; especially the roll-your-own sort often advocated here.

      cloud sync, torrent sync, etc. Fail. So you've got 3 redundant storage sites; The encrypted files get synchronized and overwrite the backups; and you've got nothing.

      rsync, or any thing to an offsite or local nas/server/whatever = fail. same reason. double fail if the local system mounts the drives on the remote system as part of the procedure giving the ransomware direct access to the remote filesystem.

      Essentially any backup solution that cannot easily and reliably restore to a given point in time, including deleted files is a hard fail vs ransomware.

      You need continuous ongoing incremental backups via an agent/daemon/service on a remote system. Its certainly possible to set something like this up and manage it yourself, but its not simple.

      Honestly for personal / home / small businesses stuff like carbonite and crashplan and spideroak are probably your best line of defense vs ransomware.

      That's not to say having torrent sync setup with 3 offsite systems is a bad idea. Its a fine idea for all sorts of disaster scenarios; and is probably quicker to recover from in the event of a system failure. Its just not much defense against ransomware.

      For that you really need continual incremental backups.

    3. Re:Better yet by vux984 · · Score: 1

      I have my zfs server, an offsite realtime replicated backup, and a revolving carousel of offline SMR HDDs that include all the snapshots currently held on my zfs servers weekly to cover catastrophic hacks on the file servers.

      Yeah, that sounds just like what my grandmother would do. /eyeroll

    4. Re:Better yet by MrL0G1C · · Score: 1

      Not a problem so long as the ransomware notifies you quickly before you back up.

      A good reason to use backups which check file signatures for differences rather than just rely on time/date, unfortunately this is a lot slower.

      --
      Waterfox - a Firefox fork with legacy extension support, security updates and better privacy by default.
    5. Re:Better yet by Nethead · · Score: 1

      We've been hit with a crypto at work. Some "engineer" thought it would be a good idea to open the company computer and pull a SATA line out for his portable eSATA box. He ran a program that he got off a torrent and bang, crypto took off on all his drives.

      The problem was that he, being an aerospace engineer, had R/W access to almost all the mapped drives on his box (think mounts for you *nix types.) So it hit the main file servers and ran for about four hours before we got notice of it. Yeah we got recovered from backups but it still killed us for about a day. The cost of 100 odd (yes they are mostly odd) aerospace engineers sitting at their computers without access to the fileserver is a lot of money. More than the crypto ransom demand in the final reckoning.

      --
      -- I have a private email server in my basement.
    6. Re:Better yet by mlts · · Score: 1

      Problem is, if you ask a lot of companies why they don't bother with backups or security, you will get an answer along the lines of "security has no ROI", "nobody has made a cent from padlocks except the padlock maker", or something along those lines.

      Then they get stung, and what happens is that some worker bee gets blamed for everything, shitcanned, some "security measure" is taken like forcing all AD users to change their password, and life goes on.

  7. Re:FBI by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    PGP + Truecrypt + Tor

    Snowden endorsed.

    Good enough for me.

  8. What would really help by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    ...is if a few of these ransomware authors/operators started turning up dead.

    Seriously.

    1. Re:What would really help by JustAnotherOldGuy · · Score: 1

      ...is if a few of these ransomware authors/operators started turning up dead.

      I've been pushing for this solution for some time now.

      --
      Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
  9. Versioning Filesystems by Phydeaux314 · · Score: 4, Informative

    The real solution, of course, is a proper versioning filesystem with a regularly scheduled snapshot - say, once a week, or once a day if you're extra paranoid. You can even cycle the snapshots if you want to cut disk usage down.

    --
    Never underestimate the stupidity inherent in all human beings.
    1. Re:Versioning Filesystems by Kjella · · Score: 1

      The real solution, of course, is a proper versioning filesystem with a regularly scheduled snapshot - say, once a week, or once a day if you're extra paranoid. You can even cycle the snapshots if you want to cut disk usage down.

      You more or less have this with Volume Shadow Copy but ransomware will AFAIK delete them. It only works if you have some other user (root, dedicated backup-user/agent) do it that the compromised user can't fuck up. Or if you could make the backup/snapshot then drop your own delete/write privileges so you need admin rights to restore them. Though full compromise is also a risk, but ransomware usually doesn't bother it'll just encrypt your user's files.

      --
      Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
    2. Re: Versioning Filesystems by SScorpio · · Score: 1

      That's the biggest lose with Microsoft dropping their home server OS. It's still available in Windows Server, but it's several hundred dollars versus $100-150 for home server.

      It provided automatic daily backups in a way that didn't have a user accessible mounted share. Restores were provided by a read-only network share that would become mounted, as well as a boot able USB key for full restores.

      File history included with Windows 8 & 10 does give an automated time machine style backup system. But it backs up to a user writable network share or external drive.

  10. Tripwire by Scutter · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Tripwire (and tripwire-like software such as bit9/Carbon Black) has been a thing for years. What's different about this approach?

    --

    "Tell me doctor, with all of your defenses, are there any provisions for an attack by killer bees?"
    1. Re:Tripwire by JohnFen · · Score: 1

      You beat me to it!

      This sounds like old-school tech. The larger question is: why hasn't everyone been using tripwire systems for years already?

  11. Shit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    See subject

  12. Creepy lab by saccade.com · · Score: 1
    several hundred ransomware samples that were live...

    OK, definitely not taking my laptop to the University of Florida.

    1. Re:Creepy lab by JohnFen · · Score: 1

      I spent years working for a computer security firm who kept live malware for investigation and testing purposes. All live malware was restricted to a single room with very limited access and no network connectivity. Even if you were allowed access, it was forbidden to bring any devices (including any storage devices or even your personal cellphone) into it or to take any such devices out.

      Never once has any malware escaped from that lab. I assume that the University of Florida handles this stuff in a similar way.

  13. Good idea by JustAnotherOldGuy · · Score: 1

    I like this idea, as it seems practical and fairly hard to fool.

    --
    Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
  14. Re:FBI by JustAnotherOldGuy · · Score: 2

    Did you happen to find a sale on asterisks or something?

    --
    Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
  15. Entropy Canary by GlobalEcho · · Score: 1

    I have considered keeping a "Ransomware canary" around. I'm thinking of, say, a Word .doc file on a network drive. A process on some separate computer then checks its entropy on a regular basis, or on file change notification if available, to make sure file entropy has not grown huge.

    The idea fails for local files because (as I recall) the more sophisticated ransomware inserts itself as a filesystem driver. That's a likely problem for some of these researchers' heuristics as well.

    (Expanding on something I wrote a while ago)

  16. Let the dog bite you first..? by geekmux · · Score: 1

    "...and, counterintuitively, actually letting it lock up a few files before clamping down on it."

    Well, this might be better than nothing, but unfortunately this assumes that those "few files" might not still cause a considerable amount of damage.

    What this solution doesn't seem to take into account is the fact that ransomware has quickly moved on to commercial targets because the payoff is so much greater than targeting home users. Therefore, actually letting the proverbial dog bite you first may hurt worse than you think.

    The best solution to ransomware is still the oldest one; make backups, and make them often. And make those backups very hard to access(read: offline) as soon as you can, because your VM snapshots, shadow copies, and to-disk protection methods are not going to remain safe or immune from this type of attack.

  17. not impressed by xcombelle · · Score: 1

    As I said on reddit: So any compression utility is a false positive. And as long as I understand all detection worked because no countermeasure was implemented in current ransomware. I thought of one simple contermeasure which simply reduce all this effort to nothing. I'm all but impressed

  18. Is it really that hard to prevent? by CaptainDork · · Score: 1

    This shit pisses me off to no end.

    We're running goddam stupid computers and it's our own goddam fault.

    Look: How about some predictive algorithms that do practice runs? How hard can that be?

    Here's how it should have been done back when Moby Dick was a minnow:

    The computer would actually do what I've been trained NOT to do, but do anyway.

    When I click on an attachment, the computer examines the future consequences in a "play like," simulation and says to itself, "this mofo set of instructions encrypts files from "out there," and not from the keyboard."

    DANGER WILL ROBINSON

    So, in all cases, get the fucking computer to do, "look ahead," and ask permission to initiate the self-destruction sequence.

    Those consequences should be presented in plain language.

    Lookit: My mom, way back, got a computer with a modem on dialup.

    She called me up, all frustrated because the damn thing quit working and I determined that, in a manner reminiscent of the "drunk walk," had unintentionally uninstalled the goddam modem driver.

    Why the hell didn't the computer say, "Ma'am, if you keep doing this shit, we will never be able to connect to the Internet and that's just about all this crappy-ass machine is good for and stuff. You obviously don't want to do this, so, get some help, OK?"

    --
    It little behooves the best of us to comment on the rest of us.
  19. ransomeware by siga · · Score: 1

    As a total noob i have question . Recently there was article about Apple fix ransomeware vulnerability on Mac OS . This file watching approach is it specifically meant for Windows ? What about mainstream Ubuntu/Linux for us Windows refugees ? Is there ransomware for Ubuntu/Linux out there now ? Just noob asking .... ;)

  20. 100% ransomeware solution... by Excelcia · · Score: 1

    Here's a 100% effective ransomeware solution. When you fork out hundreds or thousands of dollars for your computer, fork out a $100 more and get an identical hard drive to what it has inside and a one-button disk cloner off of Ali Express or eBay for a few dollars. Weekly disk cloning kills ranssomeware dead. In the worst case scenario, you clone the drive with the malware on it but before it activates. In that scenario, you can still restore from backup and even if the OS is hopelessly compromised with malware beyond anyone's skill to remove, you still can access all your files.

    Of course, the best solution is still not to run stupid software.

  21. Really? by drolli · · Score: 1

    So Ransomware would have to gain Admin rights to disable this system?

  22. Re: FBI by ahabswhale · · Score: 1

    Why would I use truecrypt on a mac? The mac already has FDE built in, courtesy of FileVault.

    --
    Are agnostics skeptical of unicorns too?
  23. Re:FBI by Black+LED · · Score: 1

    You should be using VeraCrypt since TrueCrypt is outdated.

  24. ZFS snapshots can mitigate the risk by Wolfrider · · Score: 1

    --Setup a ZFS+Linux+Samba server as a RAID10 network share drive, copy data to it, take a known-good snapshot. Do a zpool scrub afterward to make sure.

    --Then implement a cron script that takes a rolling snapshot Mon-Sun. If you're feeling ambitious you can install the zfs-auto-snapshot package but you should really disable the "frequent" snapshots (every 15 minutes? who really needs that?) and possibly "hourly" snapshots since they will prevent your disks from going to sleep.

    --As a bonus, you could also take rolling day-of-month (1-31) snapshots in the same script. Just destroy the existing snapshot name before taking another one.

    (Disclaimer: I have done this and the concept appears fairly bulletproof, since ZFS snapshot directories are read-only.) Feel free to ask me for details or provide feedback...

    --
    .
    == WolfriderV6 == I'm willing to admit that *I just might* be wrong... Are you??