New Air-Gap Jumper Covertly Transmits Data in Hard-Drive Sounds (arstechnica.com)
Security researchers have found a new way to siphon data out of an infected computer even when it has been physically disconnected from the Internet -- otherwise known as "air-gap" computers -- to prevent the leakage of sensitive information it stores, reports ArsTechnica. From the article: The method has been dubbed "DiskFiltration" by its creators because it uses acoustic signals emitted from the hard drive of the air-gapped computer being targeted. It works by manipulating the movements of the hard drive's actuator, which is the mechanical arm that accesses specific parts of a disk platter so heads attached to the actuator can read or write data. By using so-called seek operations that move the actuator in very specific ways, it can generate sounds that transfer passwords, cryptographic keys, and other sensitive data stored on the computer to a nearby microphone. The technique has a range of six feet and a speed of 180 bits per minute, fast enough to steal a 4,096-bit key in about 25 minutes.
Considering that people play music with floppy drives then the ability to transfer information acoustically with hard drives isn't really different.
If builders built buildings the way programmers wrote programs, then the first woodpecker would destroy civilization.
Of course, if I am allowed to install software on an "air-gapped" computer, I can make it transfer information by anything on it that makes noise or can be lit or even via power supply. Speakers, various fans, hard drive heads, retractable optical drive tray, locator blue LED, LCD display, even the power draw....I can manipulate all of those.
There is no point to these studies, they only belabor the obvious.
Any manager that makes some security policy based on such studies should be beaten.
Just pretend you're defragging and people won't question it.
Most people don't even understand or know half of what's going on in their computer. If the HD suddenly starts to act up, most would probably just assume that Windows is "doing its thing".
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
Wont work with my SSD. and honestly will not work at all on SAS drives. most places that are serious about their computing and security uses thin clients running SSD boot drives and the rack of servers are all the workstations. good luck recording the drive noises with all those fans and the libert unit running.
It may work if a target's cheap laptop is set on top of the microphone.
Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
USB Sticks"?
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
'Honest boss, I was sure the computer was secure! How was I to know the high sensitivity microphone pointed at it a few feet away, with a wire running out to the van outside and the stranger asking us to all be very VERY quiet for the next hour was a problem?'
Yes, this 'research' is pure stupidity because the methods are obvious as well as being easily mitigated if you really NEED security.
Although its not quite as stupid as the actually false and incorrect claim of using pixels to an infiltrated monitor was, which was basically all just a scam (there are NOT several x86 cpus in a monitor, the cpu that is sometimes there CANNOT read individual pixels, and you CANNOT infect them without a usb connection to the monitor).
Not to mention the obvious workaround, USE A SSD. sigh.
Network booted usb reader that mounts the stick as an nfs share.
problem solved.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?...