5-Year-Old Critical Linux Vulnerability Patched (threatpost.com)
msm1267 quotes Kaspersky Lab's ThreatPost: A critical, local code-execution vulnerability in the Linux kernel was patched more than a week ago, continuing a run of serious security issues in the operating system, most of which have been hiding in the code for years.
Details on the vulnerability were published Tuesday by researcher Philip Pettersson, who said the vulnerable code was introd in August 2011.
A patch was pushed to the mainline Linux kernel December 2, four days after it was privately disclosed. Pettersson has developed a proof-of-concept exploit specifically for Ubuntu distributions, but told Threatpost his attack could be ported to other distros with some changes. The vulnerability is a race condition that was discovered in the af_packet implementation in the Linux kernel, and Pettersson said that a local attacker could exploit the bug to gain kernel code execution from unprivileged processes. He said the bug cannot be exploited remotely.
"Basically it's a bait-and-switch," the researcher told Threatpost. "The bug allows you to trick the kernel into thinking it is working with one kind of object, while you actually switched it to another kind of object before it could react."
A patch was pushed to the mainline Linux kernel December 2, four days after it was privately disclosed. Pettersson has developed a proof-of-concept exploit specifically for Ubuntu distributions, but told Threatpost his attack could be ported to other distros with some changes. The vulnerability is a race condition that was discovered in the af_packet implementation in the Linux kernel, and Pettersson said that a local attacker could exploit the bug to gain kernel code execution from unprivileged processes. He said the bug cannot be exploited remotely.
"Basically it's a bait-and-switch," the researcher told Threatpost. "The bug allows you to trick the kernel into thinking it is working with one kind of object, while you actually switched it to another kind of object before it could react."
Anyone who has ever looked at linux kernel (or any major software project) code knows that it's mostly dreams and wishes that makes it work.
Especially with threaded code like a kernel where you have no clue when and where something can change, and no clear guidelines for locking.
Code review exists, but that only takes you so far.
Especially if you change something minor in one place that violates assumptions made in completely different parts of the code.
The amazing thing to me is that the linux kernel doesn't even have a testsuite like GCC or binutils (correct me if I'm wrong).
By the twitching of my thumb ... something Muslim this way comes
I don't think so! As we all know, Linux users all look at the source code and understand every line of it and would have seen this issue as soon as it appeared.
This is just more fake news and FUD to scare people away from Linux and FOSS in general.
The real story here, is that 4 days after the vulnerability was made known to the devs, a patch was released.
Give a five-year-old a nod, he'll come back with all kinds of bait-and-switch naughtiness.
With the patch of this five-year old bug, this is finally the year of Linux on the Desktop.
If an attacker is in the same room as your system, you're already pwnd.
... is out of intensive care and is rocking the eye patch.
It little behooves the best of us to comment on the rest of us.
Usually just leads to more bugs.
The vulnerability is a race condition that was discovered in the af_packet implementation in the Linux kernel
racism is ruining our country... and now our kernel too? IS NOTHING SACRED ANYMORE?! ;)
Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
No matter what happens, and how long it takes for software bugs to be fixed, "the user" will always be the critical vulnerability in any/all computer system.
It doesn't matter how robust a system is as long as there are user whose passwords are "123456" or "password", and that social engineering is the gaping hole in the system.
Why would one spend energy exploiting software when one can send an email to a user who will "gladly" install spy-ware and ransom-ware on their computer.
So basically, a classic, well known TOCTTOU vulnerability.
Higher Logics: where programming meets science.
What happened to the "many eyes" argument? Oh yeah that died along with heartbleed and the old SSL codebase.
Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion. - Murray Rothbard
Moron.
"He said the bug cannot be exploited remotely."
In other words, "yawn". If you have physical access to a machine all bets are off.
Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
From the Shakespeare AU where Othello encounters the Wierd Sisters from Macbeth?
Inheritance is the sincerest form of nepotism.
Yea, unfortunately the "many eyes" approach was not based on rainbows and magic. It was a description of an open review process on ordinary non-magic software.
When you gave hundreds of undergraduates accounts on Sun of Vax machines. Local user access SHOULD NOT invariably lead to a root exploit.
This bug need CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges, which are VERY rarely enabled for typical user, because they will let you screw network configuration and sniff on traffic (which is almost equal to root privileges in our networking days)
given the general lack of security on Vax it most definitely did invariably lead to root access. Same on Sun machines though at least the security there was a little better.
But the way they're treated AND the way they are found is entirely different. And when one outsider group has access to the code via theft and the other equivalent has via legal means, one "outsider" group will be using it for criminal acts, the other one will be diluted by people who AREN'T pre-selected from the criminal classes.
Why are you pretending that no such difference doesn't exist WHEN YOU REPLIED TO ME TELLING YOU WHAT THEY WERE?!?!?
In case anyone cares, this code was first introduced in Linux 3.2.
This is for those of us who use uname -r to check their kernel version, not the year it was checked out from the kernel repos.
"Slow Down Cowboy! It's been 58 minutes since you last successfully posted a comment" -- slashdot, driving users away.
... and systemd
Both openssl and kernel recently received security fixes for years old vulnerabilities. Both are well reviewed (I guess and hope). How many of such vulnerabilities resides in those 270 k lines of systemd code do you think? Are those lines of code also reviewed as much as the kernel's?
Linux is unsafe at any speed.