Encrypted Messaging App Signal Uses Google To Bypass Censorship (pcworld.com)
Developers of the popular Signal secure messaging app have started to use Google's domain as a front to hide traffic to their service and to sidestep blocking attempts. Bypassing online censorship in countries where internet access is controlled by the government can be very hard for users. It typically requires the use of virtual private networking (VPN) services or complex solutions like Tor, which can be banned too. From a report on PCWorld: Open Whisper Systems, the company that develops Signal -- a free, open-source app -- faced this problem recently when access to its service started being censored in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Some users reported that VPNs, Apple's FaceTime and other voice-over-IP apps were also being blocked. The solution from Signal's developers was to implement a censorship circumvention technique known as domain fronting that was described in a 2015 paper by researchers from University of California, Berkeley, the Brave New Software project and Psiphon. The technique involves sending requests to a "front domain" and using the HTTP Host header to trigger a redirect to a different domain. If done over HTTPS, such redirection would be invisible to someone monitoring the traffic, because the HTTP Host header is sent after the HTTPS connection is negotiated and is therefore part of the encrypted traffic.
TextSecure was their original app. They replaced it with Signal.
There are 10 types of people in the world: those who understand binary and those who don't.
So, IANACryptographer, but if I understand correctly: Google gets metadata when Alice sends a message (because connect to its server using this "fronting"), and when Bob receives one (because Signal delivers messages using GCM). It doesn't look too hard for them to reconstruct that Alice is exchanging messages to Bob.
My first program:
Hell Segmentation fault
Signal is made by the same devs who make Signal.
According to the article a lot of cloud service providers and CDNs allow HTTP host header redirection, so the Egyptian government would need to block a lot than just google.com.
China also had to create a domestic tech industry to replace all the foreign websites that it blocked. A country the size of China can pull this off, but Egypt is much smaller...
If it can operate through sites other than Google, can it get through to and from China?
Egypt doesn't have to block www.google.com, they only have to discern which internal IPs are attempting to communicate securely and blacklist those IPs from performing out-bound connections. As long as Egypt's firewall can tell the difference between a redirect and a normal search response they can do this. Google would have to start padding redirect responses to make it harder to tell the difference between these response types.
I have thought about installing Signal, but then I always remember the laundry list of permissions it wants access to in order to install.
Here is a rundown on device permissions for Signal. Most of them seem basically necessary for a functional messaging app.
What is everybody else's opinion on Signal?
I've been using it for a few weeks, and I like it just fine. It is a transparent replacement for my default messaging app, and handles encryption to/from other signal users transparently. An additional perk is a Chrome plugin which lets me send/receive SMS messages from my browser. For a lot of obvious reasons, it is likely to be nowhere near as secure as a set of properly managed PGP keys, but IMO a lot of useful progress in widely deployed crypto has been hamstrung by paranoia, and letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.
One disconcerting thing is that it goes through your contact list upon install, and notifys you of all people on your contacts list who have Signal enabled, without the permission of those contacts. This should be configurable, and opt-in. Sad!