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Rogue System Administrator Faces 10 Years In Prison For Shutting Down Servers, Deleting Core Files On the Day He Was Fired (techspot.com)
Joe Venzor, a former employee at boot manufacturer Lucchese, had a near total meltdown after he got fired from his IT system administrator position. According to TechSpot, he shut down the company's email and application servers and deleted the core system files. Venzor now faces up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. From the report: Venzor was let go from his position at the company's help desk and immediately turned volatile. He left the building at 10:30AM and by 11:30, the company's email and application servers had been shut down. Because of this, all activities ground to a halt at the factory and employees had to be sent home. When the remaining IT staff tried to restart them, they discovered the core system files had been deleted and their account permissions had been demoted. Eventually the company was forced to hire a contractor to clean up all of the damage, but this resulted in weeks of backlog and lost orders. While recovering from the attack was difficult, finding out who did it was simple. Venzor was clearly the prime suspect given the timing of the incident, so they checked his account history. They discovered he had collected usernames and passwords of his IT colleagues, created a backdoor account disguised as an office printer, and used that account from his official work computer.
I guess he did not like getting the boot.
That's the wrong way to go about that. If you're going to go to that length you might as well make it a subtle surprise for the future. And think about it, if you're really such a good employee that a company would be devastated to lose you it should be evident when you leave by the fact that you're no longer doing the job.
Do the best job you can. Sometimes that works out to be unappreciated, but then you get to move on to a more lucrative position and the company gets to try to find someone to fill your shoes.
.....find someone to fill your shoes...
I see what you did there
It all happened so fast, officer. He ran that way. He was short, beige and had a tattoo that said Lexmark.
Have gnu, will travel.
Those core files were probably stale anyway.
An admin can still override authentication. Whats needs is to bring the new admin in before you sack the old one. He removes admin privileges from the guy being sacked. That, or isolate the system from the outside world for a while but in this day and age that may be impossible from a business perspective.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
Are we supposed to be outraged or something? It sure sounds like the guy deserved to be fired - and, based on the actions he took after being fired, he deserves prison time and a significant financial penalty.
#DeleteChrome
in this case, they did remove admin privileges from the guy being sacked, he used other people's accounts to access things remotely.
Two Factor authentication could have blocked that by preventing him from impersonating other admins.
We had a programmer in out Dept that got the can a few years back. He wrote some production jobs that ran as root on many servers. We discovered a subroutine in the code that would 'rm -rf /' if his account was removed or went dormant for more than 90-days. Luckily we found it before the 90-day timer kicked in. We (as a group) decided to keep it to ourselves since we didn't want to see the guy get into any trouble...
It's 2017. Everything should be running in VMs, and snapshots of those VMs should've been backed up. Guess the IT department wasn't up to scratch.
They are a bloody nuisance and just take up disk space.
A good admin will have a Canary that he has to "feed every day" or else the whole company blows up. Isolate my system and access to my system at your own risk. Do not make your admin mad. Make sure to feed him with a steady stream of shares of the company and nice benefits.
Also, other guy talking about two factor: Cloud is just someone else's computer. Two factor is just someone else's authentication. It's not a magical panacea. Most things can be overridden and even in cases when they can't be, it's really just trusting another company to provide some authentication credential.
http://www.kvia.com/crime/fbi-...
Karma: Bad
Come on, people, if you are going to get revenge on the company that canned you, you're supposed to set up a daemon on day one that checks to see if you have logged in the last month and then begins corrupting backups as they are made for the next 5 months, at which time it will execute a total system meltdown that results in total data loss! I swear, you youngin's know nothin' about properly destroying the lives of those who have wronged you! ;)
Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
Hell, if you want to be vengeful, you don't do it from a computer, you do it from a IoT device on the network. You can even make it a canary to take action when your account is disabled or something. But for gods' sake, do it in parts over a longer period of time... and give yourself a way to clear your mind and stop it!!
It is scary just how hard it can be to detect a rogue employee trying to sabotage you. There are only a few things you can actually do to limit impact to a reasonable level.
You're spelling it g-o-o-d but pronouncing it "evil and incompetent".
It's not your system--it's your employer's. If you feel that you have to make yourself "indispensable" in such a fashion, you're doing it wrong.
Il n'y a pas de Planet B.
If you want to be vengeful, thank your former employer for the job on the way out the door and ask for a letter of reference. Then go get a similar job at another company at a higher wage knowing you would never have gotten such a raise at your former employer's.
Don't get me wrong, this guy certainly deserves punishment if guilty, but 10 years? Did any CEOs or politicians get 1 day of jail time for the 2008 financial crisis?
very factual. ownership of the resource is the company, not the admin, the Admin is the manager of 1 of the many resources. such a simple concept but for years people don't get it. and it's in every industry that I know of.
if you see me, smile and say hello.
You're confused if you think MAC addresses are somehow secure.
This guy had that kind of access, and knowledge for that matter, as a help desk employee? The article is confusing but who puts a sys admin on the help desk with any ability to access all company servers in the first place?
...and I found my answer...a company that is dumb enough to run it's entire business applications from a single server. http://www.kvia.com/crime/fbi-...
"Investigators learned that the server controlled the company's production line, warehouse, distribution center and its ability to take orders."
Realistically you can't keep him out. He could have created a fallback account to use.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
He had physical access. What good is a VM?
Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion. - Murray Rothbard
I was once fired (purposefully, so I could collect unemployment benefits) from a network admin job. Afterwards, I was accessing their servers remotely to secretly do maintenance because I felt bad for leaving some of the good people I worked with. It was illegal for me to do so, but I was never caught. I can admit doing it now because it was so long ago and I no longer live in the same country.
That's not just a problem in IT. Ask the CEO who's company it is. Usually they don't own it, but they act like they do.
Cheap storage VM.
We should mostly agree that 'don't be stupid' is a good rule to follow. Though we man rant about having similar feelings about past employers, just not enough to take any such actions.
-The wise argue that there are few absolutes, the fool argues that there are no probabilities.
I suppose the exit interview did not go well.
Curious writings though: "What happens though if the person being fired is an IT system administrator in charge of managing those accounts?" "Venzor was let go from his position at the company's help desk and immediately turned volatile."
Something's missing. They call him an IT system administrator in one sentence, then say he was a part of the company's help desk in the next. Collecting usernames and passwords, this I see, and an account 'disguised' as a printer...however, the kind of damage he has caused speaks of privilege escalation. Was he one System Administrator among many, or was he the Domain Administrator? Perhaps a Network Administrator? These types aren't typically referred to as "help desk" personnel.
And what exactly did they say to him, when they fired him? (Note the lack of the words "let go") What was the incident for which they were firing him?
Which works until the admin is in an induced coma for a couple of days after a really bad accident. The canary dies and at the very time the admin would be hoping for sympathy and some leeway due to her long upcoming recovery, she is instead fired and eventually ends up in prison and bankrupt and unable to ever again get a job in IT (or, perhaps anywhere).
Why is there an "insightful" mod and why isn't it "-1"? If I wanted insight, I wouldn't be reading
He was an admin, and he obviously had little to zero ethics or morals. had they had an MFA solution I am sure he would have just disabled it for a few accounts or simply registered an MFA token to one of those accounts that he could have taken with him. MFA does not solve the rogue administrator problem completely
It seems the hype and hysteria over computer issues is still ongoing.
You can, I've been there and done that during a layoff in a place I'd never been to before. You disable all remote access until you are certain what is at the other end of each remote access method. One time the former sysadmins had VPNs to their home machines (in 2002 so not as common as today), which was totally legit when they had a job but completely undocumented, yet it still wasn't hard to stop until it was clear where everything was going.
That sort of canary happens by accident instead of design when systems grow "organically" with all kind of weird interdependancies, especially on very low budgets. I started work at a place like that once and my initial goal was to remove every little quirk that needed feeding every day so that I would be free to spend time at the beach every now and again.
I seem to remember some years ago stories of suppose dead man switches and sabotage would come out when the reality was fragile systems carefully looked after by people who never got to train a replacement.
This story is of course different - but ten years? Corporate crime with consequences of shutting down companies completely doesn't get ten years, serious embezzlement doesn't get ten years - why should this sort of corporate crime get ten years?
I would like to know what the sentence would have been if he'd taken a baseball bat to the server and backup media instead of using electronic means.
This is what regular ad account audits are for. If you don't trust, then reset service accounts password after you remove his admin access.
That's a very 1990 way of looking at things in server space (IBM etc was doing it then). Zones (AKA containers) are a less wasteful way separate things and unlike recent VMs there is some consideration of security.
"Everything" is a bad word to use when describing something outside of your own workplace in terms of what applies inside yours.
In the MS world VMs are the bandaid solution to poor resource management by an OS. Outside of the MS world there is less need and very frequently you want a piece of hardware (or a cluster) to be dedicated to a single task - so a VM is pointless in that situation apart from convenience of backups (which once again outside of the MS world is trivially easy).
And who will do the auditing? I know places like this. The IT manager is king and nobody knows what he does.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
Better example - probably just a warning and good behavior bond instead of a possible ten years.
Where I am, IT manager is not king. If I see something out of place, I can go directly to the CEO. I create the audits and then the CIO will audit it. We do this quarterly. We compare all users to a list of current employees from HR to verify that we don't have any "accidental" users not disabled / deleted.
Perhaps we are unique that we actually do try to take security seriously.
He didn't get 10 years, 10 years is the maximum he CAN get under the law. though this arsehole looks like he probably deserves the maximum
I create the audits and then the CIO will audit it. We do this quarterly. We compare all users to a list of current employees from HR to verify that we don't have any "accidental" users not disabled / deleted.
... except for any ones that you might have removed from the audit before handing it over.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
A good canary won't rely on the owner hand feeding it; but will accept food from authorized automatons.
If the user's account is closed, the canary will no longer be fed by the golems, and will peck the neener button. But the user going on vacation or to hospital won't cause the account to be closed, and the golems continue feeding the canary.
And that's why what I hand off gets audited by him. If I have a special account, he will see it during his audit.
If you hand it to him, you also have the ability to modify what gets handed to him.
Even if he shoulder rides you, it's easy to hide things like accounts. Like replacing commands like cat and cp with ones that grep out what you don't want seen.
And how do you know that formeruser1 doesn't have backdoor access to currentuser2 or automatedaccount3 that bypasses the authentication scheme? The ways to set up that are endless.
"why should this sort of corporate crime get ten years?"
Because "computers."
He should have deleted the files a little bit later, tho :)
aaaaaaa
Not really a good strategy imho.
aaaaaaa
The obvious solution to the rogue admin problem : Use Linux :)
A study has shown that when using Linux, admins are 47,5% happier on average.
By using Linux you can nearly guarantee that you will not have a sour relationship to your admin, and probably don't have to be in this situation
aaaaaaa
Infosec teams often have direct read-only access to equipment and audit logs to central servers, with alerts on use-cases such as turning off logging, modifying account permissions etc. etc. In some circumstances even command history is logged.
It's hard to imagine why infosec would conspire to hide an account. If it has a good reason to exist, the case can be made to the CIO.
It might be possible to circumvent this stuff if you have physical access during a network outage, but your card access logs would still be in the system, it just might take a couple years for it to turn up when people investigate "how did the back door get there?" and it may be enough to put you in prison.
Yeah, and anyone knowing things were so bad could have easily sabotage the backups. In my case, an incompetent admin set the last server to backup "over wright" So the only backup that worked was the one nobody cared about. And the backups were completed daily without error.
So an admin that is looking to cause problems could do so silently, even with nightly backups.
Learn to love Alaska
A random AC said:
It's "rouge". Rogue is what old-fashioned women apply to their faces so they'd look healthier.
Umm, no. You got it backwards, and (for once?) the Slashdot editors do it better than the random contradicting AC.
"Rouge" (French for "red", same Latin origin as "ruby") is the cosmetic, and rogue (from Latin "rogare", "ask"/"beg", same origin as "interrogate") is a excellent word to describe the guy in this story. Just because it's on Slashdot doesn't mean it's *wrong*.
I don't care about correcting AC who will probably never see this, but some poor guy might read that and believe it...
That's a very 1990 way of looking at things in server space (IBM etc was doing it then). Zones (AKA containers) are a less wasteful way separate things and unlike recent VMs there is some consideration of security. "Everything" is a bad word to use when describing something outside of your own workplace in terms of what applies inside yours. In the MS world VMs are the bandaid solution to poor resource management by an OS. Outside of the MS world there is less need and very frequently you want a piece of hardware (or a cluster) to be dedicated to a single task - so a VM is pointless in that situation apart from convenience of backups (which once again outside of the MS world is trivially easy).
A VM, is pointless?
In the real world you properly assess risk and impact, define an SLA, virtualize all critical servers in VMWare, and run encrypted snapshot backups multiple times a day, written to tape nightly and kept offline as well as offsite, away from any risk of "rouge" attack. Proper snapshots capture the entire server (including those pesky "core system files"). Had they used and protected VMs properly, it would have likely resulted in little more than getting admin rights back and restoring the entire environment within a day.
While the rogue admin deserves punishment, the real crime was this clusterfuck of a DR strategy. Whoever signed off on that shit should also be fired.
Oh, that DR solution is too expensive? I wonder how much weeks of backlog and lost business cost. Maybe they should have invested more in IT instead of their Polo team...
For this use case, they are secure.
I see my shadow changing, stretching up and over me...
I used to work at a $Very Big Transportation Company from 1982 to 1998. They are now clients of our company. Earlier this year Transportation Company needed to give me access to some of their systems. My old username and account, from 1998, were still in their systems.
None of them can see the clouds; The polished wings don't care.
but your card access logs would still be in the system,
Who set up the card access?
No, what needs to be done is to wait until someone who's generally regarded as a dick is fired, and then trash everything that same day while leaving no traces. Extra BOfH points if you do it while you're still working there.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
How about teaching your users: under no circumstances does anybody else ever need to know your password.
And the higher-ups who insist that they don't need passwords? Because it's "their" computer. even though it's not? And "passwords are hard".
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
Like it's not possible to clone a card?
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
So much for "taking ownership of a problem." Success is everyone's happy child, failure is a miserable orphan.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
Venzor admitted that on September 1, 2016, after being terminated from his position at the company’s help desk, he logged onto the company’s network through an administrator account and shut down the company’s email server and application server while deleting systems files essential to restoring computer operations.
Why a help desk monkey was able to create accounts with admin privileges is a question left unanswered. Also, it was Windows, because if it were any of the *nixes, it would be root privileges if you really wanted to do serious destruction and still be able to cover your tracks. Non-root users simply can't modify or delete everything at will, including all system logs.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
Sorry for not checking the link.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
Appearing before Senior United States District Judge David Briones, Venzor pleaded guilty to one count of transmission of a program to cause damage to a computer. By pleading guilty, Venzor admitted that on September 1, 2016, after being terminated from his position at the company’s help desk, he logged onto the company’s network through an administrator account and shut down the company’s email server and application server while deleting systems files essential to restoring computer operations.
But of course, both the original submission and the register claim that he was a sysadmin. Probably because a hell desk jockey shouldn't be able to create sysadmin accounts in the first place. I wonder who left their password on a post-it stuck to the bottom of their keyboard this time.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
to society? If you just want punishment for punishment's sake I guess there's that. He's a first time offender, the damage was minimal. Nobody got hurt, and they just needed a few contractors (read: Cheap Windows guys) to sort it all out. "Core Files" here if you RTFA means he broke the OS. He should get slapped with restitution equal to lost sales and the contractor hours + a little for pain/suffering (very little) and sent on his merry way. Maybe get some court mandated therapy. By the sound of it this was a spur of the moment/rage thing. Throwing him in jail is a waste of everyone's time and money and might unnecessarily destroy his life.
Hi! I make Firefox Plug-ins. Check 'em out @ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/youtube-mp3-podcaster/
Basic asymmetry. It's the admins responsibility/problem but someone else's property.
John McAfee 'It was like that time I hired that Bangkok prostitute; to do my taxes, while I fucked my accountant'
Just makes this attack a bit more difficult. Even if many people on the business side are putting their heads in the sand about this, it remains true that there is no protection against competent system administrators except keeping them happy.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
Does not matter. If he had not, he could have placed a dead-man-switch.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
Indeed. There is no protection against a system administrator. A system administrator _needs_ the possibility to screw up everything in order to do his job, there is no way around that. Solution: Keep them happy, give golden parachute when firing them, etc. You know, the things that CEOs get for doing nothing nearly as valuable.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
It is. People are still exceptionally stupid and this is one thing they understand even less (it that is possible).
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
Funny that you say that. I do an accountability chart, so I know when it's my fault, when I am related to the fault, or when I am not accountable. Makes my life much easier. While we are all accountable to a point, I use it to know where the limits of liability are.
if you see me, smile and say hello.
From the official announcement by the Department of Justice, the guy was NOT a sysadmin. He was a help desk monkey.
Appearing before Senior United States District Judge David Briones, Venzor pleaded guilty to one count of transmission of a program to cause damage to a computer. By pleading guilty, Venzor admitted that on September 1, 2016, after being terminated from his position at the company’s help desk, he logged onto the company’s network through an administrator account and shut down the company’s email server and application server while deleting systems files essential to restoring computer operations.
All this "sysadmin gone bad" stuff is one big April Fools joke.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
Shhh - we now know that Sarah Palin posts on slashdot - "Going Rouge" :-) If she's busy here, she's not screwing things up elsewhere. Now maybe we can also get Trumputin to stop by?
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
The chart says it's not your fault.
A CxO says it is.
Whose fault is it?
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
Thanks for asking, hope this helps and guild you correctly: /start/
Most people don't have a true, who gives a fuck what you say attitude and or my life does not depend on this job lifestyle so...
well, here is my accountability chart.
note that the fault is
A = mine
B = not mine
a= I accept the blame for this.
keep mouth shut tight as can be, CxO will piss and rant then walk away
b= you can tell, being that the fault is not mine, BUT however, if you let me solve it, and I succeed, I want a 38% pay raise
CxO says " how about I let you keep your job"
me = you are funny, so about the problem and my pay raise, do I send this in a memo and CC personnel or whom?
shut up tight as can be
I've always been amazingly good at not having fear when asking for something that is justified ( or just a great gamble), if you got fired then they really did not see the value in you. BTW 38% is a great number to start with, weirdly enough people argue intensely or accept it as fact. I use it exclusively.
if you see me, smile and say hello.
The "real world" has systems other than MS Windows in it.
Ah - the "real world" bit should have given me a clue - you are a student aren't you? Encrypting your backups in a vastly stupid idea since when the backups are required in the future it can never be certain that someone with the passphrase or whatever is available. Physical security is the answer with backup tapes but beyond that you want them to be as easy to restore as possible. For example, the AMANDA backup system has instructions in ASCII in the tape header of how to get files out on anything that can read the tape (so long as it has "tar" and "dd" you can eventually get everything without needing to install the AMANDA software). Of course it's much easier to use the actual software, but if you don't it's still not hard. That's how you should be doing backups, making them so a PC hooked up to a tape drive is all you need for a relative newbie to get what is needed quickly enough when nobody else is available.
Unlikely. Nurses check paperwork, which gets printed onto actual paper and they would see the previous dose. That's a system that is already has a lot of mistakes from data entry so has error checking outside of the computer system.
You do have a point, just the example doesn't quite fit.
The higher ups failed from an infosec perspective, but not even related to passwords.
Put simply: The guy was fucking help desk. How the fuck did he get domain admin permissions to begin with? Because that's what he would have needed to do all of this. You don't even give help desk people the ability to reset passwords or unlock accounts, rather you delegate that to a few people in a given department so that they can authenticate the user by e.g. speaking with them face to face, and even then they can only do that for people within their own department; certainly not IT staff.
Help desk people shouldn't have access to anything except for the ability to remote in to a user's PC and do things for them, and even then only if the user explicitly permits it. If help desk can't resolve an issue that way, then that should be escalated to tier-2, aka desktop support, who should have higher permissions but even then still shouldn't be domain admins.
I've never seen a DC without 2 factor authentication. The second factor usually being a fingerprint, and implemented in a mantrap. If your rubber finger doesn't work, and you don't have a good explanation for the guards, the doors won't be opened until the police arrive.
The datacenter provider.
Nobody has said anything about data centers. This wasn't one, and access cards to regular buildings can be faked.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
In April 2016, their MX changed to outlook.com. He was fired Sept 1.
How do you know it wasn't a DC?
I know it wasn't a DC because I actually read the articles and the statement from the department of justice. Shame on me for cheating so blatantly, doing a bit of research and using real facts.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
It wasn't him, it was the solar flares.....
Ah - semantics now. Dropping every packet at every point of ingress and egress is effectively the same as an air gap, and is the same if you do it by unplugging things.
What's with the bluster, getting personal and the need to show dominance? It's kind of pathetic the way you are big noting yourself to try to show how much better you are than someone who offered a suggestion.
If the consequence of data loss is very high you DON'T encrypt because the vastly increases the chance of loss - when shit happens your careful house of cards with the keys doesn't even have a table to sit on and is lost. A corporate restructure, let alone a buyout, is likely to lose those keys and anyone who knows where they are.
As I wrote elsewhere, I've had to have reels of tape transcribed (on well over a dozen occasions now) because the client lost their copies over time and the tape that was sent to my workplace years ago to transport the data to the people interpreting it ended up being the only one surviving. If someone in the 1980s decided to encrypt those tapes the key would be long gone with most of the other paperwork so it would mean a very expensive seismic survey to get that data again. All industries have similar situations where old information is of great value but not any sort of secret.
Accounts info - sure you don't want all that getting out, but in the general case? That is asking for trouble.
Mantraps are incredibly rare in the U.S. business world. First, they present a significant evacuation hazard, and a true criminal might not hesitate to pull the alarm. Second, not many businesses have the resources or the need to go that far. Those that do, they have other ways
I did a short gig for a recognizable firm, rack & stack bunches of servers. Our orientation to the data center included pointing out a standalone cabinet we were instructed to avoid. As in, do not touch, brush up against, or walk to closely to. Cameras, touch-sensitive cabinet, pressure-sensitive flooring. Well marked. And we were told why - this was the PKI insfrastucture, one of several redundant sets. This company literally has knowledge and information as their product; tangible, manufactured products are merely the expression of that knowledge and information. Losing that would be catastrophic for them, causing decades of diminished profits and ultimately ending in a permanent loss of capability. This bit of infrastructure, certificate servers and such, were critical to their data security. No touch. We were advise to not linger nearby too long, which was not a problem, first because this was out of the way, close to the security office, and not a place we needed to go. But, the point, this datacenter did not have mantraps. They did, however, have the ability to lock the gates and deploy security staff if needed. They drilled for this, thankfully not when I was there. My friends that work there tell me their security is somewhat stricter than where I work, and it's onerous here. But necessary. And we have mantraps for the machine room, and I'm told a fire alarm will release them into the tender loving arms of Security. Somehow. Just don't worry.
And second, because I can take the hint. Touch nothing that isn't your responsibility.
It was a great gig - except for the fist day, when bad news led to screaming people running through the halls, and people being fired and rehired because they laughed in the cafeteria. Other than that, I loved being asked to do stuff I wasn't actually hired on for. And no, they did not ask me to work on anything PKI. I was not offended.
deleting the extra space after periods so i can stay relevant, yeah.
I'd be in real trouble. I have a great deal of difficulty getting fingerprint readers to recognize me. I managed to get my iPhone to recognize my fingerprint about once or twice a year, and finally disabled fingerprint access.
"When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
With modern hard drives, one pass of zeros is sufficient.
I don't always use unix-like operating systems; but when I do, I prefer FreeBSD.
So you've marked me foe because I didn't act meek and mild after you jumped in on me stating the obvious and said I was someone you would fire? That's somewhat pathetic.