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Gigabyte Firmware Bugs Allow the Installation of BIOS/UEFI Ransomware (bleepingcomputer.com)

Posted by BeauHD on from the malicious-intentions dept.

An anonymous reader writes from a report via BleepingComputer: Last week, at the BlackHat Asia 2017 security conference, researchers from cyber-security firm Cylance disclosed two vulnerabilities in the firmware of Gigabyte BRIX small computing devices, which allow an attacker to write malicious content to the UEFI firmware. During their presentation, researchers installed a proof-of-concept UEFI ransomware, preventing the BRIX devices from booting, but researchers say the same flaws can be used to plant rootkits that allow attackers to persist malware for years. The two vulnerabilities discovered are CVE-2017-3197 and CVE-2017-3198. The first is a failure on Gigabyte's part to implement write protection for its UEFI firmware. The second vulnerability is another lapse on Gigabyte's side, who forgot to implement a system that cryptographically signs UEFI firmware files. Add to this the fact that Gigabyte uses an insecure firmware update process, which doesn't check the validity of downloaded files using a checksum and uses HTTP instead of HTTPS. A CERT vulnerability note was published to warn users of the impending danger and the bugs' ease of exploitation.

49 comments

  1. Oh BIOS WP Jumper by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Oh how we miss you in the UEFI age!

    1. Re:Oh BIOS WP Jumper by zifn4b · · Score: 1

      Oh how we miss you in the UEFI age!

      You would think we would have learned from this. There were nasty viruses like this in the 90's. But nope. I think it's because no one knows how to program in assembly language anymore. In fact, a lot of young programmers be like "Assembly Language, what's that?" Meanwhile, some black hat that does know is like "Oooh, look at me, I rekt ur firmware bc u forgots to write protect it!"

      --
      We'll make great pets
    2. Re:Oh BIOS WP Jumper by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      I don't think there is any technical reason why you couldn't have a WP jump with UEFI. It uses the same kind of flash memory chips, and some people using Libreboot do lift the WP pin away from the motherboard after installing a trusted bootloader.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    3. Re:Oh BIOS WP Jumper by Highdude702 · · Score: 1

      haha! youre not far off. and the hackers are normally the people that have skill and were sick of being blamed for other peoples bad code. so they decide to find it and expose it first.

  2. BRIX by Fragholio · · Score: 3, Funny

    So, essentially, they can now turn a BRIX into a brick.

    --
    412077696e6e657220697320796f7521da
    1. Re:BRIX by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I see what you did there.

    2. Re: BRIX by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      One thing is certain: the engineer who snuck that name by their boss has a sense of humor.

    3. Re:BRIX by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      You jest but actually bricking is the most likely outcome of an infection. Windows 8 and above will likely be using Secure Boot to verify that the UEFI firmware has not been compromised in this manner, so unless the attacker also gets hold of valid signing keys (from Microsoft) Windows will simply refuse to boot.

      It's recoverable of course, just re-install without Secure Boot enabled, but kind of a give-away. Would also cause a TPM module to refuse to give up any keys it held, potentially making encrypted drives unrecoverable.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    4. Re: BRIX by Alex_Ionescu · · Score: 1

      Sorry, SecureBoot is implemented in the very firmware you can own when WP is busted... so Windows will happily believe all is good. That's the point of these types of vulnerabilities.

      The TPM point would be valid if you actually manually configured which PCRs will cause BitLocker and remote attestation to fail. By default the firmware ones are NOT setup this way. Even if they were, it the attacker knew the expected measurements (from the original firmware), TPM has no signing on measurements and therefore you could fake the old numbers by self measuring.

  3. Write malicious content to the UEFI firmware by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why not put a read/write switch on the UEFI firmware.

  4. Well, DUH! by freeze128 · · Score: 2

    Computers have had that vulnerability for YEARS! It's not a *REMOTE* exploit. Anyone with physical access to the machine can flash the bios with something bad. It's only a problem with UEFI, which is supposed to have "SECURE BOOT" capability.

    1. Re:Well, DUH! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Not entirely.

      Using http & no checksum means could be redirected. I've had computers that checked for new bios. All it needs is quiet driveby malware edit to hosts that redirects the next update check to a compromised server.

      The no checksum part scares me more than the malware potential. Really easy to kill your bios with a corrupt update.

    2. Re:Well, DUH! by wbr1 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      But.. this does not require direct physical access. since the download mechanism for the manufacturer updates is not encrypted it could easily be patched in by an adversary with advanced capabilities. Even if it were https it could be vulnerable to MITM attacks to modify the flash files. And really, no checksum and/or signature? This is an APTs wet dream.

      --
      Silence is a state of mime.
    3. Re:Well, DUH! by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Buy some bulk ISP traffic and just search for device updates. If the IP is the same weeks or months later that device might still be online.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    4. Re:Well, DUH! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > The no checksum part

      The summary only says, no signing, not that there isn't, for example, an unsigned MD5 checksum for the download listed on the download site web page.

    5. Re:Well, DUH! by zifn4b · · Score: 1

      And really, no checksum and/or signature? This is an APTs wet dream.

      Like leaving your front door unlocked

      --
      We'll make great pets
    6. Re:Well, DUH! by Highdude702 · · Score: 1

      Most decent motherboards have a backup BIOS chip so you cant flash corrupt FW and brick your mother board. I can verify ASUS and GIGABYTE AMD motherboards have them(i have multiple of both) If it sees a boot fail from bad FW update, it will pull last known good BIOS version from written chip. Also most High-end motherboards have actual removable BIOS chips that you can have the manufacturer send replacments with new bios version on it(for use when you have old run of board and put a not supported in this version CPU into it for its first run). Also I know Asus MSI and GIGABYTE all read whole bios before flashing to chip to check ahead of time for corrupted bios file. So the only real risk here is the Malware aspect of it. Which as i said previously i have been telling people for years was a bad idea from the start.

  5. Hit the bricks! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    With a name like Brix...
    Was Crasht already taken?

  6. Oh come on. by mhkohne · · Score: 5, Informative

    Can we please just go back to making sure the BIOS is right BEFORE shipping the motherboard and putting it in ROM? That would really help, thanks!

    Or at least put a 'write protect' jumper on there? The people who will actually update their BIOS can find a jumper...

    --
    A thousand pounds of wood moving at 300 feet per minute. Don't get in the way.
    1. Re:Oh come on. by networkBoy · · Score: 1

      +1 for the jumper!
      It's NOT THAT HARD to add a jumper for the WE# signal.

      --
      whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
    2. Re:Oh come on. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Or a screw, like chromeboxes, though that is just google making sure their malware is not misplaced.

      Captcha:combated

    3. Re:Oh come on. by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      We can go back to making sure the BIOS is perfect before shipping, if you want to pay 3x as much or wait a couple of years or narrow down hardware compatibility significantly (e.g. RAM, CPU models).

      It's the old, "good, fast, cheap - pick any two" scenario.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    4. Re:Oh come on. by phorm · · Score: 1

      Right for what? Many of the BIOS upgrades I've downloaded dealt with hardware or situations that weren't present at the time the motherboard came out. Yes, there are bugfixes as well, but even these often deal with "allows hardware X (made after BIOS release) which doesn't play nicely in situation Y"

  7. Demand a "hardware reset switch" by davidwr · · Score: 1

    Demand that devices come with a "hardware reset switch" that will reset the firmware and other settings to factory condition.

    Yes, your data is still screwed if you get firmware ransomware that encrypts your storage, but at least you can get your device back.

    I would allow for one exception: Devices like phones and laptops which may NEED to be remotely controlled or even "perma-bricked" if they are stolen or otherwise fall out of your physical control. This kind of theft-protection/deterrent is incompatible with the "factor reset" I'm proposing.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Demand a "hardware reset switch" by Neuronwelder · · Score: 1

      A reset switch eh? You definitely deserve points for this one!! Wish I didn't spend them already!

  8. Persistent non-removable storage is a design-flaw by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

    Boot loaders should be ROM (not flash, EEPROM, etc.) and everything else should either be removable or not persistent.

  9. I think you missed a bit... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    "Add to this the fact that Gigabyte uses an insecure firmware update process, which doesn't check the validity of downloaded files using a checksum and uses HTTP"

    so remotely is possible.

    1. Re: I think you missed a bit... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Also, since remote admin escalation continues to be possible (see pwn2own 2017), a remote unauthenticated attacker can potentially remotely flash your bios. Sounds crazy or far-fetched? These guys are linking 4, 5, 6 unrelated vulnerabilities together. What's adding one more to the mix to own the UEFI?

    2. Re: I think you missed a bit... by Highdude702 · · Score: 1

      The guys that participate in pwn2own are the gods of hacking for the most part. so i wouldnt be too worried about average joe script kiddie being able to break thru your VM and Hypervisor and owning your UEFI BIOS. Governments on the other hand.. Well they hire those gods of hacking a lot of the time, or just sub contract the "pentest" company the group of friends have created to do the nasty stuff. So this would only really matter if you had something to hide from the state. Im not by any means saying "leave it open" or "i wouldnt worry about it" as i feel any insecurity is a huge security risk in any form. Im simply stating that you would have to be rather skilled, or own the network the computer in question is connecting to the internet through to MiTM this.

  10. Open source BIOS firmware? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Is that a reality? It would be nice if people could install BIOS firmware of their choice.

  11. Not surprising by Gravis+Zero · · Score: 2

    Security people have been warning people about this possibility for a long time. I certain various government agencies from various governments have developed their own UEFI rootkits for a slew of motherboards.

    --
    Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
    1. Re:Not surprising by Highdude702 · · Score: 1

      Yes the CIA/NSA has, I have a buddy that is combing through the recent 'Vault 7' leak. and from what im understanding from talking to him, to actually use UEFI correctly is a pain in the ass. It can be made secure. But takes skill and patience.

  12. It's CIH for UEFI by fred911 · · Score: 1

    Updated to 2107 with a little ransomware flair.

    --
    09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B - D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0 45 5F E1 04 22 CA 29 C4 93 3F 95 05 2B 79 2A B2
  13. can we have more dual bios boards? by Joe_Dragon · · Score: 4, Interesting

    can we have more dual bios boards?

    http://www.gigabyte.us/microsi...

    is real old.

    1. Re:can we have more dual bios boards? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Systems with redundant (particularly auto-recovering) bios images unfortunately are more likely to break by erroneously thinking things are broken than they are to bail you out...

      Also, for this sort of scenario, it's not protected with respect to security, both banks could hit at the same time.

    2. Re:can we have more dual bios boards? by l20502 · · Score: 1

      Huh?
      I see plenty of both ultradurable and gaming series with DualBIOS

    3. Re:can we have more dual bios boards? by phorm · · Score: 1

      That only works if an attacker isn't able to write the secondary BIOS. If the attacked can "pollute" the first BIOS then he/she could also do it to the second unless there's a physical impediment to doing so.

      One good way to secure this might be the good ol' BIOS jumper, but instead of flashing have multiple options/jumpers

      Flash jumper (3-pin)
      No pins: No BIOS flashing allowed (prevents BIOS drive-by's)
      A+B) Allow flashing BIOS A
      B+C) Allow flashing BIOS B

      Boot jumper (2-pin):
      open: Boot from BIOS A (default)
      closed: Boot from BIOS B

  14. Obligatory:Intel CPU Backdoor Report by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

    The goal of this report is to make the existence of Intel CPU backdoors a common knowledge and provide information on backdoor removal.

    What we know about Intel CPU backdoors so far:

    TL;DR version

    Your Intel CPU and Chipset is running a backdoor as we speak.

    The backdoor hardware is inside the CPU/Bridge and the backdoor firmware (Intel Management Engine) is in the chipset flash memory.

    30C3 Intel ME live hack:
    @21m43s, keystrokes leaked from Intel ME above the OS, wireshark failed to detect packets.
    [Video Link] 30C3: Persistent, Stealthy, Remote-controlled Dedicated Hardware Malware
    [Quotes] Vortrag:
    "DAGGER exploits Intel's Manageability Engine (ME), that executes firmware code such as Intel's Active Management Technology (iAMT), as well as its OOB network channel."

    "the ME provides a perfect environment for undetectable sensitive data leakage on behalf of the attacker. Our presentation consists of three parts. The first part addresses how to find valuable data in the main memory of the host. The second part exploits the ME's OOB network channel to exfiltrate captured data to an external platform and to inject new attack code to target other interesting data structures available in the host runtime memory. The last part deals with the implementation of a covert network channel based on JitterBug."

    "We have recently improved DAGGER's capabilites to include support for 64-bit operating systems and a stealthy update mechanism to download new attack code."

    "To be more precise, we show how to conduct a DMA attack using Intel's Manageability Engine (ME)."

    "We can permanently monitor the keyboard buffer on both operating system targets."

    Backdoor removal:
    The backdoor firmware can be removed by following this guide using the me_cleaner script.
    Removal requires a Raspberry Pi (with GPIO pins) and a SOIC clip.

    Decoding Intel backdoors:
    The situation is out of control and the Libreboot/Coreboot community is looking for BIOS/Firmware experts to help with the Intel ME decoding effort.

    If you are skilled in these areas, download Intel ME firmwares from this collection and have a go at them, beware Intel is using a lot of counter measures to prevent their backdoors from being decoded (explained below).

    Useful links:
    The Intel ME subsystem can take over your machine, can't be audited
    REcon 2014 - Intel Management Engine Secrets
    Untrusting the CPU (33c3)
    Towards (reasonably) trustworthy x86 laptops
    30C3 To Protect And Infect - The militarization of the Internet
    30c3: To Protect And Infect Part 2 - Mass Surveillance Tools & Software

    1. Introduction, what is Intel ME

    Short version, from Intel staff:

    Re: What Intel CPUs lack Intel ME secondary processor?
    Amy_Intel Feb 8, 2016 9:27 AM

    The Management Engine (ME) is an isolated and protected coprocessor, embedded as a non-optional part in all current Intel chipsets, I even checked wit

    1. Re:Obligatory:Intel CPU Backdoor Report by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you forgot the "...apk".

  15. Flip side by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    'Security vulnerability: the physical owner of the machine has final say over the code that runs on it. This will be addressed immmmediately!"

  16. Gigabyte by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It was to be expected from Gigabyte. They sell the cheapest stuff on the market. You don't get to make cheap stuff without cutting corners.

  17. BRST by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ... and had a job.

    His Boss (BRST = Bosses read Slashdot, too)

    Nahhhh.

  18. Not all BIOS fixes are for the vendor's issues by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0
    • CPU microcode updates (but many/most can be installed by the OS now)
    • CPU issue workarounds that can't be fixed with microde
    • Firmware for third-party controllers on the board
  19. Re:Not BIOS/UEFI, just UEFI by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The original article mentions only UEFI. Think it was added on slashdot for clarity

  20. we need to be spanking them hard by bbelt16ag · · Score: 1

    Somebody needs to rake GB over the damn coals for this shit. This is terrible and inexcusable.

    --
    NEVER NEVER NEVER NEVER NEVER NEVER NEVER NEVER GIVE UP! "No limitations, no boundaries, there is no reason for them."