The NSA Intercepted Microsoft's Windows Bug Reports (schneier.com)
Bruce Schneier writes on his security blog:
Back in 2013, Der Spiegel reported that the NSA intercepts and collects Windows bug reports... "When Tailored Access Operations selects a computer somewhere in the world as a target and enters its unique identifiers (an IP address, for example) into the corresponding database, intelligence agents are then automatically notified any time the operating system of that computer crashes and its user receives the prompt to report the problem to Microsoft... this passive access to error messages provides valuable insights into problems with a targeted person's computer and, thus, information on security holes that might be exploitable for planting malware or spyware on the unwitting victim's computer..."
The article talks about the (limited) value of this information with regard to specific target computers, but I have another question: how valuable would this database be for finding new zero-day Windows vulnerabilities to exploit?
The article talks about the (limited) value of this information with regard to specific target computers, but I have another question: how valuable would this database be for finding new zero-day Windows vulnerabilities to exploit?
I suppose this is "news", but I also suppose it should have been (and for many, was) assumed. And I'll bet the NSA and the foreign equivalents are not the only ones that thought of this obvious source...
If you want news from today, you have to come back tomorrow.
It's now reporting on articles from 2013!
the NSA intercepts and collects Windows bug reports.
No way can that be true. Even the NSA's Utah Data Center doesn't have that much storage capacity.
I hope they'll decide to monetize it soon - there's a bunch of posts I made to talk.bizarre a long time ago, and google doesn't seem to have archival copies.
Backdoor, front door, trapdoor, or in the window.
If one way in is closed by a user or unexpected update another way into Windows is found.
Collect it all always works.
Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
bugging
Someone still thought bug reports got encrypted and sent to the big private company secure from strange computer on the net.
Reality now sets in.
Windows is the way in.
Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
The Microsoft bug reports are important to Microsoft. They do actually analyze them to try and find bugs or in their products or in code from common/popular vendors. The NSA is undermining this trust. This is similar to the way the USA undermined doctors in Pakistan by using doctors in their search for Bin Laden. Maybe if the USA had to compensate every single person who gets Polio 10 million dollars they might not think their plan was such a great idea. Same for the NSA, they should be trying to help close exploits but at this point their collateral damage has been far greater than anything they have prevented.
The NSA intercepted anything and everything which went in the direction of the US, possibly also stuff which never went in the US. Consider all your communication compromised by the NSA. Now whether you care (privacy minded people, people not liking government overreach and spying and crook/spy/other nations intelligence agencies) or not (most people) is up to you.
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Hello,
I seem to recall a discussion about this at the time of disclosure that the main concern was not so much finding exploitable bugs in Windows, per se, but finding bugs in third-party drivers like those from AMD and nVidia, as well as determining hardware and software a target might be using, in order to help perform vulnerability research on targets.
Regards,
Aryeh Goretsky
Dexter is a good dog.
Windows and windows networks are a huge liability. CIOs and CSO need to have a come to Jesus moment on that.
I sometimes do internal pentest work, and Its rare even not in 2017 that some combination of null sessions to get user names, and password spray, or just shutting up and listening for LLMNR or old NetBios and than cracking the acquired hashes won't work at a big organization. That is before you even need to consider getting "fancy" with attacks on Kerberos or SPNs. Yes you need to be on the internal network to do these things but you one good phishing catch away from that with most big organizations too. Many of the other pentests I know rarely even both trying to exploit other types servers or internal web applications anymore.
I am not saying the traditional UNIX/Linux solutions like (YP|NIS|LDAP|Hesiod) with or without Kerberos are not worse in many ways than (AD/LDAP) + Kerberos. Its just the AD is the standard and most often I see UNIX land being made to talk to AD rather than and Windows infra being made to speak anything UNIXy.
My thesis here is that when your authentication/authorization infrastructure itself is the biggest liability and has been for nearly a decade something is terribly terribly wrong. Windows/Windows networking really is the way in and why that remains "acceptably" is beyond me. Sure you can harden it a lot, but that is a real challenge for anyone who isn't an expert and does not have $$$ to eliminate every old client, many of which are part of integrated solutions like controllers etc.
What M$ really needs to do is make the next windows server upgrade move the hardened configurations OOB. No NTLMv1, no LLMNR, no NetBIOS, no null sessions, password complexity enabled, and some others. They then need to provide a "Gateway" for legacy systems where the older protocols can be configured to only talk to certain hosts, and only allow the use of specific accounts easily.
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