FTP Resources Will Be Marked Not Secure in Chrome Starting Later This Year (google.com)
Google engineer Mike West writes: As part of our ongoing effort to accurately communicate the transport security status of a given page, we're planning to label resources delivered over the FTP protocol as "Not secure", beginning in Chrome 63 (sometime around December, 2017). We didn't include FTP in our original plan, but unfortunately its security properties are actually marginally worse than HTTP (delivered in plaintext without the potential of an HSTS-like upgrade). Given that FTP's usage is hovering around 0.0026% of top-level navigations over the last month, and the real risk to users presented by non-secure transport, labeling it as such seems appropriate. We'd encourage developers to follow the example of the linux kernel archives by migrating public-facing downloads (especially executables!) from FTP to HTTPS.
...FTP just needs to die. The two port requirement and worse still, people who don't get it still insisiting on 'active' FTP, is a pain in the backside for firewall admins (we had one vendor insist that passive mode was 'insecure' and active mode was somehow 'secure' but after some browbeating and the threat of the wire brush of enlightenment accepted they should use this new fangled "sftp" which didn't have any of the drawbacks of ftp, passive or active).
FTP's day was done over ten years ago.
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Donâ(TM)t throw the baby out with the bathwater, you can use ftp over tls ( goes by many names) . I dobâ(TM)r see any reson to kill of ftp (well the unencryptet version needs to go) it works perfectly eell for what it is intended to do
FTP can be done using TLS and there is also SSH-FTP. FTPS is no more or less secure than HTTPS.
Have you ever downloaded large files over HTTP? It's not built for it, you practically need a download manager because the browsers will just choke or won't be able to continue unfinished downloads and there are hacks that make it work but many configurations aren't set up right to continue partial downloads.
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GOPHER!
At least it's not providing a false sense of security, unlike several other protocols (those with an 's' on the end) that allow any fraudulent certificate authority to issue certificates for any domain they feel like.
Make file transfers great again. Trimp 2018!
Given that FTP's usage is hovering around 0.0026% of top-level navigations over the last month
or... the kind of people who use FTP are also the kind that disable telemetry.
(and... the kind that use sFTP are the kind that don't use a browser.)
This is typical of Google; always trying to gain CONTROL over our lives. Fortunately, I never use Chrome, and I am to the point where I am thinking of creating my own browser that enables the user to have FULL control.
Imagine...
Being able to block popups on one site but be able to enable them on another.
Blocking some sites but not others.
Enable cookies at one site, but not another.
False seeding cookies
etc. etc.
If somebody else comes up with one of these, and no not just another addon, then I will try it because I don't want to create a browser if I don't have to.
Browsers should have stopped supporting FTP at least 10 years ago. We're never going to force the dinosaurs to upgrade until we stop enabling them! FTP has a proud place in the history of the internet, but it's time has long since passed, and it is time to retire the protocol, forever.
One day, someone will explain to me why a completely public piece of information, distributed freely to everyone everywhere, needs to be delivered securely.
In a world where FedEx drops packages at my front door, and leaves them there when I'm away.
In a world where the only thing stopping my speeding car from hitting an on-coming speeding car is a line of yellow paint.
In a world where my front door is locked with a deadbolt, right next to a glass window.
Can anyone say "overboard"? I don't need to encrypt something, and then give everyone the key.
And before someone says something technically valid like "man-in-the-middle", remember that https doesn't stop the man-in-the-middle, it only stops some of the men-in-the-middle, and not most of them.
To what extent do common clients and servers for SSH, the session protocol underlying SFTP, support sessions that do not require authenticating with a username and password or username and public key?
Uploads through the POST method require a server-side script. But I thought a server could handle the PUT method by itself.
a system that requires multiple ports with connections established in different directions
A data connection established with PORT does go in the opposite direction of the control connection. But I thought PASV, which runs both connections in the same direction and cooperates better with NAT, had become more common. The exception is so-called "FXP" transfers from one server to another, where the client opens control connections to two servers and sends PASV to one and PORT to the other in order not to have to bounce a file off a residential last mile.
you practically need a download manager because the browsers will just choke
I download large files over HTTP using wget.
True, GNU Wget offers more robust resume support than a web browser. But it illustrates guruevi's point because it's a download manager, not a browser.
It's a better use of just about anything I can think of to encrypt the file or make a secure hash of it or whatever ONCE, and transmit it in the clear
If you transmit the hash in the clear, a man in the middle can alter the hash in transit.
Marking cleartext HTTP as "not secure" is actually the eventual plan, as I understand blog posts by Google, Mozilla, and DigiCert. First documents delivered over HTTP containing a password form was marked not secure. Then documents delivered over HTTP containing any forms. Then documents delivered over HTTP containing scripts. And finally, all documents delivered over HTTP other than from localhost.
Why does Google know the number of visits to FTP servers from Chrome ?
Because Chrome users have opted into sending anonymous coverage data to Google in exchange for Google developers not deprecating and removing features that the users use on grounds that nobody uses them.
It would seem that the only unsecure bit of an ftp download would be some asshole manipulating packets at a router somewhere down the line. That should be illegal anyway, imagine if they did that with TV.
Cable TV operators already replace a small number of commercials per hour per their retransmission contracts with the networks. You can tell this is happening on (say) The Weather Channel because the crawl at the bottom disappears.
It's also ass-backwards. Do I need to watch cat videos over SSL? No. But it insists on SSL and cuts the battery life down by doing so. Not to mention destroys caching and consumes more power on the server too.
Forcing SSL everywhere also screws up the trust model of looking for the SSL indicator, since shitty phishers just register paypal-fraud.cn and give it a ssl cert or push it over cloudflare.
Modern FTP clients and servers support STARTTLS as a command to initiate TLS
Unless the ISP intercepts the STARTTLS command sent by the client and turns it into a garbage command that produces a 502 Method Not Supported response, fooling the client into thinking the server doesn't support TLS. This has happened, Ars Technica has reported on it, and there's even a proof of concept in PyPI. What's FTP's counterpart to HSTS?
Do I need to watch cat videos over SSL?
TLS ensures that you're watching only the cat video, not the cat video followed by an ad inserted by a man in the middle, nor the cat video followed by a full-screen phishing form inserted by a man in the middle.
The biggest benefit I can think of would be for all of the advertisers to join all of the lawyers at the bottom of the ocean.
That won't work in practice for one simple reason. Publishers will sw...
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You can just as easily spoof a UI image over an encrypted channel as you can over a cleartext channel.
With an encrypted channel, the browser has a fully qualified domain name with which to associate all images transmitted over that channel. With an unencrypted channel, the browser can't tell what domain has injected the images.
The way to do this is with digital signatures. You have no idea if the source server has been compromised.
Digital signatures (HMAC) are part of HTTPS. They're automatically generated on demand, so not quite as good as a manual signature generated offline after careful examination of the content and verified after every download by the end user with a proper web of trust—but still better than nothing and no worse than any other signature generated on the server itself. They at least prove that the content did originate from a system authorized to sign it on behalf of the administrator. Whether or not you can trust the server to remain under the administrator's control is a separate matter.
From the server operator's point of view, you always want to use HTTPS because you will be blamed either way for any malware people receive while visiting your site. Even if you offer signatures, which isn't a very practical solution for most of the Web. You can police your own server; you can't control what others might inject into the traffic if the connection is unsecured.
"The state is that great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else." - Bastiat