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Dell Begins Offering Laptops With Intel's 'Management Engine' Disabled (liliputing.com)
An anonymous reader quotes Liliputing.com
Linux computer vendor System76 announced this week that it will roll out a firmware update to disable Intel Management Engine on laptops sold in the past few years. Purism will also disable Intel Management Engine on computers it sells moving forward. Those two computer companies are pretty small players in the multi-billion dollar PC industry. But it turns out one of the world's largest PC companies is also offering customers the option of buying a computer with Intel Management Engine disabled.
At least three Dell computers can be configured with an "Intel vPro -- ME Inoperable, Custom Order" option, although you'll have to pay a little extra for those configurations... While Intel doesn't officially provide an option to disable its Management Engine, independent security researchers have discovered methods for doing that and we're starting to see PC makers make use of those methods.
The option appears to be available on most of Dell's Latitude laptops (from the 12- to 15-inch screens), including the 7480, 5480, and 5580 and the Latitude 14 5000 Series (as well as several "Rugged" and "Rugged Extreme" models).
Dell is charging anywhere from $20.92 to $40 to disable Intel's Management Engine.
At least three Dell computers can be configured with an "Intel vPro -- ME Inoperable, Custom Order" option, although you'll have to pay a little extra for those configurations... While Intel doesn't officially provide an option to disable its Management Engine, independent security researchers have discovered methods for doing that and we're starting to see PC makers make use of those methods.
The option appears to be available on most of Dell's Latitude laptops (from the 12- to 15-inch screens), including the 7480, 5480, and 5580 and the Latitude 14 5000 Series (as well as several "Rugged" and "Rugged Extreme" models).
Dell is charging anywhere from $20.92 to $40 to disable Intel's Management Engine.
So in theory, it doesn't matter if you order one of these 'Custom Order' editions? You'll be able to apply the exact same changes yourself?
Intel Management Engine: the original Systemd. ;)
Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
Does anyone trust Intel or Dell (or AMD or anyone else) enough at this point to actually believe that the chip is disabled? Or that it won't just be magically re-enabled the first time you log in to the machine? How can anyone independently verify that the chip is actually disabled and stays that way?
We need to move back towards more open hardware and things like physical switches to turn devices on and off, DIP switches to configure hardware, and on-board fuses that can be permanently blown to disable things you don't want. Oh, and mainboards/CPUs/chipsets that don't have this deep-state backdoor bullshit built-in in the first place.
None of this shit should have EVER found its way into consumer-grade hardware. EVER. The out of band management hardware should only have been able to be ordered on enterprise grade servers. This is really the only valid use case for this kind of technology. I've worked in a number of large corporate environments, and never once has the ME/vPro shit even been used on desktop PCs. Build it in to the servers that need it, and if a company really NEEDS it for their desktop support method, then it should be a special order.
Until it's physically gone from the board, you can bet it's never going to be permanently disabled.
Well, its a start, at least. With a little luck, maybe vendors will get the message that we don't want this black box privacy invading systems in our computers. I remember when Intel had us over to show off their latest and greatest and they were just gushing with pride over this system. I asked them then about the potential privacy and security problems and all they could answer with is don't worry, it will be the most secure system ever made. Like I haven't heard that a million times with the same result. After that, I was just treated like the party buzzkill.
"Be particularly skeptical when presented with evidence confirming what you already believe." -
Rather than having to follow yet a Slashdot link to another Slashdot link, which then has a link to the actual story - here is a direct one:
Researchers find a way to disable Intel's Management Engine.
#DeleteChrome
Intel created it's own operating system on a chip that is almost completely outside of user control. It has full functionality to read and take control of any part of your PC, even when it is powered off. All the code is black boxed and unreadable to the user so there is no auditing it to see if it is secure. If a hacker or virus was able to re-write the OS on the chip (something that has confirmed to be possible), they would have complete control of your system with virtually no way to remove it. For people in the tinfoil hat club (a club I visit from time to time), this means that Intel, and anyone that they choose to grant access to, such as FBI, NSA, etc., can clandestinely monitor all activity that you do on your PC without any indication that they are doing so and no security software that you run, commercial or home-brew, will alert you to the monitoring.
"Be particularly skeptical when presented with evidence confirming what you already believe." -
Yes, it's called a "Platform Security Processor".
1. https://libreboot.org/faq.html...
Thank you to the Linux hardware vendor who took the leadership role in opting out of this Intel spyware madness. For any of you thinking about finally escaping the Windows chamber of horrors, this company deserves your business.
When all you have is a hammer, every problem starts to look like a thumb.
In general opt-out is problematic. Most people don't do it then the vendors say "see no one wants to opt-out", making it a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now imagine you charge them or limit their options to some expensive computer models if they want to opt-out. That's not going to work.
And the basic problem here is that it's not me that I'm worried about it's, collectively, everyone else. The same logic as getting a Flu shot. THe herd immunity protects you more than the flu shot you just got.
I want everyone else to have a secure computer. And not just so they aren't mailing me trojans in cat pictures or attacking me across the network, But also so they aren't attacking my bank or DDOS-ing netflix when I'm watching Game of thrones.
Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
It's not Dell's fault and it did genuinely take some effort on their part to figure out a way to do this without bricking machines in a fairly reliable manner. They also tend to have the best support in the industry, meaning if Intel figures out a way to reactivate it Dell will be on the hook for disabling it again, $20-$40 is nothing for that kind of long term support on a system they have no actual control over.
Well, that's fucking scary. What is the alleged upside to Intel ME? Asking for a friend...
Mass configuration, deployment, and recovery for a large fleet of desktop computers you are tasks with managing.
You enable ME to remotely control the hardware and provision its boot drive, and manage the initial setup of the OS down for untrained staff for repair purposes.
You can enable it by hitting Control-P at boot, turn ME on, setup an IP/vlan, and upload a public key into it to authenticate.
Alternately you can load some config files on a USB stick to do that, and hitting Control-P will see this and use those configs for you.
Alternately again, if you buy a hundred or more PCs a year, you can provide a special public key and ME-Manager IP address to your OEM, and they put it into a special provisioning mode with that info.
On first boot it will contact your provisioning server and accept configurations sighed with that special keypairs private key, and the provisioning server then uploads the real public key and other settings.
Once provisioned, you can instruct the system to mount an ISO image over the network to be in the optical drives place, and send power on/off events.
Generally you'll do this to load your initial OS base image and let it image the HD for your company.
Once that part completes, the base image OS does its own initial setup depending on OS (Active directory for windows; ldap with puppet for unix or RedHats launchpad as just two examples)
When a desktop has a boot drive failure, you can order a new HD and have it shipped to the branch office, and have nearly anyone swap the HD out.
In the mean time you've reset the system to be in provisioning mode, so you instruct your "remote hands" to change out the HD for the new one and hit the power button.
The system comes up and has the HD imaged again, either with a previous backup, or your base image, and go from there.
The concept is a great one.
However the GP is telling the truth when they say the ME code can't be audited.
That's a pretty big problem as you have to trust Intel that it does what they say it does.
Of course to even get to ME, you need either layer-3 network access or physical access.
If one has physical access they already "own" the system, and already falls under physical security instead.
It's the local LAN access that can be a problem.
The concern in the real world isn't so much about Intel or the government, as those bodies already don't have access into our firewalls nor do we provide them VPN access in. It's about other employees which need to be in the building to do their work and thus have access to the LAN.
GP also intentionally confused the separate issues with taking over the ME code.
Researchers have found code exploits and used those to perform the hijacking of the ME.
There is zero evidence Intel has any additional access than is claimed.
This is like saying a one-off typo in some code that results in a remote exploit in your webserver is the exact same thing as the makers of that webserver intentionally granting someone else access to your system. And that is rarely the case.
As the ME code isn't able to be audited the possibility is not zero percent.
But even if it could be shown Intels code has no backdoors and everything is written to work exactly like the ME documentation says it does, that only means Intel is trustworthy in their intentions. Bugs in code that result in an exploit are still very possible and still a real threat.
I just don't see the usefulness of saying "Looks like a bug in OpenSSH has an exploit, and Linus allowed it to be put on Linux, thusly I will never trust another thing Linus says or writes including any patches to fix the problem" purely due to not being smart enough to understand the math and code doing encryption.
Most of that is simply false, and I have proven it myself with HP Compaq, EliteDesk, and EliteBook hardware.
You don't need access inside a network or on the physical machine, it has been proven to "call home" and receive orders much as botnets do, over unblocked HTTP requests.
Etherial shows nothing except ARP traffic while powered off, or powered on in any mode but provisioning mode.
In provisioning mode Etherial shows two TCP connections to my provisioning server, and neither are HTTP.
You can't stop it if it is plugged into a network
Until ME is enabled, it doesn't even perform ARP requests let alone is capable or tries to send packets anywhere.
and all of the benefits you listed already existed in other forms which didn't require a massive multi-million-dollar engineering effort to stick inside the chip undetected for years.
It was never hidden in the chip, you just didn't bother reading Intels documentation, which was publicly available on Intels website since before vPro and ME hit the market.
Yes management cards were available before, but they are equally closed source and not auditable, and cost extra per PC to deploy.
If it were legitimate it would have been public knowledge from the start,
Which is has been.
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-active-management-technology-start-here-guide-intel-amt-9
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/software/setup-configuration-software.html
Documentation goes back to 2008 when vPro, the software containing ME, was released.
not a secret projects the alphabet agencies recruited hardware developers for, required top secret clearance to undertake within the Intel team working on it, etc.
Any evidence for that claim? Other than Intels own website and documentation that disproves it was "secret"?
The justifications for the existence of it are like the shills
Oh, damn, wish I saw that sooner before actually providing you with facts you don't care about.
Yes, I use technology, that makes me a shill by your definition.
Continue on with your fantasies, I'll stop ruining them.
https://github.com/corna/me_cl...
TrustZone is just a hardware-level (think at the data bus level) capability to allow software to be non-secure (eg, Normal World) or secure (eg, Secure World). This happens at the at the AXI interface level with a special bit called the 'NS bit'. Every single AXI transaction carries this bit. Now, on its own this is harmless as TrustZone requires another software-level portion of this called the TrustZone Secure Monitor (ARMv7 and prior) or ARM Trusted Firmware (ARMv8 and later).
ARM Trusted Firmware (ATF) is open source here: https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware
TrustZone is described here: https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone
This is COMPLETELY DIFFERENT technology from what is being done by Intel because this TrustZone/ATF are technologies that run on the actual CPU and actually time-share CPU cycles while the CPU is alive. If the CPU is not up and running and configured properly then they are completely useless and have no impact on security.
What intel is doing is having a *COMPLETELY SEPARATE* computing subsystem on the chipset that operates independently of your traditional x86 CPU cycles. That is what makes it so dangerous. Its operations is completely asynchronous to anything else.