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Researcher Finds Another Security Flaw In Intel Management Firmware (arstechnica.com)
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Meltdown and Spectre are not the only security problems Intel is facing these days. Today, researchers at F-Secure have revealed another weakness in Intel's management firmware that could allow an attacker with brief physical access to PCs to gain persistent remote access to the system, thanks to weak security in Intel's Active Management Technology (AMT) firmware -- remote "out of band" device management technology installed on 100 million systems over the last decade, according to Intel. [T]he latest vulnerability -- discovered in July of 2017 by F-Secure security consultant Harry Sintonen and revealed by the company today in a blog post -- is more of a feature than a bug. Notebook and desktop PCs with Intel AMT can be compromised in moments by someone with physical access to the computer -- even bypassing BIOS passwords, Trusted Platform Module personal identification numbers, and Bitlocker disk encryption passwords -- by rebooting the computer, entering its BIOS boot menu, and selecting configuration for Intel's Management Engine BIOS Extension (MEBx).
If MEBx hasn't been configured by the user or by their organization's IT department, the attacker can log into the configuration settings using Intel's default password of "admin." The attacker can then change the password, enable remote access, and set the firmware to not give the computer's user an "opt-in" message at boot time. "Now the attacker can gain access to the system remotely," F-Secure's release noted, "as long as they're able to insert themselves onto the same network segment with the victim (enabling wireless access requires a few extra steps)."
If MEBx hasn't been configured by the user or by their organization's IT department, the attacker can log into the configuration settings using Intel's default password of "admin." The attacker can then change the password, enable remote access, and set the firmware to not give the computer's user an "opt-in" message at boot time. "Now the attacker can gain access to the system remotely," F-Secure's release noted, "as long as they're able to insert themselves onto the same network segment with the victim (enabling wireless access requires a few extra steps)."
Totally different things. I imagine they find software and firmware vulnerabilities all the time. Hardware is difficult to patch around, and obviously comes with the noteable performance hit.
If MEBx hasn't been configured by the user or by their organization's IT department, the attacker can log into the configuration settings using Intel's default password of "admin." The attacker can then change the password
So, the "flaw" is that the user forgot to set the lock? I am stunned that this is considered a vulnerability/flaw. I mean, when I buy a new gun safe or document safe for my home or office, it comes from the factory with a default combination. I have to set it to one of my choosing. If I choose to not change the default combination, then that is on me.
Now, you might argue that it should be more like keyless entry for an automobile: the manufacturer sets a code a and provides you a device (key fob) for entry. However, if Intel did that, they would be accused of making their products difficult to use or crippling them (because people would certainly lose their AMT key fobs and Intel would either be unable to recover them, or would charge a fee for the service) or taking advantage of the user (because they would certainly lose the key fob). Plus, that would make it an absolute nightmare for central IT, the target audience for this particular feature.
The point is that if you are buying machines that have this capability, then you are buying mid-range to high-end business/professional stuff. AMT is not available on entry-level and most consumer gear. Besides, the people who don't bother setting the MEBx password on their systems (assuming they don't have central management through IT) are probably the same sort of people who buy a wireless AP, turn it on and leave the password set to the default and the admin function accessible over the wireless interface.
Intel has problems, but this one is definitely way down on the list.
Getting to the point where I'm going to have to dig out my old VIA-powered Wal-Mart PC to do my banking and such on to ensure security from hackers dropping javascript into my browser.
At the very least, the slow speed means I'll realize pretty quickly when someone is trying to use it to mine cryptocurrencies.
If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
Bad analogy. The difference here is once the attacker turns on remote monitoring, it occurs silently. There's no indication that it's happened and no way to recover. If you forget the combination to your safe, then 1) it's obvious and 2) you can still retrieve the contents in other ways.
This is not just a case of "stupid user". It's a poor design on Intel's part. Intel handed them a loaded shotgun with a hair trigger pointed directly at their foot.
Democracy is two wolves and a sheep voting on lunch.