Slashdot Mirror
Researcher Finds Another Security Flaw In Intel Management Firmware (arstechnica.com)
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Meltdown and Spectre are not the only security problems Intel is facing these days. Today, researchers at F-Secure have revealed another weakness in Intel's management firmware that could allow an attacker with brief physical access to PCs to gain persistent remote access to the system, thanks to weak security in Intel's Active Management Technology (AMT) firmware -- remote "out of band" device management technology installed on 100 million systems over the last decade, according to Intel. [T]he latest vulnerability -- discovered in July of 2017 by F-Secure security consultant Harry Sintonen and revealed by the company today in a blog post -- is more of a feature than a bug. Notebook and desktop PCs with Intel AMT can be compromised in moments by someone with physical access to the computer -- even bypassing BIOS passwords, Trusted Platform Module personal identification numbers, and Bitlocker disk encryption passwords -- by rebooting the computer, entering its BIOS boot menu, and selecting configuration for Intel's Management Engine BIOS Extension (MEBx).
If MEBx hasn't been configured by the user or by their organization's IT department, the attacker can log into the configuration settings using Intel's default password of "admin." The attacker can then change the password, enable remote access, and set the firmware to not give the computer's user an "opt-in" message at boot time. "Now the attacker can gain access to the system remotely," F-Secure's release noted, "as long as they're able to insert themselves onto the same network segment with the victim (enabling wireless access requires a few extra steps)."
If MEBx hasn't been configured by the user or by their organization's IT department, the attacker can log into the configuration settings using Intel's default password of "admin." The attacker can then change the password, enable remote access, and set the firmware to not give the computer's user an "opt-in" message at boot time. "Now the attacker can gain access to the system remotely," F-Secure's release noted, "as long as they're able to insert themselves onto the same network segment with the victim (enabling wireless access requires a few extra steps)."
I've worked in the IT field for 15 years - in academia, for financial institutions, for Fortune 500 companies, and at small, locally owned businesses.
You would balk if you saw how many of the "top companies in America" don't give 2 shits about security, outside of whatever the latest CNN scare story is. I personally find it amazing how some of these corporations will spend tens of thousands of dollars on fancy security equipment.... that they never bother to actually configure.
You can show your C-levels the lock and hand them the key, but you can't make them set the latch.
An enigma, wrapped in a riddle, shrouded in bacon and cheese
I think the main point is that people don't realize that they have a "lock" that they need to change the combination on. Perhaps with additional education people can "check their sh*t" and see if it needs to be changed. Then the bad actor can just look under their keyboard for the PW, but at least it won't be "admin" anymore.
Stop it's ability to send info. outward via router port filtering ports 16992-16995 + 623-625 Intel AMT/ME uses in a modem/router external to OS/PC.
Intel ME/AMT operates from your motherboard but has NO CONTROL OF YOUR MODEM/ROUTER!
(This stops it cold talking in/out permanently OR being able to remotely 'patch' it to use other ports by Intel OR malicious actors/malware makers etc.!)
Additionally, once you disable the AMT engine's software interface (ez via software like the unistaller for it & DisableAMT.exe + the test in usermode via Intel-SA-00075-GUI.exe to TRIPLE CHECK)? A malware to 'repatch' this = impossible (bios updaters require it in usermode ware, e.g. ASUS).
(I only allow 80, 8080 & 443 in/out here on a SINGLE stand-alone system (no home LAN but TCP/IP connected online in BOTH my modem or router port filters or software firewalls))
HOWEVER - Be CERTAIN your modem/router's internal ware is "solid" too (turn off things like UPnP etc. & CHECK router/modem HAS NO KNOWN BACKDOOR EXPLOITS (tons do unfortunately)) - get it patched ASAP if it's KNOWN exploited & TONS of routers, ARE https://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=9995967&cid=53488785/
* GOOD ROUTERS/MODEMS HAVE PORT FILTERING OPTIONS (crappy ones don't)!
Especially after this finding: Intel Management Engine pwned by buffer overflow vendor patches for the vulnerability may not be enough http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/12/06/intel_management_engine_pwned_by_buffer_overflow/ & Marcus Hutchin's "magic bit" patch doesn't help vs. this either.
APK
P.S.=> Good luck - it's the BEST EASIEST & CHEAPEST DEFENSE using what you already have (hopefully, again as not ALL modems have port filtering but most do & certainly GOOD ONES DO) vs. this threat by stopping it being able to communicate in/out period, from OUTSIDE of the INTEL chipset external to it via a router/firewall hardware... apk
Change log:
2018/01/01 - Added 14 Useful Links. Disable Intel ME 11 via undocumented NSA "High Assurance Platform" mode with me_cleaner, Blackhat Dec 2017 Intel ME presentation, Intel ME CVEs (CVSS Scored 7.2-10.0)
Intel CPU Backdoor Report
The goal of this report is to make the existence of Intel CPU backdoors a common knowledge and provide information on backdoor removal.
What we know about Intel CPU backdoors so far:
TL;DR version
Your Intel CPU and Chipset is running a backdoor as we speak.
The backdoor hardware is inside the CPU/Bridge and the backdoor firmware (Intel Management Engine) is in the chipset flash memory.
30C3 Intel ME live hack:
[Video] 30C3: Persistent, Stealthy, Remote-controlled Dedicated Hardware Malware
@21:43, keystrokes leaked from Intel ME above the OS, wireshark failed to detect packets.
[Quotes] Vortrag:
"the ME provides a perfect environment for undetectable sensitive data leakage on behalf of the attacker".
"We can permanently monitor the keyboard buffer on both operating system targets."
Backdoor removal:
The backdoor firmware can be removed by following this guide using the me_cleaner script.
Removal requires a Raspberry Pi (with GPIO pins) and a SOIC clip.
2017 Dec Update:
Intel ME on recent CPUs may be disabled by enabling the undocumented NSA HAP mode, use me_cleanerme_cleaner with -S option to set the HAP bit, see me_cleaner: HAP AltMeDisable bit.
Decoding Intel backdoors:
The situation is out of control and the Libreboot/Coreboot community is looking for BIOS/Firmware experts to help with the Intel ME decoding effort.
If you are skilled in these areas, download Intel ME firmwares from this collection and have a go at them, beware Intel is using a lot of counter measures to prevent their backdoors from being decoded (explained below).
Useful links (Added 2018 Jan 1):
Disabling Intel ME 11 via undocumented HAP mode (NSA High Assurance Platform mode)
me_cleaner: Set HAP AltMeDisable bit with -S option
Blackhat 2017: How To Hack A Turned Off Computer Or Running Unsigned Code In Intel Management Engine
EFF: Intel's Management Engine is a security hazard, and users need a way to disable it
Sakaki's EFI Install Guide/Disabling the Intel Management Engine
Intel ME bug storm: Hardware vendors race to identify and provide updates for dangerous Intel flaws.
CVE-2017-5689: An unprivileged network attacke