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Researchers Warn of Physics-Based Attacks On Sensors (securityledger.com)
chicksdaddy shares a report from The Security Ledger: Billions of sensors that are already deployed lack protections against attacks that manipulate the physical properties of devices to cause sensors and embedded devices to malfunction, researchers working in the U.S. and China have warned. In an article in Communications of the ACM, researchers Kevin Fu of the University of Michigan and Wenyuan Xu of Zhejiang University warn that analog signals such as sound or electromagnetic waves can be used as part of "transduction attacks" to spoof data by exploiting the physics of sensors. Researchers say a "return to classic engineering approaches" is needed to cope with physics-based attacks on sensors and other embedded devices, including a focus on system-wide (versus component-specific) testing and the use of new manufacturing techniques to thwart certain types of transduction attacks.
"This is about uncovering the physics of cyber security and how some of the physical properties of systems have been abstracted to the point that we don't have a good way to describe the security of the system," Dr Fu told The Security Ledger in a conversation last week. That is particularly true of sensor driven systems, like those that will populate the Internet of Things. Cyberattacks typically target vulnerabilities in software such as buffer overflows or cross-site scripting. But transduction attacks target the physics of the hardware that underlies that software, including the circuit boards that discrete components are deployed on, or the materials that make up the components themselves. Although the attacks target vulnerabilities in the hardware, the consequences often arise as software systems, such as the improper functioning or denial of service to a sensor or actuator, the researchers said. Hardware and software have what might be considered a "social contract" that analog information captured by sensors will be rendered faithfully as it is transformed into binary data that software can interpret and act on it. But materials used to create sensors can be influenced by other phenomenon -- such as sound waves. Through the targeted use of such signals, the behavior of the sensor can be interfered with and even manipulated. "The problem starts with the mechanics or physics of the material and bubbles up into the operating system," Fu told The Security Ledger.
"This is about uncovering the physics of cyber security and how some of the physical properties of systems have been abstracted to the point that we don't have a good way to describe the security of the system," Dr Fu told The Security Ledger in a conversation last week. That is particularly true of sensor driven systems, like those that will populate the Internet of Things. Cyberattacks typically target vulnerabilities in software such as buffer overflows or cross-site scripting. But transduction attacks target the physics of the hardware that underlies that software, including the circuit boards that discrete components are deployed on, or the materials that make up the components themselves. Although the attacks target vulnerabilities in the hardware, the consequences often arise as software systems, such as the improper functioning or denial of service to a sensor or actuator, the researchers said. Hardware and software have what might be considered a "social contract" that analog information captured by sensors will be rendered faithfully as it is transformed into binary data that software can interpret and act on it. But materials used to create sensors can be influenced by other phenomenon -- such as sound waves. Through the targeted use of such signals, the behavior of the sensor can be interfered with and even manipulated. "The problem starts with the mechanics or physics of the material and bubbles up into the operating system," Fu told The Security Ledger.
If I hit something with a hammer, is that a "physics-based attack", or a physical attack?
The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
I can turn on the AC and fog up a camera. Should all cameras have heat strips on them now? There's a point where security turns into flat out paranoia and the secured device functions as well as if it were turned off.
Direct hits from nuclear weapons can cause issues with the long-term reliability of sensors.
Don't do that.
I'll send you the bill for my consulting fee.
Those are the worst.
excitingthingstodo.blogspot.com
All of which translates into more expensive sensors. Hopefully our suppliers can meet the challenge.
All analog sensors are susceptible to "physics based attacks" too. Like putting device that gives off a lot of heat under a thermostat to get a nice cool comfy workspace....
This sounds like how radar guns can clock a house going 100MPH due to the heater causing it to malfunction. Or side-channel attacks. The problem with employing a physics-based attack is that it can be tracked down, and requires hardware to be specially employed for this purpose, so it can't be widely deployed without the attacker getting caught. OTOH, a software worm can travel hundreds of hops before researchers/law enforcement catch wind of it, can be deployed behind 17 proxies, and takes no special hardware to deploy. Aside from denial of service (like shining a bright light at a camera) I'm having trouble coming up with an attack precise enough to cause serious problems, that couldn't be affected via other means (like say an anti-materiel rifle or explosives.)
Corruption is convincing someone that the selfless ideal is the same as their selfish ideal.
The military calls it Electronic Counter Measures.
There is also ECCM, Electronic Counter Counter Measures.
management who did not want union workers on site.
An engineer could use networking to replace many of the workers.
Now people work out that the sensors can be manipulated over distances.
Buy new, better sensors? With new code? Build a wall around a sensitive site? Have security patrol large areas of private land around sensitive sites?
Work out the distance that sound and other signals can still be a problem and buy up the land around a site greater that that range?
Build a wall, fence around the site.
Cant buy the land? Build a stronger wall, use a sally port. Consider the way mil factories got designed in the 1950-90's. Lots of land, few windows, a strong fence with guards on duty.
Keep the bad people away from the secrets and harden the networks. Find out who is going to want to alter the result of sensors. Spies? Other nations? Faith groups? Environmental activists? Party political activists? Ex and former gov/mil workers/contractors with skills and site plans? Competitors?
Start looking at who is walking, driving around, using a camera near the "sensors" that are so important. Use some facial recognition, voice prints, get a license plate. Consider the size and amount of equipment needed for sound and other signals to work over distances. What size are the "special tools"? A truck? Van? Car? Laptop? Bag? A tablet? Look for strangers walking, driving around the fence line who do not belong.
Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
....I am not (yet) buying into this IoT hype. Certainly between smart TVs and thermostats, etc. the use of IP-enabled devices is expanding, but...there's no cohesive vision/standard tying everything together, thereby limiting its ultimate usefulness beyond today's "Let me check my refrigerator app on my iPhone..." nonsense. Secondly, why use "physics-based attacks" when very, very basic methods remain as open as a whorehouse without a roof! Perspective remains absent...
All I'm can tell here is that some sensors can be tricked into recording incorrect data. What I don't understand is how this can be turned into an attack. I mean, unless your security is based on shaking your phone like a maraca, I really don't see how this can be used to attack you. Anyone have an idea what this guy's freak out is all about?
Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
Are they sure this wasn't written by a bot?
Not sure what is new here. Side channel attacks such as voltager glitching, timing, or power measurements have been known for a while (heard of meltdown lately? - timing attack).
That said, I'm still not sure this is even a real article. The images of Tesla used look like a click-bait to include the name "Tesla" in the article - many cars have parking sensors. Also, the figure of Tesla display in the article is BS - the right-most part (c) shows tire pressure, nothing to do with ultrasonic sensor readings shown in parts (a) (b), so it definitely does not show "jammed distance" as claimed in the article. That lack of readings will shows up when you first start driving, until the first TPMS sensor readings are picked up by the computer, so they hacked nothing. I bet you can jam the TPMS signals of course since they use radio to transmit information, but that is not news.
Good thing we've legislated physics out of the picture.
The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
And was reminded of the wisdom of Solomon....Dick Solomon that is.
"Guns don't kill people, physics kills people!"
Interesting. A couple weeks after the revolutionary Spectre and Meltdown attacks, another "new way" exploit (likewise, sensors have been used for decades, yet that kind of attack makes the news only today)
Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
the vast majority of computer systems, including those responsible for the security of our country remain totally vulnerable to liberal arts-based attacks expressed through the medium of interpretive dance.
It's "physically impossible"!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sH9MJBLXtxs
MIT is a sure "n1gger" university with stupid diversity nazis running it's SJW department.
It used to be fine 30 years ago, before libturds infested schools en masse
Huh? What does that mean? ... do something.
"the consequences often arise as software systems"
Typical Slashdot summary.
Am I the only one who noticed? Brought to you by the team of Fu and Xu!
Just another day in Paradise
Physics never pulled a trigger. A person did using physics. Sorry about that gun nut narrative you had going.
There's nothing new about physically fooling sensors; the NVA/VC used to hang bags of urine in trees as a low-tech solution to the US's sophisticated human detection devices...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
But I think what they're getting at here is that as people increasingly throw together IoT devices (and phones, and PCs...) using
(a) the same (cheap and easily fooled) hardware, and
(b) the same commodity firmware / software stacks and libraries, with damn-all security insight
There will not be the same kind of "end to end" systems engineering applied that one would expect - say - from a car or airplane manufacturer...
And yet you'll be entrusting your family's safety, security & data to cheap-ass, easy to crack-and-hack, commodity IoT devices that will be always-on, always-listening, always-connected and running your power, HVAC, fire detection and physical access systems...
For some reason, I read it as "Researchers warn of psychics based attacks on sensors" and I was disappointed. After re-reading it, I was still disappointed, but for a different reason.
"Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet." General James Mattis
Don't feed the trolls. They write stupid stuff like this in every post, regardless of the subject. OP has no esteemed opinions.
Used to work on sensors for monitoring environmental ionizing radiation. We definitely had problems with microphonics in some of our more sensitive pre amplifiers and channel analyzers.
Wouldnâ(TM)t surprise me at all that someone with knowledge of the gaps in testing and design flaws in an instruments can exploit those to cause massive failures in critical sensors. I worked with many software and systems engineers that had no clue about basic physics and engineering behind the hardware they were working on. So if there was a hardware problem, all kinds of wild theories emerged as to what was causing it and basics of how to test the systems they worked on....
This is basically the device that JC Denton carries around in the original Deus Ex. A small handheld signal generator that you can use to glitch out keypads and cameras and other devices. These are already in use by car thieves to remotely unlock/start certain brands of luxury cars.
If Geordi La Forge were around today, he would get a DMCA cease and desist for the "physics-based attack" of "reversing the polarity of the deflector dish".
Quote from here: https://blog.regehr.org/archiv...
The new Power had no weapons on the ground, nothing but a comm laser. That could not even melt steel at the frigate's range. No matter, the laser was aimed, tuned civilly on the retreating warship's receiver. No acknowledgment. The humans knew what communication would bring. The laser light flickered here and there across the hull, lighting smoothness and inactive sensors, sliding across the ship's ultradrive spines. Searching, probing. The Power had never bothered to sabotage the external hull, but that was no problem. Even this crude machine had thousands of robot sensors scattered across its surface, reporting status and danger, driving utility programs. Most were shut down now, the ship fleeing nearly blind. They thought by not looking that they could be safe.
One more second and the frigate would attain interstellar safety.
The laser flickered on a failure sensor, a sensor that reported critical changes in one of the ultradrive spines. Its interrupts could not be ignored if the star jump were to succeed. Interrupt honored. Interrupt handler running, looking out, receiving more light from the laser far below.... a backdoor into the ship's code, installed when the newborn had subverted the humans' groundside equipment.... ... and the Power was aboard, with milliseconds to spare. Its agents -- not even human equivalent on this primitive hardware -- raced through the ship's automation, shutting down, aborting. There would be no jump. Cameras in the ship's bridge showed widening of eyes, the beginning of a scream. The humans knew, to the extent that horror can live in a fraction of a second.
There would be no jump. Yet the ultradrive was already committed. There would be a jump attempt, without automatic control a doomed one. Less than five milliseconds till the jump discharge, a mechanical cascade that no software could finesse. The newborn's agents flitted everywhere across the ship's computers, futilely attempting a shutdown. Nearly a light-second away, under the gray rubble at the High Lab, the Power could only watch. So. The frigate would be destroyed.
After reading TFS I still have no idea what this is about.
I hate to break it to you, but Universities were overrun by liberals in the 18th century and maintained that control ever since. Please take more care the next time you feebly attempt to be shocking and edgy.
Coolest. Title. Ever.