AMD Says Patches Coming Soon For Chip Vulnerabilities (securityweek.com)
wiredmikey writes: After investigating recent claims from a security firm that its processors are affected by more than a dozen serious vulnerabilities, chipmaker Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) says patches are coming to address several security flaws in its chips. In its first public update after the surprise disclosure of the vulnerabilities by Israeli-based security firm CTS Labs, AMD said the issues are associated with the firmware managing the embedded security control processor in some of its products (AMD Secure Processor) and the chipset used in some socket AM4 and socket TR4 desktop platforms supporting AMD processors.
AMD said that patches will be released through BIOS updates to address the flaws, which have been dubbed MASTERKEY, RYZENFALL, FALLOUT and CHIMERA. The company said that no performance impact is expected for any of the forthcoming mitigations.
AMD said that patches will be released through BIOS updates to address the flaws, which have been dubbed MASTERKEY, RYZENFALL, FALLOUT and CHIMERA. The company said that no performance impact is expected for any of the forthcoming mitigations.
Intel Response:
Take this untested BIOS update that could cause data corruption and reboots
Purchase a new CPU
AMD Response:
Apply this BIOS update
AMD just needs to force MB makers to push out updates?? And down the road what about cpu bios updates that work on ANY MB?
This was nothing more than a poorly sourced hitpiece.
The list of vulnerabilities require administrator access. I doubt real security researchers would even consider that a vulnerability. There was nothing "disastrous" to report, and the claim by CTS Labs that it would "take 2 years to fix" the reported flaws was nothing short of outright lying. I wouldn't be surprised if Intel recently funded independent Israeli security researchers for goodwill.
http://www.tomshardware.com/ne...
What about Intel's Meltdown flaw? Fixed yet?
You just have to buy a new CPU, motherboard, and RAM.
Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion. - Murray Rothbard
Anybody who exposes the hypervisor in such a way that can allow any remote access wouldn't be in charge of a data-center anyways. This was never a risk to the datacenter. This could be exploited on home systems and poorly administered bare-metal systems tho.
I do not want a Platform Security Processor, Management Engine, or any other hardware on my CPU that I cannot control.
These products serve absolutely no purpose for the general consumer - they are only useful in enterprise (corporate) environments for centralized control.
I would like the option to destroy the PSP on any CPU that I own.
If you refuse to manufacture CPUs lacking this component, then give customers the ability to request an unlock code that forever physically disables a component that is both dangerous and (to them) irrelevant. The request could work similarly to cell phone programs that unlock bootloaders.
AMD, make no mistake - home users emphatically do not want the PSP.
The military has service badges, why not collect tokens for vulnerabilities? https://badgly.com/collections/vuln
Or a way to disable OEM signing and run a local key instead, whether store in NVRAM, burned in the SPI flash, or efused into the PSP (last for obvious reasons I don't recommend.)
So long as it can't be updated or read from userspace during the operation of the computer it is secure, and the benefit to having it external to the processor is that if either the key or algorithm is ever compromised it won't matter because it will still require physical access to compromise the security processor on the system. And with access to the security processor there are many opportunities for the owner/operator of the computer to utilize it for out of band purposes which actually WOULD secure their system, some of which we haven't even dreamed of yet.
The processor itself isn't the problem, the mandatory blackbox firmware blobs, lack of documentation, and inability for the end user to replace it *ARE*. The same problem exists on all modern ARM SoCs and most devices designed off them (save the SBCs like the Raspberry Pi, etc most of which have the TrustZone infrastructure permanently disabled in the efused/rom stage0 bootloader programmed into the SoC by a manufacturer. Given that many applications today REQUIRE a TrustZone/TPM/Secure Processor to install/run/attest the platform before operation, it is very difficult to find end-user secure platforms before even getting down to OS-level or application specific bugs/attacks.)
The point is by the time someone/something has a hold of admin level access (which the AMD exploits requires to work), many parts of the system can be compromised in many different ways already, such as planting persistent backdoors everywhere.
That is why Linus was publicly mocking CTS lab.