Ubuntu and CentOS Are Undoing a GNOME Security Feature (bleepingcomputer.com)
An anonymous reader writes: Current versions of Ubuntu and CentOS are disabling a security feature that was added to the GNOME desktop environment last year. The feature's name is Bubblewrap, which is a sandbox environment that the GNOME Project added to secure GNOME's thumbnail parsers in July 2017, with the release of GNOME 3.26. In recent years, security researchers have proven that thumbnail parses can be an attack vector [1, 2, 3].
Ubuntu Security Tech Lead Alex Murray said the Ubuntu team chose to disable Bubblewrap inside Ubuntu because they did not have the time to perform a security audit. Murray blamed the many CPU bugs (Spectre, Meltdown, etc.), which kept the team busy and prevented them to audit the feature.
Ubuntu Security Tech Lead Alex Murray said the Ubuntu team chose to disable Bubblewrap inside Ubuntu because they did not have the time to perform a security audit. Murray blamed the many CPU bugs (Spectre, Meltdown, etc.), which kept the team busy and prevented them to audit the feature.
The last thing we need is additional layers of minimally-tested software promising to protect people.
So a new security feature isn't getting wider distribution (yet) because there weren't enough resources to get it ready. This just doesn't seem very controversial.
This doesn't have really much to do with bubblewrap on its own. What this has to do with is GNOME running thumbnail generating software within bubblewrap. However there are issues with this, if a user is already running some gnome software inside of a container or something already using bubblewrap, you can't run multiple levels of it.
The real question that needs to be asked though, who the hell is still using GNOME?
You seem a little confused about the impact here. They're removing it because having it there makes things less secure, while promising security. That is dangerous.
You seem a bit confused about the dangers.
It seems obvious, but if there isn't enough available hours to audit the sandbox, there is even less available to individually audit all the code that would run inside the sandbox.
And most of that code has been in the wild for a long time and is pretty stable. (Stable means unchanging in software) So it is less likely to be dangerous than newer code, that hasn't been in the wild for long, and isn't yet stable.
removing systemd.
Lets blame CPU hardware bugs, which we cannot do anything about, for our inability to secure our own software.
You do realise it's about securing other people's software right?
I have always found KDE very flexible.
Make SELinux enforcing again!