Slashdot Mirror


Creating the First Quantum Internet (axios.com)

Scientists in Chicago are trying to create the embryo of the first quantum internet. If they succeed, the researchers will produce one, 30-mile piece of a far more secure communications system with the power of fast quantum computing. From a report: The key was the realization of an unused, 30-mile-long fiber optic link connecting three Chicago-area research institutions -- Argonne National Lab, Fermi Lab and the University of Chicago. This led to the idea to combine efforts and use the link for what they call the Chicago Quantum Exchange. David Awschalom, an Argonne scientist and University of Chicago professor who is the project's principal investigator, tells Axios that the concept is difficult to grasp, even for experts. MIT Technology Review elaborates: The QKD approach used by Quantum Xchange works by sending an encoded message in classical bits while the keys to decode it are sent in the form of quantum bits, or qubits. These are typically photons, which travel easily along fiber-optic cables. The beauty of this approach is that any attempt to snoop on a qubit immediately destroys its delicate quantum state, wiping out the information it carries and leaving a telltale sign of an intrusion. The initial leg of the network, linking New York City to New Jersey, will allow banks and other businesses to ship information between offices in Manhattan and data centers and other locations outside the city.

However, sending quantum keys over long distances requires "trusted nodes," which are similar to repeaters that boost signals in a standard data cable. Quantum Xchange says it will have 13 of these along its full network. At nodes, keys are decrypted into classical bits and then returned to a quantum state for onward transmission. In theory, a hacker could steal them while they are briefly vulnerable.

7 of 52 comments (clear)

  1. In theory? by YuppieScum · · Score: 2

    In theory, a hacker could steal them while they are briefly vulnerable.

    In practice, some three-letter agency or foreign power will steal them.

    FTFY

    --
    This sig left unintentionally blank.
  2. Heisenberg checks his wallet by fahrbot-bot · · Score: 3, Funny

    Chicago Quantum Exchange

    Great. So traders will know where the market is going or where it is, but not both.

    I imagine Heisenberg wouldn't like uncertainty when it comes to his principle - or dividends ...

    --
    It must have been something you assimilated. . . .
  3. What is the use case for QKE? by goombah99 · · Score: 2

    A nice 8193 bit key should be as much protection as anyone ever needs.

    While Bill Gates never said that it may be true for as long as necessary. Just use some extra long key to encode the exchange of shorter length keys. Why do we need quantum key exchange?

    --
    Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
    1. Re:What is the use case for QKE? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      Many years ago Bruce Schneier calculated that with a ideal classical processor, possessing lossless energy usage, would require more energy than the sun is capable of producing in its entire lifetime to crack a 256-bit symmetric keyspace given no implementation problems resulting in possible computational shortcuts. Meaning, even if quantum computing is capable of orders of magnitude higher cryptographic computation rates and an imperfect suite, 512-bit will never, ever be able to be cracked until we create a dyson sphere to do it.

      Quantum cryptography, at its best, is only capable of providing a security benefit of an additional integrity auditing process which is not vulnerable to collision attacks over classical cryptographic systems.

      Professionally, quantum computing isn't going to meaningfully impact security, but is an economic opportunity for researchers and security professionals.

    2. Re:What is the use case for QKE? by dissy · · Score: 2

      What is the use case for QKE?

      That's the strangest part of this, QKE's main outstanding feature is that if the photons have their entanglement collapsed prior to reaching the other end, you A) lose the data being transmitted, and B) know for certain that this has happened.

      The only way it makes things "more secure" is that when the first photon is intercepted, the transmitter knows about that fact and then can refuse to send any further data.
      Unsent data can't be intercepted after all.

      At one point banks were thinking to use such links in place of their current private leased classical ones. That at least makes some sense.

      But the Internet?! We don't need QKE to know with 100% certainty that Internet traffic is intercepted. Nearly every major government has either been caught doing it or has outright admitted to doing it.
      There is literally no question, the answer is simply always a yes.

      Worse, QKE's response to when interception happens, aka always any anywhere outside of a lab, it's response is to shutdown and stop transmitting!

      If that really is the desired end effect, I can save you a bit of money - say "yes" outloud and go unplug the routers. Done and done.

  4. I see problems and I'm not expert by Zontar_Thing_From_Ve · · Score: 2
    I'm no expert on quantum computing, but I can see problems already based on the summary.

    The QKD approach used by Quantum Xchange works by sending an encoded message in classical bits while the keys to decode it are sent in the form of quantum bits, or qubits. These are typically photons, which travel easily along fiber-optic cables. The beauty of this approach is that any attempt to snoop on a qubit immediately destroys its delicate quantum state, wiping out the information it carries and leaving a telltale sign of an intrusion.

    Maybe if I'm a bad guy, I'm quite OK with that. That would be something like a DDOS. Maybe I don't care about trying to steal your quantum encrypted data but I want to deny your ability to transfer data that way so you will move to a method of transmission I can read.

    At nodes, keys are decrypted into classical bits and then returned to a quantum state for onward transmission. In theory, a hacker could steal them while they are briefly vulnerable.

    Believe me, bad people will certainly do this. One of the ways Blu Ray encryption got cracked is that the players stored the keys unprotected in memory and smart people figured out how to dump the memory to get the keys. National actors who really want access to your data will have no problems trying to attack this weak point in the chain.

  5. A solution looking for a problem by FeelGood314 · · Score: 2

    The Quantum Key exchange is interesting but not really practical. The equipment is expensive and hard to set up. Further, if you are using photons you can only send one per quantum state. If you send more than one an attacker can intercept them and figure out their state.

    In the easiest example Alice sends photons either polarized (up/down / side-2-side), or diagonally. Bob will then tell Alice which way his detector was set up for each received photon. For the photons his receiver was correct he know the polarity of Alice's photon. Alice and Bob then have a shared secret to use as a key. If Eve intercepts the photons she has to both read the photons and pass them on to Bob. If her detector is set up on the diagonal and Alice sends an up/down polarized photo Eve won't know the polarization and can't send the correct photon on to Bob. However if there are multiple photons, Eve can split them up and test them individually. With 8 photons Eve has a 63 in 64 chance of knowing the photons polarity and 255 out of 256 chance of fooling Bob well enough for her attack to go undetected.

    For the entire thing to work either you have to send multiple photons and have them boosted or you send one and the repeaters know Alice's pattern of polarization. In the second case this pattern becomes a key that must be kept secret across every repeater. You may as well just give Bob this key.