US Ballistic Missile Systems Have No Antivirus, No Data Encryption, and No 2FA, DOD Report Finds (zdnet.com)
An anonymous reader writes from a report via ZDNet: No data encryption, no antivirus programs, no multi-factor authentication mechanisms, and 28-year-old unpatched vulnerabilities are just some of the cyber-security failings described in a security audit of the U.S.' ballistic missile system released on Friday by the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG). The report [PDF] was put together earlier this year, in April, after DOD IG officials inspected five random locations where the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had placed ballistic missiles part of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) -- a DOD program developed to protect U.S. territories by launching ballistic missiles to intercept enemy nuclear rockets.
Here is a summary of the findings: (1) Multi-factor authentication wasn't used consistently. (2) One base didn't even bother to configure its network to use multifactor authentication. (3) Patches weren't applied consistently. (4) One base didn't patch systems for flaws discovered in 1990. (5) Server racks weren't locked. (6) Security cameras didn't cover the entire base. (7) Door sensors showed doors closed when they were actually open. (8) Base personnel didn't challenge visitors on bases without proper badges, allowing access to secure areas. (9) One base didn't use antivirus or other security software. (10) Data stored on USB thumb drives was not encrypted. (11) IT staff didn't keep a database of who had access to the system and why.
Here is a summary of the findings: (1) Multi-factor authentication wasn't used consistently. (2) One base didn't even bother to configure its network to use multifactor authentication. (3) Patches weren't applied consistently. (4) One base didn't patch systems for flaws discovered in 1990. (5) Server racks weren't locked. (6) Security cameras didn't cover the entire base. (7) Door sensors showed doors closed when they were actually open. (8) Base personnel didn't challenge visitors on bases without proper badges, allowing access to secure areas. (9) One base didn't use antivirus or other security software. (10) Data stored on USB thumb drives was not encrypted. (11) IT staff didn't keep a database of who had access to the system and why.
Shouldn't the DOD know exactly what our missile defense system is running? Why did they need to generate a report for this?
https://xkcd.com/463/
They need to do a better job of censoring the doors. We don't need to see that filth!
The crumbling infrastructure of cold-war politics surely comes as a surprise to no one. the USSR's incentives for building infrastructure and defense were much more resilient and sustainable based on the charter of the government they were building as a reflection of the society itself.
,br> The US on the other hand only had one drive: just beat the USSR. It doesnt matter if your space program is run on nickels and dimes in 30 years, or your superhighways and bridges crumble without any meaningful maintenance or even a thought of repair, just so long as what you make now continues to promote the image that the US does it better. So here it is, our sterling testament to the defense of american freedom. At the time it was a pinnacle because it had to be. Now the doors are all ajar and the computers are run by idiots.
Good people go to bed earlier.
(10) Data stored on USB thumb drives was not encrypted.
I'm not alarmed that it's not encrypted, I'm alarmed that they are using USB FLASH drives. If you are unaware, all of theses have MCUs and almost all of them use an 8051 CPU with re-programmable FLASH memory which makes them their own little computers that someone can hijack. It's also the attack vector used by Stuxnet to infiltrate an air-gapped network in Iran.
The other things have obvious fixes but unless they are using USB devices specifically made so that they cannot be reprogrammed (one-time programmable MCUs) then there is a serious security issue here. I honestly hope that government would manufacture their own USB FLASH drives but the fact that I haven't read about it doesn't inspire hope.
Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.
Some very crude 8086 CPU with 16K of RAM is incapable of supporting viruses. And even though the code might be bad, it is small enough that someone understood it. And minimal communication with external world, 40 years ago is pre internet for most things.
The problem starts when they upgrade to modern operating systems. And control it all from Windows desktops. Nobody really understands how they work. Everything is interconnected. And it is only a matter of time before some nasty manages to remotely press "the button".
Think that should be "door sensors".
Look! Up in the Sky! Is it a bird? Is it a plane? No, it's a joke .. flying right over the top of you!
I am Slashdot. Are you Slashdot as well?
and real 5.25 inch floppies (not the newfangled 3.5 inch ones)... formatted for CP/M. This was in a report I saw about 10 years ago. Even 10 years ago, this setup was deemed so obsolete that it was thought to be good security... there was no virus on earth being written for such an ancient system. And of course internet connection was out of the question.
you're not totally wrong.
But the Paul Ryan shutdowns have wreaked havok on program budgets over the past 10 years, and yeah, that led to a LOT of chaos and turnover in these kinds of programs. I'm not at all s yearurprised there's a problem like this. Doing security RIGHT: in the context of a DoD framework like RMF, is very expensive. And just as you get a team that understands one process, it gets changed. And the requirements are laden with REALLY fucking expensive software licenses. WHich is an additional financial drain. You add to that - a product lifecycle that is expected to last decades: you won't really find a closed-source commercial solution that has that kind of longevity without some marketing goon on a rebranding spree, coming along and obsoleting one crucial part of the stack, and forcing significant rework.
But no: a lot of us who work (or have worked ) in that space, LOVE the work, and love the people they work with - it's filled with a lot of exciting challenges and problem solving, and it does pay well - except that it's hard to find a program that doesn't force you to relocate every 5 years.
I'm not sure where the article summary got their list of findings. The report mentions USB *once*, and that's in a reference to a NIST glossary for removable media.
Whomever summarized the summary appeared to not understand the report and added their own color and errors to it.
"USB Thumb Drives" seems to be fabricated from the submitter reading "removable media"
The ZDNet article is also guilty of this. E.g.,
No. Just no.
The report looks interesting though, far more nuanced.
Yes, the military uses old technology. By design. They like their stuff to work. Reliably, Which it often does. It's hard to imagine a dumber idea than applying a mess of half baked "modern" technologies that routinely don't work to a problem quite different than that the ones that they don't solve. (Hint: Type "lists of data breaches" into your favorite search engine. **THAT** is what nifty modern technology buys you.)
Suggested reading, for anyone who thinks the authors of this study have a point -- "Superiority" by Arthur C Clarke. https://www.freesfonline.de/au...
Note that active military facilities typically have elaborate physical security measures including guys with guns in place and that the militaries of the world have been using encrypted communications since biblical times and relatively modern techniques for data protection about a century. On the whole, their approaches have a decent record except when someone inside leaks data or massive state level attacks are made on their technologies.
Not that I'm a fan of spending billions to deploy Ballistic Missile Defense. Ever so long ago -- before most folks posting here were born -- I knew quite a lot about some aspects of the problem. It's an enormously difficult problem and I doubt that it's really been solved although it MIGHT -- and I emphasize MIGHT -- be able to intercept a single missile that doesn't deploy sophisticated countermeasures.
You can't see ANYTHING from a car, You've got to get out of the goddamned contraption and walk...Edward Abbey
A massively parallel and distributed system to scan the system for viruses and security flaws and proactively take actions to safeguard the system.
If it were satellite based we called it network in the sky or maybe some other sort of acronym
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Whoever wrote that is just clueless. The Ballistic Missile Defense System is a system which protects against ballistic missiles, not one which fires ballistic missiles.
Also, how would a missile based explain that it hadn't fired its missiles because the software had received a pushed update and was too busy applying it. And that it was more important to fix a bug in a foreign font than to unleash a nuclear holocaust.
politicians are like babies' nappies: they should both be changed regularly and for the same reasons