Boeing Delays 737 Max Software Fix (arstechnica.com)

Boeing's promised software fix for its 737 Max planes involved in two deadly crashes since October has been pushed back several weeks after an internal review by engineers not connected to the aircraft raised additional safety questions. "The results of the 'non-advocate' review have not been revealed, but the Federal Aviation Administration confirmed on April 1 that the software needed additional work," reports Ars Technica. From the report: "The FAA expects to receive Boeing's final package of its software enhancement over the coming weeks for FAA approval," an FAA spokesperson said in a statement. "Time is needed for additional work by Boeing as the result of an ongoing review of the 737 MAX Flight Control System to ensure that Boeing has identified and appropriately addressed all pertinent issues." Just how far back the delivery of the MCAS patch has been pushed is uncertain. The New York Times reports that the update's schedule has been pushed back "several weeks." And after its delivery, an FAA spokesperson said, "the FAA will subject Boeing's completed submission to a rigorous safety review. The FAA will not approve the software for installation until the agency is satisfied with the submission."

This means it could be months before grounded Boeing 737 MAX aircraft are once again deemed airworthy. And that means more flight cancellations for airlines that have the aircraft in their inventory. Southwest Airlines, Boeing's largest 737 MAX customer, canceled all of its flights dependent on its 34 737 MAX aircraft through April 20 so far -- about 150 flights per day. And Boeing's delivery of new 737 MAX aircraft -- the company's best-seller -- has been indefinitely delayed.

Comments

So they messed it up again

[gweihir]

If internal reviewers are brave enough to point out flaws with this huge amount of pressure, it must be a really bad mess. Or they actually have some engineers left that found a backbone and are unwilling to be responsible for hundreds of people killed, no matter what management wants.

Tres Fucked.

[0100010001010011]

As someone that has worked in both functional safety and off-highway vehicles.

How the fuck did this ever make it into production. Why is a 'second sensor' an upsell?

When given the option to completely update the cockpit to the latest and greatest with digital displays.

They chose to replicate the old mechanical dials so the pilots couldn't be retrained.

The entire thing from start to finish was rushed. Mechanical design comes first. There is no 'try and develop software in parallel'. A clean software design depends on a good mechanical design.

The plane should have been a white board redesign, it should have been balanced such that a pilot could fly it stable with no avionics. This isn't a jet fighter.

But it was rushed because Europe invested in R&D and beat them to economy routes. How much money did Boeing C-suites make before 2011? During the 2009 crash there was a hiring spree by some companies because the market was flooded with cheap, good engineers that just got laid off. Companies invested in talent. Did Boeing?

People died because... Boeing sat on R&D from post WWII while making a ton of money so when Airbus released a good plane they scrambled to retrofit an old design by putting huge engines on an airframe causing it to pitch up but to appease its clients it added software to mimic the old plane behavior and tested it themselves and told the FAA they promise they did it right.

More or less.

Re:Tres Fucked.

[bobby]

Hey, you make a lot of great points and I agree. Just please everyone stop blaming engineers. I take it you're not one? We engineers do not make the decisions- managers do. Please study the Challenger disaster. Engineers said "do not launch" but the managers overrode them and launched. After 7 astronauts died, the managers pandered to public and govt. scrutiny and listened to engineers somewhat for a while. But the cycle repeats, and then we had Colombia.

We engineers are usually told what to do- we figure out how to implement someone else's ideas, under manager's rule. Often we come up with better ideas, or how and why something won't work or is dangerous, and we're told to shut up, don't make trouble, just do our jobs. That's why so many new companies are started by engineers who want to be in charge but the corporate authority structure disallows it.

The real problem, as most people point out, or at least ultimately understand, is greed.

BTW, my personal biggest gripe with most of technology today is excessive automation. Like Windows 10 auto updating, wizards, on and on, things you can't control. The machine is built by humans to serve humans. We should always be in control. We should always be able to override the machine instantly.

I'm not a pilot (a couple of hours of FAA flight log lessons) but from what I've read by actual pilots here and other blogs and forums, the flight dynamics that the MCAS compensates for are pretty minimal. Like if you increase engine thrust, the plane starts to climb. ANY pilot will see the vertical speed increase, artificial horizon move, and compensate manually (push on yoke, adjust elevator trim).

Part of the problem, IMHO, is that MCAS is more than a "trim" / compensation. It was trying to prevent stall, and generating HUGE elevator inputs, AND, that the pilots were not able to override. MCAS should only make fine trims, and only in response to pilot's input. Other systems should handle anti-stall. And all of them need to be very clearly controllable (big OFF switch label).

Finally, and most importantly, IMHO NO system should EVER override the pilot, especially not repeatedly. And AFAIK, autopilots will disengage when the pilot takes control. Of course that caused some crashes where the pilot did not notice the autopilot had disengaged, so I could advocate a system that prevents a plane from descending when there's no pilot input. IE., if there's been no pilot input, we're sinking and could be getting dangerously close to the ground, the system would take over and prevent the crash. There are altitude and stall warning systems, but maybe something happened to cause the humans to become unconscious, so with no human input, an automatic system would kick in. But no system should continually override the human.

Re:Propaganda is Working

[Santas L Helper]

Except mcas was designed not as an anti-stall mechanism exclusively but rather a software solution to make this abomination of an aircraft fly move like the NG models. The design was so shitty from the start they had to install a new system and keep it quiet from pilots. Further more this is not just a simple trim runaway like pilots have been trained on, MCAS runs the trim a whole lot faster than standard trim inputs, do this during takeoff when there's a lot going on and you can quickly find yourself in an extremely bad situation. It's a shit plane that Boeing rushed to the market in order to compete with the Airbus A320Neo. This pile of shit should have never been drafted on paper much less frankenstined onto a 60+ year old design like those 707's you reference.

Re:Propaganda is Working

[Anonymous Coward]

MCAS still only controls the trim. The quick temporary solution is to tag the breaker so it's easier and faster to find. And the GP is right, all the recent fatal airline crashes are happening with third world airlines and/or with crazy mixed up international crews that barely understand each other. The real problem is cultural. Boeing's design is defective, but needn't result in catastrophe. Simple competence would have saved the day. Look through all the squawk sheets over the last year or two. You will see lots of write ups on the system, pulled the breaker, landed, ground check ok, sign the fucker off, rinse, repeat... The Indonesian and African crews pray to Allah, and everybody blames big bad Boeing! That's fucked up