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Ethiopian Airlines Crew Followed Procedures Before Boeing Max Crash, Early Report Says (latimes.com)

The pilots of a doomed Ethiopian Airlines jet followed all of Boeing's recommended procedures when the plane started to nose dive but still couldn't save it, according to findings from a preliminary report released Thursday by the Ethiopian government. From a report: The plane crashed just six minutes after taking off from Addis Ababa, killing all 157 people on board. The report, based on flight data and cockpit voice recorders on the Boeing 737 Max 8, was not released in full. Boeing declined to comment pending its review of the report on the March 10 crash. The Max 8 has been under scrutiny since a Lion Air flight crashed off the coast of Indonesia under similar circumstances in October. Thursday's revelations raise questions about repeated assertions by Boeing and U.S. regulators that pilots could regain control in some emergencies by following steps that include turning off an anti-stall system designed specifically for the Max, known by its acronym, MCAS. Investigators are looking into the role of MCAS, whose functions include automatically lowering the plane's nose to prevent an aerodynamic stall. The Max has been grounded worldwide pending a software fix that Boeing is rolling out, which still needs to be approved by the Federal Aviation Administration and other regulators. Further reading: Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA Certified the Suspect 737 MAX Flight Control System.

193 comments

  1. Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    should have bought AirBus

    1. Re:Terrible plane by TigerPlish · · Score: 4, Insightful

      should have bought AirBus

      AF 443.

      The Paris Air Show lawnmower, AF 296 (And in that one, investigators allegedly altered blackbox data to frame the pilot because heavens no, we can't have FBW impuned in the international spotlight after crashing 1 of 3 at the world's biggest airshow. Vive la France!)

      The sad truth is that now Boeing is just as shitty as Airbus, because Boeing now behaves like McDonnel Douglas did. Why? It's Douglas "leadership" that took over Boeing post-merger, and now Boeing is accountant-driven, not engineer-driven. Anytime you subjugate engineering to the beancounters this happens.

      I am so dissapointed with Boeing ever since the slippage started on the 787. The rollout for that one was of an empty shell, unlike all other rollouts before it. Shameful. Live it up, shareholders, live it up, your short-term greed fucked up what was America's best, most visible product.

      Maybe it's time to buy Sukhoi. Or maybe Lockheed can be persuaded, they've not built any jetliners since the L1011.

      --
      The "Civilized World" jumped the shark ca. 1973.
    2. Re: Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Found one of many bugs

      Boeing.getCommonSenseLevel()>=Math.minusInfinity()?"cool":null

    3. Re:Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      From Wikipedia on AF 296

      The crew applied full power and the pilot attempted to climb. However, the elevators did not respond to the pilot's commands, because the A320's computer system engaged its "alpha protection" mode (meant to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall).

      Very interesting.

    4. Re:Terrible plane by Kartu · · Score: 1, Insightful

      The sad truth is that now Boeing is just as shitty as Airbus

      Now I need to know when did Airbus:

      1) Design a system which can decide to nosedive the plan
      2) Make it depend on a single fucking sensor
      3) Have guy who worked for airbus before, but is now owrking for the government, claim that sensor was supposed to fail "only" in 1 out of 100'000 cases hence it was OK to have "terminate this plane" feature depend only on that single sensor
      4) After letting all that shit into production and actually killing people pretend nothing is wrong and do fucking nothing

      I won't even dive into how the fuck is deadly piece of crap feature like that accompanied by only a fucking PDF being sent to pilots to read.

      PS
      Oh, and no more "authorities faked data" BS please.

    5. Re:Terrible plane by michelcolman · · Score: 5, Informative

      AF 443

      Pilot error, and a hair raising one at that

      Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings (making the pilots believe they were in a high speed stall). Stall warning that shut up at low speed (below 60 kts) but came back on precisely when the pilots were temporarily taking the correct action, making them believe that pushing the stick was the wrong thing to do. Pilots that cannot feel what the other pilot is doing with the stick. With all the simultaneous warnings and inconsistent indications, they had no idea what information to trust anymore. Sure, with perfect hindsight it's easy to see what they did wrong, but it wasn't as clear cut as some seem to believe.

      The Paris Air Show lawnmower, AF 296

      Ah, I see, you are a conspiracy nut. The envelope protection saved almost all lifes back then when the pilot actively tried to kill everyone by stalling the aircraft. Without the protection the plane would have fallen from the sky like a bloody brick, not slowly gliding on the top of the trees.

      They were actually trying to demonstrate the stall protection, by flying extremely slowly right at the edge of the stall (which no pilot would ever attempt in a regular plane). The big problem was that the engines did not spool up as quickly as the pilots had expected. The conspiracy theory is about why the engines took so long to spool up: some say they got into ground idle due to a programming error, some say it was because the pilots had pulled certain circuit breakers, some say flight data recorder info was falsified, etc... I have never really dug in to the whole story, but the theories are not as nutty as they would seem at first sight.

    6. Re:Terrible plane by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      The elevators were functioning correctly. They were at max angle of attack, any further up elevator would have stalled the plane. The problem was that the engines were not spooling up quickly enough.

    7. Re:Terrible plane by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      Airbus did have several incidents where the plane violently pitched down because both AOA probes had iced up (because they had gone through the same area of icing conditions at the same time). Not quite as bad as Boeing relying on a single sensor, but actually harder to recover from since the only solution was shutting down two Air Data Computers using push buttons on the overhead panel. Fortunately, in each incident, the pilots could regain control when the plane reached a lower altitude and the system no longer detected a stall.

      Airbus took corrective action by first adding a memorized procedure for the pilots (telling them to turn off two Air Data Computers), then correcting the software so it crosschecked the AOA probe data with airspeed, inertial reference and attitude (which is the fix that Boeing is implementing now).

      It's beyond belief how Boeing could not only fail to learn from Airbus' mistakes, but actually do worse by relying on only a single sensor for something so critical (and making a crosscheck between the two available AOA probes an option for an extra price?!?!)

      Also, before the first crash, pilots didn't even know the MCAS existed. It wasn't in the flight manuals. Unbelievable.

    8. Re:Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Anon because of mod points, I modded both of your comments up, very interesting information.

    9. Re:Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I thought it was two sensors, one light, no conflict reporting between the two sensors? I also don't know how the MCAS was unknown when it's in the ipad training they got. It just isn't called MCAS.

    10. Re:Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      The crew applied full power and the pilot attempted to climb. However, the elevators did not respond to the pilot's commands, because the A320's computer system engaged its "alpha protection" mode (meant to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall).

      Which was exactly the right action. Stalling would've been much, much worse and that's what would've happened if the computer hadn't saved the day to the extent that it could be saved. The aircraft did not have the speed to climb so all they would've managed to do was to gain a little altitude, loose all their speed and then fall like a brick. This argument has been done to death.

    11. Re:Terrible plane by mvdwege · · Score: 1

      Airbus did have several incidents where the plane violently pitched down because both AOA probes had iced up

      Can you cite more than AF447? Because I can't find any. What I can find is multiple reports of inconsistent airspeed readings, but so far AF447 appears to be the only that actually got in trouble for it.

      --
      "I know I will be modded down for this": where's the option '-1, Asking for it'?
    12. Re:Terrible plane by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      It's beyond belief how Boeing could not only fail to learn from Airbus' mistakes,

      This, more than anything else. The FAA reports the results of EVERY accident they investigate for this sole reason, so that we can all learn from those that have gone before us. How someone that claimed to be a professional engineer and be put in charge of a flight system that would affect the lives of hundreds of people at a time, could be so ignorant of standard best practices baffles me.

      In the experimental aircraft community, we have a gentleman name Bob Nuckolls who run Aeroelectric.com. Publishes an excellent manual on aircraft wiring, and keeps an email list to answer builder's questions. Any engineer involved in flight systems that don't follow his tenants is an idiot. The first one is, "Any system required for safe completion of the flight should be as reliable as the wing spars." No electric sensor is that reliable.

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    13. Re: Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      LOl! Blame the pilots!!

    14. Re:Terrible plane by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      Airbus took corrective action by first adding a memorized procedure for the pilots (telling them to turn off two Air Data Computers), then correcting the software so it crosschecked the AOA probe data with airspeed, inertial reference and attitude (which is the fix that Boeing is implementing now).

      It's beyond belief how Boeing could not only fail to learn from Airbus' mistakes, but actually do worse by relying on only a single sensor for something so critical (and making a crosscheck between the two available AOA probes an option for an extra price?!?!)

      You and the GP still missed the critical difference, which was that Airbus at least made sure that shutting off the failing system actually shut it down. With this new info, I question whether the Max series will ever be flown again by U.S. carriers even if they somehow manage to get it re-certified.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    15. Re:Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      AF 443

      Pilot error, and a hair raising one at that

      Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings (making the pilots believe they were in a high speed stall). Stall warning that shut up at low speed (below 60 kts) but came back on precisely when the pilots were temporarily taking the correct action, making them believe that pushing the stick was the wrong thing to do. Pilots that cannot feel what the other pilot is doing with the stick. With all the simultaneous warnings and inconsistent indications, they had no idea what information to trust anymore. Sure, with perfect hindsight it's easy to see what they did wrong, but it wasn't as clear cut as some seem to believe.

      First off, it's AF447 and not 443.

      There was no overspeed warning. The reason is quite simple: the first thing the pilot did when the autopilot disconnected was to pull on the stick. As any pilot will know, that will lower the speed. They never got it back.
      The stall warning sounded at this point, correctly, as a response to the pilot's commands. It's only after that the FBW disconnected, and the stall warning stopped.

      When it did resume, it's not like the pilot tried many times to push the nose down, triggering the stall warning as a result, as you seem to believe. The stall warning sounded for a whole minute during which the pilot flying kept increasing the nose up attitude. That's right at the top of the flying 101 don'ts. And all this while the alarm was screaming "don't do this".

      So, basically, the plane entered a stall _because_ of unnecessary pilot actions, and stayed in stall _despite_ a constant alarm from the computer.

      There's a valuable lesson here about the necessity of practising the basics of flying - when the computer can't deal. There's another one about managing panic: it still took 4 minutes for the plane to crash - there is time to think.

      Blaming the computer, or Airbus, is just the one that won't actually help with anything.

      The Paris Air Show lawnmower, AF 296

      Ah, I see, you are a conspiracy nut. The envelope protection saved almost all lifes back then when the pilot actively tried to kill everyone by stalling the aircraft. Without the protection the plane would have fallen from the sky like a bloody brick, not slowly gliding on the top of the trees.

      They were actually trying to demonstrate the stall protection, by flying extremely slowly right at the edge of the stall (which no pilot would ever attempt in a regular plane). The big problem was that the engines did not spool up as quickly as the pilots had expected. The conspiracy theory is about why the engines took so long to spool up: some say they got into ground idle due to a programming error, some say it was because the pilots had pulled certain circuit breakers, some say flight data recorder info was falsified, etc... I have never really dug in to the whole story, but the theories are not as nutty as they would seem at first sight.

      No they were actually trying to show the plane to a public that was quite incapable of understanding what "stall protection" means, during an airshow at an airport too small for the A320 to operate from (and not in Paris, as you seem to believe). Black boxes and a concurring audio analysis show that the engines spooled up as per spec. If the pilots "expected" them to do so faster, that's their mistake. In any case, while the 10m slow flyby might still have worked out, the nail in the coffin appears to be that the pilots didn't see the forest beyond the runway.

    16. Re:Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Yep. With a warp drive, they would have made it. And without the computer preventing them from doing so, they would have stalled the plane, crashed much harder, with more than 3 casualties.

      Back in reality, the engine spooled up as they were designed and certified to. Faster, actually.

      The problem, then, is the pilots not having a clue what to expect from the engines. Or, alternatively, that you don't do a 10m flyby at idle before pushing the throttles 5 seconds away from the forest in front of you.

    17. Re: Terrible plane by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      That's great; you just modded up a bunch of bullshit because you thought I sounded interesting. Congrats.

    18. Re:Terrible plane by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      The FAA reports the results of EVERY accident they investigate for this sole reason,

      The FAA doesn't investigate aircraft accidents. That's the job of the NTSB.

      so that we can all learn from those that have gone before us

      The same thing happened last October, the FAA issued an emergency AD covering the issue, Boeing sent messages to every customer. The second crash should never have happened because the information was disseminated last November. Plenty of time for training. But ...

      "Any system required for safe completion of the flight should be as reliable as the wing spars."

      The AoA sensor is not required for safe completion of any flight. How do all those airplanes that don't have any AoA sensors manage to stay aloft without them, hmm?

    19. Re:Terrible plane by Cochonou · · Score: 1

      Actually, AF447 did not pitch down. You might want to look at QF72, in which the incident was not caused by icing, but by a quite strange signalling condition from air data inertial reference units that the flight computer software interpreted incorrectly. LH1829 did pitch down because of two frozen angle of attack sensors. I do not know about other incidents.

    20. Re:Terrible plane by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

      Pilots that cannot feel what the other pilot is doing with the stick.

      So? The pilot clearly ignored the procedure where once one pilot says "I have control" and gets it acknowledged he should keep his paws off the controls. And besides, the airplane told them both loud and clear "dual control". They ignored it as well.

      With all the simultaneous warnings and inconsistent indications, they had no idea what information to trust anymore. Sure, with perfect hindsight it's easy to see what they did wrong, but it wasn't as clear cut as some seem to believe.

      If it wasn't as clear cut, why was the captain able to instantly recognise the situatuon at hand as soon as he reentered the cockpit?

      They were actually trying to demonstrate the stall protection, by flying extremely slowly right at the edge of the stall (which no pilot would ever attempt in a regular plane).

      Yes, and they were doing it at the third of the planned altitude. Why? Because the pilot flying didn't recognise he was flying too low even though the numbers were right at the bloody PFD. I guess he was getting a blowjob from the pilot monitoring, that would maybe excuse both pilots from looking at the altitude indicator.

      The big problem was that the engines did not spool up as quickly as the pilots had expected.

      Well, duh. All jet engines take their time to spool up from flight idle to full power. This has been known by any jet pilot since the Heinkel He 178 had its first take off in 1939. First to ensure smooth airflow in the compressor so it won't stall (that's like backfire, only worse and can destroy the engine) and second, modern aircraft have high bypass turbofans and they simply have more inertia. So, 12 seconds to spool up and even at full power the aircraft would keep sinking for a few seconds because inertia is a bitch.

      All the conspiracy theories are just the pilot trying to distract form his mistakes.

      --
      "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
    21. Re:Terrible plane by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      It really was shut down, but they reenabled it because they needed to trim the nose back up.

      The only way to stop the MCAS from trimming down, is by cutting power to the electric trim. But now they still couldn't get the nose back up because the plane had been trimmed down and they couldn't trim it back up without the electric trim. Manual trim is too slow and possibly even blocked because of the high aerodynamic forces on the jack screw caused by combined down trim and up elevator.

      Since they couldn't get the nose back up and manual trim didn't work, they decided to reenable the electric trim to try and trim back up. But as soon as they did that, MCAS trimmed down even further.

    22. Re:Terrible plane by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      I stand corrected, apparently there was no overspeed warning. But the speed indications were fluctuating wildly, and the altimeter was initially going down (due to icing), which prompted the flying pilot to pull the nose up. There were lots of conflicting indications, and at some point the flight director (which had initially disappeared) came back on with a pitch up command to climb at 6000 fpm! (Yes, one of the initial items on the unreliable airspeed checklist is to switch the flight directors off, but since they had already disappeared, they did not think of this step).

      A good explanation from a pilot's point of view is here. It doesn't just explain what the pilots did wrong, but also what they were probably thinking at that point.

      By the way, both pilots flew small airplanes in their free time. They did have the necessary basic flying skills, they just did not believe they were in a stall. They thought the stall warning was caused by incorrect speed indications, and the increased aerodynamic noise seemed to point towards excessive speed rather than a lack of speed.

      As for the airshow crash, the whole point of the conspiracy theorists is that some parts of the report were faked to hide the fact that the engines did not spool up quickly enough. I'm not saying it's true, just explaining what the controvercy is about. Nobody is saying there was anything wrong with the elavators afaik. They were deliberately flying at max AOA to show off the airplane flying at extremely low speed.

    23. Re: Terrible plane by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Most of the bullshit recently comes from lying faggots like yourself.

    24. Re:Terrible plane by mjwx · · Score: 1

      Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings (making the pilots believe they were in a high speed stall).

      To which the pilots responded to by giving the aircraft conflicting instructions and turning off the stall alarm. The incident was ruled to be pilot error over technical failure (which was the pitot tube issue that Airbus then fixed).

      Thus far, the A330 has had 2 fatal incidents since it's introduction in 1992 with a combined total fatalities of under 300, both due to pilot error. The B737 max has had 2 fatal incidents with the same cause within six months of each other since it's launch in 2016, combined total fatalities of over 350, both due to the same computer error.

      --
      Calling someone a "hater" only means you can not rationally rebut their argument.
    25. Re:Terrible plane by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings (making the pilots believe they were in a high speed stall).

      To which the pilots responded to by giving the aircraft conflicting instructions and turning off the stall alarm. The incident was ruled to be pilot error over technical failure (which was the pitot tube issue that Airbus then fixed).

      They did not turn off the stall alarm. It turned off itself when speed dropped below 60 kts. Then, the few times when the pilots started to take the correct action by pushing the nose down, speed increased above 60 kts again and the stall warning was reactivated. Which gave them the false impression that they were doing something wrong, and stopped pushing the stick.
       

    26. Re:Terrible plane by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      The only way to stop the MCAS from trimming down, is by cutting power to the electric trim. But now they still couldn't get the nose back up because the plane had been trimmed down and they couldn't trim it back up without the electric trim. Manual trim is too slow and possibly even blocked because of the high aerodynamic forces on the jack screw caused by combined down trim and up elevator.

      Thanks. I read that detail a few minutes after I posted that comment. So it's more accurate to say that Boeing didn't make sure that the plane would actually be recoverable after following their shutdown procedure.

      I find it absolutely appalling that Boeing never tested their procedure in a real aircraft under anything even approaching the trim state that the first doomed plane got into. Obviously they couldn't test a failing MCAS, but Boeing could have easily electrically commanded that much trim by hand and then tried to manually trim the aircraft back to a stable flight envelope. If they had tried that, they would have instantly recognized that it was not possible, reenabled the electric trim, landed the plane, and ordered the fleet to be grounded until the problem could be rectified. This effectively means Boeing didn't test the procedure at all; they did not even test things that would be relatively trivial and safe to test.

      But even worse than the lack of testing is the realization that if there are still bugs in MCAS, the current hardware clearly does not provide any way to override MCAS safely. That would still be an unacceptable safety violation even if Boeing's hadn't already failed to adequately diagnose and provide workarounds for the MCAS problem, even if the design of MCAS weren't fundamentally flawed, etc.

      IMO, no matter what changes Boeing makes to the software, the FAA should refuse to certify this aircraft until Boeing adds a separate MCAS Disable switch, and those of us in the flight path of major airports should use whatever legal avenues are at our disposal to ensure that these planes remain grounded until the problem is fixed in hardware. At this point, a software-only fix simply will not fly.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    27. Re:Terrible plane by Cederic · · Score: 1

      The FAA doesn't investigate aircraft accidents. That's the job of the NTSB.

      You'd best tell these guys then: https://www.faa.gov/about/offi...

  2. Another Trump Victory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Troll

    Remove regulations and let the free market manage itself. Gotta make profits next quarter!

    1. Re:Another Trump Victory by Opportunist · · Score: 0

      It creates jobs. First by letting the aerospace industry skimp on security standards so they can build cheaper planes, and then by freeing up the jobs of those using the planes.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    2. Re:Another Trump Victory by higuita · · Score: 1

      s/of those using the planes/of those dying in the planes/

      FTFY

      --
      Higuita
    3. Re:Another Trump Victory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It was certified 6 weeks after Trump's inauguration, he didn't remove any relevant regulations. It's just another thing you can be grateful for to Obama.

    4. Re:Another Trump Victory by Guignol · · Score: 1

      that woosh noise that sounded like a 737 max 8 knowing better than its pilots....

    5. Re:Another Trump Victory by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      You mean like the one that requires me to carry a nearly useless ELT? Even though ADS-B has been mandated?

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    6. Re: Another Trump Victory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Everyone, including higuita and you, knew it was sarcastic.

      Everyone, except you, knew higuita knew.

    7. Re:Another Trump Victory by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      You mean like the one that requires me to carry a nearly useless ELT?

      An ELT is only required for certain operations.

      Even though ADS-B has been mandated?

      ADS-B out is only mandated for operations in certain airspaces.

      You clearly don't understand the difference between ADS-B out and an ELT if you think ADS-B out is designed to cover for the other. If you think otherwise, will you be happy to get a phone call from the FAA or FSDO or flight service when they notice that your ADS-B out shows zero forward speed after you've landed? There really is a difference between sitting on the ramp and sitting in a swamp with serious injuries.

  3. Next up: by Narcocide · · Score: 2, Interesting

    They find out that some completely different bug causes the MCAS override to stay on even if you shut it off.

    Either that or that it is susceptible to external control.

    1. Re:Next up: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A computer virus could have infected the navigation system, and the black box recorder would have no way of knowing this.

    2. Re:Next up: by lgw · · Score: 2

      They find out that some completely different bug causes the MCAS override to stay on even if you shut it off.

      Either that or that it is susceptible to external control.

      Possible, but also possible the procedures were bad. Given these planes weren't falling out of the sky left and right, I suspect switching off the MCAS works (assuming it's done while the plane is still recoverable).

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    3. Re: Next up: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, and too many time travellers, visiting the plane to figure out why it crashed, would not have been detected by the black box either.

    4. Re:Next up: by Narcocide · · Score: 0

      Did you have anything to add other than this proof that you're even stupider and more ignorant?

    5. Re:Next up: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Did you have anything to add other than this proof that you're even stupider and more ignorant?

      how much.stupidity and ignorance does it take to respond to anonymous trolls? tell us more!

    6. Re:Next up: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I, for one, welcome our anonymous troll overlords!

    7. Re:Next up: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your flight controls have been encrypted. Forward 1 bitcoin to this address ...

    8. Re:Next up: by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      OMG!! You found step three!

      1: Infect plane with virus
      2:Demand ransom
      3:
      4: Profit!

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    9. Re:Next up: by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      OMG!! You found step three!

      1: Infect plane with virus
      2:Demand ransom
      3: (plane crashes)
      4: Profit!

      Stupid /. editor.

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    10. Re: Next up: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There is no MCAS override. There is a horizontal stabilizer trim motor disconnect.

  4. Biggest. Lawsuit. Ever. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If you're a Boeing shareholder, I'd advise to get out now, or prepare to bend over and grab your ankles. This will be the biggest lawsuit and settlement ever seen in the country. And due to the broad mix of people slaughtered on the doomed plane thanks to Boeing's poor management decisions, they probably will be coming in from all over the globe.

  5. In the USA money is GreedOverrulesDecency by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Boeing should have been more honest and named and sold this plane as the 737 Deathtrap. At least potential customers would have known what they were getting into.

    1. Re:In the USA money is GreedOverrulesDecency by olsmeister · · Score: 1

      737 Max Pinto?

    2. Re:In the USA money is GreedOverrulesDecency by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      737 Max Pinto?

      Ford would haved sued Boeing's ass off though.
      The Pintos went up in flames, the 737 just misses the air. Bad engineering all around.

      If Boeing's management doesn't go to jail and the company isn't raked over the coals for this tragedy then nothing will.

    3. Re:In the USA money is GreedOverrulesDecency by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Boeing and the government are so cozy at this point that what will likely happen is the executives will have to have dinner with the officials that should be in charge of busting their asses into little bitty pieces, they'll have a good laugh at all the hulabaloo and then everything will go back to standard operating.

    4. Re:In the USA money is GreedOverrulesDecency by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Boeing and the government are so cozy at this point that what will likely happen is the executives will have to have dinner with the officials that should be in charge of busting their asses into little bitty pieces, they'll have a good laugh at all the hulabaloo and then everything will go back to standard operating.

      Ah, but this time the executives will have to pay for dinner rather than the taxpayer. That will teach them.

  6. Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by EndlessNameless · · Score: 5, Interesting

    So, to summarize:

    1. Boeing self-certified that pilots certified in type did not require additional training. (Prior to the recent deregulation, they weren't allowed to self-certify.)

    2. Pilots had to break out the manual during an emergency to properly control a system they were not trained to use.

    3. The system either did not disengage properly, or else it reengaged automatically, contrary to well-established norms for this aircraft type.

    Boeing screwed up, but it also happened because of relaxed oversight. The previous level of oversight seems more appropriate.

    Perhaps the FAA Administrator who made these changes should be forced to resign. This administration has had enough turnover that the President should be capable of appointing new leadership quickly.

    --

    ---
    According to the latest ruleset, this post should be modded as Vorpal Flamebait +5.
    1. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Streetlight · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Perhaps the FAA Administrator who made these changes should be forced to resign. This administration has had enough turnover that the President should be capable of appointing new leadership quickly.

      The replacement administrator would likely be the Boeing's chief lobbyist.

      --
      In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. George Orwell
    2. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Your number 3 does not apply. The system disengaged and the pilots later turned it back on, the why is unknown at this point. It is possible it was already unrecoverable when they turned it off.

    3. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Talderas · · Score: 4, Informative

      Perhaps the FAA Administrator who made these changes should be forced to resign. This administration has had enough turnover that the President should be capable of appointing new leadership quickly.

      The administrator of the FAA at the time of the certification of the 737 Max was Michael Heurta, who was appointed by President Obama. He took the position in December of 2011 and held it until January 2018. The 737 Max was certified in March of 2017.

      --
      "Lack of speed can be overcome. In the worst case by patience." --Znork
    4. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

      There seems to be a lot of confusion around how the MCAS system is "disabled" in the case of problems. The MCAS system itself can't be disabled. The procedure for dealing with runaway trim adjustment, a larger umbrella under which problems with MCAS fall, is to turn off power to the electric motors that turn the trim adjustment wheels. These are physical switches that can't be turned on or off without physical contact by someone in the cockpit. The plane can't restore this power, only a person can flip the switches.

      Removal of power to the motors prevents MCAS from being able to continue to add more nose-down trim. Unfortunately, most 737 pilots do not turn the trim adjustment wheels by hand when flying, because it is slow and awkward process. They usually use a small thumb joystick on the control yoke to adjust trim, which is carried out by the same electric motors used by MCAS. My guess is that with a bunch of nose-down trim, the pilots turned the power back on so they could make a large trim adjustment with the thumb joystick. But as the pilots add nose-up trim with the electric system, MCAS was again able to counteract that with nose-down trim.

      Basically, MCAS can add so much nose-down trim, and do it so rapidly, that even disabling the system leaves the plane in such a nose-down trim that it is unrecoverable. The pilots can't crank the trim wheels fast enough by hand, and turning the electric motors back on gives MCAS the advantage again.

    5. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by michelcolman · · Score: 2

      The pilots disengaged the electric trim which was causing the plane to pitch down. However, since it had already trimmed the nose down so much, they were unable to pull the nose back up using only the elevators (i.e. the stick). They could trim manually by turning the big trim wheels by hand, but that wasn't fast enough while they were continuing to dive towards the ground. So they decided to reengage the electric trim, hoping they could trim the nose back up. But instead, the MCAS immediately started to trim down even further.

    6. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/04/ethiopian-air-pilots-turned-off-737-max-anti-stall-system-then-it-turned-on-again/
      A lot of articles today are jumping on the fact that they followed procedure to turn MCAS off, but they fail to mention that they violated procedure and turned it back on again. So, the headline and article are wrong - the pilots did not follow procedures, and your #3 summarized assumption is incorrect.

    7. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by sunking2 · · Score: 1

      There in lies the question. The decision to reengage electric control, thus mcas, was made. Calculations will be made that take all the factors into account as to whether this was something that doomed them or it wouldn't have mattered. Timing is everything in these investigations in determining blame. Did the pilots react quickly enough? Did they go down a wrong path in their decision making at some point? If you remember even Sully was raked over the coals after saving an entire airplane worth of people. Did they perform adequately to alleviate the issues of difficulty in manual trim adjustments. All questions that haven't been answered.

    8. Re: Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      There was a reason they turned it back on; they couldnâ(TM)t recover while leaving it off (couldnâ(TM)t trim fast enough manually) so their last ditch attempt was to turn it back on to get motorised support for the trimming, probably knowing full well MCAS would work against them but at least electrically trim against it in the by now weâ(TM)ll known roller-coaster fashion.

    9. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You need to watch more Air Disaster/Mayday, pilots often pull out the emergency manual, that's what they're trained to do. There is too much to memorize on a modern plane.

    10. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Here is an article that states that when the jackscrew that adjusts the horizontal stabilizer is under load from aerodynamic pressure, the manual trim requires too much force to adjust trim. https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-switches-to-stop-mcas/

      They turned the electric trim back on because the manual trim could not be used.

    11. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Darinbob · · Score: 2

      But who was the administrator at the time the regulations were weakened?

    12. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      Pull it out?

      My instructor had me stick the checklist under my shoulder harness.

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    13. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by slacktide · · Score: 2

      The change which greatly expanded delegated certification was mandated by Congress, not the FAA. It was a part of HR 2115 "Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act" in 2003. Refer to section 227 - DESIGN ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATES. https://www.congress.gov/bill/...

    14. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by slacktide · · Score: 5, Informative

      The Speaker of the House was Dennis Hastert (R–Illinois). The change which greatly expanded delegated certification was mandated by Congress, not the FAA. It was a part of HR 2115 "Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act" in 2003. Refer to section 227 - DESIGN ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATES. https://www.congress.gov/bill/...

    15. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No boeing did nothing wrong here. The pilot had only 200 hours of flight time. They doesn’t qualify you to be a copilot is the US.

    16. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Doesn't MCAS de-activate when the trim-buttons are used? That would seem to be what happened, or else the situation gets so bad that even that doesn't save the plane!(Overheat? Too much force when combined with pulling up?)

      It seems to be self-evident that the ET crew turned the motors back on so they could use the trim-buttons. So why did that not save them?

      Boeing's instructions should have said use the trim-buttons to neutral trim, THEN turn off trim motors.

    17. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Oh great. Any of his actions as speaker could have been blackmail on the part of anybody who knew about the kid he was (later?) paying off in exchange for not talking about abuse.

    18. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's irrelevant if they violated procedure at that point: article says they were already in unrecoverable dive. I read it as they were doomed at that point.

    19. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by sjames · · Score: 1

      In other words, Congress decided that regulation was evil because no private corporation would put profit first and now hundreds are dead and the short term profits are being paid for in long term losses

    20. Re: Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Thanks, this is the only truly insightful comment here. If aerodynamic loading really is that much of an issue for the 737 trim wheel, then that calls into question previous models of the aircraft also - not just the MAX. It may just be that Boeing has gotten lucky in the past due to runaway trim being a pretty uncommon occurrence.

    21. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sully wasn't raked over coals. That Tom Hanks movie was pure fiction.

    22. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      2. Pilots had to break out the manual during an emergency to properly control a system they were not trained to use.

      Bullshit. Dealing with a runaway stabilizer trim is a procedure that is trained into every pilot. It ought to be automatic. "If the trim is malfunctioning, TURN OFF THE TRIM." End of problem. It's SO COMMON that even I, as a pilot who has never flown a 737 of any variant, know what to do when the trim system runs away. It's so basic that anyone who has an ATP certificate will know it by heart. It is the same thing that the dead-heading pilot on the earlier flight that did NOT crash did -- turn off the electric trim and leave it off.

      If you are right that they were not trained to use this airplane, it is NOT Boeing's fault, it is the fault of the airline that allowed completely untrained pilots to fly passengers.

      3. The system either did not disengage properly, or else it reengaged automatically,

      Didn't read TFA, did you? That's normal, and it's made harder because the LINK to TFA is a self-referential link back to this same story. Here, I'll quote the relevant part for you:

      The pilots initially followed Boeing's emergency steps by disconnecting the MCAS system by switching off power to a stabilizer on the tail, the report said. But they turned the system back on 32 seconds before hitting the ground and tried unsuccessfully to use it to point the nose up. Boeing's procedures instruct pilots to leave the MCAS disconnected and fly manually for the rest of the flight.

      The system did not "reengage[d] automatically", THEY TURNED THE SYSTEM BACK ON. The FAA emergency AD says not to, and the Boeing emergency procedure they allegedly followed said NOT TO. And common sense says "if turning the broken thing back on results in continued problems, TURN IT OFF AGAIN." (Emphasis in quote is mine.)

      So, the story lies -- they did NOT follow the procedure, they decided to turn a know-malfunctioning system back on, and then wondered why the trim system they should have turned off was still operating. And they kept the system on again until they hit the ground.

      Pilot error. Period. They didn't not follow the procedure. They thought they knew better and clearly did not.

    23. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Cochonou · · Score: 1

      Yes, please read the NTSB investigation report.

      Simulation flights were run to determine whether the accident flight could have landed successfully at LGA or TEB following the bird strike. The simulations demonstrated that, to accomplish a successful flight to either airport, the airplane would have to have been turned toward the airport immediately after the bird strike. The immediate turn did not reflect or account for real-world considerations, such as the time delay required to recognize the extent of the engine thrust loss and decide on a course of action. The one simulator flight that took into account real-world considerations (a return to LGA runway 13 was attempted after a 35-second delay) was not successful. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the captain’s decision to ditch on the Hudson River rather than attempting to land at an airport provided the highest probability that the accident would be survivable.

    24. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by labnet · · Score: 2

      737 pilots are actually trained for this circumstance and even the flight simulators simulate the jackscrew load on the trim wheels. They are taught to duck dive to release pressure to adjust elevator trim. The problem with the Ethiopian flight, was not enough height.... but once they had re-enabled the electric trim system, had they kept manually trimming up (then cutout the trim system again), they likely would have saved themselves.

      --
      46137
    25. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There in lies the question. The decision to reengage electric control, thus mcas, was made. Calculations will be made that take all the factors into account as to whether this was something that doomed them or it wouldn't have mattered. Timing is everything in these investigations in determining blame. Did the pilots react quickly enough? Did they go down a wrong path in their decision making at some point?

      Uh, this isn't a video game. The pilots aren't "losers" just because there exists a contorted and obscure way of "winning" that Boeing has cleverly hidden in the game mechanics.

    26. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In other words, Congress decided that regulation was evil because no private corporation would put profit first

      No, because regulation is like corporate healthcare. It's inefficient since it prevents corporations from absconding responsibility until their only feasible option is to die and leave a mess others have to clean up behind.

      and now hundreds are dead and the short term profits are being paid for in long term losses

      It's not the job of Congress to worry about profits. They should worry about lives. Tough luck that this cost both, but that's always a risk when gambling. Could have worked, too.

    27. Re: Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The aircraft was overspeed at that point. There was too much force on the stabilizer to manually turn the trim wheels.

    28. Re: Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Except that after turning the trim motors off they were unable to manually turn the trim handles to raise the nose. The aircraft was overspeed by that point and there was too much aerodynamic load on the horizontal stabilizer to move the trim wheels by hand.

    29. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That appears to be correct. However, after they used the electric trim, they did not turn the trim power back off. So, a bit later, MCAS put the plane more nose down. MCAS does have a delay built in, which could possibly have been taken advantage of if the crew were astute enough -- though that's asking a lot. The root problem appears to be that MCAS cannot be turned off. Even when electricity was turned off to the trim motor(s), MCAS continued issuing commands to the trim system. Nothing happened then, because power was turned off.

      Inability to manually turn off MCAS is a software design error.

      In addition, the ability to turn the manual trim wheels depends on the strength of the person(s) trying to do it. If both pilots are average-size women, for example, or slight build males, the aircraft's safe recovery envelope will be smaller.

    30. Re:Boeing Deserves to Pay for This by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If the MCAS System System can't be disabled disabled, why does it keep coming up that the pilots disabled it?

      Hopefully the Federal FAA can answer these questions once they publish the report, Mr. Redundancy.

  7. Where is the link by jeremyp · · Score: 3, Informative

    I'd like to RTFA, but there's no link to it. There's no link to the source of the quotation.

    --
    All I want is a secure system where it's easy to do anything I want. Is that too much to ask ~~ Randall Munroe
    1. Re:Where is the link by jeremyp · · Score: 4, Informative

      Found it. It's from the LA Times.

      https://www.latimes.com/busine...

      --
      All I want is a secure system where it's easy to do anything I want. Is that too much to ask ~~ Randall Munroe
    2. Re:Where is the link by ilguido · · Score: 4, Informative
    3. Re:Where is the link by Xylantiel · · Score: 5, Informative

      Yeah, some the articles don't really give the necessary details. The one I found that really discussed it is this.

      Basically it is possible for the MCAS, in combination with other things, to put the airplane in a situation that is not easily recoverable without turning the system that the MCAS is part of back on. This is because the system that bypasses the MCAS isn't strong enough to turn the tail back to the right position. But when the electrical stabilizer system is turned back on, the MCAS just kicks in again and puts it right back in nose-down. There are ways to work it out but they require "non-checklist actions" as the article says. There is no way pilots can figure this out in less than a minute while the MCAS is driving them into the ground. So basically the whole idea that "they could just switch it off" only works in some circumstances. So now we see that it appears even the instructions to pilots were not properly tested.

    4. Re:Where is the link by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      There is no way pilots can figure this out in less than a minute while the MCAS is driving them into the ground.

      The report tells us it was six minutes from takeoff to crash. The manual trim is certainly "strong enough" to deal with the trim system -- that's what it does.

      And having one person diagnose while the other flies is why there are two pilots to begin with.

    5. Re:Where is the link by mesterha · · Score: 1

      The report tells us it was six minutes from takeoff to crash. The manual trim is certainly "strong enough" to deal with the trim system -- that's what it does.

      All they needed to do was make a left turn for Laguardia like they're going to pick up the milk.

      --

      Chris Mesterharm
  8. Authority by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    The word "Report" has such an authoritative tone. According to the report...
    And then you read who wrote the report. Of course they would conclude that their country, their people, their pilots were not at fault.
    You see this legal positioning stuff play out over and over.

    And all you can do is try to backpedal and say, no, the Ethiopian government isn't a reliable authority on the correct operation of a Boeing airplane. Then the argument goes to, well then who is?

    1. Re:Authority by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Then the argument goes to, well then who is?

      Why Boeing, of course! I mean, they're authorized to certify it so obviously they're the best authority in terms of assigning fault as well. /sarcasm

  9. BAD AD by ghoul · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The AD which went out after the Lion Air Crash said disable the MCAS using cutoff switches. What it did not consider is that if the plane is already nose down then the aerodynamic forces are too strong to use the manual wheels to make it nose up. The AD should have specified use your electric trim yoke switches to make the trim up and then cut out the electric trim so MCAS cannot make it nose down again.
    Also why is the MCAS triggering 6 minutes into a flight. Takeoff by definition is close to stall. It should be off during takeoff. If this plane cannot takeoff without MCAS then this plane is not safe. This is not a fighter jet where the pilot can eject if the software screws up or the plane goes unstable.

    --
    **Life is too short to be serious**
    1. Re:BAD AD by omnichad · · Score: 1

      Also why is the MCAS triggering 6 minutes into a flight. Takeoff by definition is close to stall.

      Isn't that exactly the situation MCAS is designed for (takeoff)? It's not supposed to over-correct. It's supposed to correct for user action because the pilot wasn't retrained on the characteristics of these larger engines being placed where they were. If it's unsafe, the plane should either be scrapped or pilots re-certified for this model specifically, without MCAS.

    2. Re:BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Because the pitot tubes that make up the sensors can freeze over (or have other issues, the ones on Lion air were repaired prior to the fatal flight) as the plane ascends or descends in certain conditions.

    3. Re:BAD AD by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Both flights seem to have run into trouble when they put their flaps up, engaging the normal (non-takeoff) flight regime.

    4. Re:BAD AD by wired_parrot · · Score: 5, Interesting

      The AD which went out after the Lion Air Crash said disable the MCAS using cutoff switches. What it did not consider is that if the plane is already nose down then the aerodynamic forces are too strong to use the manual wheels to make it nose up. The AD should have specified use your electric trim yoke switches to make the trim up and then cut out the electric trim so MCAS cannot make it nose down again..

      This is a good explanation of the difficulty in trimming the aircraft in a mistrim condition by a former senior Boeing engineer. The short of it is that in the mistrim condition encountered by ET302, with stab nose down and the pilots pulling elevator nose up, the combined tail loads would've produced high jackscrew load opposing nose stab up trim that would be impossible to overcome with manual trim.

      Boeing did publish guidance for older 737 models on recovering on a severe nose out-of-trim condition, which would have required taking the aircraft into a roller-coaster maneuver to relieve the horizontal stabilizer loads. But given that they were already close to the ground, this was not an option. The other suggestion was to extend flaps, but given that the aircraft was above the minimum flap speeds, this was also not possible.

      In short, it looks like the fix to the problem was as much to blame as the problem itself

    5. Re:BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Angle of attack sensors, they look like weather vanes. This is not a pitot tube issue, that was the Air France Airbus.

    6. Re:BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "An angle of attack indicator offers a visual indication of the amount of lift the wing is generating at a given airspeed or angle of bank. ... Both AOA configurations consist of a heated wing probe that looks similar to a standard pitot tube."

      You don't know what you're talking about.

    7. Re:BAD AD by tinkerton · · Score: 1

      Takeoff by definition is close to stall.

      Isn't 6 minutes the time it needs to reach altitude? Because then multiple parameters change. Adjusting thrust? Flaps? MCAS could take in account multiple parameters/

    8. Re: BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's triggering because there was a fault in the CA side AOA sensor that was indicating it beyond critical angle of attack triggering MCAS to correct. While not the typical triple redundancy. This is far from a complicated correction. MCAS is only active when flaps are up and autopilot is off. There are two trim switches below the thrust levers quadrant, one for autopilot trim and the other for electric pilot trim. MCAS does not work when either electric trim is used by the pilot or the electric pilot trim switch is off. So in the 737 they were pointed 15Â-20Â nose up depending on weight and flap configuration. They ran into this problem and ran the appropriate checklist which has you turn off the electric trim switch. End of checklist, return to nearest suitable airport. These guys then go against procedures and turn the trim back on, this reactivating MCAS and it pitches over. Ethiopian Airlines FO had 200 hours and the captain had just shy of 8000 supposedly. Here's the catch, they don't let their FOs fly and the captain had just upgraded. So real experience flying the planes may have been minimal. In the US, this would have been pilot error with an AD attached to correct for the logic errors not disabling MCAS when the Captain and FO side AOAs disagree.

    9. Re:BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The vane type sensor is by far the most common on airliners.

    10. Re: BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sorry, the 15-20 is at takeoff otherwise, 6 minutes into flight, they should be pitched down lower than that and they should have had plenty of altitude to recover.

    11. Re:BAD AD by wired_parrot · · Score: 1
      And to further add to this, the relevant pilot procedure to recovering from severe mistrim condition, as provided by Centaurus on pprune.org. Note that the procedure below is not included in the newer 737-MAX flight manuals.

      Extract from the Boeing 737-200 Pilot Training Manual February 1982 page 04.80.31. Edited for brevity

      Runaway and Manual Stabiliser - Recovery from Severe Out-of-Trim

      "In an extreme nose-up out-of-trim condition, requiring almost full forward control column, decelerate, extend the flaps and/or reduce thrust to a minimum practical setting consistent with flight conditions until elevator control is established. Do not decrease airspeed below the minimum maneuvering speed for the flap configuration. A bank of 30 degrees or more will relieve some force on the control column. This, combined with flap extension and reduced speed should permit easier manual trimming.

      If other methods fail to relieve the elevator load and control column force, use the "roller coaster" technique. If nose-up trim is required, raise the nose well above the horizon with elevator control. Then slowly relax the control column pressure and manually trim nose-up. Allow the nose to drop below the horizon while trimming. Repeat this sequence until the airplane is trim.

      It is unclear if the Ethiopian pilots were aware of this procedure, but given that they were close to the ground and at too high of a speed to deploy flaps, the yo-yo maneuver would not have been feasible.

    12. Re: BAD AD by ghoul · · Score: 1

      6 Minutes is when they crashed. the problem happened even sooner.

      --
      **Life is too short to be serious**
    13. Re:BAD AD by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      Nope, they do look like weather vanes. Just do a Google Image search. (There are other types, but most look like weather vanes, including the ones on the 737 Max)

    14. Re: BAD AD by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      It looks like they turned the trim back on because the MCAS had trimmed down so much that it was impossible to recover using only the elevators and manual trim. (And as someone else has posted, aerodynamic forces in that combined stabilizer/elevator configuration may even have made it completely impossible to trim manually)

    15. Re:BAD AD by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      Also why is the MCAS triggering 6 minutes into a flight.

      Where did you read it triggers 6 minutes into a flight? By all accounts all I could find is evidence that it caused problems 6 minutes into the flight.

      But in any case the MCAS system is designed to counter act the fact that the plane changes pitch with thrust due to the poorly placed centre of thrust thanks to engine placement. During takeoff thrust is constant so while you're closest to stall you're also least likely to need MCAS.

    16. Re:BAD AD by ghoul · · Score: 1

      Let me restate what I meant. In my opinion MCAS should not engage below a certain altitude as a nose down attitude is dangerous if you dont have altitude to play with. The risk of stall (and there is a stick shaker to let pilots know) is less than of a nosedive into terrain.

      --
      **Life is too short to be serious**
    17. Re:BAD AD by ghoul · · Score: 1

      Could they have extended flaps to switch of MCAS without switching off electric trim or were they too fast for flaps.
      BTW on the NG you can switch off autopilot input to electric trim without switching off the electric trim. In the Max if you want to switch off MCAS you have to switch off electric trim
      This malfunction would have been much easier to handle if there had been a dedicated MCAS switch off button. Hit the MCAS switch off and then use the manual electric trim switches to trim back to normal.
      How did the Max and NG get a same type rating?

      --
      **Life is too short to be serious**
    18. Re: BAD AD by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      the captain had just upgraded.

      Not relevant. The 737-MAX is the same as any other 737.

      Source: Boeing.

      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    19. Re:BAD AD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The ET plane was supposedly fast. If they had the same AoA error as Lion, then they would have unreliable speed too. Unreliable speed probably calls for flaps up, set power, set nose up angle. Addis Ababa is a high-elevation airport, so low-speed stall would be a larger concern. It is a lot for a pilot to handle with no training. On top of all that, the plane is trying to kill you, and the AD seems to have been way too short-sighted.

    20. Re: BAD AD by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      That section of the manual does mention reducing speed and extending flaps though. Either they weren't familar with it, or they weren't able to reduce speed for whatever reason. There still isn't enough data to draw a solid conclusion, but things are definitely looking worse for Boeing.

    21. Re: BAD AD by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      A stall is evenore dangerous of you don't have altitude to play with.

    22. Re:BAD AD by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      IIRC, the Lion Air flight did put the flaps back down at one point, and everything settled down, until they put them back up again. The Ethiopian plane was apparently too fast, although presumably there was a window of opportunity earlier.

    23. Re:BAD AD by ghoul · · Score: 1

      Couldnt they have reduced speed or does MCAS takeover the throttle as well to prevent stalls?

      --
      **Life is too short to be serious**
    24. Re:BAD AD by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      I don't think MCAS interacts with the throttles. Possibly they could have reduced speed, again if they'd thought of it soon enough.

      One of the reasons for the MCAS system is that in any 737 (not just the MAX) you must not throttle up when in or approaching a stall because the under-wing engines contribute a pitch up moment. In the old 737s if you got into a stall and increased throttle you could get yourself into a situation where the plane would not pitch down. The engine placement on the MAX makes that normal tendency a bit worse.

    25. Re:BAD AD by ghoul · · Score: 1

      Were they afraid if they reduced throttle they would lose the lift from the wings and the nose would drop even further?

      --
      **Life is too short to be serious**
    26. Re:BAD AD by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Maybe. I think it's more likely that they just didn't think of extending the flaps, or didn't think of it until it was too late. They might well have reduced power since the pilots would have been trained to do that in response to overspeed.

  10. Clunky system? by CaptainDork · · Score: 2

    I was in the Navy aboard an aircraft carrier. I worked on the avionics but never serviced or knew about the anti-stall systems.

    That said, I do not recall two blades on either side of the nose cones.

    It sounds clunky to me. Shit that sticks out is subject to damage. Apparently, the two blades could be out of sync. There is a "double-vote yes," system that indicates when the blades are not reporting the same conditions, and a "disagree," warning light Boeing apparently provided as an "in-app," purchase.

    Small-revenue airlines did not opt for the expansion pack and didn't get the fucking memo as to how to deal with a cray cray "AI" system that can fly the goddam plane better than a human.

    "Stall," has a well-established definition and whatever method of detection works on other airlines is not the one Boeing uses.

    --
    It little behooves the best of us to comment on the rest of us.
    1. Re:Clunky system? by jabuzz · · Score: 2

      The problem is the two sensors. You need three is a safety critical system like this so one bad sensor can be out voted by the remaining two good sensors.

      Boeing have two options. Redesign the whole system to have three sensors which means retrofitting it on all delivered planes. That's going to be costly and time consuming.

      The second option is just to disable the MCAS and have all pilots flying the MAX variants of the 737 type certify. This will take time and makes the 737 MAX a much less attractive plane for airlines as they have to type certify their pilots for the new plane.

      The best Boeing can do with the current hardware is have the software disengage on differential sensor input and turn on the indicator light (which presumably will need retrofitting on all planes without it). However at this point the pilots won't be trained/certified for a plane which now has different stall characteristics. Consequently you are back at having to type certify your pilots for the MAX variant.

      Boeing are completely and totally screwed. Further the person or persons who signed off on using just two sensors need to find themselves in the dock on corporate manslaughter charges.

    2. Re:Clunky system? by ceoyoyo · · Score: 2

      Two sensors is fine, because it isn't really a safety critical system. All engine-under-wing airliners have the same instability problem in a stall, and the MAX isn't that much worse. If the system turned off on failure, it would be fine.

      Whoever approved using only one sensor was an idiot.

    3. Re:Clunky system? by PPH · · Score: 1

      That said, I do not recall two blades on either side of the nose cones.

      Some fighters and other military aircraft don't use AoA vanes. Instead, they use a pitot tube type sensor to sense the direction of the direction of the air flow. This type of sensor will just be a few more ports in the air data boom and a few more pressure transducers.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
    4. Re:Clunky system? by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

      Weren't paying attention, eh?
      https://upload.wikimedia.org/w...

      --
      "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
    5. Re:Clunky system? by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      Airbus used to rely on two AOA probes. Until they had several incidents where both probes iced up simultaneously at an AOA which was below stall AOA at low altitude but above the limit at high altitude. So when reaching that higher altitude, the plane pitched down violently and was temporarily uncontrollable until reaching a lower altitude again (unless you switched off two Air Data Computers to get into a more basic flight control law)

      The correct fix (which Airbus implemented and Boeing is going to) is to rely not just on two AOA sensors, but also crosscheck the AOA with other flight data (airspeed, inertial reference, attitude)

    6. Re:Clunky system? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The extra warning light won't cause a recert.

    7. Re:Clunky system? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The faulty AoA sensors weren't actually a problem by themselves. The fatal flaw is that MCAS doesn't reset the trim, so there is a ratchet effect. Without that ratcheting, it could not crash the plane.

    8. Re:Clunky system? by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      Two sensors is not fine. Doubly so if the two are of the same type, because they are likely to fail in the same way.

      What is "fine" is doing the same thing EVERY single engine pilot does when flying in the clouds. At that point, the pilot is in the same condition as the computer: no outside reference and relying totally on what the instruments say. The pilot is trained to continuously crosscheck the instruments to verify that they all make sense and to cover up an instrument that is giving anomalous readings. For instance, if I'm at high engine RPM, with medium airspeed, a positive reading on the VSI, but the altitude reading is decreasing, I'm going to surmise that my altimeter is busted and cover it with a post-it note (so it doesn't confuse me anymore). I'll use the GPS reading for altitude, then contact center to let them know I'm having problems and will probably be busting my altitude assignment at some point (they'll keep other planes even further away from me in that case.)

      The thing is, this is turns a failing instrument into little more than the irritation of having to get an instrument fixed. AND THIS IS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE!! Why the hell is an engineer with a major airliner manufacturer NOT AWARE.

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    9. Re:Clunky system? by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Two sensors is fine.

      See what I did there? Same thing you did: assert an opinion with nothing to back it up. See the post you replied to for said backup. If you'd like to actually reply to that, instead of ranting, happy to discuss.

    10. Re:Clunky system? by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      "Stall," has a well-established definition and whatever method of detection works on other airlines is not the one Boeing uses.

      There's three methods generally used. One is a small slit which activates a reed switch would be useful only for a warning light and not for any kind of control scheme, one is to use differential pitot tubes which since you have a problem with things sticking from planes I'm sorry to inform you also stick out from planes, and then there's the AoA vane sensor used by Boeing ... and ... Airbus, and because I was really bored I spent the last 10 minutes looking at aircraft pictures so you can also see them on the first 5 planes you come up with when you google image search Bombardier, you can see them on Fokker F70s, I tried to see how small I could go but it would look like tiny aircraft like Gulfstreams and Dassault Falcons tend to use differential pitot tubes again.

      You're quick to judge from your throne of ignorance.

    11. Re:Clunky system? by jeff4747 · · Score: 1

      Further the person or persons who signed off on using just two sensors

      One sensor.

      The plane has two, but MCAS only reacts to one.

    12. Re:Clunky system? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      (you sound drunk)

    13. Re:Clunky system? by michelcolman · · Score: 1

      As I already explained in a reply to another post higher up, two sensors is not fine if they are of the same type. Several airbus airplanes suffered a violent pitch down because both AOA probes iced up at the same time while going through a layer of icing conditions, resulting in a stall detection at higher altitude. One of these events is described here.

      The correct action is to crosscheck AOA with other airplane data to make sure it's consistent. Which is a few lines of computer code since all the hardware already feeds into those computers. Airbus has implemented this fix, and Boeing will now do the same. Belatedly.

      GP's post is very relevant. This is indeed something that is taught to every student pilot: never rely on any single instrument, always crosscheck. It's unforgiveable that they didn't program it this way, especially after the Airbus incidents.

    14. Re:Clunky system? by jabuzz · · Score: 1

      Except when two sensors disagreeing can send your plane into an unrecoverable dive then that immediately makes it a safety critical feature.

    15. Re:Clunky system? by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Yes. Which is apparently in Boeing's software fix. The solution is not three sensors (of the same type) as was suggested by the OP. Two AOA sensors are fine.

    16. Re:Clunky system? by mjwx · · Score: 1

      Small-revenue airlines did not opt for the expansion pack and didn't get the fucking memo as to how to deal with a cray cray "AI" system that can fly the goddam plane better than a human.

      "Stall," has a well-established definition and whatever method of detection works on other airlines is not the one Boeing uses.

      The MCAS does more than just stall prevention. It changes the input of the pilot to make the aircraft feel like how a 737 NG responds in order to prevent the new 737-MAX from having a separate type certification and having to retrain pilots on it. The problem is the 737-MAX has a radical change from the 737-NG, in order to fit the larger CFM LEAP engines they couldn't put them under the wing, instead they put them higher and mounted them forward of the wing. This has the side effect of putting the thrust directly under the wing that can cause the aircraft to pitch up without a change in control surfaces or thrust.

      Hence Boeing built in a stall prevention component into MCAS.

      This is why it cant be fixed with a software patch, it's a hardware problem. I think Boeing are going to have to start using the older CFM56 engines which fit underwing until the plane can be redesigned.

      The irony is, they spend decades and billions rubbishing Airbus for allegedly using computers to override pilot control which has not killed anyone via failure in over 30 years.... because the Airbus flight control computers are designed to throw back control under any ambiguity and say "sorry pilot, your plane now".

      --
      Calling someone a "hater" only means you can not rationally rebut their argument.
  11. Re:Biggest. Lawsuit. Ever. by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    Yeah, next time make sure you only have poor idiots that can't afford good lawyers in the crashing planes. In other words, if you skirt the security regulations, build all-coach planes.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  12. Re:Capitalism again by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    Nah, that's just a side effect of profit maximization. Corporations don't want to kill people. That's bad for business. There's fewer customers, and what's worse, fewer people competing for jobs so you might have to pay a living wage at some point even if you kill too many of them.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  13. American Workmanship? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    U.S. Air Force rejects Boeing's KC-46A aerial tankers
    https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2019/04/03/US-Air-Force-again-stops-acceptance-of-Boeings-KC-46A-aerial-tankers/6401554265675/

    The reason? The planes had foreign object debris in closed compartments.

    If a Boeing assembler dropped a tool or peice of trash and couldn't reach it - no problem. Just cover it up and pretend you never saw it. It's just a military fuel tanker.

    This is the second time. The 1st time, Boeing said they put corrective action in place, but trash/tools are still being found sealed in the body of the plane.

    Maybe Boeing is trying to imitate Harbor Freight. Free Tools with every KC-46A.

    1. Re:American Workmanship? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why is the Air Force taking apart sealed pieces of the plane?

    2. Re:American Workmanship? by Shotgun · · Score: 1

      Because they weren't "sealed". They found the stuff behind maintenance access panels when they went to perform maintenance.

      --
      Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
      Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
    3. Re:American Workmanship? by Hognoxious · · Score: 1

      To find out what the fuck is causing all those clunks and rattles.

      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    4. Re: American Workmanship? by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Boieng is hardly unique there. I've worked on fleets from two other manufacturers on which we found tools and rags in places they weren't supposed to be.

  14. Re: Capitalism again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Increased mortality is not how I want to improve the job market, maybe at the executive level...

  15. O where art thou by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    c6gunner?

  16. Re:Biggest. Lawsuit. Ever. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    full plane of UN staff this time around.

  17. Re: Trying to "frame me"? GROW UP! apk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Wow, you sound like a big gay baby.

  18. Re:Capitalism again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Nah, that's just a side effect of profit maximization. Corporations don't want to kill people. That's bad for business. There's fewer customers, and what's worse, fewer people competing for jobs so you might have to pay a living wage at some point even if you kill too many of them.

    Corporations don't care if they kill people, nor do they care if they break the laws, if the dollar costs are less than the revenue gained. That said, killing people does impose a cost on the corporation, especially if the corporation is found to be at fault.

  19. Re: Trying to "frame me"? GROW UP! apk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    APK made you EAT YOUR WORDS in 100's of upmods on hosts and slashdot users liking his program https://games.slashdot.org/com...

  20. Re:"Aviation safety expert" Lying Kendall sez : by Kartu · · Score: 1

    ATTEMPTED TO RAPE A CLASSMATE

    FFS, Ford wasn't his classmate, her accusation was messy at best and have changed over time on top of it.

  21. Re:Capitalism again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's a shame that the market position of Boeing and Airbus has very little to do with capitalism and everything to do with cronyism.

    It could be argued that problems like this are a lack of competition. What else are you going to fly, a Yugo?

  22. Re:Biggest. Lawsuit. Ever. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    If you're a Boeing shareholder, I'd advise to get out now, or prepare to bend over and grab your ankles.

    This is going to end Boeing as a corporate entity. There is simply too much gross negligence on too many levels, and too much willful lying to get a new aircraft to be accepted as the former type to avoid re-certifying pilots.

    This is going to take the company down. However, the remainders may be picked up by someone for pennies on the dollar.
     

  23. Re: Trying to "frame me"? GROW UP! apk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    apk must be on break from slobbing trucker knob

  24. Re:"Aviation safety expert" Lying Kendall sez : by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You trumptards will not stop lying. Jesus makes you evil.

  25. The link is right there! by Atmchicago · · Score: 1

    All Slashdot articles place the link to the right of the headline, next to the little icons.

    --

    You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it dissolve.

  26. Re:Capitalism again by Mr.+Dollar+Ton · · Score: 2, Informative

    It's a shame that the market position of Boeing and Airbus has very little to do with capitalism and everything to do with cronyism.

    You say that like "cronyism" sprang up all by itself from the vacuum. Cronyism is the expected result of the operation of a capitalist economy without effective and strong oversight, the result of which operation is always and invariably capitalism taking over politics, democratic or otherwise. The economic mechanisms are also well understood by the economic theory: when investing in bribes and government subversion creates better returns than investing in production, a capitalist will invest in bribery and not in production. This case is a perfect illustration of the phenomenon - it was a lot more effective for Boeing to subvert the certification process than to ensure quality aircraft design. Boeing boss even had the temerity to call Trump and ask that grounding of the dangerous planes be delayed for PR reasons.

    The result of the right-wing(nut) policies of oversight removal in the US are well known. Corporations have for a long time had a say over politics that the ordinary citizens don't. Even science says so:

    Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.

    The worst part is that US is exporting this model worldwide, damaging and weakening democratic governments all over the place.

  27. I have an even more basic question by Ecuador · · Score: 1

    Why is the MCAS needed now? I understand it was there to avoid pilot training, but we are way passed that.
    If it can cause issues and you have to turn it off at times why not just remove it and let the pilots do what they are supposed to and push the nose down themselves of they have to.
    Of it can stall way too easily and pilots are not enough then still it would mean you have to discontinue the plane not enable MCAS.

    --
    Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent. Polar Scope Align for iOS
    1. Re:I have an even more basic question by slacktide · · Score: 1

      That is a valid question, and one that the media frequently gets 100% wrong. Non-technical media frequently describes MCAS as an anti-stall feature. It is not. The intent of MCAS is to make the control column forces on the 737 MAX feel identical to a 737 NG during a stall, so that additional training is not required when a pilot is transitioning from an NG to a MAX.

    2. Re:I have an even more basic question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      FAA was told MCAS was originally 0.6 or so degrees. It ended up 2.5(unlimited due to stupidity). It may be the case that the 737-MAX is so unstable if the nose gets up enough that MCAS is no longer just 'for feel,' but to make sure the plane isn't nose-up stall-happy.

  28. The cultural elephant in the room by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Nobody is questioning the real reason why all the recent fatal accidents happen in the third world. It's a whole left brain - right brain thing. People that operate a machine have to think like the machine, not be prayin' to their superstitious golden calf when the galley coffeemaker quits working.

    Regardless, Boeing fucked up big time. They suffer all the same management problems responsible for so many disasters, like the space shuttle. And yet, once again, nothing will be learned, and we have the overused *rinse-repeat*. Oh well... c'est la vie.

    1. Re: The cultural elephant in the room by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The main conclusion here is actually: First World Fuck-up (clue: where was this flying turd designed and sold from?)

    2. Re: The cultural elephant in the room by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, the main conclusion is that some people are properly conditioned by their society and upbringing to deal with real problems, no matter whose fuck-up it is. The numbers speak much louder than everybody's pontificating, but the blinders and ear plugs are much more effective at obscuring the ugly truth about one's self!

    3. Re:The cultural elephant in the room by jeff4747 · · Score: 1

      Uh, no.

      The issue is detecting the problem early enough to deal with it requires an optional warning light.

      Since it's optional, third-world airlines didn't buy it. Because they're a lot poorer than first-world airlines.

      On the other hand, third-world airlines are way, way, way smarter than you. So they have that going for them, which is nice.

    4. Re:The cultural elephant in the room by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      third-world airlines didn't buy it.

      They're not the only ones. I know how you all hate the truth, but you have to accept the published numbers. Right now the smart thing to do is stay off those airlines. The airplane is a bit finicky, but it's not really serious in the hands of any competent flyer that can think beyond rote training. The third worlders are taught not to question authority, ever. This is a far bigger problem than the airplane's foibles.

  29. Re:Capitalism again by PPH · · Score: 1

    when investing in bribes and government subversion creates better returns than investing in production, a capitalist will invest in bribery and not in production.

    Please be more specific. It's only bribery and corruption when it it is paid to a foreign official. It is protected speech when paid to a domestic politician.

    Congress voted itself a monopoly in the taking of graft.

    --
    Have gnu, will travel.
  30. Followed procedures? by PPH · · Score: 1

    They turned it off. Then they turned it on again. Did they get tech support on the line or what?

    --
    Have gnu, will travel.
  31. Help! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The first link in TFS has me stuck in an infinite loop!

  32. Re: Trying to "frame me"? GROW UP! apk by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    APK's idea of fun is licking the toilet seat at truck stops and standing in front of the mirror naked and punching himself in the balls hoping that he will turn into a real man.

    -subie

  33. Re: "Aviation safety expert" Lying Kendall sez : by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Please provide factual evidence that ford's testimony was true in anyway considering that no witnesses backed up her claims and her story change more than twice. Also notice that all the other women disappeared afterwards without further investigations.

    -Subie

  34. Hyello - dis is Bo-ink technical support by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hyello - dis is Bo-ink technical support.

    Vee are calling because airplane is messaging out many nose dive error.

    Are you in front of control so that vee can show you deese error?

  35. Re:Icing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That wasn't AoA, that was the pitot tubes, which are a completely different system.

  36. Re:Biggest. Lawsuit. Ever. by Shotgun · · Score: 1

    Unless there is some tiny print on all those tickets that say, "We're not responsible for crashing planes" or "Liablitily limited to $1M(US), collectible at Boeing Headquarters."

    --
    Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
    Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
  37. Re:Icing by michelcolman · · Score: 1

    No, it was AOA probes. You're thinking about AF 447 which was a pitot problem.

    Here's a description of one of the events.

  38. Re:Capitalism again by Shotgun · · Score: 1

    And there never has been any major catastrophes in socialist countries (other than the socialism itself). Sure thing, bud. Just keep smokin' what your smokin' as we watch the Venezualans cooking their pets over trash fires.

    --
    Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
    Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
  39. Re:Capitalism again by Shotgun · · Score: 1

    First you argue that oversight will be subverted by cronyism.
    Then you claim that oversight is removed by cronyism.

    In neither case is capitalism the problem. The problem is businesses seeking to subvert the concentration of power within government.

    The worst part is your wilful ignorance that despite some major flaws, the US has been the biggest exporter of democratic governments and liberty that the world has ever seen.

    --
    Aah, change is good. -- Rafiki
    Yeah, but it ain't easy. -- Simba
  40. Re:Icing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Oh wow, I hadn't heard about that one. Thank you.

  41. Water drowns people by istartedi · · Score: 1

    Water drowns people. Let's ban it.

    --
    For all intensive purposes, "whom" is no longer a word. That begs the question, "who cares"?
  42. Boeing employees also followed procedures... by ffkom · · Score: 1

    to optimize the system for maximum profit, compromising on safety. Maybe those procedures should be reviewed as well, not just the MCAS specific documentation.

  43. Lawsuits are not the problem. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Paying damages for the immediate accidents won't be a big problem. However, the prospect of losing thousands of future orders could be a significant blow to both Boeing and the US economy.

    Japan Airlines Flight 123 - a boeing 747 that crashed killing 520 people - remains the deadliest single-aircraft accident in aviation history.

    The official cause was botched maintenance by a team of technicians sent to Japan by Boeing.

    JAL paid a total of $7.6 million to the victims' relatives in the form of "condolence money".

    JAL president, Yasumoto Takagi, resigned.

    A JAL maintenance manager and an engineer who had inspected and cleared the aircraft as flightworthy, both committed suicide.

  44. Read the Report by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Did you read the preliminary report?

    THE PILOTS TURNED THE STAB TRIM BACK ON. The MCAS was unable to do anything for several minutes because the motor that moves the stabilator was TURNED OFF. The preliminary report states that MCAS tried to command nose-down trim, but the stab did not move. Once they turned it back on they put in some nose-up trim. But when they stopped pushing the manual trim switches, the MCAS waited 5 seconds and did what it was programmed to do.

    Had they hit the damn trim switches again, IT WOULD HAVE STOPPED. Earlier in the flight, the pilot had overridden MCAS commands by doing precisely that- manual trim stops MCAS commands, and the system pauses 5 seconds, then evaluates again.

  45. Re:Capitalism again by Mr.+Dollar+Ton · · Score: 1

    the US has been the biggest exporter of democratic governments and liberty

    LOL. You must be as indoctrinated as you're stupid and ignorant.

  46. Re:Capitalism again by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    The question whether a corporation cares about a law can be answered by a simple equation: If the revenue for breaking the law is higher than the chance of getting caught times the fine to pay when caught, ignore the law. Then it's just part of the operating cost.

    People dying isn't necessarily a no-go either. If you can somehow turn it into a "regrettable oversight", maybe add some human error and then threaten to dump a few thousand unemployed on the streets if you're fined more than the equivalent of a finger waggling and a "no, no, no, naughty corporation!", why bother caring about human lives?

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  47. Not Exactly True by Toad-san · · Score: 1

    - No one told them to firewall the throttles. Excessive speed made trimming more difficult.
    - No one told them to turn the malfunctioning MCAS back on, which put the aircraft into its final fatal dive.