"In the USA they hire morons and idiots to work for thew TSA. none of them have any Law enforcement background and are nothing more than minimum wage private store cops that have been given far more power than they should have."
You don't honestly think that's accidental, do you?
I'm asking because I'm looking to replace a Mini-ATX running Windows XP with something somewhat better, maybe Windows 7. I thought it was memory-bound with 512MB, but I increased the RAM and it turns out it's CPU-bound instead. A relative rarity these days. Turns out it has a VIA x86-compatible processor.
Somebody got this for a relative, and didn't check with me first. Even running XP, it's slow. I'd like to go to somewhere near a Core 2 Duo, on a budget.
Critical thinking carries over to ethics. Who would have guessed?
(I have to agree with some others here though that "more stringent" ethics are in the eye of the beholder. At least the study shows that some people are thinking about it, rather than getting all their ethics once a week from some guy who dresses funny.)
On the other hand, if you just want to keep it from being recognized by the average city-cop-on-the-street, you could use far simpler crypto with extremely low CPU overhead. I am thinking of one as I write this. It would be dead simple to circumvent if you recognized it, but just like most door locks, while it might not stop somebody determined it would keep my friend John Q. Public out.
"Jane the whole argument is going off bad math, the Bobcat E350 uses 16w under load NOT when idle, when idle less than 5w, and if you aren't using the IGP when idle less than 3w. So you can have all the power of the dual core Bobcat with the idle power damned close to the Pi but having much better performance."
I will just point out that I specifically stated I was not referring to a Pi, but to one of the many superior products that are now on the market.
"Something tells me that the DUO will be more widely available before the LEAP, despite the "headstart" that LEAP has - they've been at this for how long now and all they have to show is a pretty webpage and a press onslaught in response to a Kickstarter project."
But this was my point. The DUO does not even have devices in developer hands yet. LEAP has had them out for I think close to a year now. And they are not just "prototypes". They are beta versions of the commercial product.
Sorry, but it's just wrong. LEAP is WAY ahead of the DUO. The DUO folks still have to go through all the things that LEAP has already done, before the DUO will be a production product. I see absolutely nothing indicating otherwise.
240 frames per second is not "ridiculously low" latency. Try thousands, and you are starting to get into LEAP range.
Again, I know because I have seen it. I have a production-ready LEAP right here not 2 feet away from me.
LEAP has published specs. Their precision is down to single-digit microns. They are getting thousands of frames per second versus 240. The numbers are there. Whether it "seems" that way to you or not.
"A moving power plant has to worry about its power-to-weight ratio, and its power-to-volume ratio. "
Actually, studies have shown that the make-or-break factor for hydrogen isn't the vehicle, it's long-term storage and transport of the gas.
The other issues (storage tanks for vehicles, power-to-weight ratios, etc.) have all been sufficiently solved. Allow hydrogen to be economically produced at local plants, and you have a viable fuel.
"Mythbusters pretty much proved how easy these things are to bypass."
The problem is that in order to prevent false negatives, the recognition has to be loose enough to allow way too many false positives.
But -- and here's the big issue, IMHO -- the same is true for facial recognition, and voice recognition.
So you have 3 "biometric security" options, all of which are ridiculously easy to circumvent.
Security theater, anybody?
The really big problem here is that it's a false sense of security. People come to rely on means that aren't secure, they they feel they are secure. This just makes them sitting ducks for malicious people who know what they're doing.
"Here's two comments from leapmotion forums from the Co-Founder & CTO:"
But those two comments do not say what you appear to think they're saying.
"Just to clear up a tiny bit of mystery. The device does not output any form of depth-map or point cloud over USB. There is no processor on the device."
It does not have to have a processor onboard in order to do a lot of the heavy lifting. There are all kinds of ways to process data without a "processor" per se. It could be a custom IC, or a PLA, or any number of other kinds of electronics going on in there.
But more to the point: the comment was about whether it outputs a point cloud. So what? It does output a hell of a lot of data, it just isn't in the form of a point cloud. (Which makes sense, as a 3D point cloud of that size and resolution would massively overwhelm even a speedy new machine with quad cores, not to mention the USB interface.) And that brings us right back to the context of the comment: it doesn't output a point cloud. So it HAS TO be doing something with the data onboard, even if it's only to reduce the volume of data to a manageable level.
"The developer units do not have firmware with plug-and-play legacy features right now."
They may not have "plugh-and-play legacy features", but they *DO* have firmware. I know because I've updated mine, and it's due for another update. Which very strongly implies that there is data manipulation of some kind going on in the device itself. (As I pointed out above, in fact that isn't even optional. It MUST be manipulating the data in order to even operate within the limits of USB. And even if that were not logically so, I know it is so because before the last firmware update it was overwhelming my USB.)
"With the growing number of cases of seizure of cameras and recording devices by police, I think the need for something like this exists, even if people don't realize it."
It isn't growing. It did for a short while, when the police thought they could get away with confiscating recordings of themselves in action, but they have invariably (if slowly) been shot down by the courts.
Increasingly, the police are being told "If you see somebody taking pictures or video, (A) be nice and (B) leave them alone. We can't afford to lose more lawsuits."
"Ultracap set and voltage sensor. No issues with component aging, works in sub-freezing temperatures, and lighter. It'll power the computer for a minute or so, which is enough time for a clean shutdown."
Just connect the + from the ignition switch to a series diode, then your ultracap set and the board. Then your "voltage sensor" can be just a couple of resistors as a voltage divider, connected from the upstream side of the diode to an input. So when you turn the ignition off, the caps still power the unit for a while, but the input goes low which tells the computer to shut down. Your program should allow the input to be low for a couple of seconds before shutting down, both to smooth out electrical glitches, and to give you time to turn the ignition from "run" to "accessory" if you want to turn the ignition off but leave the computer running.
There should be no need for the thing to normally run or draw power when the ignition is off. That's what the "accessory" position is for.
If you use something like a Raspberry Pi (or better, one of the superior minis now available), even when it's running you should only draw around 2W or less, nowhere near the 16W being discussed.
"In the US at least, the courts (all the way up to the Supreme Court IIRC) have ruled that law enforcement can't legally force you to provide access to your encrypted data (thanks to a little thing called the 5th amendment)"
That's only in most cases. There are exceptions, but fortunately those exceptions are rare.
In particular, if they already KNOW (as opposed to just suspect) that there is illegal material contained in the encrypted data, they can compel you to provide the access. The reasoning is: if they already KNOW it is there, you aren't incriminating yourself anyway.
But it is important to note that they must have pretty darned strong evidence that the illegal material is there (like multiple witnesses). Probable cause is not even nearly enough.
"Now if they grant you immunity, then yes you have to decrypt it, but then you have immunity and are not at risk."
That is the reasoning of the courts but I disagree. It is based on an assumption that is not necessarily valid. What if there is evidence of some OTHER crime on the drive?
The 5th Amendment says, in so many words, that nobody can be compelled to be a witness against himself. It doesn't make any provision for immunity. Prosecutors might say, "well, you are no danger so it isn't being used 'against' you." But that is only an assumption.
Let's take a hypothetical example. You have an entire drive encrypted. On the drive are pictures of you and your boyfriend killing your husband and cutting him up. (Some idiots actually posted pictures like that online, a long time ago. But let's say they're on the hard drive.) Let's say further that you have broken up with your boyfriend. You can't stand him anymore.
The prosecution says, "We'll grant you immunity if you give us the password. We can use the evidence then to convict your boyfriend."
Well... what if you also know that somebody left some child pornography on that drive? You can't prove it. So even if you were granted immunity for the murder, you could still be convicted and sent to prison. So you WOULD be testifying against yourself.
So it seems to me that Constitutionally, you could still invoke the 5th, even if you were granted immunity.
(It might be different if they granted you immunity for everything on the drive. Not just the murder.)
"11th circuit court of appeals ruled that you *CANNOT* compel somebody to decrypt their HD."
There is a caveat, however. This is only true if it is NOT known in advance whether there is specific illegal material contained in the encrypted data.
In another case, Customs (apparently randomly) searched a man who was coming back into the United States. His laptop was turned on but asleep, and an encrypted volume was active and accessible. Two Customs agents saw child pornography among the encrypted data, before the man (I don't know how) managed to switch the computer off. When the computer was started back up again, the encrypted data was not accessible without a password.
In this case, the court ruled that the man could be compelled to supply the password, because it was already known that specific illegal material was contained in the encrypted data. (With a certain measure of reliability. After all, two agents testified to seeing that material, AND if that turned out not to be the case when the data was accessed, two Customs agents would no doubt lose their jobs, to say the least. Maybe get sued or be prosecuted as well.)
The lesson here is: be sure your decryption is turned off.
There's more, though: another circuit court recently ruled firmly that even at the border, agents of the government must have probable cause to conduct a search. So the random searches they were doing are no longer kosher. (They never were, really, but they were getting away with it.)
This also holds true if, for example, you had a vault with a combination lock that could not be physically forced. (Admittedly an unlikely scenario, but still.) You can be ordered to unlock a key lock, but you can't be ordered to turn over a combination.
Obviously, in many circumstances force could just be used to get past a combination lock. But that's irrelevant to the principle that you can't be forced to turn over a combination. Or a password. Or any credentials that are stored only in your memory.
"Also, in some states it is a crime to record an on-duty police officer without their permission."
No, it isn't.
This has been tried in a relatively few states, and while at first some judges were cooperative with the police, eventually in every state where it has been tried so far it has been thrown out of court.
It is now a pretty well-established principle that if something is occurring in public, you can film it. Even if it's cops doing it. Almost anything that occurs on the street, in fact, plus anywhere else public. Even backcountry roads.
People have a RIGHT to film the police doing their taxpayer-funded jobs in public. Period.
Recently some cops tried a new twist on this idea. They claimed that filming was okay, but that recording audio at the same time was "illegal surveillance" under their states' "all-party consent" law. (I.e., in some states, all parties have to consent before a phone conversation, for example, can be legally recorded.)
Slashdot Mirror
"In the USA they hire morons and idiots to work for thew TSA. none of them have any Law enforcement background and are nothing more than minimum wage private store cops that have been given far more power than they should have."
You don't honestly think that's accidental, do you?
"Scientific literacy is not equivalent to critical thinking."
I did not claim that they were equivalent. But it's pretty hard to argue that they aren't related.
Ugh. Badly worded. I mean this study is evidence that there just may be a causal relationship.
"There are ethical critical thinkers and unethical critical thinkers."
Yes, there are. But I would hardly say that one "has nothing to do" with the other. In fact, this study is evidence of just that.
I'm asking because I'm looking to replace a Mini-ATX running Windows XP with something somewhat better, maybe Windows 7. I thought it was memory-bound with 512MB, but I increased the RAM and it turns out it's CPU-bound instead. A relative rarity these days. Turns out it has a VIA x86-compatible processor.
Somebody got this for a relative, and didn't check with me first. Even running XP, it's slow. I'd like to go to somewhere near a Core 2 Duo, on a budget.
How's the performance of the CPU? Would it compare to a lower-end Core 2 Duo maybe? Better?
Critical thinking carries over to ethics. Who would have guessed?
(I have to agree with some others here though that "more stringent" ethics are in the eye of the beholder. At least the study shows that some people are thinking about it, rather than getting all their ethics once a week from some guy who dresses funny.)
On the other hand, if you just want to keep it from being recognized by the average city-cop-on-the-street, you could use far simpler crypto with extremely low CPU overhead. I am thinking of one as I write this. It would be dead simple to circumvent if you recognized it, but just like most door locks, while it might not stop somebody determined it would keep my friend John Q. Public out.
"Jane the whole argument is going off bad math, the Bobcat E350 uses 16w under load NOT when idle, when idle less than 5w, and if you aren't using the IGP when idle less than 3w. So you can have all the power of the dual core Bobcat with the idle power damned close to the Pi but having much better performance."
I will just point out that I specifically stated I was not referring to a Pi, but to one of the many superior products that are now on the market.
"Something tells me that the DUO will be more widely available before the LEAP, despite the "headstart" that LEAP has - they've been at this for how long now and all they have to show is a pretty webpage and a press onslaught in response to a Kickstarter project."
But this was my point. The DUO does not even have devices in developer hands yet. LEAP has had them out for I think close to a year now. And they are not just "prototypes". They are beta versions of the commercial product.
Sorry, but it's just wrong. LEAP is WAY ahead of the DUO. The DUO folks still have to go through all the things that LEAP has already done, before the DUO will be a production product. I see absolutely nothing indicating otherwise.
240 frames per second is not "ridiculously low" latency. Try thousands, and you are starting to get into LEAP range.
Again, I know because I have seen it. I have a
production-ready
LEAP right here not 2 feet away from me.
LEAP has published specs. Their precision is down to single-digit microns. They are getting thousands of frames per second versus 240. The numbers are there. Whether it "seems" that way to you or not.
But I did not intend to criticize. I'm just saying that was probably the source of misunderstanding.
Your very first sentence mentions cameras. And "recorded" gestures don't mean much without a picture to go with them.
"A moving power plant has to worry about its power-to-weight ratio, and its power-to-volume ratio. "
Actually, studies have shown that the make-or-break factor for hydrogen isn't the vehicle, it's long-term storage and transport of the gas.
The other issues (storage tanks for vehicles, power-to-weight ratios, etc.) have all been sufficiently solved. Allow hydrogen to be economically produced at local plants, and you have a viable fuel.
In most cases, you don't have to. Just use a photocopier or make a mold and fill it with gelatin.
"Mythbusters pretty much proved how easy these things are to bypass."
The problem is that in order to prevent false negatives, the recognition has to be loose enough to allow way too many false positives.
But -- and here's the big issue, IMHO -- the same is true for facial recognition, and voice recognition.
So you have 3 "biometric security" options, all of which are ridiculously easy to circumvent.
Security theater, anybody?
The really big problem here is that it's a false sense of security. People come to rely on means that aren't secure, they they feel they are secure. This just makes them sitting ducks for malicious people who know what they're doing.
Don't bother me. I'm Bz.
"Here's two comments from leapmotion forums from the Co-Founder & CTO:"
But those two comments do not say what you appear to think they're saying.
"Just to clear up a tiny bit of mystery. The device does not output any form of depth-map or point cloud over USB. There is no processor on the device."
It does not have to have a processor onboard in order to do a lot of the heavy lifting. There are all kinds of ways to process data without a "processor" per se. It could be a custom IC, or a PLA, or any number of other kinds of electronics going on in there.
But more to the point: the comment was about whether it outputs a point cloud. So what? It does output a hell of a lot of data, it just isn't in the form of a point cloud. (Which makes sense, as a 3D point cloud of that size and resolution would massively overwhelm even a speedy new machine with quad cores, not to mention the USB interface.) And that brings us right back to the context of the comment: it doesn't output a point cloud. So it HAS TO be doing something with the data onboard, even if it's only to reduce the volume of data to a manageable level.
"The developer units do not have firmware with plug-and-play legacy features right now."
They may not have "plugh-and-play legacy features", but they *DO* have firmware. I know because I've updated mine, and it's due for another update. Which very strongly implies that there is data manipulation of some kind going on in the device itself. (As I pointed out above, in fact that isn't even optional. It MUST be manipulating the data in order to even operate within the limits of USB. And even if that were not logically so, I know it is so because before the last firmware update it was overwhelming my USB.)
"With the growing number of cases of seizure of cameras and recording devices by police, I think the need for something like this exists, even if people don't realize it."
It isn't growing. It did for a short while, when the police thought they could get away with confiscating recordings of themselves in action, but they have invariably (if slowly) been shot down by the courts.
Increasingly, the police are being told "If you see somebody taking pictures or video, (A) be nice and (B) leave them alone. We can't afford to lose more lawsuits."
"There is demand."
I agree. Up for a joint project? As you say, the demand is already there. I say let's supply it.
Hmmm. Have to research what chips there are available in the way of on-the-fly encryption.
"Ultracap set and voltage sensor. No issues with component aging, works in sub-freezing temperatures, and lighter. It'll power the computer for a minute or so, which is enough time for a clean shutdown."
Just connect the + from the ignition switch to a series diode, then your ultracap set and the board. Then your "voltage sensor" can be just a couple of resistors as a voltage divider, connected from the upstream side of the diode to an input. So when you turn the ignition off, the caps still power the unit for a while, but the input goes low which tells the computer to shut down. Your program should allow the input to be low for a couple of seconds before shutting down, both to smooth out electrical glitches, and to give you time to turn the ignition from "run" to "accessory" if you want to turn the ignition off but leave the computer running.
There should be no need for the thing to normally run or draw power when the ignition is off. That's what the "accessory" position is for.
If you use something like a Raspberry Pi (or better, one of the superior minis now available), even when it's running you should only draw around 2W or less, nowhere near the 16W being discussed.
"In the US at least, the courts (all the way up to the Supreme Court IIRC) have ruled that law enforcement can't legally force you to provide access to your encrypted data (thanks to a little thing called the 5th amendment)"
That's only in most cases. There are exceptions, but fortunately those exceptions are rare.
In particular, if they already KNOW (as opposed to just suspect) that there is illegal material contained in the encrypted data, they can compel you to provide the access. The reasoning is: if they already KNOW it is there, you aren't incriminating yourself anyway.
But it is important to note that they must have pretty darned strong evidence that the illegal material is there (like multiple witnesses). Probable cause is not even nearly enough.
"Now if they grant you immunity, then yes you have to decrypt it, but then you have immunity and are not at risk."
That is the reasoning of the courts but I disagree. It is based on an assumption that is not necessarily valid. What if there is evidence of some OTHER crime on the drive?
The 5th Amendment says, in so many words, that nobody can be compelled to be a witness against himself. It doesn't make any provision for immunity. Prosecutors might say, "well, you are no danger so it isn't being used 'against' you." But that is only an assumption.
Let's take a hypothetical example. You have an entire drive encrypted. On the drive are pictures of you and your boyfriend killing your husband and cutting him up. (Some idiots actually posted pictures like that online, a long time ago. But let's say they're on the hard drive.) Let's say further that you have broken up with your boyfriend. You can't stand him anymore.
The prosecution says, "We'll grant you immunity if you give us the password. We can use the evidence then to convict your boyfriend."
Well... what if you also know that somebody left some child pornography on that drive? You can't prove it. So even if you were granted immunity for the murder, you could still be convicted and sent to prison. So you WOULD be testifying against yourself.
So it seems to me that Constitutionally, you could still invoke the 5th, even if you were granted immunity.
(It might be different if they granted you immunity for everything on the drive. Not just the murder.)
"11th circuit court of appeals ruled that you *CANNOT* compel somebody to decrypt their HD."
There is a caveat, however. This is only true if it is NOT known in advance whether there is specific illegal material contained in the encrypted data.
In another case, Customs (apparently randomly) searched a man who was coming back into the United States. His laptop was turned on but asleep, and an encrypted volume was active and accessible. Two Customs agents saw child pornography among the encrypted data, before the man (I don't know how) managed to switch the computer off. When the computer was started back up again, the encrypted data was not accessible without a password.
In this case, the court ruled that the man could be compelled to supply the password, because it was already known that specific illegal material was contained in the encrypted data. (With a certain measure of reliability. After all, two agents testified to seeing that material, AND if that turned out not to be the case when the data was accessed, two Customs agents would no doubt lose their jobs, to say the least. Maybe get sued or be prosecuted as well.)
The lesson here is: be sure your decryption is turned off.
There's more, though: another circuit court recently ruled firmly that even at the border, agents of the government must have probable cause to conduct a search. So the random searches they were doing are no longer kosher. (They never were, really, but they were getting away with it.)
This also holds true if, for example, you had a vault with a combination lock that could not be physically forced. (Admittedly an unlikely scenario, but still.) You can be ordered to unlock a key lock, but you can't be ordered to turn over a combination.
Obviously, in many circumstances force could just be used to get past a combination lock. But that's irrelevant to the principle that you can't be forced to turn over a combination. Or a password. Or any credentials that are stored only in your memory.
"Also, in some states it is a crime to record an on-duty police officer without their permission."
No, it isn't.
This has been tried in a relatively few states, and while at first some judges were cooperative with the police, eventually in every state where it has been tried so far it has been thrown out of court.
It is now a pretty well-established principle that if something is occurring in public, you can film it. Even if it's cops doing it. Almost anything that occurs on the street, in fact, plus anywhere else public. Even backcountry roads.
People have a RIGHT to film the police doing their taxpayer-funded jobs in public. Period.
Recently some cops tried a new twist on this idea. They claimed that filming was okay, but that recording audio at the same time was "illegal surveillance" under their states' "all-party consent" law. (I.e., in some states, all parties have to consent before a phone conversation, for example, can be legally recorded.)
That didn't stand up in court, either.