Neither of the two web services has an OpenDNS account and they do report the CNAME response. Their resolvers are not influenced by your account settings, so I know you are lying if you say you got the actual Google addresses from these two services. This discussion is over. To everybody else: See for yourself.
Maybe they're giving different answers to different geographical regions, or maybe you have a transparent DNS resolver in your network path. Try from a different network. I've already posted one webinterface to check from in a sibling post to yours. Here's another:
To be sure that you talk to their DNS server, use "dig @208.67.222.222 www.google.com" (or "nslookup www.google.com 208.67.222.222", if you must use nslookup). This gives the following results:
www.google.com. 30 IN CNAME google.navigation.opendns.com. google.navigation.opendns.com. 30 IN A 208.69.34.230 google.navigation.opendns.com. 30 IN A 208.69.34.231
or from nslookup: www.google.com canonical name = google.navigation.opendns.com. Name: google.navigation.opendns.com Address: 208.69.34.230 Name: google.navigation.opendns.com Address: 208.69.34.231
If you know how DNS works and look behind the curtain, you'll notice that the OpenDNS resolvers don't return A records for www.google.com, but a CNAME (alias) record "google.navigation.opendns.com", which makes the resolver lookup that name instead. That resolves to 208.69.34.231, which is in an OpenDNS network range of IP addresses. That's the server you connect to when you use OpenDNS and go to www.google.com. The URL bar won't change because according to the OpenDNS resolver, 208.69.34.231 is the IP address of www.google.com, which is just a non-canonical name of that IP address, and that is a BIG FAT LIE.
Show of hands: Who uses OpenDNS and is aware of that hijacking? Now who's the spy?
Automatically storing files locally with contents and names that are defined remotely is a security risk. It would not be a security breach in itself, but it could create an opportunity to exploit unrelated bugs which would otherwise not be remotely exploitable.
Well, it may often be less than productive, but apparently there is no getting through without analogies when you're up against an unfounded but firm belief. If it takes an analogy to explain that not wanting to look out for the owners of open access points isn't the same as trying to exploit them, then an analogy it is. Analogies are problematic. People often see similarities that aren't really there. I used the road analogy to explain the requirement to balance rights and responsibilites in regard to a shared resource. The analogy fails where you try to equate getting run over with having unwanted WLAN visitors. That only works in as far as both are negatives, but even just the severity is not comparable. Consequently the analogy is not useful to find a balance between the rights and responsibilites. It only serves to explain the general nature of the relationship between the participants. The analogy is useful as an explanation that people can't be as ignorant as they want to be in public, or they have to accept the consequences.
You still need to understand that it's really an either-or situation: Either you can connect to any open access point, or you can't use automated WLAN connections. Is this very useful feature (think WLAN-VoIP-phones) worth less than the pretend-safety of requiring explicit permission to connect? Even when weighed against the triviality of enabling encryption? People have nothing to fear from me: I will use their open access point for email, casual webbrowsing and maybe some VoIP. I am not interested in their private networks. On the other hand, people who are up to no good will only be kept away by strong encryption. There really is nothing to win and much to lose by requiring explicit permission.
You can appeal to my compassion for dim-witted unlighted cyclists all you want: If I run someone over at night only because they were invisible, then it's 100% their fault. In fact I can probably sue them because they caused me emotional stress when they caused that accident. There, every analogy snaps when stretched too far.
I don't destroy a village to save it. I don't run over cyclists to save them. I drive at night because I want to and because it's a legitimate way of using the road. If they don't value their lives enough to put lights on their bikes, then I am certainly not obliged to value their lives higher than my travel efficiency. That's the part where I cannot really improve the situation but they can, so they need to get their act together.
You want an analogy? Your freedom to ride a bike with the lights off at night ends where it stops me from driving at night without running into you. Am I morally obliged to stop driving at night because you fail to obey security standards? Is it my fault if I run you over because I couldn't see you? If I insist that I can and will drive at night even though I know you're out there with the lights off, does that mean I condone running people over on purpose?
Is the ISM band more like a loaded gun or more like a public road?
Ok, analogy time. Your freedom to ride a bike with the lights off at night ends where it stops me from driving at night without running into you. Does common courtesy require that I stop driving at night because you fail to obey security standards? Is it my fault if I run you over because I couldn't see you? If I drive at night even though I know you're out there with the lights off, does that mean I am trying to run you over? Is "resent" the correct word for my feeling towards people who ignore basic safety requirements? Is it my superior knowledge of the "protocols of the road" that makes me reject the notion that I should work around your problem?
It's a weighing of rights and responsibilities when sharing a public resource. Do we protect people who could easily protect themselves but don't and harm people who do everything they can to follow existing standards? Or do we protect people who follow the rules and tell people who don't that they should get with the program, because it's the only way it's going to work for everybody?
Yes, I can reconcile those phrases. The concept is called "collateral damage". I am not trying to exploit them, but I will accept that I use their resources even though they consider them private if they, by not declaring their access points private, interfere with an established way of using public hotspots. I am not helping security by mooching wifi, but you are not helping security either by telling people that it's not ok to connect to open access points. The only thing that can help security is if the access points get a proper configuration. You are advocating something which reduces the motivation for securing access points and which has many other negative effects, including the acceptance of ignorance as the status quo to which more knowledgeable people must surrender.
My usage of wireless LAN technology depends on the unambiguous declaration of open vs closed access points. If your access point is unencrypted even though you don't want it to be open, I will make connections to a private access point. If you then sue and some clueless judge decides against me, I have to stop using the technology in the way it was meant to be used and can only use it in a very limited way, just because you failed to properly apply the standard and secure your private network. Consequently I think that you have no right to complain when I connect to your private unencrypted access point because it is your mistake that makes it impossible for me to avoid your access point if I use automated connections to open access points, a way of using WLANs which is clearly supported by the standard.
An analogy is usually chosen for its effect, not for its potential to familiarize the reader with a new topic. That's what makes it a method of emotion, not reason. It could be used differently, but in a discussion between opponents it usually isn't. The people who equate wireless networks with doors are aware of the many fundamental flaws of that analogy. They are not interested in a rational discussion. They want the reader to think "accessing open wireless networks without permission is wrong, because it's like breaking and entering". They usually continue to explain just that. But that is just a gut feeling, an emotional response created by an invalid comparison. It is much more complicated to point out the flaws of such a broken analogy than to approach the topic directly. Pointing out the flaws of an analogy usually ends in name calling or at least an endless stream of "better" analogies, chosen for alternating results.
I wrote the same thing in my first comment on this topic. It may not have been obvious to everybody what the "shared resource" is and how requiring prior permission is a "restriction on useful applications".
select which one you think describes my position
You argue like you mean well, but you don't understand that your position is trouble even for the people whom you want to protect. If we could help everybody secure their private networks, we should do that. It would end the problem in the most direct and unambiguous way. Unfortunately we can't do that. We have to rely on guiding millions of individuals so that they secure their networks themselves or get help with that. In order for them to do that, they have to know that it is their problem. Declaring connections to open access points without prior permission illegal or immoral sends the opposite message: It's ok to go without encryption, because the leecher is at fault. Consequently they will not pay someone to secure the network. That's not what you intend, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
weasel out of the original argument
I am not weaseling out of anything. My position is that accessing an open access point is legitimate and morally sound, no matter what the intentions of its owner are. That decision is not guided by looking at that individual connection alone. It is also guided by the broader impact that the decision has on the owners of unencrypted private access points and on the owners of public hotspots. I am also looking at the ways in which the participants can change the situation for the better, and I am looking at the way they treat the shared resource "frequency band". From all that, it is clear that the individual access point owner who accidentally created a public hotspot has to accept the small negative impact of unwanted users to avoid a significant negative impact on the people who use the shared resource properly and also to avoid the wrong impression that it is safe to have private unencrypted wireless networks. The public hotspot owner can't improve the situation without accepting significant damage to his own interests, neither can the user. The owner of the unencrypted private network can improve the situation without causing himself harm. He will even gain more security besides ridding himself of freeloaders.
I am not trying to exploit anyone. I am trying to prevent the destruction of the only viable way of automated cooperation on a public frequency band, and the only way to do that is to tell owners of unintentionally open access points in no uncertain terms that they are the ones who are causing the problem, not the people who access open wireless networks. Consequently I can't condemn people who use public access points no questions asked.
There are many good arguments for "open is open", including the often cited arguments that the handshake is explicit permission by proxy and that encryption is the only way to automatically tell private from public access points (and thus the only way to have automated public access). There is only one argument against "open is open", and it's weak because it defends ignorance: Many users don't know that they're making their network available. For many reasons we have to eliminate that argument, either by educating people or by not giving them access points that are default-open. A situation where that argument is true is harmful to everyone and in a situation where that argument isn't true, there is no argument against "open is open".
See my other comments for my stance on why open should mean open, even if it's open by mistake. We don't want to use accidentally open access points, but you have no right to stop us from using technology as it was intended to be used if the only reason for limiting our use is your mistake, even if someone else could have made it easier for you not to make the mistake.
That's irrelevant. Automated connections are useful and have been in use long before "everybody" started using wireless access points without caring for the technical implementation. People have sued because their non-machine-readable "contracts" were ignored by robots. And they lost.
People deal with things outside their area of expertise all the time, and when their lack of expertise causes mistakes, they blame them on others all the time, but that doesn't make it right. We should make things as easy as possible for non-experts, but mistakes are mistakes, and operating a private wireless network without encryption is such a mistake. Fortunately it is a preventable mistake: Many manufacturers sell access points with encryption turned on by default. It is viable. Nobody needs to be punished, but when something unwanted happens because the access point was open by mistake, then that mistake needs to be corrected, not blamed on somebody else.
I help people in my building secure their access points.
So do I, but we can't be everywhere. The people who sue over these things apparently don't have neighbors like us. Those are the people who "get the message" when you make accessing open access points illegal or declare it unethical. Those are the people who need to be told, for their own good, that it is their fault if they leave their network unencrypted.
I would rather make a false positive than a false negative error: The owner of a public hotspot has no other means to efficiently declare his access point public (I've explained several times why it is like that). The owner of a private unprotected access point can easily remove the ambiguity.
I am not entitled to anybody's private resources, but I am entitled to using a public frequency band according to an established standard. Refusing to secure private access points impedes my legitimate usage of that shared resource for automated network connections between the nodes of consenting owners, and the limitation of that usage is for no good reason whatsoever. You can be ignorant in private if you want, but when you share a public resource, you have to cooperate.
I wouldn't argue like this if it were not a clear win-win strategy: Only by securing their access points can wireless users really have private networks. Only with an unambiguous "open is open" rule can public hotspots work efficiently. On the flipside, you propose a lose-lose strategy: Users feel protected by the law (or by "common sense ethics") and don't demand secure access point preconfigurations and don't seek to secure existing access points, which leaves them vulnerable. In the absence of "open is open", hotspots cannot operate efficiently because they need to give prior out-of-band permission to their users.
You are correct: Political affiliations have nothing to do with the argument.
SSID is short for "Service Set Identifier", not "Access Condition and Contract". My computer does not and can not understand "Not Free". It sees eight bytes that identify a service set (a group of machines that are on the same network). That's how the standard was designed. You can not expect users who abide by the standard to give up their legitimate uses just because you don't care to follow it yourself.
You continue to ignore that you can't have it both ways. If you tell people that they can't use open access points because a technically open access point might not be intended to be open, you also tell the access point owner that they don't need to worry about securing their access points. In addition to that, trying to prevent the false positives inevitably causes false negatives in almost all important wireless networking use cases, because there is no other way to automatically tell an open access point from a private access point. I don't choose A because I want to connect to accidentally open access points. I choose A as "collateral damage" because the actual damage of my using their network access is minimal compared to the problems that these people can cause themselves and others by leaving a private network unencrypted and because there is no other way to automatically use hotspots that are intentionally open and because not protecting them by law will incite demand for actual security which is the only way of solving the problem that doesn't hurt legitimate wireless LAN uses.
I repeat my question: You want connections to unencrypted access points to be illegal, and by now you must understand that that causes more problems than it solves (it leaves more vulnerable private networks out there, it causes more computer illiterate people to unknowingly connect through someone else's access point and it makes many interesting, legitimate and established uses of wireless technology impractical). So why do you want it that way?
even anonymous login with a banner (delivered to every connection) that this is a private port and that use of it was private. At that point: it's private.
No, see the recent ruling against a woman who tried to establish a contract with a search engine robot in plain english, but failed to use robots.txt or access controls to keep the unwanted visitor out.
Slashdot Mirror
Max Headroom
YES. Where do I send my nuts?
Neither of the two web services has an OpenDNS account and they do report the CNAME response. Their resolvers are not influenced by your account settings, so I know you are lying if you say you got the actual Google addresses from these two services. This discussion is over. To everybody else: See for yourself.
I see. You're lying. Read this.
Maybe they're giving different answers to different geographical regions, or maybe you have a transparent DNS resolver in your network path. Try from a different network. I've already posted one webinterface to check from in a sibling post to yours. Here's another:
http://www.kloth.net/services/nslookup.php
I'm sure you can find more.
And here's a way to check this from a different network: http://www.simpledns.com/lookup.aspx
DNS Server IP: 208.67.222.222 (that's one of the two OpenDNS resolvers)
Domain Name: www.google.com
Record Type: Any (*)
Request Recursion: yes
To be sure that you talk to their DNS server, use "dig @208.67.222.222 www.google.com" (or "nslookup www.google.com 208.67.222.222", if you must use nslookup). This gives the following results:
www.google.com. 30 IN CNAME google.navigation.opendns.com.
google.navigation.opendns.com. 30 IN A 208.69.34.230
google.navigation.opendns.com. 30 IN A 208.69.34.231
or from nslookup:
www.google.com canonical name = google.navigation.opendns.com.
Name: google.navigation.opendns.com
Address: 208.69.34.230
Name: google.navigation.opendns.com
Address: 208.69.34.231
Go to this page: http://google.navigation.opendns.com/
I hope you can see that that isn't Google.
If you know how DNS works and look behind the curtain, you'll notice that the OpenDNS resolvers don't return A records for www.google.com, but a CNAME (alias) record "google.navigation.opendns.com", which makes the resolver lookup that name instead. That resolves to 208.69.34.231, which is in an OpenDNS network range of IP addresses. That's the server you connect to when you use OpenDNS and go to www.google.com. The URL bar won't change because according to the OpenDNS resolver, 208.69.34.231 is the IP address of www.google.com, which is just a non-canonical name of that IP address, and that is a BIG FAT LIE.
Show of hands: Who uses OpenDNS and is aware of that hijacking? Now who's the spy?
Automatically storing files locally with contents and names that are defined remotely is a security risk. It would not be a security breach in itself, but it could create an opportunity to exploit unrelated bugs which would otherwise not be remotely exploitable.
BIND does indeed not scale well. Down, that is.
Well, it may often be less than productive, but apparently there is no getting through without analogies when you're up against an unfounded but firm belief. If it takes an analogy to explain that not wanting to look out for the owners of open access points isn't the same as trying to exploit them, then an analogy it is. Analogies are problematic. People often see similarities that aren't really there. I used the road analogy to explain the requirement to balance rights and responsibilites in regard to a shared resource. The analogy fails where you try to equate getting run over with having unwanted WLAN visitors. That only works in as far as both are negatives, but even just the severity is not comparable. Consequently the analogy is not useful to find a balance between the rights and responsibilites. It only serves to explain the general nature of the relationship between the participants. The analogy is useful as an explanation that people can't be as ignorant as they want to be in public, or they have to accept the consequences.
You still need to understand that it's really an either-or situation: Either you can connect to any open access point, or you can't use automated WLAN connections. Is this very useful feature (think WLAN-VoIP-phones) worth less than the pretend-safety of requiring explicit permission to connect? Even when weighed against the triviality of enabling encryption? People have nothing to fear from me: I will use their open access point for email, casual webbrowsing and maybe some VoIP. I am not interested in their private networks. On the other hand, people who are up to no good will only be kept away by strong encryption. There really is nothing to win and much to lose by requiring explicit permission.
You can appeal to my compassion for dim-witted unlighted cyclists all you want: If I run someone over at night only because they were invisible, then it's 100% their fault. In fact I can probably sue them because they caused me emotional stress when they caused that accident. There, every analogy snaps when stretched too far.
I don't destroy a village to save it. I don't run over cyclists to save them. I drive at night because I want to and because it's a legitimate way of using the road. If they don't value their lives enough to put lights on their bikes, then I am certainly not obliged to value their lives higher than my travel efficiency. That's the part where I cannot really improve the situation but they can, so they need to get their act together.
Stupid analogies.
You want an analogy? Your freedom to ride a bike with the lights off at night ends where it stops me from driving at night without running into you. Am I morally obliged to stop driving at night because you fail to obey security standards? Is it my fault if I run you over because I couldn't see you? If I insist that I can and will drive at night even though I know you're out there with the lights off, does that mean I condone running people over on purpose?
Is the ISM band more like a loaded gun or more like a public road?
Ok, analogy time. Your freedom to ride a bike with the lights off at night ends where it stops me from driving at night without running into you. Does common courtesy require that I stop driving at night because you fail to obey security standards? Is it my fault if I run you over because I couldn't see you? If I drive at night even though I know you're out there with the lights off, does that mean I am trying to run you over? Is "resent" the correct word for my feeling towards people who ignore basic safety requirements? Is it my superior knowledge of the "protocols of the road" that makes me reject the notion that I should work around your problem?
It's a weighing of rights and responsibilities when sharing a public resource. Do we protect people who could easily protect themselves but don't and harm people who do everything they can to follow existing standards? Or do we protect people who follow the rules and tell people who don't that they should get with the program, because it's the only way it's going to work for everybody?
Yes, I can reconcile those phrases. The concept is called "collateral damage". I am not trying to exploit them, but I will accept that I use their resources even though they consider them private if they, by not declaring their access points private, interfere with an established way of using public hotspots. I am not helping security by mooching wifi, but you are not helping security either by telling people that it's not ok to connect to open access points. The only thing that can help security is if the access points get a proper configuration. You are advocating something which reduces the motivation for securing access points and which has many other negative effects, including the acceptance of ignorance as the status quo to which more knowledgeable people must surrender.
My usage of wireless LAN technology depends on the unambiguous declaration of open vs closed access points. If your access point is unencrypted even though you don't want it to be open, I will make connections to a private access point. If you then sue and some clueless judge decides against me, I have to stop using the technology in the way it was meant to be used and can only use it in a very limited way, just because you failed to properly apply the standard and secure your private network. Consequently I think that you have no right to complain when I connect to your private unencrypted access point because it is your mistake that makes it impossible for me to avoid your access point if I use automated connections to open access points, a way of using WLANs which is clearly supported by the standard.
An analogy is usually chosen for its effect, not for its potential to familiarize the reader with a new topic. That's what makes it a method of emotion, not reason. It could be used differently, but in a discussion between opponents it usually isn't. The people who equate wireless networks with doors are aware of the many fundamental flaws of that analogy. They are not interested in a rational discussion. They want the reader to think "accessing open wireless networks without permission is wrong, because it's like breaking and entering". They usually continue to explain just that. But that is just a gut feeling, an emotional response created by an invalid comparison. It is much more complicated to point out the flaws of such a broken analogy than to approach the topic directly. Pointing out the flaws of an analogy usually ends in name calling or at least an endless stream of "better" analogies, chosen for alternating results.
I wonder why it took you so long to formulate it
I wrote the same thing in my first comment on this topic. It may not have been obvious to everybody what the "shared resource" is and how requiring prior permission is a "restriction on useful applications".
select which one you think describes my position
You argue like you mean well, but you don't understand that your position is trouble even for the people whom you want to protect. If we could help everybody secure their private networks, we should do that. It would end the problem in the most direct and unambiguous way. Unfortunately we can't do that. We have to rely on guiding millions of individuals so that they secure their networks themselves or get help with that. In order for them to do that, they have to know that it is their problem. Declaring connections to open access points without prior permission illegal or immoral sends the opposite message: It's ok to go without encryption, because the leecher is at fault. Consequently they will not pay someone to secure the network. That's not what you intend, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
weasel out of the original argument
I am not weaseling out of anything. My position is that accessing an open access point is legitimate and morally sound, no matter what the intentions of its owner are. That decision is not guided by looking at that individual connection alone. It is also guided by the broader impact that the decision has on the owners of unencrypted private access points and on the owners of public hotspots. I am also looking at the ways in which the participants can change the situation for the better, and I am looking at the way they treat the shared resource "frequency band". From all that, it is clear that the individual access point owner who accidentally created a public hotspot has to accept the small negative impact of unwanted users to avoid a significant negative impact on the people who use the shared resource properly and also to avoid the wrong impression that it is safe to have private unencrypted wireless networks. The public hotspot owner can't improve the situation without accepting significant damage to his own interests, neither can the user. The owner of the unencrypted private network can improve the situation without causing himself harm. He will even gain more security besides ridding himself of freeloaders.
I am not trying to exploit anyone. I am trying to prevent the destruction of the only viable way of automated cooperation on a public frequency band, and the only way to do that is to tell owners of unintentionally open access points in no uncertain terms that they are the ones who are causing the problem, not the people who access open wireless networks. Consequently I can't condemn people who use public access points no questions asked.
There are many good arguments for "open is open", including the often cited arguments that the handshake is explicit permission by proxy and that encryption is the only way to automatically tell private from public access points (and thus the only way to have automated public access). There is only one argument against "open is open", and it's weak because it defends ignorance: Many users don't know that they're making their network available. For many reasons we have to eliminate that argument, either by educating people or by not giving them access points that are default-open. A situation where that argument is true is harmful to everyone and in a situation where that argument isn't true, there is no argument against "open is open".
no excuse for using it
See my other comments for my stance on why open should mean open, even if it's open by mistake. We don't want to use accidentally open access points, but you have no right to stop us from using technology as it was intended to be used if the only reason for limiting our use is your mistake, even if someone else could have made it easier for you not to make the mistake.
That's irrelevant. Automated connections are useful and have been in use long before "everybody" started using wireless access points without caring for the technical implementation. People have sued because their non-machine-readable "contracts" were ignored by robots. And they lost.
If anything, it's like asking the lampshade to shift so the light points out the door. If the lampshade complies, that's one cool lampshade.
People deal with things outside their area of expertise all the time, and when their lack of expertise causes mistakes, they blame them on others all the time, but that doesn't make it right. We should make things as easy as possible for non-experts, but mistakes are mistakes, and operating a private wireless network without encryption is such a mistake. Fortunately it is a preventable mistake: Many manufacturers sell access points with encryption turned on by default. It is viable. Nobody needs to be punished, but when something unwanted happens because the access point was open by mistake, then that mistake needs to be corrected, not blamed on somebody else.
I help people in my building secure their access points.
So do I, but we can't be everywhere. The people who sue over these things apparently don't have neighbors like us. Those are the people who "get the message" when you make accessing open access points illegal or declare it unethical. Those are the people who need to be told, for their own good, that it is their fault if they leave their network unencrypted.
I would rather make a false positive than a false negative error: The owner of a public hotspot has no other means to efficiently declare his access point public (I've explained several times why it is like that). The owner of a private unprotected access point can easily remove the ambiguity.
I am not entitled to anybody's private resources, but I am entitled to using a public frequency band according to an established standard. Refusing to secure private access points impedes my legitimate usage of that shared resource for automated network connections between the nodes of consenting owners, and the limitation of that usage is for no good reason whatsoever. You can be ignorant in private if you want, but when you share a public resource, you have to cooperate.
I wouldn't argue like this if it were not a clear win-win strategy: Only by securing their access points can wireless users really have private networks. Only with an unambiguous "open is open" rule can public hotspots work efficiently. On the flipside, you propose a lose-lose strategy: Users feel protected by the law (or by "common sense ethics") and don't demand secure access point preconfigurations and don't seek to secure existing access points, which leaves them vulnerable. In the absence of "open is open", hotspots cannot operate efficiently because they need to give prior out-of-band permission to their users.
You are correct: Political affiliations have nothing to do with the argument.
SSID is short for "Service Set Identifier", not "Access Condition and Contract". My computer does not and can not understand "Not Free". It sees eight bytes that identify a service set (a group of machines that are on the same network). That's how the standard was designed. You can not expect users who abide by the standard to give up their legitimate uses just because you don't care to follow it yourself.
You continue to ignore that you can't have it both ways. If you tell people that they can't use open access points because a technically open access point might not be intended to be open, you also tell the access point owner that they don't need to worry about securing their access points. In addition to that, trying to prevent the false positives inevitably causes false negatives in almost all important wireless networking use cases, because there is no other way to automatically tell an open access point from a private access point. I don't choose A because I want to connect to accidentally open access points. I choose A as "collateral damage" because the actual damage of my using their network access is minimal compared to the problems that these people can cause themselves and others by leaving a private network unencrypted and because there is no other way to automatically use hotspots that are intentionally open and because not protecting them by law will incite demand for actual security which is the only way of solving the problem that doesn't hurt legitimate wireless LAN uses.
I repeat my question: You want connections to unencrypted access points to be illegal, and by now you must understand that that causes more problems than it solves (it leaves more vulnerable private networks out there, it causes more computer illiterate people to unknowingly connect through someone else's access point and it makes many interesting, legitimate and established uses of wireless technology impractical). So why do you want it that way?
even anonymous login with a banner (delivered to every connection) that this is a private port and that use of it was private. At that point: it's private.
No, see the recent ruling against a woman who tried to establish a contract with a search engine robot in plain english, but failed to use robots.txt or access controls to keep the unwanted visitor out.