Or blame your employer for classifying you as Exempt if in fact you shouldn't be. Have you checked the standards yourself to make sure the classification is correct? It's not automatically correct for IT workers to be called Exempt...
Even when the law says overtime must be paid, companies often don't. They count on employees not to know it's illegal and not to see better options elsewhere, and it often works.
It's not that this legal change would enable companies to do something they haven't already been doing -- it's that it removes the legal remedy that employees could use in those cases where someone noticed they were getting hosed.
Of course, CA can't set standards that are less worker-friendly than the federal law. Many IT workers are incorrectly classified as Exempt wrt the federal law when in fact they are not, and some in CA will remain in this category no matter whether this bill passes or not. Companies tend to get shaken up pretty badly when they lose lawsuits for improper classification of employees.
If who isn't authorized to do what? You appear to be trying to look at a p2p download as a single atomic act that either is or is not authorized, but that's not the case. Even if I'm fully authorized to make copies, doesn't mean you're in the clear to give me one if you're not authroized to distribute.
So, yeah, actually the copyright holder can have it both ways.
"Note that I specifically did not mention access methods here"
You also didn't mention certain details that do matter -- like whether, in your first example, you broadcast that people could come copy your books (like a p2p network does when you put files in its shhares).
Your second example is further flawed as a description of p2p because, in addition to leaving out the "broadcast that you can copy files from my computer" step, it stipulates that the person who ends up making the copy of the file had legal access to the files. What legal access do you think a person downloading from a p2p network has to copyrighted files on the other end? The only access that person has, is the ability to download.
The summary answer to your question (though I suppose you thought it was rhetorical) is: either or both parties can be responsible for the copyright infringement in both of your scenarios, depending on circumstances. When those circumstances are aligned with a p2p fileshare, I believe both parties are responsible -- though again, we'll see how the courts sort it out and how Congress responds.
BTW, if you're going to be condescending, you might want to properly capture the issue under discussion first.
There are two problems with your analysis in my opinion, and I expect the courts' interpretation will differ from yours for these reasons:
1) Just because MediaSentry contracts with the RIAA and acts on their behalf, does not mean that MediaSentry is granted any rights with respect to RIAA member organizations' copyrights.
2) Copyright does not control possession of the work. It controls specific acts, such as the act of distributing the work. The act of distribution can be unauthorized even if the result of such distribution is that a copy is placed in the hands of someone who already has a legitimate copy.
I recognize that your statement reflects how you think the system should work, and perhaps a system based on a right-to-possess would make some sense, but that isn't the system we have today.
And if I buy a bootleg DVD, I fetch it from the shelf. Doesn't matter.
Every file transfer has a sender and a receiver. The sender is (probably, though I suppose we'll see what the courts ultimately say) engaged in distribution, no matter whether the protpcol model was "pull" or "push".
The more interesting question would be whether, by requesting a copy, an agent of the copyright holder implicitely "approves" the distribution on the copyright holder's behalf. I don't see why that would be the case.
As I've said before -- I believe this verdict was faulty, and I believe the damages were too high, so on both counts I'm glad to see this outcome... but I also believe that putting a file on a p2p network is more than "just making it available", that doing so (if deliberate) should be punishable under the civil provisions of copyright infringement, and that the law may need to be amended to make it so.
Remember, "copyright hasn't kept up with technology" does not always mean "copyright is too strong". Both are generally true, but they don't always overlap neatly.
Actually, they can be. It depends on the circumstances of the individual case.
The problem here is, each poster is trying to put up a simple, black-and-white rule of 'this is what will happen', and that isn't how trademark works.
Trademark isn't like copyright or patent (as if they weren't unclear enough); it's primary focus isn't to establish a monopoly, but rather to avoid consumer confusion; as such the rights reserved are much narrower.
In day-to-day use, I can throw around anyone's trademark all day long. As long as my uses don't create confusion, it's not illegal.
The largely-unresolved trouble with domain names is, while a given use of a mark in a domain name may not cause confusion, one person using it does interfere with another person being able to use it. Trademark wasn't designed to address that situation (my use of a mark in most contexts doesn't affect your ability to use it, except to the extent I use it in a confusion-causing manner), but trademark holders often expect that they have a protected right to use the mark in such a high-profile context -- and thus they think nobody else should be able to use their mark in that way.
Of course, domain names don't line up well with trademarks. They aren't specific to a particular market, or even to commercial use, in the way that trademarks are. So Apple music and Apple computer can't both have a natural right to the apple.com domain name.
I do think there's generally something shady about grabbing up a bunch of domain names matching a pattern, then using the ones that happen to be significant to active Olympic bids -- but I'm not so sure it's a trademark problem or that there's any legitimate rule in place to suppress that sort of thing.
The Big Red Flags[tm] that make me think the Chicago 2016 organization is talking out its small end:
1) They claim they have a right because it's "natural" that they'd use the domain name.
2) Even though the site clearly says it doesn't belong to Chicago 2016, the organization tries to stretch the definition of "create confusion" to cover the possibility of language-barrier-induced misunderstandings. Give me a break. By that logic, if a foreigner sees an Apple logo on an install CD and thinks it's music, that should show that Apple music's trademark has been infringed.
Maybe you could build a business case around one or more of those, but what you've really got there are just marketing angles.
The question is, how is this going to make/save me money? More specifically, how will it make/save me more money than investing the input capital in some other way?
Being able to say I'm the first to have it? Well, that might be worth soemthing for one company in any given industry, if that company's customers care about IPv6 for some reason.
Unless whatever kitschy thing I might do can only be done with IPv6, I can do it cheaper without the IPv6 conversion and get the same buzz; so to make this a business case you need a specific "something kitschy".
Attention of early adopters might be of value in some markets, but without some detailed projections I'd be hard pressed to invest in an entire network overhaul for marketing buzz.
I'm not saying the business case does or doesn't exist, but until you've tied it to dollars and cents (or better yet NPV), you haven't made what most people would take as a compelling business case.
I don't know anything about the Indian court system, but taking the questions in general and applying them to the U.S.:
"How reliable should a test have to be, when eyewitnesses are notoriously fallible?"
In a jury system, the problem with an unreliable scientific test is the weight the test would be given by jurors. The jurors can't reasonably assess the reliability of the test in a given set of circumstances, as they are instructed to do regarding witness testimony.
A scientific test by its nature will be given the weight of evidence (rather than testimony), so it should be as reliabile as evidence (not merely as reliable as testimony).
"Does a person have a right to privacy over their own memories, or should society's interest in holding criminals accountable come first?"
If right to privacy ever matters, it's in the context of one's own thoughts. You might be scared to realize some of the things you yourself think.
We have a system to balance the right to privacy (where privacy is reasonably expected) against social interest: warrants. The question is, does this test work in a manner consistent with the restrictions that a warranted search is supposed to follow? For example, if I go looking for some specific thing, can the test be conducted in such a way that I get no information (or at least minimal information) other than what I was supposed to look for; or am I likely to uncover other information incidentally?
"Stop the Creationist push and you wont hear of the poor old FSM any longer."
Uh, yeah, you might want to take another read over my post, at which point you'll probably notice that I'm not a Creationist.
Sounds like your strategy for dealing with those who are, though, is to annoy them until they comply with your demands... Good luck with that.
"Should English teachers make room for "ain't" and misuses of their/they're/there along with good English diction just because students do it?"
Well, in point of fact, English teachers do exactly that. It's effective, so yes, they should continue to do so. Addressing misconceptions about a field that some/all of your sudents likely hold is part of teaching.
Every English teacher I had made a point that "aint isn't a word", and when their/they're/there were taught both correct and incorrect usages were given as exercises.
"But argumentum ad numerum has no place in science"
What you're implying I said, is pretty much the opposite of what I said. In fact I was quite specific in agreeing that the differences between Christian creationism and FSM are irrelevant in discussing the theories' scientific merit.
It appears to me that you're so busy assuming the position of anyone who disgrees with you, that you're not reading what I actually wrote.
Neither my original post, nor the post to which I originally replied, nor any of the discussion that properly flows from those posts, are about whether Christian creationism is, or should be taught as, science.
"Teach the kids the scientific method, and they can apply it to whatever they like"
Let's also teach them physics formulae without giving them problems to apply them to and see how that goes.
Most people learn better with real-world examples to ground the theory. Picking a high-profile relevant example from the real world is a valid teaching approach.
"Have them pick a "truism" and show why it's invalid from a scientific point of view."
Your assumption that any truism is "as good as" any other is incorrect. There is direct educational value to picking examples that are relevant to the real world and setting them up as exercises.
Such dislike as you may have for the fact that it would expose students to an idea with which you disagree is irrelevant. In fact it's no better than religious dogma that would suppress the teaching of evolution.
"[creationism] should not be given any preferential treatment. It doesn't deserve it, from a scientific point of view"
I fail to see how being held up as a "how not to" example is 'preferential', but ok...
It deserves it from an educational point of view. Students don't get to pick their own test questions for a reason.
Yes, I'm aware. I'm not sure what I wrote that makes you think I think they think FSM should be accepted.
What I said is, FSM as an argument can serve the purpose you've stated; but that doesn't mean it's the answer to every question about creationism. The similarities only run so far, because whereas Christian creationism is thousands of years old and has a sizable following including some who do push for it to be accepted as science, FSM is none of those things.
In discussing their relative validity as science, those differences don't matter; hence the viability of the FSM argument when properly applied. In discussing whether to hold them up as an example of reasoning that is not scientific, the differences are a huge deal.
By way of full disclosure, I also personally dislike the FSM argument. I think it's a clever way to preach to the choir -- as those who already agree with the premise tend to find it amusing -- but as a meaningful instrument in debate, I think it's pretty much useless -- as those who don't agree with its premise find it insulting (which, of course, is exactly why those who do agree with it find it amusing).
Respect your opponent or don't act surprised when he just starts ignoring you. (I'm sure there are those who think that'd be a good thing -- get them to ignore you, then ignore them. Well, Christian creationism has a well-established foothold in the world; ignore it at your own peril.)
The FSM argument is applicable (though its persuasive effectiveness is debatable) when discussing the relationship between creationism and science, or the objective merits of creationism as scientific or unscientific.
But FSM it is not appilcable to questions that hinge on the modern significance of creationism as a global meme (for lack of a better word). FSM mythology may have "just as much basis" to become a respected theory as Christian creationism or not, but it has not in fact acheived the same position in the world mindset.
For purposes of this particular point, what makes Christian creationism different from FSM, or any of the other creation mythologies you've cited, is that somehow the idea of Christian creationism as a scientific theory keeps popping up (and not in an ironic tone).
You know, the whole FSM thing is funny, but when it becomes the knee-jerk reaction to every discussion about creationism, it gets old fast.
The reason it makes sense to discuss the differences between scientific reasoning vs. creationist belief is that there is a significant, vocal population of people who earnestly believe that creationism is not only true, but just as valid in a scientific context as evolution.
By that yardstick, it does not make sense to worry about showing why FSM isn't science -- because nobody honestly believes that it is.
Whether one believes that science can answer all questions, or that the answers science yields are true (or what "true" even means in that context) are matters of philosophy. But when people are honestly pushing to blur the distinction between a non-scientific conclusion and a scientific conclusion by trying to insist on teaching the former in a course about the latter, then it does make sense to ensure that the curriculum includes a section on telling the difference, and a high-profile example like creationism certainly would belong as part of that discussion.
This does not mean teaching it "alongside evolution", though. The true subject matter would be the reasoning proces behind the theory, not the theory itself; and hence it would properly belong in an introductory-level general science class -- not a biology class in particular.
I go along with your summary of what patents are for, but let's take a closer look at how those principles are being applied here.
This is not a story about Apple using a patent to prevent competition in the "make an iPod-sneaker interface" market. Someone making a device just like the iPod+Nike sensor thing might run into IP trouble somewhere along the way, but it won't be because of this patent.
This is a story about Apple using DRM to protect the viability of their marketing agreement with Nike, and using a patent to prevent competition in this part of the "using DRM to protect the viability of marketing agreements" market.
If we keep in mind that the patent dosen't "allow" Apple to use such a DRM system -- it merely prevents others from doing so -- then the patent itself doesn't seem so bad. The thing being patented, though, seems to belong in the "are you serious?" bucket. Apple is trying to protect a poorly-thought-out business model because that model only works in the real world if you can control your customers' behavior; if they're free to do what they want with what they bought, then the value to Nike of the marketing deal drops rapidly.
And really, that's no all that different from 99% of what DRM gets used for...
Public performance is protected, but watching a DVD in my home is not public performance. Non-public performance is not protected. You say it is, but even your own quoted passage doesn't back you up -- notice how the 3 bullets you cite all say "perform publicly" and do not just say "perform"...
I've read Title 17 many times. And FWIW, that's only the tip of the iceberg if you want to actually understand the law.
That's what they want you to believe, but I don't think there's actually any legal basis to it. I need a license if I want rights I don't already get from the act of purchase -- like distribution of copies, hence the meaningful-ness of the GPL -- but "view the content" isn't a right reserved to the copyright holder. I don't need or want a license, hence there is no leverage to impose constraints on my use.
This is the fundamental problem IMO with any EULA. The publisher wants the best of both worlds -- the no-effort boiler-plate transactions that take place at retail sale, along with the control of a contractually negotiated arrangement. Thing is, that's not supposed to be legal -- at best it's a contract of adhesion.
And don't kid yourself -- the publishers know full well they wouldn't get the sales volume they do if the purchaser didn't think of it just like any retail transaction. I'd argue they're using the form of a retail transaction to lead consumers into believing they're buying the disc, then later trying to claim "oh, that wasn't the arrangement at all; all you got was a license."
Making, possessing, using, etc. etc. technology that can make the copy may be illegal, because to do so you have to circumvent a technology whose primary purpose is to protect copyright.
That's why the anti-circumvention clause of the DMCA is such a problem. Either "fair use" has to be held up as a significant non-infringing use (which could/should apply to pretty much any circumvention technology, negating the effect of the anti-circumvention clause), or fair use has to be reduced to something you get if the content publisher chooses to give it to you (which explicitely isn't supposed to be the case).
I'd like to see this solution: Let them keep the anti-circumvention clause, but also make it illegal for a content publisher to make, possess, use, etc. etc. any technology that inhibits the consumer's ability to exercise fair use.
That's how it's done normally, yes; and I assume this reactor will work that way (although I suppose capturing thermal energy and cooling the core are both tasks for which you could design a water-free approach if you wanted to).
Now, if only we had a way to transport a necessary material from here to the moon... but alas, we'll have to build the reactor entirely using materials already there...
(Ok, well, I think I'm funny anyway...)
FWIW, I'm pretty sure you could send a finite amount of water and just keep using it in a closed system.
That's true; but it's beside the point that I think NYCL was trying to make.
Copyright exists for a specific reason -- to ensure compensation for creative work, thereby promoting such creative work. That's how copyright is used in theory; to the extent that differs from how copyright is used in practice, copyright is broken (or at least imperfect).
When we discuss "how copyright gets used in practice", society's subjective judgement about who's made "enough" money or other notions of fairness are perfectly relevant, even though they do not play into the proper interpretation and application of the law as it stands.
No system of intellectual property rights is going to be perfect; when rights are based on social benefit rather than an inherant moral theory, there are always going to be edge cases where the system works against its ideals. The question is, how broken is the current system? Can we do better? Does society find that the system does more good than harm?
In that light, I think NYCL's sarcasm, though perhaps a bit on the snarky side, is at least relevant to the conversation.
Well, no, monopolies are not illegal; but they are subject to regulations designed to keep them from taking advantage of the lack of competition at the consumer's expense.
TFA is either skipping a lot of details in the author's reasoning, or is far less than insightful. First off, the quote you mention; "you'd probably charge the same, because it's legal". Well, not if it's not in my best interest. TFA claims the services are willing to benefit the industry, in which case it would not be in my interest to charge fees that keep them from doing so. The root cause, then, is one of two things: Either the services wouldn't really benefit the labels, or the labels are short-sighted. On unsound reasoning TFA dismisses those causes and blames the law... Now don't get me wrong, the law is flawed, but here it really seems the law is just being held up as an excuse.
More to the basic premise of the article, TFA fails to elaborate on why partnering with the industry leads to a lack of users. The fee structures may make the services unprofitable in spite of drawing users, but the question posed in the opening paragraph -- and then left unanswered -- is why many such services don't draw users in the first place. Again there's inference that it's because of the lables' influence, and maybe that's so... but never does TFA explain the connection. While it's true that a service subject to insane fees might never turn a profit in spite of a huge user base (which actually is somewhat iconic of the music industry), it's also true that a service subject to no costs at all would fail if it couldn't draw users.
I'm not sure why it would be any less legal than any other ELUA term; agreements that require hadning over rights to IP are pretty typical.
How it would be interpreted, and how/if it would be enforced, in the context of an EULA is an interesting quesetion to me, though, as I've never heard of such a thing being tested (and in general my understanding is that EULA interpretation isn't well understood).
But in general, my expectation is that unless we revisit the general underpinnings of an EULA as an enforcable agreement, we're bound to see more and more of this, and over time it will become accepted because it will be ubiquitous.
It boils down to the question, why would an end user need a license?
It seems like most of the arguments about how to evade this technology, assume that the person/organization using it need it to be perfect and universally applicable.
A bigger concern than false negatives is false positives. How many distinct gaits can this system distinguish? How many people are there on the Earth? Yet, even that really just limits the applications.
That satellite range isn't realistic means this would presumably be used in a relatively small, defined area where something of interest is going on.
That the subject could defeat the system means that it would probably be used on people who don't know they're being watched and/or people who actually want to be distinguished from others in the area ("we know our agent's gait data; don't shoot this guy").
That false positives could arise means that you'd want to use it in situations where (1) you know certian persons of interest are present but need to track them, and (2) there aren't too many "unknowns" in the area.
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Or blame your employer for classifying you as Exempt if in fact you shouldn't be. Have you checked the standards yourself to make sure the classification is correct? It's not automatically correct for IT workers to be called Exempt...
Even when the law says overtime must be paid, companies often don't. They count on employees not to know it's illegal and not to see better options elsewhere, and it often works.
It's not that this legal change would enable companies to do something they haven't already been doing -- it's that it removes the legal remedy that employees could use in those cases where someone noticed they were getting hosed.
Of course, CA can't set standards that are less worker-friendly than the federal law. Many IT workers are incorrectly classified as Exempt wrt the federal law when in fact they are not, and some in CA will remain in this category no matter whether this bill passes or not. Companies tend to get shaken up pretty badly when they lose lawsuits for improper classification of employees.
If who isn't authorized to do what? You appear to be trying to look at a p2p download as a single atomic act that either is or is not authorized, but that's not the case. Even if I'm fully authorized to make copies, doesn't mean you're in the clear to give me one if you're not authroized to distribute.
So, yeah, actually the copyright holder can have it both ways.
"Note that I specifically did not mention access methods here"
You also didn't mention certain details that do matter -- like whether, in your first example, you broadcast that people could come copy your books (like a p2p network does when you put files in its shhares).
Your second example is further flawed as a description of p2p because, in addition to leaving out the "broadcast that you can copy files from my computer" step, it stipulates that the person who ends up making the copy of the file had legal access to the files. What legal access do you think a person downloading from a p2p network has to copyrighted files on the other end? The only access that person has, is the ability to download.
The summary answer to your question (though I suppose you thought it was rhetorical) is: either or both parties can be responsible for the copyright infringement in both of your scenarios, depending on circumstances. When those circumstances are aligned with a p2p fileshare, I believe both parties are responsible -- though again, we'll see how the courts sort it out and how Congress responds.
BTW, if you're going to be condescending, you might want to properly capture the issue under discussion first.
There are two problems with your analysis in my opinion, and I expect the courts' interpretation will differ from yours for these reasons:
1) Just because MediaSentry contracts with the RIAA and acts on their behalf, does not mean that MediaSentry is granted any rights with respect to RIAA member organizations' copyrights.
2) Copyright does not control possession of the work. It controls specific acts, such as the act of distributing the work. The act of distribution can be unauthorized even if the result of such distribution is that a copy is placed in the hands of someone who already has a legitimate copy.
I recognize that your statement reflects how you think the system should work, and perhaps a system based on a right-to-possess would make some sense, but that isn't the system we have today.
And if I buy a bootleg DVD, I fetch it from the shelf. Doesn't matter.
Every file transfer has a sender and a receiver. The sender is (probably, though I suppose we'll see what the courts ultimately say) engaged in distribution, no matter whether the protpcol model was "pull" or "push".
The more interesting question would be whether, by requesting a copy, an agent of the copyright holder implicitely "approves" the distribution on the copyright holder's behalf. I don't see why that would be the case.
As I've said before -- I believe this verdict was faulty, and I believe the damages were too high, so on both counts I'm glad to see this outcome... but I also believe that putting a file on a p2p network is more than "just making it available", that doing so (if deliberate) should be punishable under the civil provisions of copyright infringement, and that the law may need to be amended to make it so.
Remember, "copyright hasn't kept up with technology" does not always mean "copyright is too strong". Both are generally true, but they don't always overlap neatly.
Meh. If it does get coverage, it will merely reinforce the belief that she's guilty.
Actually, they can be. It depends on the circumstances of the individual case.
The problem here is, each poster is trying to put up a simple, black-and-white rule of 'this is what will happen', and that isn't how trademark works.
Trademark isn't like copyright or patent (as if they weren't unclear enough); it's primary focus isn't to establish a monopoly, but rather to avoid consumer confusion; as such the rights reserved are much narrower.
In day-to-day use, I can throw around anyone's trademark all day long. As long as my uses don't create confusion, it's not illegal.
The largely-unresolved trouble with domain names is, while a given use of a mark in a domain name may not cause confusion, one person using it does interfere with another person being able to use it. Trademark wasn't designed to address that situation (my use of a mark in most contexts doesn't affect your ability to use it, except to the extent I use it in a confusion-causing manner), but trademark holders often expect that they have a protected right to use the mark in such a high-profile context -- and thus they think nobody else should be able to use their mark in that way.
Of course, domain names don't line up well with trademarks. They aren't specific to a particular market, or even to commercial use, in the way that trademarks are. So Apple music and Apple computer can't both have a natural right to the apple.com domain name.
I do think there's generally something shady about grabbing up a bunch of domain names matching a pattern, then using the ones that happen to be significant to active Olympic bids -- but I'm not so sure it's a trademark problem or that there's any legitimate rule in place to suppress that sort of thing.
The Big Red Flags[tm] that make me think the Chicago 2016 organization is talking out its small end:
1) They claim they have a right because it's "natural" that they'd use the domain name.
2) Even though the site clearly says it doesn't belong to Chicago 2016, the organization tries to stretch the definition of "create confusion" to cover the possibility of language-barrier-induced misunderstandings. Give me a break. By that logic, if a foreigner sees an Apple logo on an install CD and thinks it's music, that should show that Apple music's trademark has been infringed.
Maybe you could build a business case around one or more of those, but what you've really got there are just marketing angles.
The question is, how is this going to make/save me money? More specifically, how will it make/save me more money than investing the input capital in some other way?
I'm not saying the business case does or doesn't exist, but until you've tied it to dollars and cents (or better yet NPV), you haven't made what most people would take as a compelling business case.
I don't know anything about the Indian court system, but taking the questions in general and applying them to the U.S.:
"How reliable should a test have to be, when eyewitnesses are notoriously fallible?"
In a jury system, the problem with an unreliable scientific test is the weight the test would be given by jurors. The jurors can't reasonably assess the reliability of the test in a given set of circumstances, as they are instructed to do regarding witness testimony.
A scientific test by its nature will be given the weight of evidence (rather than testimony), so it should be as reliabile as evidence (not merely as reliable as testimony).
"Does a person have a right to privacy over their own memories, or should society's interest in holding criminals accountable come first?"
If right to privacy ever matters, it's in the context of one's own thoughts. You might be scared to realize some of the things you yourself think.
We have a system to balance the right to privacy (where privacy is reasonably expected) against social interest: warrants. The question is, does this test work in a manner consistent with the restrictions that a warranted search is supposed to follow? For example, if I go looking for some specific thing, can the test be conducted in such a way that I get no information (or at least minimal information) other than what I was supposed to look for; or am I likely to uncover other information incidentally?
Uh, yeah, you might want to take another read over my post, at which point you'll probably notice that I'm not a Creationist.
Sounds like your strategy for dealing with those who are, though, is to annoy them until they comply with your demands... Good luck with that.
"Should English teachers make room for "ain't" and misuses of their/they're/there along with good English diction just because students do it?"
Well, in point of fact, English teachers do exactly that. It's effective, so yes, they should continue to do so. Addressing misconceptions about a field that some/all of your sudents likely hold is part of teaching.
Every English teacher I had made a point that "aint isn't a word", and when their/they're/there were taught both correct and incorrect usages were given as exercises.
"But argumentum ad numerum has no place in science"
What you're implying I said, is pretty much the opposite of what I said. In fact I was quite specific in agreeing that the differences between Christian creationism and FSM are irrelevant in discussing the theories' scientific merit.
It appears to me that you're so busy assuming the position of anyone who disgrees with you, that you're not reading what I actually wrote.
Neither my original post, nor the post to which I originally replied, nor any of the discussion that properly flows from those posts, are about whether Christian creationism is, or should be taught as, science.
"Teach the kids the scientific method, and they can apply it to whatever they like"
Let's also teach them physics formulae without giving them problems to apply them to and see how that goes.
Most people learn better with real-world examples to ground the theory. Picking a high-profile relevant example from the real world is a valid teaching approach.
"Have them pick a "truism" and show why it's invalid from a scientific point of view."
Your assumption that any truism is "as good as" any other is incorrect. There is direct educational value to picking examples that are relevant to the real world and setting them up as exercises.
Such dislike as you may have for the fact that it would expose students to an idea with which you disagree is irrelevant. In fact it's no better than religious dogma that would suppress the teaching of evolution.
"[creationism] should not be given any preferential treatment. It doesn't deserve it, from a scientific point of view"
I fail to see how being held up as a "how not to" example is 'preferential', but ok...
It deserves it from an educational point of view. Students don't get to pick their own test questions for a reason.
Yes, I'm aware. I'm not sure what I wrote that makes you think I think they think FSM should be accepted.
What I said is, FSM as an argument can serve the purpose you've stated; but that doesn't mean it's the answer to every question about creationism. The similarities only run so far, because whereas Christian creationism is thousands of years old and has a sizable following including some who do push for it to be accepted as science, FSM is none of those things.
In discussing their relative validity as science, those differences don't matter; hence the viability of the FSM argument when properly applied. In discussing whether to hold them up as an example of reasoning that is not scientific, the differences are a huge deal.
By way of full disclosure, I also personally dislike the FSM argument. I think it's a clever way to preach to the choir -- as those who already agree with the premise tend to find it amusing -- but as a meaningful instrument in debate, I think it's pretty much useless -- as those who don't agree with its premise find it insulting (which, of course, is exactly why those who do agree with it find it amusing).
Respect your opponent or don't act surprised when he just starts ignoring you. (I'm sure there are those who think that'd be a good thing -- get them to ignore you, then ignore them. Well, Christian creationism has a well-established foothold in the world; ignore it at your own peril.)
I understand the fundamental FSM argument.
What I'm saying is this:
The FSM argument is applicable (though its persuasive effectiveness is debatable) when discussing the relationship between creationism and science, or the objective merits of creationism as scientific or unscientific.
But FSM it is not appilcable to questions that hinge on the modern significance of creationism as a global meme (for lack of a better word). FSM mythology may have "just as much basis" to become a respected theory as Christian creationism or not, but it has not in fact acheived the same position in the world mindset.
For purposes of this particular point, what makes Christian creationism different from FSM, or any of the other creation mythologies you've cited, is that somehow the idea of Christian creationism as a scientific theory keeps popping up (and not in an ironic tone).
You know, the whole FSM thing is funny, but when it becomes the knee-jerk reaction to every discussion about creationism, it gets old fast.
The reason it makes sense to discuss the differences between scientific reasoning vs. creationist belief is that there is a significant, vocal population of people who earnestly believe that creationism is not only true, but just as valid in a scientific context as evolution.
By that yardstick, it does not make sense to worry about showing why FSM isn't science -- because nobody honestly believes that it is.
Whether one believes that science can answer all questions, or that the answers science yields are true (or what "true" even means in that context) are matters of philosophy. But when people are honestly pushing to blur the distinction between a non-scientific conclusion and a scientific conclusion by trying to insist on teaching the former in a course about the latter, then it does make sense to ensure that the curriculum includes a section on telling the difference, and a high-profile example like creationism certainly would belong as part of that discussion.
This does not mean teaching it "alongside evolution", though. The true subject matter would be the reasoning proces behind the theory, not the theory itself; and hence it would properly belong in an introductory-level general science class -- not a biology class in particular.
I go along with your summary of what patents are for, but let's take a closer look at how those principles are being applied here.
This is not a story about Apple using a patent to prevent competition in the "make an iPod-sneaker interface" market. Someone making a device just like the iPod+Nike sensor thing might run into IP trouble somewhere along the way, but it won't be because of this patent.
This is a story about Apple using DRM to protect the viability of their marketing agreement with Nike, and using a patent to prevent competition in this part of the "using DRM to protect the viability of marketing agreements" market.
If we keep in mind that the patent dosen't "allow" Apple to use such a DRM system -- it merely prevents others from doing so -- then the patent itself doesn't seem so bad. The thing being patented, though, seems to belong in the "are you serious?" bucket. Apple is trying to protect a poorly-thought-out business model because that model only works in the real world if you can control your customers' behavior; if they're free to do what they want with what they bought, then the value to Nike of the marketing deal drops rapidly.
And really, that's no all that different from 99% of what DRM gets used for...
Public performance is protected, but watching a DVD in my home is not public performance. Non-public performance is not protected. You say it is, but even your own quoted passage doesn't back you up -- notice how the 3 bullets you cite all say "perform publicly" and do not just say "perform" ...
I've read Title 17 many times. And FWIW, that's only the tip of the iceberg if you want to actually understand the law.
That's what they want you to believe, but I don't think there's actually any legal basis to it. I need a license if I want rights I don't already get from the act of purchase -- like distribution of copies, hence the meaningful-ness of the GPL -- but "view the content" isn't a right reserved to the copyright holder. I don't need or want a license, hence there is no leverage to impose constraints on my use.
This is the fundamental problem IMO with any EULA. The publisher wants the best of both worlds -- the no-effort boiler-plate transactions that take place at retail sale, along with the control of a contractually negotiated arrangement. Thing is, that's not supposed to be legal -- at best it's a contract of adhesion.
And don't kid yourself -- the publishers know full well they wouldn't get the sales volume they do if the purchaser didn't think of it just like any retail transaction. I'd argue they're using the form of a retail transaction to lead consumers into believing they're buying the disc, then later trying to claim "oh, that wasn't the arrangement at all; all you got was a license."
Making the copy is not illegal.
Making, possessing, using, etc. etc. technology that can make the copy may be illegal, because to do so you have to circumvent a technology whose primary purpose is to protect copyright.
That's why the anti-circumvention clause of the DMCA is such a problem. Either "fair use" has to be held up as a significant non-infringing use (which could/should apply to pretty much any circumvention technology, negating the effect of the anti-circumvention clause), or fair use has to be reduced to something you get if the content publisher chooses to give it to you (which explicitely isn't supposed to be the case).
I'd like to see this solution: Let them keep the anti-circumvention clause, but also make it illegal for a content publisher to make, possess, use, etc. etc. any technology that inhibits the consumer's ability to exercise fair use.
It's all about balance.
That's how it's done normally, yes; and I assume this reactor will work that way (although I suppose capturing thermal energy and cooling the core are both tasks for which you could design a water-free approach if you wanted to).
Now, if only we had a way to transport a necessary material from here to the moon... but alas, we'll have to build the reactor entirely using materials already there...
(Ok, well, I think I'm funny anyway...)
FWIW, I'm pretty sure you could send a finite amount of water and just keep using it in a closed system.
That's true; but it's beside the point that I think NYCL was trying to make.
Copyright exists for a specific reason -- to ensure compensation for creative work, thereby promoting such creative work. That's how copyright is used in theory; to the extent that differs from how copyright is used in practice, copyright is broken (or at least imperfect).
When we discuss "how copyright gets used in practice", society's subjective judgement about who's made "enough" money or other notions of fairness are perfectly relevant, even though they do not play into the proper interpretation and application of the law as it stands.
No system of intellectual property rights is going to be perfect; when rights are based on social benefit rather than an inherant moral theory, there are always going to be edge cases where the system works against its ideals. The question is, how broken is the current system? Can we do better? Does society find that the system does more good than harm?
In that light, I think NYCL's sarcasm, though perhaps a bit on the snarky side, is at least relevant to the conversation.
Well, no, monopolies are not illegal; but they are subject to regulations designed to keep them from taking advantage of the lack of competition at the consumer's expense.
TFA is either skipping a lot of details in the author's reasoning, or is far less than insightful. First off, the quote you mention; "you'd probably charge the same, because it's legal". Well, not if it's not in my best interest. TFA claims the services are willing to benefit the industry, in which case it would not be in my interest to charge fees that keep them from doing so. The root cause, then, is one of two things: Either the services wouldn't really benefit the labels, or the labels are short-sighted. On unsound reasoning TFA dismisses those causes and blames the law... Now don't get me wrong, the law is flawed, but here it really seems the law is just being held up as an excuse.
More to the basic premise of the article, TFA fails to elaborate on why partnering with the industry leads to a lack of users. The fee structures may make the services unprofitable in spite of drawing users, but the question posed in the opening paragraph -- and then left unanswered -- is why many such services don't draw users in the first place. Again there's inference that it's because of the lables' influence, and maybe that's so... but never does TFA explain the connection. While it's true that a service subject to insane fees might never turn a profit in spite of a huge user base (which actually is somewhat iconic of the music industry), it's also true that a service subject to no costs at all would fail if it couldn't draw users.
I'm not sure why it would be any less legal than any other ELUA term; agreements that require hadning over rights to IP are pretty typical.
How it would be interpreted, and how/if it would be enforced, in the context of an EULA is an interesting quesetion to me, though, as I've never heard of such a thing being tested (and in general my understanding is that EULA interpretation isn't well understood).
But in general, my expectation is that unless we revisit the general underpinnings of an EULA as an enforcable agreement, we're bound to see more and more of this, and over time it will become accepted because it will be ubiquitous.
It boils down to the question, why would an end user need a license?
It seems like most of the arguments about how to evade this technology, assume that the person/organization using it need it to be perfect and universally applicable.
A bigger concern than false negatives is false positives. How many distinct gaits can this system distinguish? How many people are there on the Earth? Yet, even that really just limits the applications.
That satellite range isn't realistic means this would presumably be used in a relatively small, defined area where something of interest is going on.
That the subject could defeat the system means that it would probably be used on people who don't know they're being watched and/or people who actually want to be distinguished from others in the area ("we know our agent's gait data; don't shoot this guy").
That false positives could arise means that you'd want to use it in situations where (1) you know certian persons of interest are present but need to track them, and (2) there aren't too many "unknowns" in the area.
"Dubbed Eva de Naharon..."
Huh?
"...or Eve of Naharon
Oh, ok, got it!