DES did not turn out not to require brute forcing. DES turned out to require a search of slightly less than the whole keyspace, but thats still brute force by any reasonalb definition of the word.
There is a very important problem with sending out DVD's. You can be fairly certain that in 40 years time people will still be able to read words on paper (they might fell it to be a bit oldfashioned), but you probably wont be able to find hardware that can read that DVD.
Even today you would have to look rather hard to find a drive for 5.25 inch floppys and even harder for 8 inch floppys. Finding a punch card reader will be even harder still.
Well no.* means that its a norwegian newsgroup. That means that its filled with people writing norwegian at each other. Unfortunately I'm not very good at norwegian, but I believe the name translates to no.society.health.handicaps.misc. In other words its discussions about various handicap related issues, conducted in norwegian.
There's a difference between no training and what RIP is talking about. When I'm interviewing someone who supposedly has been
coding for 5 years, I expect them to have learned a thing or two in that time. If they haven't, what are the odds I'm going to be able
to train them now?
In other words: there is a huge differnce between 5 years experience, and one years experience repeated five times.
Because restoring the data tends to rely on rather expensive equipment. A drive with double the capacity, and 10000 times the price wouldn't sell that well.
The essence of public/private key crypto (which is what we use today for key exchange) is the putative difficulty of prime-factoring a very large number. Our confidence in this sort of algorithm stems from centuries of direct investigation of this problem and corresponding centuries of failure to accomplish a solution in a reasonable time order. The problems involved in solving this problem is so well understood that mathematicians have even been able to generalize this problem to a class of seemingly unrelated problems in the NP set. I won't pretend I understand NP at all, but any discipline that can draw a parallel between prime factorization and problems like the traveling salesman is obviously deeply researched and well developed.
RSA depends on factorization being hard. There exists other public key systems depending on other problems being hard.
Oh and computer science has not proved a link between factorisation and the traveling salesman. Factorization is not known to be NP-complete, although it is known to be in NP.
Landline providers doesn't guarante anything either. You might want to be by a landline with a mobile handy. Then again if it truly is life and death you should be on the scene.
If factorization does have a P-space solution, that would be catastrophic to RSA.
Not really. It would be catastrophic if factorisation had a low-exponent polynomial solution. If someone could find a n^10 algorithm, and prove that this was a lower bound on the complexity, RSA would be strengthend, not weakened.
You make a very good point. I for example live in a small town some 5 hours drive away from the location of the ISP I dial into. If they
have that information, they no doubt believe I live in the city I dial into, so this kind of information is practically worthless.
Even though a lot of the information is inaccurate the information is far from worthless. Naturally, accurate information would be even more valuable, but thats impossible to get. First of all, it will be known that you are in the USA, somethin which cannot be guessed from an email adress (.com is global, like it or not). Secondly, I would guess that most people live near their ISP dialup point.
Re:Huge crytography implications!
on
Does P = NP?
·
· Score: 1
So if P=NP, then RSA breaks.
If you look at cryptography through complexity theory, that statement is true. However, it might be the case that factoring is in P, but that there is a lower bound of, say, n^12 (preferably with a large constant factor). A proof of this would actually be an argument for the security of RSA (still not a proof).
Whats realy needed is a gap between the time taken to create keys, and the time needed to break them. If this time increases exponentially with the key length, great, but I can live with a large polynomial increase.
Factoring a 256-bit number using Shor's algorithm for a quantum computer should take up to 769 qubits (we have, what, 5 or 7 so far?) and runs in O((lg n)^2 * lg lg n), which is O(really fast). For a 256-bit n the inner part works out to 524288, which doesn't tell you much but at least you can see it doesn't grow that fast.
Factoring a 256 bit number is not really that hard. A 512 bit number has been succesfully factored using normal computers. Furthermore factoring has absolutely nothing to do with this. Factoring is for breaking assymetrical ciphers.
Furthermore, noone has shown that quantum computers can be used for breaking symmetrical ciphers, they are not magical in any way.
[ BTW, one thing I didn't understand was this statement about TwoFish: "During Round 1, there were a few concerns regarding the overall complexity of its design." Anyone know what they meant by this? ]
I think that I do. There's really two problems with a very complex cipher. First, a complex cipher can be harder to analyse, thereby increasing the probability that a hidden flaw isn't found before the competition is over (3-4 years is a short time for cipher analysis).
Secondly, a complex design makes implementation harder, increasing the probability that a hidden flaw in the implementation exposes the cleartext.
Nobody cares how fast the crypto is in hardware, really.
A lot of people care very much how fast the crypto is in hardware (and how much the absolute minimum memory needed is.
Smartcards are expected to become more and more widespread, and will often need some form of crypto on them. These are very restrained environments where the last byte matters.
Furthermore, if you wish to build a secure network (or a VPN), network adapters that automatically encrypt all traffic is a way to do it. This also requires hardware encryption.
Look at the bottom right corner of this screenshot for a nice solution to the problem of tray icon overpopulation: only the ones you use appear and the others are accessible through the "" icon.
There's just a slight problem. Some of my icons are informational. They are not there because I use them frequently, but because they convey some information, such as CPU load or whatever.
Nah. 99.999% of the people who did that crap stuck it in their.sig file. You think the NSA's not smart enough to write a parser that ignores keywords after the last "--" at the beginning of a line in an email?
I have always considered putting suspicious keywords into the.sig to be a joke. A good joke but still a joke. If the NSA really filters all email based on keywords, we in the geek liberation front ofcourse have two choices.
Use euphemisms. When discussing fort knox, write bahamas (which is where were going after the raid).
Put our real messages into the signatures, and write a program that splits long messages up.
CUT
There's a handshake scheme so that all peripherals (and maybe everything on the LAN) have to do a cryptographic SDMI handshake before any protected content will play. The idea is that either you have a 100% SDMI-compliant system, or a 0% SDMI compliant system; nothing in between will work. The SDMI designers figure that while building a 0% SDMI system is possible, few people will bother, and it will be so nonstandard it won't be very useful.
I very much doubt consumers will tolerate this. I use my speakers to play lots of different sounds, not all of them music. Theres an irritating jingle when windows starts, a beep when mail arrives etc.
Requiring a cryptographic handshake in all these cases will introduce to large a delay. Besides do you really think everyone is connected all the time. They are not, and the won't be in the foreseeable future.
Lego, not only is your cookie block stupid, IT DOESN'T EVEN WORK! Oh, and you would happen to be using this cookie stuff to be monitoring kids under 13, would you?
The server is most probably in Denmark so danish law applies (maybe, it might also be the law in the country the surfer is in, or the law in france if anyone should build anything remotely connected with nazism).
This means that they are not allowed to correlate the information they get with anyone else without the express permission of the person the information is about, EVERYTIME they want to share data with anyone. But it also means that the age of 13 is NOT the divider between when your a kd with special protection, and when your not (i believe its either 16 or 18).
Where I used to work had/tmp and swap shared via a resizable ramdisk on Solaris.
I can see the point in putting/tmp on a ramdisk, although I think it would be better to use it for buffers. But WHY would anyone want to put swap on a ramdisk. Then when the system runs low on memory it would take some of the contents of memory, and move them to some other memory. That doesn't make a lot of sense.
This isn't useful to stop people flaming. It might be useful if it can detect a large percentage of normal inflammatory mails. That way you get a warning, which I think would make me think once more whether I really wanted to send that.
Naturally I might feel that the recepient needs the flame, and send it anyway.
Slashdot Mirror
DES did not turn out not to require brute forcing. DES turned out to require a search of slightly less than the whole keyspace, but thats still brute force by any reasonalb definition of the word.
Even today you would have to look rather hard to find a drive for 5.25 inch floppys and even harder for 8 inch floppys. Finding a punch card reader will be even harder still.
Well no.* means that its a norwegian newsgroup. That means that its filled with people writing norwegian at each other. Unfortunately I'm not very good at norwegian, but I believe the name translates to no.society.health.handicaps.misc. In other words its discussions about various handicap related issues, conducted in norwegian.
In other words: there is a huge differnce between 5 years experience, and one years experience repeated five times.
Because restoring the data tends to rely on rather expensive equipment. A drive with double the capacity, and 10000 times the price wouldn't sell that well.
RSA depends on factorization being hard. There exists other public key systems depending on other problems being hard.
Oh and computer science has not proved a link between factorisation and the traveling salesman. Factorization is not known to be NP-complete, although it is known to be in NP.
Landline providers doesn't guarante anything either. You might want to be by a landline with a mobile handy. Then again if it truly is life and death you should be on the scene.
Not really. It would be catastrophic if factorisation had a low-exponent polynomial solution. If someone could find a n^10 algorithm, and prove that this was a lower bound on the complexity, RSA would be strengthend, not weakened.
Yes its a great book, the sequel called the Ringworld engineers is great too. The final book, the Ringworld Throne however is not.
See, we cant do without the word fuck.
If you are going to feed the trolls, at least do so with a litle humour.
Even though a lot of the information is inaccurate the information is far from worthless. Naturally, accurate information would be even more valuable, but thats impossible to get. First of all, it will be known that you are in the USA, somethin which cannot be guessed from an email adress (.com is global, like it or not). Secondly, I would guess that most people live near their ISP dialup point.
If you look at cryptography through complexity theory, that statement is true. However, it might be the case that factoring is in P, but that there is a lower bound of, say, n^12 (preferably with a large constant factor). A proof of this would actually be an argument for the security of RSA (still not a proof).
Whats realy needed is a gap between the time taken to create keys, and the time needed to break them. If this time increases exponentially with the key length, great, but I can live with a large polynomial increase.
It really should have :-)
Factoring a 256-bit number using Shor's algorithm for a quantum computer should take up to 769 qubits (we have, what, 5 or 7 so far?) and runs in O((lg n)^2 * lg lg n), which is O(really fast). For a 256-bit n the inner part works out to 524288, which doesn't tell you much but at least you can see it doesn't grow that fast.
Factoring a 256 bit number is not really that hard. A 512 bit number has been succesfully factored using normal computers. Furthermore factoring has absolutely nothing to do with this. Factoring is for breaking assymetrical ciphers.
Furthermore, noone has shown that quantum computers can be used for breaking symmetrical ciphers, they are not magical in any way.
I think that I do. There's really two problems with a very complex cipher. First, a complex cipher can be harder to analyse, thereby increasing the probability that a hidden flaw isn't found before the competition is over (3-4 years is a short time for cipher analysis).
Secondly, a complex design makes implementation harder, increasing the probability that a hidden flaw in the implementation exposes the cleartext.
A lot of people care very much how fast the crypto is in hardware (and how much the absolute minimum memory needed is.
Smartcards are expected to become more and more widespread, and will often need some form of crypto on them. These are very restrained environments where the last byte matters.
Furthermore, if you wish to build a secure network (or a VPN), network adapters that automatically encrypt all traffic is a way to do it. This also requires hardware encryption.
So encryption in hardware is important.
I just dl their newest source and i counted 3 switch statements in the entire source. Why does it matter how many switch statements they used?
There's just a slight problem. Some of my icons are informational. They are not there because I use them frequently, but because they convey some information, such as CPU load or whatever.
I have always considered putting suspicious keywords into the .sig to be a joke. A good joke but still a joke. If the NSA really filters all email based on keywords, we in the geek liberation front ofcourse have two choices.
Use euphemisms. When discussing fort knox, write bahamas (which is where were going after the raid).
Put our real messages into the signatures, and write a program that splits long messages up.
I very much doubt consumers will tolerate this. I use my speakers to play lots of different sounds, not all of them music. Theres an irritating jingle when windows starts, a beep when mail arrives etc.
Requiring a cryptographic handshake in all these cases will introduce to large a delay. Besides do you really think everyone is connected all the time. They are not, and the won't be in the foreseeable future.
The server is most probably in Denmark so danish law applies (maybe, it might also be the law in the country the surfer is in, or the law in france if anyone should build anything remotely connected with nazism).
This means that they are not allowed to correlate the information they get with anyone else without the express permission of the person the information is about, EVERYTIME they want to share data with anyone. But it also means that the age of 13 is NOT the divider between when your a kd with special protection, and when your not (i believe its either 16 or 18).
I can see the point in putting /tmp on a ramdisk, although I think it would be better to use it for buffers. But WHY would anyone want to put swap on a ramdisk. Then when the system runs low on memory it would take some of the contents of memory, and move them to some other memory. That doesn't make a lot of sense.
Naturally I might feel that the recepient needs the flame, and send it anyway.
Unfortunately its already slashdotted. It just shows a 404 too many users connected.
In that case you should remember to watch out for the mindworms.