Do you have some idea of what you plan to send this reverse lookup to?
Yes... the number. Essentially, you basically would be making a kind of special "call" to this number from your own phone, effectively performing a reverse lookup that is completely independent of the incoming phone call. This special call wouldn't be identical to a regular phone call, more resembling a "ping", to use tcp/ip terminology, but the idea would be that a phone line that wasn't actually calling you at the time wouldn't even try to respond to this sort of ping, thereby effectively notifying you through a lack of response that a spoofed # is not where the caller is really calling from.
The route that this special kind of call that effectively does a reverse lookup would take cannot be controlled by the original caller, so the caller has no practical way to spoof an arbitrary phone number unless the number they pretend to be from is not only a real one that the recipient has the ability to actually call back, but also a number is directly controlled by the caller as much as they control their own real phone line.
There would have to be some additional work to allow legitimate spoofing, such as showing only the main office number on any outgoing call for a company, even from a direct dial phone anywhere in the building, but since this spoofed number is one that would be directly controlled by the company, the general principle still works.
How I imagine it would work is as follows: The dialout line tells the main line that it is making a call to XYZ, and to act as a proxy for the reverse lookup request from XYZ when it happens. The main line verifies the number that the dialout line claims to be from using the same reverse-lookup protocol that the receiver would use, and if verified as an authentic number that it can proxy for, it would know to be a proxy for that phone call for a brief period... creating a temporary proxy entry in its cache so that it can authenticate a reverse lookup when it happens, and deleting the proxy entry after a short time (maybe 15 to 30 seconds or so, which should be plenty of time for a reverse lookup to happen) so that memory resources are not needlessly wasted.
The only agent that knows who to bill is the one that is directly connected to the caller, but even their own exchange still doesn't have any way to know if the caller is going to route the call through another exchange that will enable them to spoof their number. The end result is that the receiving exchange has no way to currently identify the caller, or know who to bill. They only know the exchange that the number came from, but the call may have been forwarded through any number of other exchanges.
If I were to guess at the cause, I would suggest that it is probably because there are fewer independently controlled switched networks in a given area.
Enforcement. A switched telephone network does not have any way to verify that a call which is coming in from an exchange that they don't have any control over actually originated in that exchange or was simply being passed along from some other exchange, and so has no possible way to enforce ramifications on someone who fakes a call.
The receiving end does have a way to know that the caller is *CLAIMING* to be calling from.... that's the number that the receiver does a reverse lookup on.
Unless the number that they are spoofing is also controlled by the caller, a reverse lookup on a spoofed number would always fail.
Theoretically, yes.... which is why this idea won't work.
The only way I can see to make verified caller ID using the existing phone switching network is via an out-of-band reverse lookup that is done by the receiving phone. It the call is spoofed, then the reverse lookup will end up reaching a phone number other than the one the caller is actually calling from (if any). This would mean that you could only spoof real numbers that the person you are calling could actually call back, and where you actually have real control over that number.
I'd imagine you can probably continue to use the service... the signature the recipient receives would then be generated by the service instead of by your phone.
Cardano famously discovered and used them, but there was no convention of referring to them as unreal or imaginary numbers until Descartes' time. Descartes famously claimed that square roots were merely hypothetical, "what-if" scenarios, having no practical application to reality, and so Descartes used the term "imaginary" to refer to them, even inventing the "i" notation to specifically refer to the unit-length imaginary number which we still use to describe complex numbers today. From Cardano until Descartes, square roots of negative numbers were simply left in notation as unaltered radicals. Over a century after Descartes, when it was realized that the notion of the number line could be expanded so that it was just one axis of a complex number plane, it was realized that the terminology which had very obviously stuck by that time was simply an unfortunate artifact of what they historically knew at the time. Some effort was made to change it, one of them preferring the term "lateral", for instance, but those efforts never really grew in popularity.... Descartes' "i" notation and terminology was simply too well entrenched, and so it remained.
It's hardly the only time in history that something was named a term that was later discovered to not apply to it... Atoms, for instance, turned out to be very ironically named as well when it was discovered that they were not indivisible as their name suggests.
They are "imaginary" only because Descartes used the term to describe them, and then only because that is what he believed them to be, and by the time the complex plane was conceived a little more than a hundred years later, the term "imaginary" was entrenched, even though alternative terms such as "lateral" were proposed.
They exist as fully as the real numbers themselves do.
That's ironic, because contrary to the name associated with it, the square root of -1 actually exists.
Descartes believed them to be imaginary (yes, he can be credited with giving them that name) because at the time expanding the idea of a number line to being just one axis of a number plane had not yet been thought of (the notion of a complex plane would come over a century later, and by that time, the term "imaginary" was very well entrenched).
And using Youtube as a platform for payment doesn't change that.... I'd be surprised if this doesn't violate Youtube's TOS, and they can suspend or even terminate the account.
Depends on the employer. If you have a full time job that doesn't pay very much, then you might be eligible for free coverage... but you still have to apply for it, and you have to regularly reapply.
The premiums are based on a person's net income and in my view are not cost prohibitive for a person that is earning those amounts, even if their employer doesn't cover them.
. If you have a valid reason for being unable to serve (pregant, student, self-employed, terminally ill) then you can be made exempt.
Obviously... my point was to challenge the idea presented:
Everybody chosen MUST serve...
Clearly, not everyone can... which was my point. And as soon as you allow exemptions, then you make it possible for people to weasel their way into an exemption if they are determined enough.
(1) Reverse Path Verification (That is, do not accept terminations from a network that could not be the originator)
Not possible, since you only know the networks you are directly connected to... and the network you are connected to may only be just trying to forward you the details it was given itself. There may be any number of reasons that a call that you think should have come from network Y because that's the route that you would have taken to reach it from your network might instead be coming to you from network X.
A related idea to this that I think *would* work is end-to-end reverse path verification, which at the end point directly connected to the receiving phone, a brief out-of-band communication is attempted with the originating phone caller, and asks it if that number is really calling you. the caller is not spoofing, everything is fine and the caller ID shows up normally, while otherwise, unless the caller directly controls the number they are spoofing, the end point that your phone ends up contacting to ask if they are calling you isn't going to give any kind of sane response, so your phone can know that any claimed ID in that circumstance is forged.
Put the burden on every single exchange that a call might happen to pass through to verify the identity of the caller when you can just leave it up to the caller and receiver to sort out.
Because the communication would happen out of band, initiated by the receiver of a phone call, the caller has absolutely no way to control the outcome of the communication unless they also control the phone number that the communication is going to ultimately reach.
I remember when Caller ID first started to become a thing, I always said that it needed some form of out-of-band reverse lookup in order to be practical. I have no idea why it was never implemented alongside of it.... it always seemed feasible to me to develop an out-of-band protocol for trying to talk back to the number that *YOUR* phone thinks is calling you to see if it really is... If the caller is faking some other number, then the out-of-band protocol would end up reaching some other phone which would simply ignore the lookup and without any sane response, your phone could know that it had no verified caller ID info.
The rollout for this to fully work would have been slower, requiring more end-point upgrades before being ubiquitous enough to be practical, but I'm pretty sure that we still could have gotten there by now. Regular phone calls without caller ID would have still worked in the interim, however, just as they did while caller ID itself was initially being rolled out.
A drunk driver killing someone is still an accident unless he was intentionally trying to murder said person.
Not exactly.... more like the death of the person is more of an unintended consequence of something that they *did* deliberately choose to do, which was to get drunk enough that they couldn't safely control the vehicle.
But how can one justly say that something that they never directly intended to happen, but which was both made more likely to happen and even predictable to happen, is only an "accident" when in fact it only arose out of a direct consequence of something that they *did* deliberately choose to do, which was to try and drive after they had been drinking too much alcohol?
It's like saying that if I deliberately drop a raw egg onto the floor, the mess that it makes is an "accident".
It's against the law to have an open bottle of bear in the back seat too, regardless of whether the driver has consumed any alcohol. The only time passengers are allowed to consume alcohol in a vehicle is if they are isolated from the driver so that they are effectively in an isolated part of the cabin from where the driver sits, such as what you may find at the back of a limo, etc.
That depends on how the perimeter is built... I would imagine that any really functional AI would have so many layers of redundancy that you'd have to compromise far more than just a single point of failure, and depending on how the system is designed, it may even self-correct, eliminating data points within its own matrix that are indicative of an agenda that services the demands of a single corporation or only the wealthiest at the expense of the needs of the many.
Everybody chosen MUST serve. they get paid appropriately and do something such as making their employer maintain a position for them upon return.
What if they were self-employed? How do you force that person's regular clients to keep coming back to that person when they've been unavailable for several weeks?
What if they were a student? Are you going to force the college to give that person a private tutor for the remainder of the classes that they didn't get to attend?
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No, I'm pretty sure that backward compatibility could be retained while it is being rolled out.
Caller ID didn't work either until at least the source and destination exchanges had been updated, but phone calls continued to work normally.
Yes... the number. Essentially, you basically would be making a kind of special "call" to this number from your own phone, effectively performing a reverse lookup that is completely independent of the incoming phone call. This special call wouldn't be identical to a regular phone call, more resembling a "ping", to use tcp/ip terminology, but the idea would be that a phone line that wasn't actually calling you at the time wouldn't even try to respond to this sort of ping, thereby effectively notifying you through a lack of response that a spoofed # is not where the caller is really calling from.
The route that this special kind of call that effectively does a reverse lookup would take cannot be controlled by the original caller, so the caller has no practical way to spoof an arbitrary phone number unless the number they pretend to be from is not only a real one that the recipient has the ability to actually call back, but also a number is directly controlled by the caller as much as they control their own real phone line.
There would have to be some additional work to allow legitimate spoofing, such as showing only the main office number on any outgoing call for a company, even from a direct dial phone anywhere in the building, but since this spoofed number is one that would be directly controlled by the company, the general principle still works.
How I imagine it would work is as follows: The dialout line tells the main line that it is making a call to XYZ, and to act as a proxy for the reverse lookup request from XYZ when it happens. The main line verifies the number that the dialout line claims to be from using the same reverse-lookup protocol that the receiver would use, and if verified as an authentic number that it can proxy for, it would know to be a proxy for that phone call for a brief period... creating a temporary proxy entry in its cache so that it can authenticate a reverse lookup when it happens, and deleting the proxy entry after a short time (maybe 15 to 30 seconds or so, which should be plenty of time for a reverse lookup to happen) so that memory resources are not needlessly wasted.
Nice conspiracy theory, but no.
The only agent that knows who to bill is the one that is directly connected to the caller, but even their own exchange still doesn't have any way to know if the caller is going to route the call through another exchange that will enable them to spoof their number. The end result is that the receiving exchange has no way to currently identify the caller, or know who to bill. They only know the exchange that the number came from, but the call may have been forwarded through any number of other exchanges.
If I were to guess at the cause, I would suggest that it is probably because there are fewer independently controlled switched networks in a given area.
Enforcement. A switched telephone network does not have any way to verify that a call which is coming in from an exchange that they don't have any control over actually originated in that exchange or was simply being passed along from some other exchange, and so has no possible way to enforce ramifications on someone who fakes a call.
The receiving end does have a way to know that the caller is *CLAIMING* to be calling from.... that's the number that the receiver does a reverse lookup on.
Unless the number that they are spoofing is also controlled by the caller, a reverse lookup on a spoofed number would always fail.
Theoretically, yes.... which is why this idea won't work.
The only way I can see to make verified caller ID using the existing phone switching network is via an out-of-band reverse lookup that is done by the receiving phone. It the call is spoofed, then the reverse lookup will end up reaching a phone number other than the one the caller is actually calling from (if any). This would mean that you could only spoof real numbers that the person you are calling could actually call back, and where you actually have real control over that number.
I'd imagine you can probably continue to use the service... the signature the recipient receives would then be generated by the service instead of by your phone.
Cardano famously discovered and used them, but there was no convention of referring to them as unreal or imaginary numbers until Descartes' time. Descartes famously claimed that square roots were merely hypothetical, "what-if" scenarios, having no practical application to reality, and so Descartes used the term "imaginary" to refer to them, even inventing the "i" notation to specifically refer to the unit-length imaginary number which we still use to describe complex numbers today. From Cardano until Descartes, square roots of negative numbers were simply left in notation as unaltered radicals. Over a century after Descartes, when it was realized that the notion of the number line could be expanded so that it was just one axis of a complex number plane, it was realized that the terminology which had very obviously stuck by that time was simply an unfortunate artifact of what they historically knew at the time. Some effort was made to change it, one of them preferring the term "lateral", for instance, but those efforts never really grew in popularity.... Descartes' "i" notation and terminology was simply too well entrenched, and so it remained.
It's hardly the only time in history that something was named a term that was later discovered to not apply to it... Atoms, for instance, turned out to be very ironically named as well when it was discovered that they were not indivisible as their name suggests.
They are "imaginary" only because Descartes used the term to describe them, and then only because that is what he believed them to be, and by the time the complex plane was conceived a little more than a hundred years later, the term "imaginary" was entrenched, even though alternative terms such as "lateral" were proposed.
They exist as fully as the real numbers themselves do.
That's ironic, because contrary to the name associated with it, the square root of -1 actually exists.
Descartes believed them to be imaginary (yes, he can be credited with giving them that name) because at the time expanding the idea of a number line to being just one axis of a number plane had not yet been thought of (the notion of a complex plane would come over a century later, and by that time, the term "imaginary" was very well entrenched).
And using Youtube as a platform for payment doesn't change that.... I'd be surprised if this doesn't violate Youtube's TOS, and they can suspend or even terminate the account.
For now... honestly, I'm not holding out much optimism that will last more than 5 or so years.
Don't get me wrong though... I'd love to be proved wrong here. I'm just saying what I think will happen.
Depends on the employer. If you have a full time job that doesn't pay very much, then you might be eligible for free coverage... but you still have to apply for it, and you have to regularly reapply.
The premiums are based on a person's net income and in my view are not cost prohibitive for a person that is earning those amounts, even if their employer doesn't cover them.
As a Canadian, I can confidently state that we do, in fact, have to pay health premiums.
In many cases, they are paid for by the employer, but where they are not, they still exist.
Here in BC, a person can spend up to about $40/month on health premiums.
Is there a market for selling a service that nobody else has any way to verify happened as they wanted?
Obviously... my point was to challenge the idea presented:
Clearly, not everyone can... which was my point. And as soon as you allow exemptions, then you make it possible for people to weasel their way into an exemption if they are determined enough.
Not possible, since you only know the networks you are directly connected to... and the network you are connected to may only be just trying to forward you the details it was given itself. There may be any number of reasons that a call that you think should have come from network Y because that's the route that you would have taken to reach it from your network might instead be coming to you from network X.
A related idea to this that I think *would* work is end-to-end reverse path verification, which at the end point directly connected to the receiving phone, a brief out-of-band communication is attempted with the originating phone caller, and asks it if that number is really calling you. the caller is not spoofing, everything is fine and the caller ID shows up normally, while otherwise, unless the caller directly controls the number they are spoofing, the end point that your phone ends up contacting to ask if they are calling you isn't going to give any kind of sane response, so your phone can know that any claimed ID in that circumstance is forged.
Put the burden on every single exchange that a call might happen to pass through to verify the identity of the caller when you can just leave it up to the caller and receiver to sort out.
Because the communication would happen out of band, initiated by the receiver of a phone call, the caller has absolutely no way to control the outcome of the communication unless they also control the phone number that the communication is going to ultimately reach.
The rollout for this to fully work would have been slower, requiring more end-point upgrades before being ubiquitous enough to be practical, but I'm pretty sure that we still could have gotten there by now. Regular phone calls without caller ID would have still worked in the interim, however, just as they did while caller ID itself was initially being rolled out.
Not exactly.... more like the death of the person is more of an unintended consequence of something that they *did* deliberately choose to do, which was to get drunk enough that they couldn't safely control the vehicle.
But how can one justly say that something that they never directly intended to happen, but which was both made more likely to happen and even predictable to happen, is only an "accident" when in fact it only arose out of a direct consequence of something that they *did* deliberately choose to do, which was to try and drive after they had been drinking too much alcohol?
It's like saying that if I deliberately drop a raw egg onto the floor, the mess that it makes is an "accident".
It's against the law to have an open bottle of bear in the back seat too, regardless of whether the driver has consumed any alcohol. The only time passengers are allowed to consume alcohol in a vehicle is if they are isolated from the driver so that they are effectively in an isolated part of the cabin from where the driver sits, such as what you may find at the back of a limo, etc.
That depends on how the perimeter is built... I would imagine that any really functional AI would have so many layers of redundancy that you'd have to compromise far more than just a single point of failure, and depending on how the system is designed, it may even self-correct, eliminating data points within its own matrix that are indicative of an agenda that services the demands of a single corporation or only the wealthiest at the expense of the needs of the many.
What do you do about the engineers you can't bribe or influence?
That assumes that every possible person who might make the AI can necessarily be bribed.
Sure, most might... but not everyone can be.
What if they were self-employed? How do you force that person's regular clients to keep coming back to that person when they've been unavailable for several weeks?
What if they were a student? Are you going to force the college to give that person a private tutor for the remainder of the classes that they didn't get to attend?