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The civil libertarians realize what none of the tin-foil hat paranoiacs on/. do. This does nothing at all to expand the legal authority of the FBI or anyone else to tap communications. The same laws (and the same amendments to the U.S. Constitution) still make it a serious pain in the a$$ to get a wiretap order. This proposal simply would have the FCC impose standards on the infrastructure so that once the legal hurdles are overcome, technical ones don't halt an investigation.
Obviously, the first step in defending our rights and freedoms is vigilance. Everyone give yourself a pat on the back for vigilance.
The next and essential step is actually identifying the real problem. Here the problem is not that the proposal will "dramatically expand the scope of the agency's wiretap powers," because it can't. First, no law specifically authorizes the FBI's wiretap powers, but the gov'ts. Second, the FCC has NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER to define when law enforcement can or cannot tap someone's communications. Third, it it was such a realistic threat, it would have already happened, as such laws and regulations have been implemented in the past.
To protect your rights, you must know your rights and understand the system, so that you know when you're really threatened and how and where to direct your energy. Read before you (continue to) rant:
1. Things like this are already required as explained in this summary of this law (remember CALEA from 1994?)!
2. The authority to wiretap anyone's communication is governed not by the FCC but by this amendment to the Constitution (with informative analysis) and this statute.
This is a threat to your ISP service bill and the quality of the services and software, not your constitutional rights. I don't want to live in a market where all communications products have legally mandated back doors, either. But not because I'm afraid the FBI (or NSA or MS or anyone) will then be able to eavesdrop on everything I do. They lack the resources, the skills, and the authority to do that whether the FCC accepts this proposal or not.
Not to say it's necessarily a good idea, but contrary to the spin in the article (and here on/.), this proposal does nothing at all to expand the legal authority of the FBI or anyone else to tap communications.
The same laws (and the same amendments to the U.S. Constitution) still make it a serious pain in the a$$ to get a wiretap order. This proposal simply would have the FCC impose standards on the infrastructure so that once the legal hurdles are overcome, technical ones don't halt an investigation. This has been done before without turning the US into a facist state.
Obviously, the first step in defending our rights and freedoms is vigilance. Everyone (even C|Net) give yourself a pat on the back for vigilance, even if you've missed the real point and mis-stated the law in alarmist fashion (like C|Net).
The next and essential step is actually identifying the real problem. Here the problem is not that the proposal will "dramatically expand the scope of the agency's wiretap powers," because it can't. First, no law specifically authorizes the FBI's wiretap powers, but the gov'ts. Second, the FCC has NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER to define when law enforcement can or cannot tap someone's communications. Third, it it was such a realistic threat, it would have already happened, as such laws and regulations have been implemented in the past.
To protect our rights, we must know our rights and understand the system, so that we know when we're really threatened and how and where to direct our energy. Read before you (continue to) rant:
1. Things like this are already required as explained in of (remember CALEA from 1994?)!
2. The authority to wiretap anyone's communication is governed not by the FCC but by to the Constitution (with informative analysis) and .
This is a threat to your ISP service bill and the quality of the services and software, not your constitutional rights. I don't want to live in a market where all communications products have legally mandated back doors, either. But not because I'm afraid the FBI (or NSA or MS or anyone) will then be able to eavesdrop on everything I do. They lack the resources, the skills, and the authority to do that whether the FCC accepts this proposal or not.
While I did not serve in an election judge capacity, I am a Maryland voter and used the Diebold machines yesterday. I was impressed with the professionalism of the election judges and believe that Prof. Rubin is correct that competent, honest, committed election officials provide a vital line of security in what is by its nature (whether paper or electronic) an imperfect process. Today there have been stories of some isolated problems with voting machines, but certainly no widespread failures or security breaches.
When Prof. Rubin notes his mistake in coding the smart card, he provides an interesting illustration. When I reported to my polling place and signed in, I was issued a smart card. When I placed in the machine, an election judge stood nearby reviewing the "orange card" that listed my party affiliation, etc. He specifically asked "does the first screen list your party as XXXXXX?" It didn't - my smart card was improperly coded by the election judge. The judges immediately had me stop so no votes were entered, recoded the card, and ushered me back to the machine to complete my ballot.
I share the concern about the security of the transmission from the Zero machine to the Bd. of Elections and hope Diebold already has implemented some encryption. But since the machines aren't actively networked during the day, and based on what I saw at my polling place, I'm relatively unconcerned about the security risks.
In the traditional paper system, which was in place for a very, very long time, we never managed to work out the problems of lost ballots, unreadable ballots, etc. Remember - in Florida in 2000, every recount seemed to produce a new "total" number of ballots cast. While there are legitimate security concerns that should be addressed, I can't believe that the system is any worse or less reliable than before.
My hat's off to the Maryland Board of Elections and all of the volunteers that made this work. A committed, honest and professional job was done by everyone I saw and I'm proud of them and grateful for their efforts.
A bunch of geeks from SCO and their lawyers (IAAL - we're all pencil-necked geeks, too) are taking on a bunch of greaser/gearheads who can call on their new spokesman biker/builder Monster Garage host Jesse James for help.
Those tatooed knuckles and huge guns of his could make short work of this fight.
A person who undermines the 911 system to get back at people with whom he has a personal grudge is not making a political statement. Punishing some idiot for such ridiculous behavior consistutes neither "political overtones" nor "abuse of those that are defenseless."
And I have no problem whatsoever with using a law to bring down a class of people made up of inadequate, insecure little punks who bring down vital infrastructure to settle a personal beef.
Evolution uses them, you can link it into your own web-page. It makes surfing more efficient, and more secure. Formerly CRAYON was, IMHO a great site for quick-surfing only the news you wanted to read, but all the news you wanted to read in one place. Sadly, a lot of (general news) sites have pulled old RSS feeds, or made them far to difficult to find.
Many people may not understand the law - it is true. However, IAAL, and I've studied the law, and the law is what I do. I've never heard of a law being declared unconsitutional because of what someone *perceived* it might do/mean, only because of what it actually did/meant.
Whether the law makes sense turns not on the label people mistakenly believe it applies to given behavior. Whether it makes sense turns on whether that behavior legally may be regulated (i.e. constitutionality), should be regulated in the first place (i.e. desirability) and the intelligence of the system of regulation imposed (in this case, the sentence, or proportionality).
Whether it is "cyber-terrorism" has little to do with whether or not what this clown did should be illegal or whether and to what extent he should be punished for it.
Once again, a legal issue rears its head on/. and the/.'ers miss the point. Whether or not DOJ, the media, or/. attaches the "cyberterrorism" label is completely irrelevant. First because it's meaningless and second because the law says its "terrorism" for the purposes of the law. (IAAL)
The law this putz was charged with violating makes it illegal to: (1) intentionally damage (which he obviously did); (2) a "protected computer" (which the 911 system obviously was); (3) causing a threat to public health or safety (which multiple fraudulent calls to 911 obviously does). Look up 18 U.S.C. 1030 - it's online and it defines all this.
The statute never actually uses the word(s) "cyber-terrorism" anywhere. That is a stupid label attached by Congress (and subsequently the media) but it is not in the law and it's not really the point. What IS in the law (the USA Patriot Act) is an amendment to 18 USC 2332b, which defines "federal crime of terrorism." Among the things that the law treats as a federal crime of terrorism (which some here have tried to explain) are any offenses that violate, among other federal statutes, 18 USC 1030.
Being a "federal crime of terrorism" has two effects: (1) it places the investigation squarely in the jurisdiction of the federal government (primarily FBI, but in this case also Secret Service); and (2) it means the guy is eligble for a harsher sentence.
The argument about whether this is "terrorism" or not is purely semantic. The law says it is - so it is. Whether it's properly labeled "cyber-terrorism" is meaningless. That this idiot let his personal vendetta put innocent third parties at risk is the heart of the issue. Instead of debating labels, consider how utterly stupid and dangerous this stunt actually was and just how hard this yahoo ought to be slapped.
"A market is never saturated with a good product, but it is very quickly saturated with a bad one."
--Henry Ford
Rental car companies use GPS to clock your speed or location and fine you for speeding or leaving the geographic area covered by your contract. Red light cameras dole out tickets (usually through some government contracting company). EZ-Pass toll systems can help track the movements of drivers. The microprocessors in your car can provide data to help determine fault in auto accidents. I won't even get into OnStar. Sheesh, next thing you know, Anheuser-Busch will be tracking your drinking habits - oh wait. Imaging linking those databases.
With a simple identification code in each Ford car, the freedom of movement in the U.S. could become very expensive. To me, it's almost more frightening that so many of these functions (and this data) is in private hands than if it were the government getting it itself.
There will be (actually already is) a flurry of legal wrangling to determine: (1) how the private companies can use this (i.e., when they can disclose or sell it); and (2) under what circumstances the government can get to it and use it.
"The employer, be it an individual, a small group of individuals, or a corporation of individuals, is taking a risk with their time and money. Only the employer deserves the reward of profits. "
I haven't read the case very closely, but it hardly seems to me that IBM was the only party taking the risks in this case.
It seems the verdict turned on the workers' failure to prove (1) the chemicals caused their cancers; and (2) IBM knew of the cause and effect and kept it a secret from its employees.
If the plaintiffs had proven those two elements, I think IBM should be held liable. While it's true that they could all have quit, it is legally irresponsible and morally reprehensible for an employer to withhold the knowledge that the very nature of the work puts employees' health and lives at risk. Fact is that in most of these types of cases the corporation has determined that the costs of defending against lawsuits are lower, overall, than the cost of fixing the problems - human lives, health, and dignity are reduced to economic equations. Where that's the case, the corporation should be slapped.
The idea that by accepting the job and not taking the affirmative steps to find out the risks on one's own, an employee somehow waives his or her rights is, to me, ridiculous. If there's an inherent danger in the job, the employer ought to come clean about it up-front. Full disclosure without a person having to insist upon it is not too much to ask.
I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to mis-attribute this quote to Voltaire. -- Avram Grumer, rec.arts.sf.written, May 2000
Because: (1) he had the courage to attach his name to the sentiment; and (2) even in the "world outside the US" there are people who agree. Also Voltaire had a demonstrated flair for expression.
On the other hand, historically and in spite of the first amendment, the American government has often evidenced a demonstrated disdain for the concept - flag-burning amendments; prohibitions on federally funded medical personnel discussing abortion; the Alien and Sedition Acts; don't-ask-don't-tell; COPA; DMCA; hate speech laws; legally mandated filtering of public internet access points (i.e., public libraries); COINTELPRO; House UnAmerican Activities Committee; cutting funding for Public Television and the Nat'l Endowment for the Arts. ..
Also, Americans themselves, rather than the government is perhaps the biggest threat: constant attempts to remove To Kill A Mockingbird, A Catcher in the Rye, etc. from schools and libraries; the Scopes Monkey Trial and other attempts to bar evolution from the curriculum. ..
As another perceptive Frenchman pointed out, "In America the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion; within these barriers an author may write what he pleases, but woe to him if he goes beyond them." -- Alexis De Tocqueville
Nonetheless proud to be one.
"Our country! . . . may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." -- Stephen Decatur
"*I was in in Pittsburgh one year when the KKK was given the right to march and hold a rally espousing their racist views. Is this what Freedom of Speech was meant for?"
Yes, that is PRECISELY what freedom of speech, as set out in the U.S. Constitution's first amendment was meant for.
"I may disagree with what you have to say, but I shall defend, to the death, your right to say it." --Voltaire
Let's get a little perspective, everyone - there are far, far more serious risks to our liberties than this, for the love of Pete.
The 4th Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The deputy didn't try to search Hiibel, the vehicle, or anything else . . . HE ASKED HIIBEL'S NAME!!
Keeping in mind that facts are our friends: The deputy had a report that Hiibel was hitting his daughter (and he was originally charged with this), Hiibel was pretty clearly under the influence (watch that tape, read the transcript) and therefore driving drunk, he also told the deputy he had no i.d. (where I'm from it's illegal to drive without your license on hand), he admitted he was fighting with his daughter, and he had a knife. When asked (11 times!!) for i.d., he placed his hands behind his back and challenged the deputy to take him to jail. Now who was unreasonable? I'll not concede the point that the deputy had no cause to believe there were crimes committed or that there was any risk to himself, Hiibel's daughter, or the driving public.
Police are killed or wounded at an alarming rate when responding to domestic disputes. An interesting statistic from Hiibel's Nevada Supreme Court case: "in the year 2000, fifty-one officers were murdered in the line of duty. These homicides occurred as follows: 13 during traffic stops/pursuits, . . .., 8 during responses to disturbance calls. . . . Of the suspects who committed these killings, 20 had been previously arrested for crimes of violence, 9 had previously assaulted a police officer, and 12 were on probation or parole. . . . If the officers . . . had known the identity and history of their attackers prior to being assaulted or killed, perhaps some of these incidents could have been prevented." Hear, hear!
Most states (like Nevada in this case) in fact REQUIRE citizens to produce identification to law enforcement upon demand where there's cause to believe a crime was committed. And based on those stats, for at least one good reason.
I for one have far more sympathy for and concern over the liberty and well being of the 17-year old daughter he was allegedly beating - her screaming and distress may not only have been at her father's arrest. Perhaps it was at the prospect of a 17 year-old girl holding her, own in a fistfight with a drunken, knife-carrying 59-year-old man, but perhaps not.
Hiibel should be castigated for clogging the courts, burning taxpayer money, and wasting the time law enforcement pretending to be a constitutional hero over a $250 fine! He got off easy!! Belligerent, drunken driving, child-beaters of the world unite! It is you who carry the banner of our freedom from tyranny! God Bless you all!
But her case is WEAK. Disclaimer: IAAL; and despite my opinions on this matter (all personal, constituting neither a professional opinion nor legal advice), I despise the RIAA's strategy and the laws on which it is based. She's still going to lose.
Racketeering activity includes only certain conduct that falls within a list of specific *criminal* activity listed in 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Scan the list - the only even remotely arguable connection is "extortion."
"Extortion" under federal law (and therefore under RICO) means "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
To try to fit the act of filing a legitimate (although despicable) lawsuit in the hope that your target will settle is not extortion. The only arguable fit is "under color of official right" which generally means illegitimate use of legitimate power (i.e., crooked police shaking down merchants for protection money; regulators denying licenses unless they get a kickback). It does NOT mean exercising a legitimate right by threatening to sue when one is entitled under the law to do so.
If any one of you ever have the misfortune to need to sue anyone to recover money, a settlement's EXACTLY what you'll hope for. It's sooo much better than dragging out years of litigation and appeals. And it's generally what happens in any serious lawsuit. You file, wait for your defendant to answer, and propose a settlement to save everyone time and effort. An enormous number, perhaps even a majority, of lawsuits in the U.S. are resolved by settlement.
Also, keep in mind that judges are lawyers. It's unlikely in the extreme that any lawyer/judge is going to determine that the RIAA committed extortion by exercising a legitimate right that Congress clearly gave them.
So, sorry to throw cold water on this, but I think her countersuit is a loser from the beginning. Nonetheless, Kudos to her for trying; if the RIAA is going to sue, make them work for it. Also - sorry for posting on the topic of the actual article instead of joining in the visceral and general RIAA-bashing, however justified it is.
Many of the same companies that produce anti-virus software offer separately or as a bundle with the their A/V software anti-spam and anti-spyware products. If everyone only spent the extra money, and configured that nice [Norton AntiSpam/McAfee SpamKiller/whatever] software to reject such messages.
If you build a better moustrap, it's good business to also sell smarter mice.
IAAL - only the government can violate your 1st amendment right to free speech. The 1st Amendment only prohibits Congress from making such laws, other amendments extend the rule to State/Local governments. None extends it to private citizens.
That's why you and I can be modded into oblivion without the recourse of suing. Damn, and I just posted, so I can't mod you down and infringe on your 1st amendment rights . . . power unused. . .
Actually, it looks like it affects the standard, but implementations that deviate from the standard (i.e., GnuPG in some respects) may be less vulnerable.
According to the Columbia University research paper (or at least one of them), the flaw does effect the OpenPGP standard, and specifically, they successfully exploited the flaw in GnuPG as well when compression was not used. The authors note that the flaw even exists when compression is employed, but that GnuPG deviates enough from the OpenPGP compression standards that compressed GnuPG messages are relatively safe. Apparently GnuPG employes a non-standards-required message integrity check that foils the attack.
Re:Sadly, it doesn't really matter.
on
Data Quality Act
·
· Score: 5, Informative
"After all, those surgeon general warnings are technically government data. . ..and I'm in government service, sorry to say."
I concur in your regret that you're in government service.
First, the Surgeon General's Warning is most certainly NOT government data under the Data Quality law. It is a legally mandated regulatory statement, like the VIN number of your car or the safety warnings on your airbags. There is absolutely no way anyone could challenge those mandates under the Data Quality law, or the OMB Guidelines or Agency Procedures issued in the Federal Register to implement it. To change this a party would need to change Federal laws and regulations, not challenge data.
Everyone is ranting generally about these challenges. The law and the OMB Guidelines and agency procedures will require more than a mere challenge. A request to correct or remove data must be accompanied by a specific explanation of the basis for the challenge and proof that the challenge is legitimate. In other words, a challenger must prove not only that the gov't is wrong, but that s/he is right.
Second, merely stamping a document as "DRAFT" does not automatically exempt it from FOIA. To paraphrase "A whole hell of a lot of court cases have been won and lost" through government folks applying such a simplistic understanding of the FOIA. To be exempt from disclosure, the document generally must be exempt from discovery in litigation - there must be a privilege such as attorney work product, attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege. Also, the document must be both "pre-decisional" and "deliberative." This often includes drafts, but not because some functionary simply stamped the document "DRAFT." No wonder no one has faith in the FOIA anymore.
More important, just because a document is exempt doesn't mean it's not "FOIA-able." The FOIA is a *disclosure* law, not a *secrecy* law (i.e. the Privacy Act or the Bank Secrecy Act) - it is intended to encourage disclosure by leaving to the agency's discretion whether to apply the available exemptions. Request whatever you want, the agency is not required to assert an exemption and it is often in the agency's interest to release drafts at some point. LatentIT's agency's practice undermines confidence in the gov't and the FOIA because it is failing to actually consider whether any given document should be disclosed and avoiding the trouble by reflexively stamping it "DRAFT" - that's lazy government at work.
I share many reader's frustration with lawyers and with the government, but being a lawyer and having some small experience with government service, I also know that much of that frustration stems from ill-informed judgments of what lawyers do and how the law works (and is supposed to work). IMHO it is *always* more effective to gripe about the law and the government based on actually reading the law and the procedures rather than react to the media's characterization . ..
For the OMB Data Quality Guidelines: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg /iqg_draft_gu idelines.pdf BTW - the comment period is open through July, make all this back and forth worthwhile - read the proposal and submit some comments "this is exactly what *should* happen."
For good FOIA information: http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/
Right, it's that easy to go undetected. As you leave the country with th $1m cash, you will be required to fill out a declaration form stating you are taking that much currency out of the country - caught. If you don't, that much currency is difficult to conceal and as likely as not will be detected - caught again. When you wire the $100,000, the receiving bank in the U.S. will file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR - required under U.S. banking law), and your transfer will be flagged in the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) databases at the Department of Treasury - caught. From there, the feds will find every piece of open-source (and closed source) data available about you . ..
As if a shell corporation in the Caymans will make everyone look the other way. And paying taxes on it - good lord, what better way to tell the feds "look at me, question my income" You still haven't established a cover for the original income.
And so on and so on and so on. The feds never catch the smart ones.
Check out ftp://ftp.stanford.edu/pub/clubs/hombrew/beer/prog rams The directory contains: BrewNIX - gpl'd recipe formulator, logger, contains the source code, of course; Extractf - an app for calculating extract efficiency; ibu.pl - a Perl script for calculating Hop IBUs;
I use BrewNIX in creating/tweaking recipes and so far am finding it very useful. I believe the most current version is several years old, but if it isn't broken. . . It includes separate ascii data files for Hop alpha acids and malt gravity/color. Since these can be easily modified, the program can become more useful and accurate over time.
Slashdot Mirror
The civil libertarians realize what none of the tin-foil hat paranoiacs on
Obviously, the first step in defending our rights and freedoms is vigilance. Everyone give yourself a pat on the back for vigilance.
The next and essential step is actually identifying the real problem. Here the problem is not that the proposal will "dramatically expand the scope of the agency's wiretap powers," because it can't. First, no law specifically authorizes the FBI's wiretap powers, but the gov'ts. Second, the FCC has NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER to define when law enforcement can or cannot tap someone's communications. Third, it it was such a realistic threat, it would have already happened, as such laws and regulations have been implemented in the past.
To protect your rights, you must know your rights and understand the system, so that you know when you're really threatened and how and where to direct your energy. Read before you (continue to) rant:
1. Things like this are already required as explained in this summary of this law (remember CALEA from 1994?)!
2. The authority to wiretap anyone's communication is governed not by the FCC but by this amendment to the Constitution (with informative analysis) and this statute.
This is a threat to your ISP service bill and the quality of the services and software, not your constitutional rights. I don't want to live in a market where all communications products have legally mandated back doors, either. But not because I'm afraid the FBI (or NSA or MS or anyone) will then be able to eavesdrop on everything I do. They lack the resources, the skills, and the authority to do that whether the FCC accepts this proposal or not.
Not to say it's necessarily a good idea, but contrary to the spin in the article (and here on /.), this proposal does nothing at all to expand the legal authority of the FBI or anyone else to tap communications.
The same laws (and the same amendments to the U.S. Constitution) still make it a serious pain in the a$$ to get a wiretap order. This proposal simply would have the FCC impose standards on the infrastructure so that once the legal hurdles are overcome, technical ones don't halt an investigation. This has been done before without turning the US into a facist state.
Obviously, the first step in defending our rights and freedoms is vigilance. Everyone (even C|Net) give yourself a pat on the back for vigilance, even if you've missed the real point and mis-stated the law in alarmist fashion (like C|Net).
The next and essential step is actually identifying the real problem. Here the problem is not that the proposal will "dramatically expand the scope of the agency's wiretap powers," because it can't. First, no law specifically authorizes the FBI's wiretap powers, but the gov'ts. Second, the FCC has NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER to define when law enforcement can or cannot tap someone's communications. Third, it it was such a realistic threat, it would have already happened, as such laws and regulations have been implemented in the past.
To protect our rights, we must know our rights and understand the system, so that we know when we're really threatened and how and where to direct our energy. Read before you (continue to) rant:
1. Things like this are already required as explained in of (remember CALEA from 1994?)!
2. The authority to wiretap anyone's communication is governed not by the FCC but by to the Constitution (with informative analysis) and .
This is a threat to your ISP service bill and the quality of the services and software, not your constitutional rights. I don't want to live in a market where all communications products have legally mandated back doors, either. But not because I'm afraid the FBI (or NSA or MS or anyone) will then be able to eavesdrop on everything I do. They lack the resources, the skills, and the authority to do that whether the FCC accepts this proposal or not.
While I did not serve in an election judge capacity, I am a Maryland voter and used the Diebold machines yesterday. I was impressed with the professionalism of the election judges and believe that Prof. Rubin is correct that competent, honest, committed election officials provide a vital line of security in what is by its nature (whether paper or electronic) an imperfect process. Today there have been stories of some isolated problems with voting machines, but certainly no widespread failures or security breaches.
When Prof. Rubin notes his mistake in coding the smart card, he provides an interesting illustration. When I reported to my polling place and signed in, I was issued a smart card. When I placed in the machine, an election judge stood nearby reviewing the "orange card" that listed my party affiliation, etc. He specifically asked "does the first screen list your party as XXXXXX?" It didn't - my smart card was improperly coded by the election judge. The judges immediately had me stop so no votes were entered, recoded the card, and ushered me back to the machine to complete my ballot.
I share the concern about the security of the transmission from the Zero machine to the Bd. of Elections and hope Diebold already has implemented some encryption. But since the machines aren't actively networked during the day, and based on what I saw at my polling place, I'm relatively unconcerned about the security risks.
In the traditional paper system, which was in place for a very, very long time, we never managed to work out the problems of lost ballots, unreadable ballots, etc. Remember - in Florida in 2000, every recount seemed to produce a new "total" number of ballots cast. While there are legitimate security concerns that should be addressed, I can't believe that the system is any worse or less reliable than before.
My hat's off to the Maryland Board of Elections and all of the volunteers that made this work. A committed, honest and professional job was done by everyone I saw and I'm proud of them and grateful for their efforts.
A bunch of geeks from SCO and their lawyers (IAAL - we're all pencil-necked geeks, too) are taking on a bunch of greaser/gearheads who can call on their new spokesman biker/builder Monster Garage host Jesse James for help.
Those tatooed knuckles and huge guns of his could make short work of this fight.
A person who undermines the 911 system to get back at people with whom he has a personal grudge is not making a political statement. Punishing some idiot for such ridiculous behavior consistutes neither "political overtones" nor "abuse of those that are defenseless."
And I have no problem whatsoever with using a law to bring down a class of people made up of inadequate, insecure little punks who bring down vital infrastructure to settle a personal beef.
Evolution uses them, you can link it into your own web-page. It makes surfing more efficient, and more secure. Formerly CRAYON was, IMHO a great site for quick-surfing only the news you wanted to read, but all the news you wanted to read in one place. Sadly, a lot of (general news) sites have pulled old RSS feeds, or made them far to difficult to find.
Kudos Slashdot. Hiss to CNN.
Many people may not understand the law - it is true. However, IAAL, and I've studied the law, and the law is what I do. I've never heard of a law being declared unconsitutional because of what someone *perceived* it might do/mean, only because of what it actually did/meant.
Whether the law makes sense turns not on the label people mistakenly believe it applies to given behavior. Whether it makes sense turns on whether that behavior legally may be regulated (i.e. constitutionality), should be regulated in the first place (i.e. desirability) and the intelligence of the system of regulation imposed (in this case, the sentence, or proportionality).
Whether it is "cyber-terrorism" has little to do with whether or not what this clown did should be illegal or whether and to what extent he should be punished for it.
Once again, a legal issue rears its head on /. and the /.'ers miss the point. Whether or not DOJ, the media, or /. attaches the "cyberterrorism" label is completely irrelevant. First because it's meaningless and second because the law says its "terrorism" for the purposes of the law. (IAAL)
The law this putz was charged with violating makes it illegal to: (1) intentionally damage (which he obviously did); (2) a "protected computer" (which the 911 system obviously was); (3) causing a threat to public health or safety (which multiple fraudulent calls to 911 obviously does). Look up 18 U.S.C. 1030 - it's online and it defines all this.
The statute never actually uses the word(s) "cyber-terrorism" anywhere. That is a stupid label attached by Congress (and subsequently the media) but it is not in the law and it's not really the point. What IS in the law (the USA Patriot Act) is an amendment to 18 USC 2332b, which defines "federal crime of terrorism." Among the things that the law treats as a federal crime of terrorism (which some here have tried to explain) are any offenses that violate, among other federal statutes, 18 USC 1030.
Being a "federal crime of terrorism" has two effects: (1) it places the investigation squarely in the jurisdiction of the federal government (primarily FBI, but in this case also Secret Service); and (2) it means the guy is eligble for a harsher sentence.
The argument about whether this is "terrorism" or not is purely semantic. The law says it is - so it is. Whether it's properly labeled "cyber-terrorism" is meaningless. That this idiot let his personal vendetta put innocent third parties at risk is the heart of the issue. Instead of debating labels, consider how utterly stupid and dangerous this stunt actually was and just how hard this yahoo ought to be slapped.
"A market is never saturated with a good product, but it is very quickly saturated with a bad one."
--Henry Ford
Rental car companies use GPS to clock your speed or location and fine you for speeding or leaving the geographic area covered by your contract. Red light cameras dole out tickets (usually through some government contracting company). EZ-Pass toll systems can help track the movements of drivers. The microprocessors in your car can provide data to help determine fault in auto accidents. I won't even get into OnStar. Sheesh, next thing you know, Anheuser-Busch will be tracking your drinking habits - oh wait. Imaging linking those databases.
With a simple identification code in each Ford car, the freedom of movement in the U.S. could become very expensive. To me, it's almost more frightening that so many of these functions (and this data) is in private hands than if it were the government getting it itself.
There will be (actually already is) a flurry of legal wrangling to determine: (1) how the private companies can use this (i.e., when they can disclose or sell it); and (2) under what circumstances the government can get to it and use it.
"The employer, be it an individual, a small group of individuals, or a corporation of individuals, is taking a risk with their time and money. Only the employer deserves the reward of profits. "
I haven't read the case very closely, but it hardly seems to me that IBM was the only party taking the risks in this case.
It seems the verdict turned on the workers' failure to prove (1) the chemicals caused their cancers; and (2) IBM knew of the cause and effect and kept it a secret from its employees.
If the plaintiffs had proven those two elements, I think IBM should be held liable. While it's true that they could all have quit, it is legally irresponsible and morally reprehensible for an employer to withhold the knowledge that the very nature of the work puts employees' health and lives at risk. Fact is that in most of these types of cases the corporation has determined that the costs of defending against lawsuits are lower, overall, than the cost of fixing the problems - human lives, health, and dignity are reduced to economic equations. Where that's the case, the corporation should be slapped.
The idea that by accepting the job and not taking the affirmative steps to find out the risks on one's own, an employee somehow waives his or her rights is, to me, ridiculous. If there's an inherent danger in the job, the employer ought to come clean about it up-front. Full disclosure without a person having to insist upon it is not too much to ask.
My $0.02, and IAAL
. . . about admitting you drink Bud.
I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to mis-attribute this quote to Voltaire.
-- Avram Grumer, rec.arts.sf.written, May 2000
Because: (1) he had the courage to attach his name to the sentiment; and (2) even in the "world outside the US" there are people who agree. Also Voltaire had a demonstrated flair for expression.
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On the other hand, historically and in spite of the first amendment, the American government has often evidenced a demonstrated disdain for the concept - flag-burning amendments; prohibitions on federally funded medical personnel discussing abortion; the Alien and Sedition Acts; don't-ask-don't-tell; COPA; DMCA; hate speech laws; legally mandated filtering of public internet access points (i.e., public libraries); COINTELPRO; House UnAmerican Activities Committee; cutting funding for Public Television and the Nat'l Endowment for the Arts. .
Also, Americans themselves, rather than the government is perhaps the biggest threat: constant attempts to remove To Kill A Mockingbird, A Catcher in the Rye, etc. from schools and libraries; the Scopes Monkey Trial and other attempts to bar evolution from the curriculum. .
As another perceptive Frenchman pointed out, "In America the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion; within these barriers an author may write what he pleases, but woe to him if he goes beyond them." -- Alexis De Tocqueville
Nonetheless proud to be one.
"Our country! . . . may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." -- Stephen Decatur
Decatur was an American, feel better?
"*I was in in Pittsburgh one year when the KKK was given the right to march and hold a rally espousing their racist views. Is this what Freedom of Speech was meant for?"
Yes, that is PRECISELY what freedom of speech, as set out in the U.S. Constitution's first amendment was meant for.
"I may disagree with what you have to say, but I shall defend, to the death, your right to say it." --Voltaire
Disclaimer: IAAL
., 8 during responses to disturbance calls. . . . Of the suspects who committed these killings, 20 had been previously arrested for crimes of violence, 9 had previously assaulted a police officer, and 12 were on probation or parole. . . . If the officers . . . had known the identity and history of their attackers prior to being assaulted or killed, perhaps some of these incidents could have been prevented." Hear, hear!
Let's get a little perspective, everyone - there are far, far more serious risks to our liberties than this, for the love of Pete.
The 4th Amendment prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The deputy didn't try to search Hiibel, the vehicle, or anything else . . . HE ASKED HIIBEL'S NAME!!
Keeping in mind that facts are our friends: The deputy had a report that Hiibel was hitting his daughter (and he was originally charged with this), Hiibel was pretty clearly under the influence (watch that tape, read the transcript) and therefore driving drunk, he also told the deputy he had no i.d. (where I'm from it's illegal to drive without your license on hand), he admitted he was fighting with his daughter, and he had a knife. When asked (11 times!!) for i.d., he placed his hands behind his back and challenged the deputy to take him to jail. Now who was unreasonable? I'll not concede the point that the deputy had no cause to believe there were crimes committed or that there was any risk to himself, Hiibel's daughter, or the driving public.
Police are killed or wounded at an alarming rate when responding to domestic disputes. An interesting statistic from Hiibel's Nevada Supreme Court case: "in the year 2000, fifty-one officers were murdered in the line of duty. These homicides occurred as follows: 13 during traffic stops/pursuits, . . .
Most states (like Nevada in this case) in fact REQUIRE citizens to produce identification to law enforcement upon demand where there's cause to believe a crime was committed. And based on those stats, for at least one good reason.
I for one have far more sympathy for and concern over the liberty and well being of the 17-year old daughter he was allegedly beating - her screaming and distress may not only have been at her father's arrest. Perhaps it was at the prospect of a 17 year-old girl holding her, own in a fistfight with a drunken, knife-carrying 59-year-old man, but perhaps not.
Hiibel should be castigated for clogging the courts, burning taxpayer money, and wasting the time law enforcement pretending to be a constitutional hero over a $250 fine! He got off easy!! Belligerent, drunken driving, child-beaters of the world unite! It is you who carry the banner of our freedom from tyranny! God Bless you all!
Can't stop the friend-of-a-friend idiot who hits "reply to all."
It might not be "spam" but I filter it now. I'll stick with my procmail filters.
But her case is WEAK. Disclaimer: IAAL; and despite my opinions on this matter (all personal, constituting neither a professional opinion nor legal advice), I despise the RIAA's strategy and the laws on which it is based. She's still going to lose.
Racketeering activity includes only certain conduct that falls within a list of specific *criminal* activity listed in 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Scan the list - the only even remotely arguable connection is "extortion."
"Extortion" under federal law (and therefore under RICO) means "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
To try to fit the act of filing a legitimate (although despicable) lawsuit in the hope that your target will settle is not extortion. The only arguable fit is "under color of official right" which generally means illegitimate use of legitimate power (i.e., crooked police shaking down merchants for protection money; regulators denying licenses unless they get a kickback). It does NOT mean exercising a legitimate right by threatening to sue when one is entitled under the law to do so.
If any one of you ever have the misfortune to need to sue anyone to recover money, a settlement's EXACTLY what you'll hope for. It's sooo much better than dragging out years of litigation and appeals. And it's generally what happens in any serious lawsuit. You file, wait for your defendant to answer, and propose a settlement to save everyone time and effort. An enormous number, perhaps even a majority, of lawsuits in the U.S. are resolved by settlement.
Also, keep in mind that judges are lawyers. It's unlikely in the extreme that any lawyer/judge is going to determine that the RIAA committed extortion by exercising a legitimate right that Congress clearly gave them.
So, sorry to throw cold water on this, but I think her countersuit is a loser from the beginning. Nonetheless, Kudos to her for trying; if the RIAA is going to sue, make them work for it. Also - sorry for posting on the topic of the actual article instead of joining in the visceral and general RIAA-bashing, however justified it is.
"Huh? 'Ethical lawyer' that's a bit of an oxymoron isn't it?"
No more so than "equal justice" or "innocent client"
Many of the same companies that produce anti-virus software offer separately or as a bundle with the their A/V software anti-spam and anti-spyware products. If everyone only spent the extra money, and configured that nice [Norton AntiSpam/McAfee SpamKiller/whatever] software to reject such messages.
If you build a better moustrap, it's good business to also sell smarter mice.
Perhaps I'm too grumpy or cynical today.
IAAL - only the government can violate your 1st amendment right to free speech. The 1st Amendment only prohibits Congress from making such laws, other amendments extend the rule to State/Local governments. None extends it to private citizens.
That's why you and I can be modded into oblivion without the recourse of suing. Damn, and I just posted, so I can't mod you down and infringe on your 1st amendment rights . . . power unused. . .
A Picture and some small bit of info about the artist is available at:
http://www.stoneguild.com/m_plunkett.htm
Actually, it looks like it affects the standard, but implementations that deviate from the standard (i.e., GnuPG in some respects) may be less vulnerable.
According to the Columbia University research paper (or at least one of them), the flaw does effect the OpenPGP standard, and specifically, they successfully exploited the flaw in GnuPG as well when compression was not used. The authors note that the flaw even exists when compression is employed, but that GnuPG deviates enough from the OpenPGP compression standards that compressed GnuPG messages are relatively safe. Apparently GnuPG employes a non-standards-required message integrity check that foils the attack.
"After all, those surgeon general warnings are technically government data. . . .and I'm in government service, sorry to say."
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g /iqg_draft_gu idelines.pdf
I concur in your regret that you're in government service.
First, the Surgeon General's Warning is most certainly NOT government data under the Data Quality law. It is a legally mandated regulatory statement, like the VIN number of your car or the safety warnings on your airbags. There is absolutely no way anyone could challenge those mandates under the Data Quality law, or the OMB Guidelines or Agency Procedures issued in the Federal Register to implement it. To change this a party would need to change Federal laws and regulations, not challenge data.
Everyone is ranting generally about these challenges. The law and the OMB Guidelines and agency procedures will require more than a mere challenge. A request to correct or remove data must be accompanied by a specific explanation of the basis for the challenge and proof that the challenge is legitimate. In other words, a challenger must prove not only that the gov't is wrong, but that s/he is right.
Second, merely stamping a document as "DRAFT" does not automatically exempt it from FOIA. To paraphrase "A whole hell of a lot of court cases have been won and lost" through government folks applying such a simplistic understanding of the FOIA. To be exempt from disclosure, the document generally must be exempt from discovery in litigation - there must be a privilege such as attorney work product, attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege. Also, the document must be both "pre-decisional" and "deliberative." This often includes drafts, but not because some functionary simply stamped the document "DRAFT." No wonder no one has faith in the FOIA anymore.
More important, just because a document is exempt doesn't mean it's not "FOIA-able." The FOIA is a *disclosure* law, not a *secrecy* law (i.e. the Privacy Act or the Bank Secrecy Act) - it is intended to encourage disclosure by leaving to the agency's discretion whether to apply the available exemptions. Request whatever you want, the agency is not required to assert an exemption and it is often in the agency's interest to release drafts at some point. LatentIT's agency's practice undermines confidence in the gov't and the FOIA because it is failing to actually consider whether any given document should be disclosed and avoiding the trouble by reflexively stamping it "DRAFT" - that's lazy government at work.
I share many reader's frustration with lawyers and with the government, but being a lawyer and having some small experience with government service, I also know that much of that frustration stems from ill-informed judgments of what lawyers do and how the law works (and is supposed to work). IMHO it is *always* more effective to gripe about the law and the government based on actually reading the law and the procedures rather than react to the media's characterization . .
For the OMB Data Quality Guidelines:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/infore
BTW - the comment period is open through July, make all this back and forth worthwhile - read the proposal and submit some comments "this is exactly what *should* happen."
For good FOIA information:
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/
Right, it's that easy to go undetected. As you leave the country with th $1m cash, you will be required to fill out a declaration form stating you are taking that much currency out of the country - caught. If you don't, that much currency is difficult to conceal and as likely as not will be detected - caught again. When you wire the $100,000, the receiving bank in the U.S. will file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR - required under U.S. banking law), and your transfer will be flagged in the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) databases at the Department of Treasury - caught. From there, the feds will find every piece of open-source (and closed source) data available about you . . .
As if a shell corporation in the Caymans will make everyone look the other way. And paying taxes on it - good lord, what better way to tell the feds "look at me, question my income" You still haven't established a cover for the original income.
And so on and so on and so on. The feds never catch the smart ones.
Check out ftp://ftp.stanford.edu/pub/clubs/hombrew/beer/prog rams
The directory contains:
BrewNIX - gpl'd recipe formulator, logger, contains the source code, of course;
Extractf - an app for calculating extract efficiency;
ibu.pl - a Perl script for calculating Hop IBUs;
I use BrewNIX in creating/tweaking recipes and so far am finding it very useful. I believe the most current version is several years old, but if it isn't broken. . . It includes separate ascii data files for Hop alpha acids and malt gravity/color. Since these can be easily modified, the program can become more useful and accurate over time.
Jean-Baptiste Clemence