YRO is indeed an acronym for that, and it has been progressively bastardized over the past 15 years. If you're cool with that, fine. I am not.
Clearly your approach of bitching anonymously about it has yielded the results you're looking for. It's YRO, I know what YRO is used for in actuality, and I'll decide whether or not to read a YRO article based on my mood.
Clearly the people who submitted it are fucking idiots and...Timothy is a fucking idiot too.
Demonstrate this. Seriously, provide actual facts to prove that these people have an IQ between 0 and 25. Just because someone disagrees with you doesn't mean they're stupid; it means that if you have to resort to calling them stupid that you're either unwilling or incapable of having a civilized conversation.
I am indeed inclined to stop reading/. entirely, and I do not anticipate missing your pissant whining.
(A) YRO is an initialism for 'your rights online'. This has nothing to do with your rights, nor is it online.
YRO may be an acronym for that, but clearly you haven't been paying attention to how it's actually been applied over the past 15 years, which as I stipulated, has not been 'News for nerds.'
(B) It does not fall under the category 'Stuff that matters'. Perhaps a fraction of the Florida populace care about it, but it absolutely is an irrelevancy.
Clearly the people who submitted it feel differently and...
(C) Timothy posted it, hence it was Timothy who held the hammer in his hand and proceeded to drive in that last nail. Fuck Timothy, fuck Slashdot, and fuck irrelevant cap like this.
...timothy agrees with them. He's an editor. Determining what and what does not matter to the majority of his readers by his judgement is specifically what he is hired to do. And if you don't like his editorial choices, you don't have to read them. Seriously. You can go under settings, click the exclusions tab, and filter out his posts entirely. Or filter out topics you don't want to read about, like say, the Zimmerman trial. Or, as you seem inclined to do, stop reading/. entirely. No one is going to miss your pissant whining.
This story is filed under YRO, which historically has encompassed far more than just online rights. The story heading used to include the YRO header, but that's been gone for a while.
Besides, OSC's SF books have nothing to do with his views on a totally orthogonal societal issue.
Not so. Enchantment is about pre-ordained heterosexual marriage and the struggle of the Christian partners against pagan deities. It's a thinly-veiled showcase of his beliefs.
Boycotting the former because of the latter is called an ad hominem. Case in point, a lot of people enjoy Disney movies and Ford cars despite Walt Disney and Henry Ford being nasty antisemitic pro-nazi nutjobs.
No, boycotting the business of someone whose beliefs you despise is called the free market. Christiansdoitallthetime. Whether or not someone can enjoy a movie is incidental to whether or not they choose to do so. Personally, I boycotted the movie Powder because the director was a convicted child molester. I don't give a shit whether or not the movie was any good. Disney knew of his history when they hired him, and I won't give them a dime of my money for that product.
Exactly how is this story pushing that agenda? It's pointing out that more respondents to the poll view him unfavorably than do favorably. Nowhere does it imply that he has no support.
However, it does NOT state that 33% voted "Snowden did the right thing." It merely shows that 33% of the respondents to the poll viewed him favorably, and it's quite a stretch to infer that they think he did the right thing from that response.
How exactly is the poll in this story a push poll? It makes a neutral summary of the issue, and then asks for an opinion if the respondent has one.
Edward Snowden, a former CIA employee, made the news recently for leaking information of government surveillance on Americans, including monitoring internet usage and phone records, to the press. What is your opinion on Snowden, if any?
I guess my point is that it's vulnerable. MiTM is particularly bothersome for anything that doesn't require a physical exchange of OTPs. As for keeping up the MiTM attack, you really only have to keep it up until your purpose is achieved and you no longer care about the attack being discovered. For long-term surveillance this is a problem, but if you're looking to swipe some confidential time-sensitive information, this should be fairly trivial.
So, you're suggesting that a viable end-to-end encryption system for email should require the use of voice authorization?
I'm well aware of PKI and asymmetric key crypto. As for reading up on it:
Another potential security vulnerability in using asymmetric keys is the possibility of a "man-in-the-middle" attack, in which the communication of public keys is intercepted by a third party (the "man in the middle") and then modified to provide different public keys instead. Encrypted messages and responses must also be intercepted, decrypted, and re-encrypted by the attacker using the correct public keys for different communication segments, in all instances, so as to avoid suspicion. This attack may seem to be difficult to implement in practice, but it is not impossible when using insecure media (e.g. public networks, such as the Internet or wireless forms of communications) – for example, a malicious staff member at Alice or Bob's Internet Service Provider (ISP) might find it quite easy to carry out. In the earlier postal analogy, Alice would have to have a way to make sure that the lock on the returned packet really belongs to Bob before she removes her lock and sends the packet back. Otherwise, the lock could have been put on the packet by a corrupt postal worker pretending to be Bob, so as to fool Alice.
One approach to prevent such attacks involves the use of a certificate authority, a trusted third party responsible for verifying the identity of a user of the system. This authority issues a tamper-resistant, non-spoofable digital certificate for the participants. Such certificates are signed data blocks stating that this public key belongs to that person, company, or other entity. This approach also has its weaknesses – for example, the certificate authority issuing the certificate must be trusted to have properly checked the identity of the key-holder, must ensure the correctness of the public key when it issues a certificate, and must have made arrangements with all participants to check all their certificates before protected communications can begin. Web browsers, for instance, are supplied with a long list of "self-signed identity certificates" from PKI providers – these are used to check the bona fides of the certificate authority and then, in a second step, the certificates of potential communicators. An attacker who could subvert any single one of those certificate authorities into issuing a certificate for a bogus public key could then mount a "man-in-the-middle" attack as easily as if the certificate scheme were not used at all. Despite its theoretical and potential problems, this approach is widely used. Examples include SSL and its successor, TLS, which are commonly used to provide security for web browsers, for example, so that they might be used to securely send credit card details to an online store.
Wait, what's that? You're still susceptible to MITM when using CA's?
1. The sender creates a message.
2. The sending software generates a hash code of the message.
3. The sending software generates a signature from the hash code
using the sender's private key.
4. The binary signature is attached to the message.
5. The receiving software keeps a copy of the message signature.
6. The receiving software generates a new hash code for the
received message and verifies it using the message's signature.
If the verification is successful, the message is accepted as
authentic.
The could just give it the SMB treatment like they did the first time through. (Also, Doki Doki Panic started life as a Mario prototype. It looks like they shoe-horned on the other IP.)
Also, we need keys for 'sh', 'ch', 'gh', 'ing', 'ion', 'tion', 'etc', etc. This could become unwieldly, so we should probably just adopt a system of characters that covers all of the possible phonetic variations. To save time, we could have multiple characters for the same sound, which would imply certain meanings based on context.
We'd probably end up with thousands of different characters; hopefully the people who make most of our components would be able to adapt.
Slashdot Mirror
No, you hang up first, silly!
Well, so long then.
Great! I can't wait for you to not read many more!
So how that "stop reading /." thing going for you?
You're absolutely right. I would correct the error if I could.
YRO is indeed an acronym for that, and it has been progressively bastardized over the past 15 years. If you're cool with that, fine. I am not.
Clearly your approach of bitching anonymously about it has yielded the results you're looking for. It's YRO, I know what YRO is used for in actuality, and I'll decide whether or not to read a YRO article based on my mood.
Clearly the people who submitted it are fucking idiots and...Timothy is a fucking idiot too.
Demonstrate this. Seriously, provide actual facts to prove that these people have an IQ between 0 and 25. Just because someone disagrees with you doesn't mean they're stupid; it means that if you have to resort to calling them stupid that you're either unwilling or incapable of having a civilized conversation.
I am indeed inclined to stop reading /. entirely, and I do not anticipate missing your pissant whining.
Good. Fuck off.
(A) YRO is an initialism for 'your rights online'. This has nothing to do with your rights, nor is it online.
YRO may be an acronym for that, but clearly you haven't been paying attention to how it's actually been applied over the past 15 years, which as I stipulated, has not been 'News for nerds.'
(B) It does not fall under the category 'Stuff that matters'. Perhaps a fraction of the Florida populace care about it, but it absolutely is an irrelevancy.
Clearly the people who submitted it feel differently and...
(C) Timothy posted it, hence it was Timothy who held the hammer in his hand and proceeded to drive in that last nail. Fuck Timothy, fuck Slashdot, and fuck irrelevant cap like this.
...timothy agrees with them. He's an editor. Determining what and what does not matter to the majority of his readers by his judgement is specifically what he is hired to do. And if you don't like his editorial choices, you don't have to read them. Seriously. You can go under settings, click the exclusions tab, and filter out his posts entirely. Or filter out topics you don't want to read about, like say, the Zimmerman trial. Or, as you seem inclined to do, stop reading /. entirely. No one is going to miss your pissant whining.
(A) This is under YRO, which has not been strictly 'News for nerds' for as long as I've been a registered user.
(B) This was the first practical test of FL's stand-your-ground law, so it does fall under the category 'Stuff that matters'
(C) Timothy only posted it, which I infer to be at the behest of a lot of other users who felt that it was either NFN and/or STM
Posted by timothy on Saturday July 13, 2013 @09:59PM
from the you-can-now-stop-submitting-the-news dept.
This story is filed under YRO, which historically has encompassed far more than just online rights. The story heading used to include the YRO header, but that's been gone for a while.
Besides, OSC's SF books have nothing to do with his views on a totally orthogonal societal issue.
Not so. Enchantment is about pre-ordained heterosexual marriage and the struggle of the Christian partners against pagan deities. It's a thinly-veiled showcase of his beliefs.
Boycotting the former because of the latter is called an ad hominem. Case in point, a lot of people enjoy Disney movies and Ford cars despite Walt Disney and Henry Ford being nasty antisemitic pro-nazi nutjobs.
No, boycotting the business of someone whose beliefs you despise is called the free market. Christians do it all the time. Whether or not someone can enjoy a movie is incidental to whether or not they choose to do so. Personally, I boycotted the movie Powder because the director was a convicted child molester. I don't give a shit whether or not the movie was any good. Disney knew of his history when they hired him, and I won't give them a dime of my money for that product.
Exactly how is this story pushing that agenda? It's pointing out that more respondents to the poll view him unfavorably than do favorably. Nowhere does it imply that he has no support.
However, it does NOT state that 33% voted "Snowden did the right thing." It merely shows that 33% of the respondents to the poll viewed him favorably, and it's quite a stretch to infer that they think he did the right thing from that response.
Edward Snowden, a former CIA employee, made the news recently for leaking information of government surveillance on Americans, including monitoring internet usage and phone records, to the press. What is your opinion on Snowden, if any?
Instead of charging the populace into action Snowden may be facing apathy at best and public disapproval at worst.
I'm pretty sure he's facing far worse than apathy and public disapproval.
I guess my point is that it's vulnerable. MiTM is particularly bothersome for anything that doesn't require a physical exchange of OTPs. As for keeping up the MiTM attack, you really only have to keep it up until your purpose is achieved and you no longer care about the attack being discovered. For long-term surveillance this is a problem, but if you're looking to swipe some confidential time-sensitive information, this should be fairly trivial.
So, you're suggesting that a viable end-to-end encryption system for email should require the use of voice authorization?
I'm well aware of PKI and asymmetric key crypto. As for reading up on it:
Another potential security vulnerability in using asymmetric keys is the possibility of a "man-in-the-middle" attack, in which the communication of public keys is intercepted by a third party (the "man in the middle") and then modified to provide different public keys instead. Encrypted messages and responses must also be intercepted, decrypted, and re-encrypted by the attacker using the correct public keys for different communication segments, in all instances, so as to avoid suspicion. This attack may seem to be difficult to implement in practice, but it is not impossible when using insecure media (e.g. public networks, such as the Internet or wireless forms of communications) – for example, a malicious staff member at Alice or Bob's Internet Service Provider (ISP) might find it quite easy to carry out. In the earlier postal analogy, Alice would have to have a way to make sure that the lock on the returned packet really belongs to Bob before she removes her lock and sends the packet back. Otherwise, the lock could have been put on the packet by a corrupt postal worker pretending to be Bob, so as to fool Alice.
One approach to prevent such attacks involves the use of a certificate authority, a trusted third party responsible for verifying the identity of a user of the system. This authority issues a tamper-resistant, non-spoofable digital certificate for the participants. Such certificates are signed data blocks stating that this public key belongs to that person, company, or other entity. This approach also has its weaknesses – for example, the certificate authority issuing the certificate must be trusted to have properly checked the identity of the key-holder, must ensure the correctness of the public key when it issues a certificate, and must have made arrangements with all participants to check all their certificates before protected communications can begin. Web browsers, for instance, are supplied with a long list of "self-signed identity certificates" from PKI providers – these are used to check the bona fides of the certificate authority and then, in a second step, the certificates of potential communicators. An attacker who could subvert any single one of those certificate authorities into issuing a certificate for a bogus public key could then mount a "man-in-the-middle" attack as easily as if the certificate scheme were not used at all. Despite its theoretical and potential problems, this approach is widely used. Examples include SSL and its successor, TLS, which are commonly used to provide security for web browsers, for example, so that they might be used to securely send credit card details to an online store.
Wait, what's that? You're still susceptible to MITM when using CA's?
1. The sender creates a message.
2. The sending software generates a hash code of the message.
3. The sending software generates a signature from the hash code using the sender's private key.
4. The binary signature is attached to the message.
5. The receiving software keeps a copy of the message signature.
6. The receiving software generates a new hash code for the received message and verifies it using the message's signature. If the verification is successful, the message is accepted as authentic.
This still seems susceptible to an MITM attack.
You know what? Forget the console games. And the blackjack.
The could just give it the SMB treatment like they did the first time through. (Also, Doki Doki Panic started life as a Mario prototype. It looks like they shoe-horned on the other IP.)
The article suggests a game based on Birdo, but how about a sequel to Doki Doki Panic (SMB2)? I'd play the hell out of that.
Also, we need keys for 'sh', 'ch', 'gh', 'ing', 'ion', 'tion', 'etc', etc. This could become unwieldly, so we should probably just adopt a system of characters that covers all of the possible phonetic variations. To save time, we could have multiple characters for the same sound, which would imply certain meanings based on context.
We'd probably end up with thousands of different characters; hopefully the people who make most of our components would be able to adapt.
I didn't even think about that. I'd mod you up if I could.
How about sending along a couple of backpacks (and monetary donations) with vetted charitable aid groups (Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, etc)?
Link
Shouldn't be long; the story is /.'d, but I assume they're filling the Altavista servers with hot grits like liquid glass in a clunker.
Imagine a Beowulf cluster of those running Linux, all naked and petrified, just like Natalie Portman.
They turned it off for now. What's to say they won't turn it back on a year or two from now?
That scenario would really only apply to people who keep their XBone online, wouldn't it?