This is a shameless pandering to the preconceptions of the Slashdot crowd. The statement that "Nobody is willing to do an honest cost accounting for the top guys" is simply not true, and it's an unfair dismissal of IE's very real successes in that space.
IT guys can and do choose other browsers. Last I heard, Navigator still had over 1/3 of the corporate browser market. Suggesting that IT folk would be cowed by the "top guys" flies in the face of every experience I've had with them: that they're pragmatic, honest, and outspoken.
Shaun, just because Connectix is on the committee doesn't mean VirtualPC will be supplied to schools. And even if they did, "PC or Mac" sounds to me like complete "technology choice", regardless of whatever additional free software is included.
Well, they haven't paid corporate income taxes for a while because of their employee stock options program (nor have many other companies e.g. Cisco), but they still pay boatloads of other taxes.
You explicitly dismiss the fact that this is a civil case without explaining why it is valid to do so.
Nor do you reconcile your statements with the fact that this is a settlement and that the civil trial never proceeded to a point where "guilt" was assessed. So your implications of "swindling", "money that was ill-gotten", etc. are unfounded.
Again, you're muddling the DOJ case and the civil case, and I think that's the source of your confusion.
1. You're muddling the DOJ trial with the civil trial, and that seems to be the source of most of your confusion.
2. As you well know, my argument wasn't that "the poor don't count"; it's that if MS wanted simply to increase their share in education (as they have been doing since 1996), there are much better ways.
3. Calm down. I know MS makes you angry, but that's no reason to throw rationality out the window.
FFFish, the truth is Microsoft doesn't need anymore tax writeoffs. They're already very successful driving their corp income taxes to zero through other means (as are all corporations). And they donate a ton already. This settlement is irrelevent for tax purposes.
Second, your figures claim that MS's costs Microsoft are 1/1000 of what it charges for software. This is wildly wrong -- your guess is not even in the ballpark. Also, you're assuming all software supplied will be MS software. In truth, schools will choose, and a good bit won't be MS stuff.
Connectix would just be on a board that doles out software. They wouldn't necessarily be providing Connectix software (in fact, that's extremely unlikely). Anyway, my understanding is that it ultimately gets down to what schools want.
This is yet another variation on the "convicted felon choosing their punishment" argument. For the last time:
1. This is a *settlement* in a *civil case*.
2. It was architected primarily by the lawyers who brought this suit in the first place.
3. It's not illegal to "destroy companies" or be a "bad guy." I'd challenge you to separate what is illegal from what is "not nice."
4. You assert both that Microsoft has a "stranglehold" and that Apple is doing well in the school market. Which is it? What facts are you relying on?
5. Microsoft already dominates the education market, and has been gaining share since 1996. Apple's share is currently 23% according to this story.
6. Is pouring money into low-income areas really the best way for Microsoft to "tighten their stranglehold"? If they wanted to make an investment in the education market to increase their share, they would probably target "high-value" segments with students who are likely to be tech savvy or affluent in the future. That is clearly not the case here.
Actually:
1. Microsoft currently dominates the education market. Their share is currently 23% according to this story.
2. Schools will be free to choose what software they want. That's what this is about, right? What schools want? Not what people with technological agendas want.
3. Is pouring money into low-income areas really the best investment for Microsoft? If they wanted to make an "investment" in the education market to increase their share, they would probably target "high-value" segments with students who are likely to be tech savvy or affluent in the future.
1. This is a *settlement* in a *civil case*.
2. It was architected primarily by the lawyers who brought this suit in the first place.
3. A $1 billion charge is not necessarily a "win-win" for Microsoft. I'd challenge you to rethink your biases on that.
4. In what way would Connectix be a "tool of Microsoft"? By sitting on an independent committee that doles out software? Again, I'd challenge you to rethink your biases on that.
5. How would "Connectix...be toast"? How does Microsoft "need" Connectix? If Microsoft wanted to "toast" them, they could now. And there are plenty of other companies MS could suggest for this committee. Nothing special about Connectix.
I want to just respond to the narrow issue of "If someone wrote a better word processer than MS Word, would companies switch?" Most probably, the answer is no. BUT, the thing many people miss is that this doesn't necessarily imply a monopoly position or a network effect.
There's a switching cost, and the benefits of your new product would have to outweight and/or reduce the switching cost. There are lots of ways to do the latter: "Emulate" the old product, provide free training, subsidize products built on top of it, etc. So the "better product failing" scenario is pretty specious. I think a lot of the disagreement on the MS/DoJ issue arrises from that.
The parent post is verifiably a lie, cobbled together from press stories and tech columns.
Hey dfeldman, try having your supposed "Uncle Isaac" answer these questions:
* Where on the MS campus is the Passport group located?
* Who is the GPM of the Passport group? Who was the dev manager?
* Complete this name: Hyer B_____
This is a great response, couldn't have said it better.
"code as law" is not a new idea
on
The Future of Ideas
·
· Score: 2, Interesting
Though Michael (charmingly) seems to think it is, "code as law" is not a new idea. Check out Marc Rotenberg's article here. It's a pretty obvious idea, actually, not particularly "groundbreaking." Lessig is an interesting writer though, and a great speaker.
My access has been off since Friday and is still off. One of my friends wrote an angry letter and was told service should be restored later this week. But as all broadband users know, even an hour without access sucks major ass, so a week is completely intolerable.
Couldn't AT&T just pretend to stay in negotiations so @home wouldn't turn off access before they set up the new network?
Here's an underreported fact to chew on: Schools have the choice of using non-Microsoft software under the proposed terms of settlement. Further, many of the donated computers will be Apples. So if schools would like RedHat software, they can ask for it. It's up to the schools to choose. That's why the software valuation under the settlement is a broad range.
Didja actually try it? It's perfectly stable. This capability has been in Windows for years, though not exposed through UI. It's a shame that some folks are unable to take off their anti-ms blinders & evaluate technology objectively.
This is arguably off-topic, but for those of you who've been pining for virtual desktops on Windows, check out the Windows XP Powertoys which includes a virtual desktop tool.
Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the schools *can choose*. This from the NYTimes article:
Because the grants could be used for Macintoshes and competing software, Microsoft said, the settlement would not be intended to give the company an even greater advantage in the marketplace.
This is a complex economic issue. It's not as simple as "the only reason to bundle is dominance, so it's anticompetitive." Take a look at _Antitrust_ by Areeda sometime -- this stuff is *really* tricky; some of these cases just boggle the mind.
Why Navigator Became Less Attractive (from Myhrvold):
* First...Netscape ignored small ISPs as potential distributors of Netscape's Web browsing software, effectively ceding that territory to Microsoft for a long time. Through working with those smaller ISPs, Microsoft learned useful information about the ISP business and the needs of ISPs and also obtained valuable feedback about Internet Explorer and the IEAK.
* Second, Netscape lost its reputation as the supplier of cutting-edge Internet technologies. Netscape's Web browsing software is simply not as good as it used to be relative to the competition, with versions 3.0 and 4.0 of Internet Explorer winning the majority of reviews.
* Third, Netscape made the strange decision to de-emphasize its established "Navigator" brand name and emphasize a new "Communicator" brand name, despite the widespread association of Navigator with Web browsing software generally. When you have a brand name rapidly becoming as well known as Band-Aid or Kleenex, you do not wisely abandon or de-emphasize it.
* Fourth, Netscape invested significant time and money going into competition with IBM's Lotus Notes and Microsoft Exchange in the enterprise messaging business, a field in which Netscape had no product experience and was entirely unprepared for the rigorous quality and product support requirements of large corporate customers.
* Fifth, Netscape continued to change its corporate direction every six months, to the extent that nobody was quite sure what kind of company it was. Initially, Netscape was a Web browsing software company; then it was a Web server software company; then it was an intranet company; then it was an extranet company, then it was an enterprise messaging company; then it was an electronic commerce company; then it was a portal Web site company. That sort of corporate identity crisis is unsettling to business partners like ISPs, which look for stability and consistency. Furthermore, these changes in corporate direction also made for changes in priorities that caused Netscape to focus much less on ISPs.
* Sixth, Netscape implemented its referral server program in ways that concerned ISPs. The focus of ISP Select, accessible only by going to Netscape's Web site, made it primarily a tool for switching ISPs and not acquiring new long term users. Although this may have provided advantages to end user customers, from an ISP perspective, it was not a good thing because each ISP's profitability is heavily dependent on maintaining customers for a sufficiently long period of time in order to recover its initial acquisition costs. In addition, Netscape favored large telecommunication companies over smaller entrepreneurial ISPs in the way it set up its ISP Select program.
* Seventh, and perhaps most importantly, Netscape sought to charge ISPs very high prices for distributing Netscape's Web browsing software. Given the highly competitive nature of the ISP business, it was not economically viable for ISPs to pay such prices. Seeking to gouge ISPs was shortsighted, and encouraged them to explore alternatives. Instead of attempting to gouge ISPs, Netscape should have distributed its Web browsing software and related tools for free and thereby promoted customer demand for other software and services that it offered.
Slashdot Mirror
This is a shameless pandering to the preconceptions of the Slashdot crowd. The statement that "Nobody is willing to do an honest cost accounting for the top guys" is simply not true, and it's an unfair dismissal of IE's very real successes in that space.
IT guys can and do choose other browsers. Last I heard, Navigator still had over 1/3 of the corporate browser market. Suggesting that IT folk would be cowed by the "top guys" flies in the face of every experience I've had with them: that they're pragmatic, honest, and outspoken.
Shaun, just because Connectix is on the committee doesn't mean VirtualPC will be supplied to schools. And even if they did, "PC or Mac" sounds to me like complete "technology choice", regardless of whatever additional free software is included.
There are different evidentiary standards and procedures for civil and criminal cases. Muddling the two leads to all kinds of confusion.
Well, they haven't paid corporate income taxes for a while because of their employee stock options program (nor have many other companies e.g. Cisco), but they still pay boatloads of other taxes.
You explicitly dismiss the fact that this is a civil case without explaining why it is valid to do so.
Nor do you reconcile your statements with the fact that this is a settlement and that the civil trial never proceeded to a point where "guilt" was assessed. So your implications of "swindling", "money that was ill-gotten", etc. are unfounded.
Again, you're muddling the DOJ case and the civil case, and I think that's the source of your confusion.
1. You're muddling the DOJ trial with the civil trial, and that seems to be the source of most of your confusion.
2. As you well know, my argument wasn't that "the poor don't count"; it's that if MS wanted simply to increase their share in education (as they have been doing since 1996), there are much better ways.
3. Calm down. I know MS makes you angry, but that's no reason to throw rationality out the window.
FFFish, the truth is Microsoft doesn't need anymore tax writeoffs. They're already very successful driving their corp income taxes to zero through other means (as are all corporations). And they donate a ton already. This settlement is irrelevent for tax purposes.
Second, your figures claim that MS's costs Microsoft are 1/1000 of what it charges for software. This is wildly wrong -- your guess is not even in the ballpark. Also, you're assuming all software supplied will be MS software. In truth, schools will choose, and a good bit won't be MS stuff.
For the last time: THIS IS A SETTLEMENT. Microsoft did not "set the terms" of this. Like any settlement, both parties sat down and negotiated. Oy.
Connectix would just be on a board that doles out software. They wouldn't necessarily be providing Connectix software (in fact, that's extremely unlikely). Anyway, my understanding is that it ultimately gets down to what schools want.
This is yet another variation on the "convicted felon choosing their punishment" argument. For the last time:
1. This is a *settlement* in a *civil case*.
2. It was architected primarily by the lawyers who brought this suit in the first place.
3. It's not illegal to "destroy companies" or be a "bad guy." I'd challenge you to separate what is illegal from what is "not nice."
4. You assert both that Microsoft has a "stranglehold" and that Apple is doing well in the school market. Which is it? What facts are you relying on?
5. Microsoft already dominates the education market, and has been gaining share since 1996. Apple's share is currently 23% according to this story.
6. Is pouring money into low-income areas really the best way for Microsoft to "tighten their stranglehold"? If they wanted to make an investment in the education market to increase their share, they would probably target "high-value" segments with students who are likely to be tech savvy or affluent in the future. That is clearly not the case here.
Actually:
1. Microsoft currently dominates the education market. Their share is currently 23% according to this story.
2. Schools will be free to choose what software they want. That's what this is about, right? What schools want? Not what people with technological agendas want.
3. Is pouring money into low-income areas really the best investment for Microsoft? If they wanted to make an "investment" in the education market to increase their share, they would probably target "high-value" segments with students who are likely to be tech savvy or affluent in the future.
No, it's not like that at all.
1. This is a *settlement* in a *civil case*.
2. It was architected primarily by the lawyers who brought this suit in the first place.
3. A $1 billion charge is not necessarily a "win-win" for Microsoft. I'd challenge you to rethink your biases on that.
4. In what way would Connectix be a "tool of Microsoft"? By sitting on an independent committee that doles out software? Again, I'd challenge you to rethink your biases on that.
5. How would "Connectix...be toast"? How does Microsoft "need" Connectix? If Microsoft wanted to "toast" them, they could now. And there are plenty of other companies MS could suggest for this committee. Nothing special about Connectix.
Ieshan, this is a *settlement* in a *civil case*. Your rhetoric is way overblown and highly irrelevant to the MS situation.
I want to just respond to the narrow issue of "If someone wrote a better word processer than MS Word, would companies switch?" Most probably, the answer is no. BUT, the thing many people miss is that this doesn't necessarily imply a monopoly position or a network effect.
There's a switching cost, and the benefits of your new product would have to outweight and/or reduce the switching cost. There are lots of ways to do the latter: "Emulate" the old product, provide free training, subsidize products built on top of it, etc. So the "better product failing" scenario is pretty specious. I think a lot of the disagreement on the MS/DoJ issue arrises from that.
The parent post is verifiably a lie, cobbled together from press stories and tech columns.
Hey dfeldman, try having your supposed "Uncle Isaac" answer these questions:
* Where on the MS campus is the Passport group located?
* Who is the GPM of the Passport group? Who was the dev manager?
* Complete this name: Hyer B_____
I can't believe moderators fell for that stuff.
This is a great response, couldn't have said it better.
Though Michael (charmingly) seems to think it is, "code as law" is not a new idea. Check out Marc Rotenberg's article here. It's a pretty obvious idea, actually, not particularly "groundbreaking." Lessig is an interesting writer though, and a great speaker.
My access has been off since Friday and is still off. One of my friends wrote an angry letter and was told service should be restored later this week. But as all broadband users know, even an hour without access sucks major ass, so a week is completely intolerable.
Couldn't AT&T just pretend to stay in negotiations so @home wouldn't turn off access before they set up the new network?
Unfortunately, the calendar functionality is pretty critical for a lot of companies.
Here's an underreported fact to chew on: Schools have the choice of using non-Microsoft software under the proposed terms of settlement. Further, many of the donated computers will be Apples. So if schools would like RedHat software, they can ask for it. It's up to the schools to choose. That's why the software valuation under the settlement is a broad range.
Didja actually try it? It's perfectly stable. This capability has been in Windows for years, though not exposed through UI. It's a shame that some folks are unable to take off their anti-ms blinders & evaluate technology objectively.
This is arguably off-topic, but for those of you who've been pining for virtual desktops on Windows, check out the Windows XP Powertoys which includes a virtual desktop tool.
Because the grants could be used for Macintoshes and competing software, Microsoft said, the settlement would not be intended to give the company an even greater advantage in the marketplace.
This is a complex economic issue. It's not as simple as "the only reason to bundle is dominance, so it's anticompetitive." Take a look at _Antitrust_ by Areeda sometime -- this stuff is *really* tricky; some of these cases just boggle the mind.
* First...Netscape ignored small ISPs as potential distributors of Netscape's Web browsing software, effectively ceding that territory to Microsoft for a long time. Through working with those smaller ISPs, Microsoft learned useful information about the ISP business and the needs of ISPs and also obtained valuable feedback about Internet Explorer and the IEAK.
* Second, Netscape lost its reputation as the supplier of cutting-edge Internet technologies. Netscape's Web browsing software is simply not as good as it used to be relative to the competition, with versions 3.0 and 4.0 of Internet Explorer winning the majority of reviews.
* Third, Netscape made the strange decision to de-emphasize its established "Navigator" brand name and emphasize a new "Communicator" brand name, despite the widespread association of Navigator with Web browsing software generally. When you have a brand name rapidly becoming as well known as Band-Aid or Kleenex, you do not wisely abandon or de-emphasize it.
* Fourth, Netscape invested significant time and money going into competition with IBM's Lotus Notes and Microsoft Exchange in the enterprise messaging business, a field in which Netscape had no product experience and was entirely unprepared for the rigorous quality and product support requirements of large corporate customers.
* Fifth, Netscape continued to change its corporate direction every six months, to the extent that nobody was quite sure what kind of company it was. Initially, Netscape was a Web browsing software company; then it was a Web server software company; then it was an intranet company; then it was an extranet company, then it was an enterprise messaging company; then it was an electronic commerce company; then it was a portal Web site company. That sort of corporate identity crisis is unsettling to business partners like ISPs, which look for stability and consistency. Furthermore, these changes in corporate direction also made for changes in priorities that caused Netscape to focus much less on ISPs.
* Sixth, Netscape implemented its referral server program in ways that concerned ISPs. The focus of ISP Select, accessible only by going to Netscape's Web site, made it primarily a tool for switching ISPs and not acquiring new long term users. Although this may have provided advantages to end user customers, from an ISP perspective, it was not a good thing because each ISP's profitability is heavily dependent on maintaining customers for a sufficiently long period of time in order to recover its initial acquisition costs. In addition, Netscape favored large telecommunication companies over smaller entrepreneurial ISPs in the way it set up its ISP Select program.
* Seventh, and perhaps most importantly, Netscape sought to charge ISPs very high prices for distributing Netscape's Web browsing software. Given the highly competitive nature of the ISP business, it was not economically viable for ISPs to pay such prices. Seeking to gouge ISPs was shortsighted, and encouraged them to explore alternatives. Instead of attempting to gouge ISPs, Netscape should have distributed its Web browsing software and related tools for free and thereby promoted customer demand for other software and services that it offered.