It isn't true. There are no exceptions for reporters to the California wiretapping statute, Cal. Penal Code 632. Daleiden and Merritt are probably going to be convicted on at least some of the charges.
There are no exceptions for being a journalist to the California wiretapping statute (Cal. Penal Code 632). If you are in California, you should get the consent of all parties before recording any conversation, just to be on the safe side.
Chattanooga did set up a city owned ISP, EPB, the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga. EPB offers some of the fastest, most reliable, Internet service at extremely competitive prices. So when EPB began thinking about expanding to other underserved communities in the Chattanooga area, it was a real threat to the incumbent duopoly: Comcast and AT&T.
The Tennessee legislature couldn't prevent Chattanooga from setting up its own ISP, but what they could do is prevent EPB from expanding their service area beyond the city limits. So areas just outside Chattanooga have some of the slowest Internet service, and it's all thanks to lobbyists for AT&T. Thank you, Tennessee Republican legislature, for protecting the profits of AT&T by protecting them from competition by a city owned utility.
Perhaps economic sanctions are an ineffective way to handle undeveloped countries. But the largest violations by ZTE were with regards to Iran, which is pretty developed. And it was a conscious decision by ZTE to use US made telecom equipment to win Iranian government contracts. It was pervasive and ongoing behavior in violation of U.S. law. And the sanctions in Iran's case helped drive Iran to the bargaining table with regards to its nuclear program, both in terms of abandoning any immediate plans for nuclear weapons building or testing, and allowing nuclear inspections.
As for North Korea, the banned items are dual-use items: things like routers, microprocessors, servers, things that can be used in ordinary products, but also military products, like long-ranged ballistic missiles. And those products weren't going there to be used for the North Korean internet.
These aren't basic economic sanctions: in North Korea's case, the banned items are dual-use military items, and in Iran's case, it isn't undeveloped.
The argument that the kill list has no geographic limit is misguided at best, deliberately misleading at worst. The leaked white paper specifically says (emphasis added):
"This white paper sets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities..."
The Obama administration has never claimed it is fine to kill Americans in the US. It has claimed that what delineates the battlefield is unclear when dealing with a non-state actor, and that under traditional laws of war a belligerent can be fought wherever it is launching or planning to launch attacks from. And it has only ever claimed that it is legal in a foreign country, not the U.S.
The U.S. is one of the few countries that does not block extradition of its own citizens (cf. Brazil, China, France, Germany, Japan, etc.). Getting a Yank extradited pursuant to one of the 109 bilateral treaties the U.S. has signed is very possible, even if the reciprocating party will not extradite its own citizens.
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada wasn't extradited under the U.S. Bolivia Extradition Treaty because there is no comparable crime under U.S. criminal law like the one he is charged with in Bolivia. The crime of genocide under Bolivian law, which includes massacres without a specific intent requirement, has no comparable equivalent under U.S. law. Therefore, the charge failed the dual criminality requirement of the treaty, and he wasn't extraditable.
The reason KAT was targeted for criminal enforcement was because KAT was operated for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Specifically, they were selling millions of dollars per year in advertisements.
Follow the money. The main criminal problem isn't the copyright infringement that KAT aided and abetted by indexing torrent files - it's that they profited heavily through ad revenue from doing so. And when they did profit from ad revenue, they attempted and specifically intended in making the transactions to conceal the source, ownership or control of the funds.
First and foremost, this is a money laundering case. There is a much better case, from what has been presented so far, for the money laundering aspects of the case than for the copyright infringement aspects.
You won't find criminal conspiracy in Title 17. You'll find it in Title 18, along with a number of other criminal statutes. Specifically, read 18 U.S. Code 371 - Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
The pertinent part that applies is, "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." In that part, "offense against the United States" refers to any federal, as opposed to state, criminal offense.
So, there is such a thing as conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement. It is an application of the federal criminal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S. Code 371, to the criminal copyright infringement statute, 17 U.S. Code 506.
Additionally, if you read the US/Polish extradition treaty you linked to, you see that, in the words of then-Secretary of State Albright, "Article 2(2) specifies that an extraditable offense also includes an attempt to commit or participation in the commission of an offense, or a conspiracy to commit (under United States law) or any type of association to commit (under Polish law) an offense as described in Article 2(1)."
So Artem Vaulin is extraditable. Thankfully, the law does matter, and both the US and Poland seem to be following it.
The new supply is almost always more expensive which drives prices up even farther.
That's utterly idiotic; creating new supply, of course, drives down prices, not up.
Don't be idiotic yourself: creating new supply doesn't always drive down prices. When demand is high, and supply is low, an increase in supply may not decrease the price at all.
I'm not endorsing the above comment, new supply in the housing market, even high end supply, generally does lower the overall price level in real terms. But in nominal terms, you can sometimes see prices continue to increase as new supply comes onto the market, simply because demand continues to remain high.
You are wrong about the reason housing prices are high, especially in cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco. While you understand the basics somewhat, you misunderstand how they are applied, and how they apply specifically to the economics of the housing market.
Housing prices are high because demand outstrips supply. That's the bottom line. There are arguments about why demand outstrips supply, but the largest reasons in California have to do with land use regulations which limit density.
Government can do little to push up demand for housing in those areas - demand for housing is driven by larger factors - the strength of the overall economy, the number of jobs in the area, and by the factors such as the geographic niceness of an area. Rental prices in Los Angeles dropped precipitously through the Great Recession, through 2010, largely because demand dropped.
Housing subsidies do little to push up demand. It can slightly prop up the price level, but low income housing subsidies do not create demand where there isn't any. Government support of mortgages through the mortgage interest tax deduction acts as an implicit housing subsidy for home buyers, but this benefits those living in high-cost, high-income areas the most, since they have larger mortgages and pay more interest. It actually acts as a net demand reducer for housing in urban areas, because there are fewer houses available for purchase, but it does little to affect overall demand for housing.
Rent control does little to discourage the creation of new supply. In California, for example, new housing is largely exempt from the rent control ordinances until the buildings are 30 years old. Once a unit is vacated, except for a few situations, landlords can rent it out at market rate. Rent control as practiced in California does nothing to discourage the creation of new housing supply.
Affordable housing unit requirements and taxes on developers can increase the overall price of a development, and reduce the profits available to the developers, but overall, that acts as more of a wealth transfer than anything else. When it causes any sort of effect, it causes it only on the margins. A profitable real estate development will remain profitable even with affordable housing unit requirements.
Zoning and usage restrictions, and other land use regulations do more than anything else to reduce supply. And during my time working real estate deals in California, it is the height restrictions and the NIMBYism that do more than anything to reduce the creation of new supply. Unthinking opposition to increased density is by far the hardest problem to overcome, and it is people who live there who don't want their neighborhoods to change that are the largest impediment to solving the housing crises in San Francisco and Los Angeles.
That's what it comes down to, at least in California. And restricting the ability of people to list rental housing on AirBnB does nothing to make the housing shortage worse. What it does is reduce the number of people who have been evicted illegally to rent out these places on AirBnB, it keeps a small number of housing units on the market, and it prevents disruptions in the lives of the people who live in those locations. That has been the experience in Los Angeles and San Francisco - greedy landlords illegally evicting people to try to get more money through AirBnB. These are short term profiteers who have no regard for the long-term consequences of their actions.
AirBnB is adding to the problems created when you have a rental housing market with over 99% occupancy. That's the tipping point where renters cease having economic power versus landlords. Those are the markets where AirBnB is facing additional regulation. And if AirBnB wants to keep playing in those markets, it will play ball with these cities. I don't think there's any specific objection to allowing short-term rentals, but the way AirBnB has affected the housing market in those areas has been almost entirely negative. Politicians will listen to the people who elect them, to their constituents, and do something. The antipathy to AirBnB comes from the fact that it allows, encourages, and profits from people acting illegally in those areas.
It's worse case for Internet Brands than that. One of the allegations of the lawsuit is that Internet Brands knew about these guys, knew enough to warn their users, and actually sued the people they bought ModelMayhem from.
From the opinion: "It is also alleged that Internet Brands sued the Waitts in August 2010 for failing to disclose the potential for civil suits arising from the activities of Flanders and Callum." It's also covered in the businessinsurance article you linked to.
If you know enough to sue who you bought it from, you know enough to warn the people on your site of a specific threat. And you should do so. They sued the original owners because they failed to disclose the potential for civil suits. It's not surprising that they then may be liable for not disclosing the risks to their users.
There is only one potentially valid concern - SSID spoofing. If you want to take on the FCC concerning that issue - go for it. But if the SSID is not the same as your facility's SSID, then you should not and legally cannot interfere with that other wireless network. Full stop.
In general, you are correct, but someone's SSID can still be deceptive without being the same and still pose a security issue.
A security concern about SSID spoofing can be more complicated than just whether the SSID is the same, because you can have a valid security concern if the SSID is misleading. My favorite example is the "Free Public WiFi" you would often see in airports in years past, set up by a virus. Someone could also be using a typo, or adding something to your SSID, like "Guest" or "5G" or something else to make it look like your SSID. In such a case, there is a real argument to be made that they are trying to interfere with your network.
But I think that's the widest possible extent of any valid security concern.
I don't think there would be an FCC enforcement action over something like this. So long as you're allowing other wireless hotspots if they aren't trying to impersonate you, that should be fine.
In the FCC enforcement advisory put out after Marriott, one of the things they mentioned was that Marriott "admitted that the customers it blocked did not pose a security threat to the Marriott network..." If there is a security threat, that does change the situation. You can see that advisory here: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-113A1_Rcd.pdf
In fact, I would argue that by trying to put up a wireless network with the same or a similar name, that would constitute an attempt at interference by them. Either way, the FCC is indicating it would consider valid security concerns.
No, what the study you cite shows is that people are bad at evaluating themselves. The fact that the large majority of drivers are reasonable and prudent is proved by the accident rate of cars on the road and how low it usually it. Otherwise, there would be far more accidents, far more injuries, and far more fatalities than there are. But that's not where the 85th percentile comes from. That comes from statistics and empirical research.
The rationale behind the 85th percentile rule is statistical, that traffic speeds follow a normal distribution, and that the mean speed plus one standard deviation approximates the 85th percentile speed for a normally distributed sample of speeds. Speeds over the 85th percentile are more than one standard deviation over the mean. Two standard deviations over the mean will get you the 95th percentile, and speeds in that region are where enforcement should be concentrated.
And generally, when you look at traffic studies, studies of the speeds of passing cars on the road, that's what you find: speeds follow a normal distribution for most roads. People drive speeds that they believe are safe, regardless of the posted speed limit, and it generally follows a normal distribution.
I believe that the recovering engineer you link to would agree with me that in designing roads, speed limits, and other traffic features, we have to take into account what people actually do, not simply what we tell them to do. This isn't a blind engineering standard: this is based off studies of how people actually behave when they are driving. You can find multiple engineering and traffic surveys done by cities in California on the web (partly because to enforce their speeding tickets they have to do the surveys), and see the actual data, see the bell curves of speeds time after time.
Setting speed limits without regard to how people actually behave and drive is madness. It encourages disrespect for the law, reduces compliance where speeds are reduced because of road conditions that aren't readily apparent, and in general, makes driving less safe. The 85th percentile rule is grounded in science. It isn't the most important thing to consider when setting speed limits (that would be actual accident rates), but it should always be considered.
Again, I'm concerned with pedestrian safety. As for the lowering the speeds aspect, I agree, physical changes help, but they're not entirely necessary. Speed cams, coupled with effective enforcement, work well too. First time somebody goes 35 in a 25 zone, and gets hit with a $200 ticket, they'll start to modify their behavior.
That's true for a while. However, studies on the long-term efficacy of enforcement have mostly shown that enforcement has an effect for a while, and then wears off once enforcement goes away. So a community must be willing to accept long-term strict enforcement if that's going to work. Otherwise, once the police are gone, people eventually go back to their speeding ways. Speed cameras are effective, but publicity and warning signs are necessary for actually getting people to slow down. I think if a community is really concerned about pedestrian safety, the best way to do that means separating pedestrians from cars, and where they can't be separated, forcing cars to slow down, preferably by physical alterations like speed bumps, traffic circles, and other measures.
The DOT has a summary of various speed research in the page below, with some notes on the efficacy of enforcement : https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/98154/speed.cfm
The 85th percentile works well for most streets, even local streets, and various traffic studies have backed this up, noting no increase in accident rates even with increases in speed. Most people will drive in a reasonably safe and prudent fashion, and won't go faster than they think is safe for them to drive on the road. The biggest problem is when there are road conditions or hazards that won't be immediately apparent to the average driver.
And that happens often in narrow residential streets, where there is less traffic, the traffic is intermittent, or there are other concerns like frequent pedestrian crossings of the road. In those cases, reductions in traffic speed are certainly justified and rational, and uniform lower traffic speeds on residential streets is certainly one way to achieve that. The speed limit on the road I live on is 25 mph, and I certainly don't like it when people speed through it.
But in general, if you have a road, most drivers are going to drive a speed that they think is safe, regardless of what the posted speed limit is. I've read traffic studies of a four lane road near my house. The posted speed limit is 35 mph. In the study, over 50% the cars were going faster than that, and the study justified a speed limit of 40 mph. People drove at speeds they considered to be reasonably safe, and they will continue to do so even if a lower posted speed limit is set. Speed limit enforcement is of limited value in those cases, because it will only be effective during periods of strict enforcement. Once the cops are gone, people go back to their speeding ways.
If you really want to lower the speeds of cars on the road, you have to do other things, like install traffic bumps or other obstacles that slow or interrupt the flow of traffic, not merely set a speed limit.
What law are you referring to? There is no law that said that Secretary Clinton, or anyone else, must turn in classified information. There are laws that pertain to classified documents, and laws that pertain to documents containing classified information. The emails were not classified documents, so those laws don't apply. So only the laws dealing with documents containing classified information would apply.
There is a big difference between possessing classified information and possessing classified documents. Anyone (even foreign spies!) can possess classified information without violating the law. Most people can possess classified documents without violating the law (sorry foreign spies, under almost all circumstances it's a crime for you, don't do it). There is no requirement in the law to turn in classified information.
As to the requirements concerning documents containing classified information, Secretary Clinton satisfied those laws when she gave her emails to the government. (See 18 U.S.C 1924).
Just because Secretary Clinton was no longer Secretary of State does not mean all her security clearances were revoked. Even if they were, it is not a crime to be an unauthorized person in possession of classified information, and she did not commit a crime by having the emails in her possession.
As to it seeming improbable that her lawyer had sufficient security clearance, his security clearances were held by the State Department, so I'm sure they gave him whatever was required to do the job he had to do to ensure the former Secretary of State's compliance with the Federal Records Act. As to the IC IG having to get special clearance, I'm sure that happened because the initial scope of his need to know was less. It is one thing to review material that has not been classified, but once it is determined to be classified, that's another matter.
Secretary Clinton's lawyer had security clearances through the State Department, and was the person who reviewed the emails for Clinton. So no law was violated there.
As to whether storing the email would support a charge, the statute requires gross negligence in handling or storing the information. Having the computers be guarded by the Secret Service alongside presidential servers doesn't meet a gross negligence standard. So the law wasn't violated there either.
Sounds like a crime, and being a crime are different things. Secretary Clinton instructed an aide to send unclassified information from a secure source through insecure channels. Not a crime. Secretary Clinton handed a flash drive containing classified information to her lawyer, a person who had the appropriate clearances through the State Department. Not a crime. Secretary Clinton's attorney, the one with the security clearance, reviewed the emails to weed out the personal email from those obligated to be saved for government records purposes. Not a crime. So no... doesn't sound like a crime to me. It just sounds like you're wrong.
Secretary Clinton has stated in at least one interview that when she asked her aides to strip the headings, she meant for them to send only the unclassified information. While something like that is suspicious, I'm sure that it was followed up on by the appropriate investigators, and the fact that no one has been indicted means that whatever was done in that instance was not enough to charge anyone.
Not at all. My argument was that even if all that has been said was true, it wasn't criminal.
What Secretary Clinton did was give potentially classified information to her attorney, a person who had the necessary security clearances from the State Department to receive the flash drive and view the information if it was classified. What she did there was neither criminal, nor incompetent
People going around saying that giving her attorney a flash drive with her emails was a crime are wrong, misleading, ignorant, and incompetent.
I didn't miss that point at all. Let's say that all her clearances have lapsed, which would put her under 18 USC 793(e) as an unauthorized person. The same knowledge and willfulness requirements exist there as well. Secretary Clinton would have to know that the information was harmful to the US or helpful to a foreign nation, and that handing the drive to her lawyer was violating the law. The exact same arguments apply there as well.
As for retention of any documents, the same knowledge and willfulness requirements apply there too, and there too, she has the same arguments to make.
There is not an easy case to make against Secretary Clinton on mishandling classified information with regards to her emails, certainly not under the facts as they are known at this point. If I was a prosecutor, I wouldn't try such a case, because I would lose.
Sorry Ken. IAAL, I've had to deal with classified information and with unclassified information that may possibly deserve classification. Reading the statutes (mainly 18 USC 793 et seq.) concerning crimes on handling classified information, merely handing a flash drive containing emails to a lawyer does not constitute a crime.
Let's break the first half of 18 U.S.C. 793(d) down into the elements a prosecutor would need to prove: 1. That a person having lawful possession, access, control over, or being entrusted with 2. Any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense 3. Which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation 4. Willfully 5. communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted 6. to any person not entitled to receive it.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that Secretary Clinton had lawful possession and the necessary clearances for whatever information was determined to be classified, and that it qualifies as a writing so satisfied the second element. Let us also assume that Secretary Clinton's lawyer does not have a security clearance (because that is an assumption, as we don't know what clearances her lawyer holds), so that the sixth element is satisfied. Let's also leave out my arguments against whether handing a flash drive to your lawyer constitutes delivery, transmission, or communication under the statute.
A prosecutor would have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Secretary Clinton knew, or had reason to know that the information in those emails was classified or should have been classified. That's a lot harder when the material is not already marked. But even then, we do not know why the information in the emails was classified, or if Secretary Clinton has reason to believe that the information would not be harmful to the US or helpful to a foreign nation, which is the actual requirement in the statute.
Additionally, there's a mens rea requirement of willfulness in the statute, meaning that Secretary Clinton would need to act "intentionally and purposely and with the intent to do something the law forbids" (see Bryan v. US, 524 U.S. 184 (1998)). To prove that, a prosecutor would need to prove that by handing unclassified material (with possibly classified information) to her attorney that she intended to break the law, and not because she wanted her attorney to give her advice, deliver the information to the proper officials, etc.
Let's contrast this with General Patraeus. He knowingly and willfully violated the law when he showed classified information to his mistress. He knew he wasn't supposed to do it. He did it anyway. He meets all the requirements of the statute. He had access to classified information, he had the material, he knew it could be harmful, he knew that his mistress was not entitled to the information, he showed it to her, and he knew that doing so was against the law and did it anyway.
I hope this shows why merely handing a flash drive containing information (that may be classified) to your lawyer does not constitute a crime under the applicable statute, and why when Secretary Clinton handed the flash drive to her lawyer, it wasn't a crime.
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It isn't true. There are no exceptions for reporters to the California wiretapping statute, Cal. Penal Code 632.
Daleiden and Merritt are probably going to be convicted on at least some of the charges.
There are no exceptions for being a journalist to the California wiretapping statute (Cal. Penal Code 632).
If you are in California, you should get the consent of all parties before recording any conversation, just to be on the safe side.
Chattanooga did set up a city owned ISP, EPB, the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga. EPB offers some of the fastest, most reliable, Internet service at extremely competitive prices. So when EPB began thinking about expanding to other underserved communities in the Chattanooga area, it was a real threat to the incumbent duopoly: Comcast and AT&T.
The Tennessee legislature couldn't prevent Chattanooga from setting up its own ISP, but what they could do is prevent EPB from expanding their service area beyond the city limits. So areas just outside Chattanooga have some of the slowest Internet service, and it's all thanks to lobbyists for AT&T. Thank you, Tennessee Republican legislature, for protecting the profits of AT&T by protecting them from competition by a city owned utility.
Perhaps economic sanctions are an ineffective way to handle undeveloped countries. But the largest violations by ZTE were with regards to Iran, which is pretty developed. And it was a conscious decision by ZTE to use US made telecom equipment to win Iranian government contracts. It was pervasive and ongoing behavior in violation of U.S. law. And the sanctions in Iran's case helped drive Iran to the bargaining table with regards to its nuclear program, both in terms of abandoning any immediate plans for nuclear weapons building or testing, and allowing nuclear inspections.
As for North Korea, the banned items are dual-use items: things like routers, microprocessors, servers, things that can be used in ordinary products, but also military products, like long-ranged ballistic missiles. And those products weren't going there to be used for the North Korean internet.
These aren't basic economic sanctions: in North Korea's case, the banned items are dual-use military items, and in Iran's case, it isn't undeveloped.
The argument that the kill list has no geographic limit is misguided at best, deliberately misleading at worst. The leaked white paper specifically says (emphasis added):
The Obama administration has never claimed it is fine to kill Americans in the US. It has claimed that what delineates the battlefield is unclear when dealing with a non-state actor, and that under traditional laws of war a belligerent can be fought wherever it is launching or planning to launch attacks from. And it has only ever claimed that it is legal in a foreign country, not the U.S.
The U.S. is one of the few countries that does not block extradition of its own citizens (cf. Brazil, China, France, Germany, Japan, etc.). Getting a Yank extradited pursuant to one of the 109 bilateral treaties the U.S. has signed is very possible, even if the reciprocating party will not extradite its own citizens.
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada wasn't extradited under the U.S. Bolivia Extradition Treaty because there is no comparable crime under U.S. criminal law like the one he is charged with in Bolivia. The crime of genocide under Bolivian law, which includes massacres without a specific intent requirement, has no comparable equivalent under U.S. law. Therefore, the charge failed the dual criminality requirement of the treaty, and he wasn't extraditable.
The reason KAT was targeted for criminal enforcement was because KAT was operated for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Specifically, they were selling millions of dollars per year in advertisements.
Follow the money. The main criminal problem isn't the copyright infringement that KAT aided and abetted by indexing torrent files - it's that they profited heavily through ad revenue from doing so. And when they did profit from ad revenue, they attempted and specifically intended in making the transactions to conceal the source, ownership or control of the funds.
First and foremost, this is a money laundering case. There is a much better case, from what has been presented so far, for the money laundering aspects of the case than for the copyright infringement aspects.
You won't find criminal conspiracy in Title 17. You'll find it in Title 18, along with a number of other criminal statutes. Specifically, read 18 U.S. Code 371 - Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
The pertinent part that applies is, "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." In that part, "offense against the United States" refers to any federal, as opposed to state, criminal offense.
So, there is such a thing as conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement. It is an application of the federal criminal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S. Code 371, to the criminal copyright infringement statute, 17 U.S. Code 506.
Additionally, if you read the US/Polish extradition treaty you linked to, you see that, in the words of then-Secretary of State Albright, "Article 2(2) specifies that an extraditable offense also includes an attempt to commit or participation in the commission of an offense, or a conspiracy to commit (under United States law) or any type of association to commit (under Polish law) an offense as described in Article 2(1)."
So Artem Vaulin is extraditable. Thankfully, the law does matter, and both the US and Poland seem to be following it.
That's utterly idiotic; creating new supply, of course, drives down prices, not up.
Don't be idiotic yourself: creating new supply doesn't always drive down prices. When demand is high, and supply is low, an increase in supply may not decrease the price at all.
I'm not endorsing the above comment, new supply in the housing market, even high end supply, generally does lower the overall price level in real terms. But in nominal terms, you can sometimes see prices continue to increase as new supply comes onto the market, simply because demand continues to remain high.
You are wrong about the reason housing prices are high, especially in cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco. While you understand the basics somewhat, you misunderstand how they are applied, and how they apply specifically to the economics of the housing market.
Housing prices are high because demand outstrips supply. That's the bottom line. There are arguments about why demand outstrips supply, but the largest reasons in California have to do with land use regulations which limit density.
Government can do little to push up demand for housing in those areas - demand for housing is driven by larger factors - the strength of the overall economy, the number of jobs in the area, and by the factors such as the geographic niceness of an area. Rental prices in Los Angeles dropped precipitously through the Great Recession, through 2010, largely because demand dropped.
Housing subsidies do little to push up demand. It can slightly prop up the price level, but low income housing subsidies do not create demand where there isn't any. Government support of mortgages through the mortgage interest tax deduction acts as an implicit housing subsidy for home buyers, but this benefits those living in high-cost, high-income areas the most, since they have larger mortgages and pay more interest. It actually acts as a net demand reducer for housing in urban areas, because there are fewer houses available for purchase, but it does little to affect overall demand for housing.
Rent control does little to discourage the creation of new supply. In California, for example, new housing is largely exempt from the rent control ordinances until the buildings are 30 years old. Once a unit is vacated, except for a few situations, landlords can rent it out at market rate. Rent control as practiced in California does nothing to discourage the creation of new housing supply.
Affordable housing unit requirements and taxes on developers can increase the overall price of a development, and reduce the profits available to the developers, but overall, that acts as more of a wealth transfer than anything else. When it causes any sort of effect, it causes it only on the margins. A profitable real estate development will remain profitable even with affordable housing unit requirements.
Zoning and usage restrictions, and other land use regulations do more than anything else to reduce supply. And during my time working real estate deals in California, it is the height restrictions and the NIMBYism that do more than anything to reduce the creation of new supply. Unthinking opposition to increased density is by far the hardest problem to overcome, and it is people who live there who don't want their neighborhoods to change that are the largest impediment to solving the housing crises in San Francisco and Los Angeles.
That's what it comes down to, at least in California. And restricting the ability of people to list rental housing on AirBnB does nothing to make the housing shortage worse. What it does is reduce the number of people who have been evicted illegally to rent out these places on AirBnB, it keeps a small number of housing units on the market, and it prevents disruptions in the lives of the people who live in those locations. That has been the experience in Los Angeles and San Francisco - greedy landlords illegally evicting people to try to get more money through AirBnB. These are short term profiteers who have no regard for the long-term consequences of their actions.
AirBnB is adding to the problems created when you have a rental housing market with over 99% occupancy. That's the tipping point where renters cease having economic power versus landlords. Those are the markets where AirBnB is facing additional regulation. And if AirBnB wants to keep playing in those markets, it will play ball with these cities. I don't think there's any specific objection to allowing short-term rentals, but the way AirBnB has affected the housing market in those areas has been almost entirely negative. Politicians will listen to the people who elect them, to their constituents, and do something. The antipathy to AirBnB comes from the fact that it allows, encourages, and profits from people acting illegally in those areas.
It's worse case for Internet Brands than that. One of the allegations of the lawsuit is that Internet Brands knew about these guys, knew enough to warn their users, and actually sued the people they bought ModelMayhem from.
From the opinion: "It is also alleged that Internet Brands sued the Waitts in August 2010 for failing to disclose the potential for civil suits arising from the activities of Flanders and Callum." It's also covered in the businessinsurance article you linked to.
If you know enough to sue who you bought it from, you know enough to warn the people on your site of a specific threat. And you should do so. They sued the original owners because they failed to disclose the potential for civil suits. It's not surprising that they then may be liable for not disclosing the risks to their users.
There is only one potentially valid concern - SSID spoofing. If you want to take on the FCC concerning that issue - go for it. But if the SSID is not the same as your facility's SSID, then you should not and legally cannot interfere with that other wireless network. Full stop.
In general, you are correct, but someone's SSID can still be deceptive without being the same and still pose a security issue.
A security concern about SSID spoofing can be more complicated than just whether the SSID is the same, because you can have a valid security concern if the SSID is misleading. My favorite example is the "Free Public WiFi" you would often see in airports in years past, set up by a virus. Someone could also be using a typo, or adding something to your SSID, like "Guest" or "5G" or something else to make it look like your SSID. In such a case, there is a real argument to be made that they are trying to interfere with your network.
But I think that's the widest possible extent of any valid security concern.
I don't think there would be an FCC enforcement action over something like this. So long as you're allowing other wireless hotspots if they aren't trying to impersonate you, that should be fine.
In the FCC enforcement advisory put out after Marriott, one of the things they mentioned was that Marriott "admitted that the customers it blocked did not pose a security threat to the Marriott network..." If there is a security threat, that does change the situation. You can see that advisory here: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-113A1_Rcd.pdf
In fact, I would argue that by trying to put up a wireless network with the same or a similar name, that would constitute an attempt at interference by them. Either way, the FCC is indicating it would consider valid security concerns.
No, what the study you cite shows is that people are bad at evaluating themselves. The fact that the large majority of drivers are reasonable and prudent is proved by the accident rate of cars on the road and how low it usually it. Otherwise, there would be far more accidents, far more injuries, and far more fatalities than there are. But that's not where the 85th percentile comes from. That comes from statistics and empirical research.
The rationale behind the 85th percentile rule is statistical, that traffic speeds follow a normal distribution, and that the mean speed plus one standard deviation approximates the 85th percentile speed for a normally distributed sample of speeds. Speeds over the 85th percentile are more than one standard deviation over the mean. Two standard deviations over the mean will get you the 95th percentile, and speeds in that region are where enforcement should be concentrated.
And generally, when you look at traffic studies, studies of the speeds of passing cars on the road, that's what you find: speeds follow a normal distribution for most roads. People drive speeds that they believe are safe, regardless of the posted speed limit, and it generally follows a normal distribution.
I believe that the recovering engineer you link to would agree with me that in designing roads, speed limits, and other traffic features, we have to take into account what people actually do, not simply what we tell them to do. This isn't a blind engineering standard: this is based off studies of how people actually behave when they are driving. You can find multiple engineering and traffic surveys done by cities in California on the web (partly because to enforce their speeding tickets they have to do the surveys), and see the actual data, see the bell curves of speeds time after time.
Setting speed limits without regard to how people actually behave and drive is madness. It encourages disrespect for the law, reduces compliance where speeds are reduced because of road conditions that aren't readily apparent, and in general, makes driving less safe. The 85th percentile rule is grounded in science. It isn't the most important thing to consider when setting speed limits (that would be actual accident rates), but it should always be considered.
Again, I'm concerned with pedestrian safety. As for the lowering the speeds aspect, I agree, physical changes help, but they're not entirely necessary. Speed cams, coupled with effective enforcement, work well too. First time somebody goes 35 in a 25 zone, and gets hit with a $200 ticket, they'll start to modify their behavior.
That's true for a while. However, studies on the long-term efficacy of enforcement have mostly shown that enforcement has an effect for a while, and then wears off once enforcement goes away. So a community must be willing to accept long-term strict enforcement if that's going to work. Otherwise, once the police are gone, people eventually go back to their speeding ways. Speed cameras are effective, but publicity and warning signs are necessary for actually getting people to slow down. I think if a community is really concerned about pedestrian safety, the best way to do that means separating pedestrians from cars, and where they can't be separated, forcing cars to slow down, preferably by physical alterations like speed bumps, traffic circles, and other measures.
The DOT has a summary of various speed research in the page below, with some notes on the efficacy of enforcement :
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/98154/speed.cfm
The 85th percentile works well for most streets, even local streets, and various traffic studies have backed this up, noting no increase in accident rates even with increases in speed. Most people will drive in a reasonably safe and prudent fashion, and won't go faster than they think is safe for them to drive on the road. The biggest problem is when there are road conditions or hazards that won't be immediately apparent to the average driver.
And that happens often in narrow residential streets, where there is less traffic, the traffic is intermittent, or there are other concerns like frequent pedestrian crossings of the road. In those cases, reductions in traffic speed are certainly justified and rational, and uniform lower traffic speeds on residential streets is certainly one way to achieve that. The speed limit on the road I live on is 25 mph, and I certainly don't like it when people speed through it.
But in general, if you have a road, most drivers are going to drive a speed that they think is safe, regardless of what the posted speed limit is. I've read traffic studies of a four lane road near my house. The posted speed limit is 35 mph. In the study, over 50% the cars were going faster than that, and the study justified a speed limit of 40 mph. People drove at speeds they considered to be reasonably safe, and they will continue to do so even if a lower posted speed limit is set. Speed limit enforcement is of limited value in those cases, because it will only be effective during periods of strict enforcement. Once the cops are gone, people go back to their speeding ways.
If you really want to lower the speeds of cars on the road, you have to do other things, like install traffic bumps or other obstacles that slow or interrupt the flow of traffic, not merely set a speed limit.
I don't know. LMGTFY. Here's two links from that google search on "speed limit 85th percentile."
http://onlinemanuals.txdot.gov/txdotmanuals/szn/determining_the_85th_percentile_speed.htm
http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/eng_spd_lmts/
If you do a Google scholar search with those same terms, you bring up a number of traffic studies.
What law are you referring to? There is no law that said that Secretary Clinton, or anyone else, must turn in classified information. There are laws that pertain to classified documents, and laws that pertain to documents containing classified information. The emails were not classified documents, so those laws don't apply. So only the laws dealing with documents containing classified information would apply.
There is a big difference between possessing classified information and possessing classified documents. Anyone (even foreign spies!) can possess classified information without violating the law. Most people can possess classified documents without violating the law (sorry foreign spies, under almost all circumstances it's a crime for you, don't do it). There is no requirement in the law to turn in classified information.
As to the requirements concerning documents containing classified information, Secretary Clinton satisfied those laws when she gave her emails to the government. (See 18 U.S.C 1924).
Just because Secretary Clinton was no longer Secretary of State does not mean all her security clearances were revoked. Even if they were, it is not a crime to be an unauthorized person in possession of classified information, and she did not commit a crime by having the emails in her possession.
As to it seeming improbable that her lawyer had sufficient security clearance, his security clearances were held by the State Department, so I'm sure they gave him whatever was required to do the job he had to do to ensure the former Secretary of State's compliance with the Federal Records Act. As to the IC IG having to get special clearance, I'm sure that happened because the initial scope of his need to know was less. It is one thing to review material that has not been classified, but once it is determined to be classified, that's another matter.
Secretary Clinton's lawyer had security clearances through the State Department, and was the person who reviewed the emails for Clinton. So no law was violated there.
As to whether storing the email would support a charge, the statute requires gross negligence in handling or storing the information. Having the computers be guarded by the Secret Service alongside presidential servers doesn't meet a gross negligence standard. So the law wasn't violated there either.
So no direct violation of laws here.
Sounds like a crime, and being a crime are different things.
Secretary Clinton instructed an aide to send unclassified information from a secure source through insecure channels. Not a crime.
Secretary Clinton handed a flash drive containing classified information to her lawyer, a person who had the appropriate clearances through the State Department. Not a crime.
Secretary Clinton's attorney, the one with the security clearance, reviewed the emails to weed out the personal email from those obligated to be saved for government records purposes. Not a crime.
So no... doesn't sound like a crime to me. It just sounds like you're wrong.
Secretary Clinton has stated in at least one interview that when she asked her aides to strip the headings, she meant for them to send only the unclassified information. While something like that is suspicious, I'm sure that it was followed up on by the appropriate investigators, and the fact that no one has been indicted means that whatever was done in that instance was not enough to charge anyone.
Not at all. My argument was that even if all that has been said was true, it wasn't criminal.
What Secretary Clinton did was give potentially classified information to her attorney, a person who had the necessary security clearances from the State Department to receive the flash drive and view the information if it was classified. What she did there was neither criminal, nor incompetent
People going around saying that giving her attorney a flash drive with her emails was a crime are wrong, misleading, ignorant, and incompetent.
I didn't miss that point at all. Let's say that all her clearances have lapsed, which would put her under 18 USC 793(e) as an unauthorized person. The same knowledge and willfulness requirements exist there as well. Secretary Clinton would have to know that the information was harmful to the US or helpful to a foreign nation, and that handing the drive to her lawyer was violating the law. The exact same arguments apply there as well.
As for retention of any documents, the same knowledge and willfulness requirements apply there too, and there too, she has the same arguments to make.
There is not an easy case to make against Secretary Clinton on mishandling classified information with regards to her emails, certainly not under the facts as they are known at this point. If I was a prosecutor, I wouldn't try such a case, because I would lose.
Sorry Ken. IAAL, I've had to deal with classified information and with unclassified information that may possibly deserve classification. Reading the statutes (mainly 18 USC 793 et seq.) concerning crimes on handling classified information, merely handing a flash drive containing emails to a lawyer does not constitute a crime.
Let's break the first half of 18 U.S.C. 793(d) down into the elements a prosecutor would need to prove:
1. That a person having lawful possession, access, control over, or being entrusted with
2. Any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense
3. Which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation
4. Willfully
5. communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted
6. to any person not entitled to receive it.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that Secretary Clinton had lawful possession and the necessary clearances for whatever information was determined to be classified, and that it qualifies as a writing so satisfied the second element. Let us also assume that Secretary Clinton's lawyer does not have a security clearance (because that is an assumption, as we don't know what clearances her lawyer holds), so that the sixth element is satisfied. Let's also leave out my arguments against whether handing a flash drive to your lawyer constitutes delivery, transmission, or communication under the statute.
A prosecutor would have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Secretary Clinton knew, or had reason to know that the information in those emails was classified or should have been classified. That's a lot harder when the material is not already marked. But even then, we do not know why the information in the emails was classified, or if Secretary Clinton has reason to believe that the information would not be harmful to the US or helpful to a foreign nation, which is the actual requirement in the statute.
Additionally, there's a mens rea requirement of willfulness in the statute, meaning that Secretary Clinton would need to act "intentionally and purposely and with the intent to do something the law forbids" (see Bryan v. US, 524 U.S. 184 (1998)). To prove that, a prosecutor would need to prove that by handing unclassified material (with possibly classified information) to her attorney that she intended to break the law, and not because she wanted her attorney to give her advice, deliver the information to the proper officials, etc.
Let's contrast this with General Patraeus. He knowingly and willfully violated the law when he showed classified information to his mistress. He knew he wasn't supposed to do it. He did it anyway. He meets all the requirements of the statute. He had access to classified information, he had the material, he knew it could be harmful, he knew that his mistress was not entitled to the information, he showed it to her, and he knew that doing so was against the law and did it anyway.
I hope this shows why merely handing a flash drive containing information (that may be classified) to your lawyer does not constitute a crime under the applicable statute, and why when Secretary Clinton handed the flash drive to her lawyer, it wasn't a crime.