But, the need for refresh is what it shares in common with it, despite being due to decoherence instead of discharge.
In any case, it wasn't intended to be stupid, silly, or funny, and certainly not first: just a bit obscure, as in *whoosh, flies completely over head*.
DRAM, or dynamic RAM would hold it's contents for a short while, requiring "refresh" cycles. These would read the data out before it disappeared, and write it back. A similar mechanism would be necessary for this type of memory -- just like DRAM refresh, hence "deja vu": seen before.
It wasn't so much that we thought "souvlaki" was a latin plural when the dish was clearly of Greek origin that bothered the restaurant owner so much as our constant bickering whether the singlar was "souvlakum" or "souvlakus".
Everyone knows that SMS is a cash cow for the telcos.
In fact, some content providers, occasionally compared to massive primates, have a reputation for approaching telcos offering partnerships to provide data notice over SMS services through them (emai alerts, weather, stock, etc.) in exchange for a slice of the revenue pie from the receiving customer.
Furthermore, mapping a MSISDN (phone number) to carrier, and thus the internet-facing SMS Gateway, is a paid service that third paries provide -- content providers ALREADY pay to figure out which gateway to use to send an SMS to your phone. Of course this information is cached, but when a customer ports their number to a new carrior, until that cache expires, some of their notifications might get lost.
Right, but it is one thing to say "This is a critcism of X®" where X® links to the company's website, and quite another to say "This article is a review of various manufactures of foos, such as A®, B®, C® and have B® link to a scathing disparagement without evidence to back it up, insted of B®'s website -- particularly if A® and C® link correctly.
You can certainly criticize B®, but what you can not do is use B® as identifying anything other than the owner or product associated with the trademark.
What if all the trademarks were links to reviews and not to their holder's websites -- that is not single out B® for harsher treatment? I think this would still be infringement becuase using a trademark to refer to something about what the trademark represents and not what it represents directly, is infringement.
That might be a tough concept for tech-heads: after all the name is just a moniker for whatever metadata it is associated with in the present context, whether it be a corporate website, picture of a prodect, or a criticism of same. But that's a rational technical argument and not a legal one.
I suppose, in the context of a web page, a non-infringing use of a trademark would be a link to an image of the product, or the website of the trademark holder, in the same way that a non-infringing use of a trademarked company name would be to associate it with an address and telephone number in a directory.
Similarly, in a Consumer Reports-style (and I probably infringed on Consumer Reports trademark there -- using it as an adjective) review of various manufacturers, a list of trademarked names, and the locations (pages) where the holder is reviwed is fair game: the trademark refers to the holder, and the page number refers to the review.
IANAL, and am not even sure of the case law on this subject, but I think that so long as a trademark is (a) noted as such, and (b) refers to either what is trademarked or the holder, it's use is fair game. I remember when Slashdot used to use a stylized IBM® graphic to refer to articles about IBM. IBM politely requested that the stylization be dropped, IIRC, but that the use to refer to articles about them was permitted.
Yes, they failed to defend against it's dilution. Or, if they didn't fail, they came close to it. I vaguely remember adds that said "This is a copier. Xerox is a company" or something like that.
I would think whether the trademark was infringed or diluted would depend on a few things:
1) what the context of the description around the trademark was;
2) whether the trademark hyperlinked to something disparaging, confusing, or dilutional.
For example, if I write an article about Apple Records, and include a hyperlink with the text "Apple" pointing to a different record company, that would be confusing and dilutional. Same thing if I wrote an article about photocopiers and used Xerox® to like to a page listing generic photocopier companies -- that's clearly dilution.
But, if I wrote an article about Xerox® Corporation, and used Xerox® as a hyperlink to their home page, that's hardly misuse.
I suppose if I used the trademark in a hyperlink to a page disparaging the company, that might be suspect. While criticism is free speech, using a corporate trademark to associate with such criticism instead of the company or product may be misuse -- best get legal advice in that case.
So what you're saying is that I should have no right to review the laws of California before making a decision to move there? In fact, I must pay for the laws before I can make the decision to be constrained by them.
First of all, were it not for the fact that California is a part of the U.S.A. and you are (presumably) a citizen of the U.S.A., California could prevent you from moving there at all, or charge whatever fee it desired for you to have the right to do so. In fact, if you are not a U.S. citizen, you can't legally move to California, period. California could chose to trump federal immigration law, of course, but then it could still set terms for you to move there, including paying to see their laws first.
That's not to say this would be a good thing for California to do, if it it wanted to encourage immigration, but I'd see nothing illegal about it.
Furthermore, you're telling me that an out of state court case tried upon California legal code would require the participants in the case to pay for copies of the laws being tried? Also commonly, you're telling me that I cannot cite precedent using California law without paying for it? Or argue the merits in council or senate sessions of my local laws compared to California laws without having a "public performance" license?
I see nothing wrong with this in principle. It may be to California's advantage that you be able to do so, and indeed, cross-jurisdictional cases are facilitated by reciprocity agreements between courts, but I see no requirement that it be the case.
Consider that I have a private company (not publicly traded). Should you be able to request a copy of that company's articles of incorporation and corporate bylaws for free?
Here's an interesting thought for you: Let's say that California does publish laws under state copyright laws. I publish one of their laws freely in another state. Does California's copyright law extend to my state? Can they sue me over copyright infringement? If they do, am I required to pay for the laws I am being sued under so that I can defend myself? If they cannot, what is the point of their state copyright law if it does not apply to citizens of California?
Ignoring the fact that copyright law is federal, if it were state law only, you could, of course break California law outside of California to the extent that you are out of California's jurisdiction, and that would include publication of it's laws. Of course, if you were subject to California law, it should be freely available to you, and sharing it with council would constitute a "fair use". So, perhaps making it freely available to California citizens only is too restrictive -- make it freely available to those within California's jurisdiction.
I agree with all these points, but it is the citizens of the area under jurisdiction who (a) are subject to and therefore (b) need to know their laws. Citizens of other jurisdictions are not. Therefore it is reasonable that the laws be copyrighted with the copyright owned by the citizens of the area under jurisdiction.
Should another government wish to model it's laws on these, a license agreement between governments would be in order, after all developing those laws was a creative effort and deserving of compensation by those that benefit from them.
But wait! That other government is out of jurisdiction so it doesn't need a license... except for the fact that copyright is an area of federal and not state jurisdiction. so, it is in jurisdiction.
The federal government can take the stance, which it currently does, that laws are not copyrightable, and the issue is moot. However, I do believe that when laws have value outside of the jurisdiction where they apply (i.e. another government wishes to copy them), compensation to those that developed them is in order. Certainly the cost C of developing them can be estimated. If they are to be applied over X+Y citizens of two jurisdictions instead of X citizens of one jurisiction, a transfer payment from the government of Y to the government of X in the amount of CY/(X+Y) is in order (less Y's cost in chosing to adopt X's laws).
I for one, love C++. I can express sufficiently abstract generic concepts with the turing-complete template system (though the stench of the resulting syntax is duely noted), as well as deal with low-level implementation details within a single programmig language.
As for libraries, they're there, and, IMNSHO, do not belong in the language definition.
I like that C++0x concepts will add some type-checking to the template system, though I'm not sure I follow all the examples in the referenced article.
I'm not sure I like the native iterator support that is proposed -- it looks too much like C# to me: where the acceptable syntax depends on the object's type to such a degree that the orthogonality of the language over the type system is broken -- and implicit conversion of explicit arrays (over objects of a base type in contiguous memory locations) to iterable objects strikes me as a hack.
I would much rahter have the array syntax [] extended to represent enumerable (and thus iteratable) collections of objects.
But, my biggest lamemt is no means to turn off language features in an enforcable way, much like the C# notion of "unsafe", but in a more generic fashion: nothing stops one from taking a bald pointer or reference to an object, and that busts any reference-counting memory management system right there. Either the scope of such things must be strictly controlled, or they should be selectively not permitted. That addresses the concerns of those who dislike exposure of low-level capabailities at the wrong level of abstraction, while permitting the coding of custom memory managers where necessary.
The 800 Mhz Nehemiah CPU runs fanless and can render 1080i with the assistance of the CN400 hardware MPEG2 decoder. VT1625 analog output provides YPbPr component outputs, though the VGA output is just fine (no HDMI).
In the Silverstone LC08 case, I also have a slim-line dual-layer DVDROM and 500 GB hard drive. The ethernet port connects to an 5 antenna 802.11n bridge which is coupled to an 8 antenna 802.11 router. I get about 100 Mb/s over that MIMO link to a server that can stream 1080i HD MPEG2 video no problem.
As far as I can tell, the nanoITX can not render 1080p for lack of sufficient memory bandwidth, but 1080i is fine.
It's currently driving a smallish Gateway 24" 16:10 1920x1200 monitor and (via a coax SPDIF digital audio connection) an Outlaw Audio 990 receiver connected to an Odessey Audio amp and a pair (no 5.1 or 7.1 yet) of Bohlender-Graebner Radia 520 speakers.
Oh sure. Like I wrote, "IIRC". It's quite possible I did not RC. Perhaps two tablespoons is the maximum amount of blood that an infant can rapidly lose safely.
Still, as others have noted, it's the amount blood that's required to prime the system that's likely the problem.
I'd rather think that the volume of blood required to be in the machine at any one time would be such that there would be insufficient blood within the body of a patient so small.
I suppose one could transfuse at the same time as starting dialisis, and at the appropriate time "close the loop", removing the source of transfused blood, but that strikes me as rather delicate in this case: IIRC, an infant has maybe two tablespoons of blood total, and the machine might require what, a pint? Maintaining a safe blood pressure range under those conditions would be damn tricky.
Re:Can we still blame pollution for this?
on
Hot Water, Hot Earth
·
· Score: 5, Informative
That said, there's no reason it couldn't be converting to steam in small pockets and then the steam re-condenses as it comes in contact with cooler water.
Actually there is a reason: it's "supercritical".
For it to turn to steam would require a phase change between it and the surrounding water, and a supercritical fluid by definition has no distinct phase change between the liquid and gasous phases.
You'd think that if the pressure would be high enough, a liquid would stay a liquid at any arbitrary temperature, but that's not what happens. If you have a vessel strong enough to withstand the increasing pressure, and you heat a liquid within it, that has a gasous phase above it, you first see boiling. Then, as the pressure in the gas phase rises, the boiling stops. But, if you keep heating it, an interesting thing happens: the line between liquid and gas phase disappears, and the fluid only has one phase. It is supercritical.
In this case, boiling never starts because the pressure is high to begin with.
Now, the supercritical water is much less dense than seawater (or plain water, for that matter), so it does rise, and if it cools slower than the pressure drops as it rises, yes, it might start to boil.
And the law does say, without a shadow of a doubt, that anyone is allowed to use whatever level of force was, or was reasonably tougth to be, needed to prevent harm.
Oh, but the hurdles through which you'd have to pass!
First, most laws prohibiting an act state what the defences are. Not so child abuse laws in WA. There is no statutory defense for striking a child that causes more than transient pain, or leaves a mark. So, while there may be a separate law making the use of force to prevent harm a defense for using said force, one would have the burden of showing that it (a) was applicable, (b) trumped the anti-child abuse one. Further, one would have to show that the force used was "reasonable". Finally, if harm was prevented, how can one prove it would have occured if one did not act?
These are sufficient barriers such that even the police here will not use force against a child to prevent harm, unless the force is consistent with what kinds of discpiline are permitted.
The weight of the law is on the side that it is better to not overly injure a child than prevent a possible harm the child may cause.
As far as my ex is concerned, my judgement is not clouded. However, she does encourage our son to engage in harmful behavior out of her own sense of spite, and has engaged local police to restrain me from seeing my kids when I have every right to. They have since "come around", but can not act against her without criminal charges against her (custodial interferance). Hence, I am working my way through the courts with a civil case against her, which might also see her charged with contempt.
It is an extremely expensive process. I can only imagine how much it would cost to effectively defend against a charge of abusing a child because of the force necessary to prevent him/her from causing serious harm. We're not talking about roughhousing here -- we're talking about children arming themselves with knives, corkscrews, and even firearms, and representing a clear lethal danger to anyone who approaches them.
Forget "time outs" and "groundings". The only way to enforce them against such kids would be constant physical restraint -- literally putting them in a cage within which they can't harm themselves. Even if this were legal (which it isn't), one would have to constantly watch them for their own safety.
There are few things that my son wants, that I can deny him to mold more correct behavior (remember his mother undermines efforts to teach him right from wrong). But, when I do, I damn well need several impartial witnesses to observe the verbal threats of groundless accusations he makes (in case he makes them), as well as to observe whatever restraint methods I use when he lashes out.
Reward, as opposed to punishment, works to a point. But, remember, one can always be blackmailed to provide the reward regardless. I have found the most effective means of teaching him right from wrong is to point out that if he continues to act this way, he will suffer the wrath of other kids who act this way, without recourse of law. That appears to be working.
Slashdot Mirror
No, it isn't a reinvintion.
But, the need for refresh is what it shares in common with it, despite being due to decoherence instead of discharge.
In any case, it wasn't intended to be stupid, silly, or funny, and certainly not first: just a bit obscure, as in *whoosh, flies completely over head*.
Much to learn have you, young padewan.
DRAM, or dynamic RAM would hold it's contents for a short while, requiring "refresh" cycles. These would read the data out before it disappeared, and write it back. A similar mechanism would be necessary for this type of memory -- just like DRAM refresh, hence "deja vu": seen before.
It wasn't so much that we thought "souvlaki" was a latin plural when the dish was clearly of Greek origin that bothered the restaurant owner so much as our constant bickering whether the singlar was "souvlakum" or "souvlakus".
(with apologies to Wayne and Shuster)
Everything old is new again.
Everyone knows that SMS is a cash cow for the telcos.
In fact, some content providers, occasionally compared to massive primates, have a reputation for approaching telcos offering partnerships to provide data notice over SMS services through them (emai alerts, weather, stock, etc.) in exchange for a slice of the revenue pie from the receiving customer.
Furthermore, mapping a MSISDN (phone number) to carrier, and thus the internet-facing SMS Gateway, is a paid service that third paries provide -- content providers ALREADY pay to figure out which gateway to use to send an SMS to your phone. Of course this information is cached, but when a customer ports their number to a new carrior, until that cache expires, some of their notifications might get lost.
Blackberry 8800 - no camera.
Right, but it is one thing to say "This is a critcism of X®" where X® links to the company's website, and quite another to say "This article is a review of various manufactures of foos, such as A®, B®, C® and have B® link to a scathing disparagement without evidence to back it up, insted of B®'s website -- particularly if A® and C® link correctly.
You can certainly criticize B®, but what you can not do is use B® as identifying anything other than the owner or product associated with the trademark.
What if all the trademarks were links to reviews and not to their holder's websites -- that is not single out B® for harsher treatment? I think this would still be infringement becuase using a trademark to refer to something about what the trademark represents and not what it represents directly, is infringement.
That might be a tough concept for tech-heads: after all the name is just a moniker for whatever metadata it is associated with in the present context, whether it be a corporate website, picture of a prodect, or a criticism of same. But that's a rational technical argument and not a legal one.
I suppose, in the context of a web page, a non-infringing use of a trademark would be a link to an image of the product, or the website of the trademark holder, in the same way that a non-infringing use of a trademarked company name would be to associate it with an address and telephone number in a directory.
Similarly, in a Consumer Reports-style (and I probably infringed on Consumer Reports trademark there -- using it as an adjective) review of various manufacturers, a list of trademarked names, and the locations (pages) where the holder is reviwed is fair game: the trademark refers to the holder, and the page number refers to the review.
IANAL, and am not even sure of the case law on this subject, but I think that so long as a trademark is (a) noted as such, and (b) refers to either what is trademarked or the holder, it's use is fair game. I remember when Slashdot used to use a stylized IBM® graphic to refer to articles about IBM. IBM politely requested that the stylization be dropped, IIRC, but that the use to refer to articles about them was permitted.
Yes, they failed to defend against it's dilution. Or, if they didn't fail, they came close to it. I vaguely remember adds that said "This is a copier. Xerox is a company" or something like that.
I would think whether the trademark was infringed or diluted would depend on a few things:
1) what the context of the description around the trademark was;
2) whether the trademark hyperlinked to something disparaging, confusing, or dilutional.
For example, if I write an article about Apple Records, and include a hyperlink with the text "Apple" pointing to a different record company, that would be confusing and dilutional. Same thing if I wrote an article about photocopiers and used Xerox® to like to a page listing generic photocopier companies -- that's clearly dilution.
But, if I wrote an article about Xerox® Corporation, and used Xerox® as a hyperlink to their home page, that's hardly misuse.
I suppose if I used the trademark in a hyperlink to a page disparaging the company, that might be suspect. While criticism is free speech, using a corporate trademark to associate with such criticism instead of the company or product may be misuse -- best get legal advice in that case.
People should be quiet.
Don't we give them good TV?"*
Oh, wait!
* "I See Red," from "Magical Ring," Clannad.
... aren't a U.S. citizen... should be ammended to include "or a permanent resident, or in other legal non-immigrant status", obviously.
Very good points. Let's examine them:
So what you're saying is that I should have no right to review the laws of California before making a decision to move there? In fact, I must pay for the laws before I can make the decision to be constrained by them.
First of all, were it not for the fact that California is a part of the U.S.A. and you are (presumably) a citizen of the U.S.A., California could prevent you from moving there at all, or charge whatever fee it desired for you to have the right to do so. In fact, if you are not a U.S. citizen, you can't legally move to California, period. California could chose to trump federal immigration law, of course, but then it could still set terms for you to move there, including paying to see their laws first.
That's not to say this would be a good thing for California to do, if it it wanted to encourage immigration, but I'd see nothing illegal about it.
Furthermore, you're telling me that an out of state court case tried upon California legal code would require the participants in the case to pay for copies of the laws being tried? Also commonly, you're telling me that I cannot cite precedent using California law without paying for it? Or argue the merits in council or senate sessions of my local laws compared to California laws without having a "public performance" license?
I see nothing wrong with this in principle. It may be to California's advantage that you be able to do so, and indeed, cross-jurisdictional cases are facilitated by reciprocity agreements between courts, but I see no requirement that it be the case.
Consider that I have a private company (not publicly traded). Should you be able to request a copy of that company's articles of incorporation and corporate bylaws for free?
Here's an interesting thought for you: Let's say that California does publish laws under state copyright laws. I publish one of their laws freely in another state. Does California's copyright law extend to my state? Can they sue me over copyright infringement? If they do, am I required to pay for the laws I am being sued under so that I can defend myself? If they cannot, what is the point of their state copyright law if it does not apply to citizens of California?
Ignoring the fact that copyright law is federal, if it were state law only, you could, of course break California law outside of California to the extent that you are out of California's jurisdiction, and that would include publication of it's laws. Of course, if you were subject to California law, it should be freely available to you, and sharing it with council would constitute a "fair use". So, perhaps making it freely available to California citizens only is too restrictive -- make it freely available to those within California's jurisdiction.
I agree with all these points, but it is the citizens of the area under jurisdiction who (a) are subject to and therefore (b) need to know their laws. Citizens of other jurisdictions are not. Therefore it is reasonable that the laws be copyrighted with the copyright owned by the citizens of the area under jurisdiction.
Should another government wish to model it's laws on these, a license agreement between governments would be in order, after all developing those laws was a creative effort and deserving of compensation by those that benefit from them.
But wait! That other government is out of jurisdiction so it doesn't need a license... except for the fact that copyright is an area of federal and not state jurisdiction. so, it is in jurisdiction.
The federal government can take the stance, which it currently does, that laws are not copyrightable, and the issue is moot. However, I do believe that when laws have value outside of the jurisdiction where they apply (i.e. another government wishes to copy them), compensation to those that developed them is in order. Certainly the cost C of developing them can be estimated. If they are to be applied over X+Y citizens of two jurisdictions instead of X citizens of one jurisiction, a transfer payment from the government of Y to the government of X in the amount of CY/(X+Y) is in order (less Y's cost in chosing to adopt X's laws).
Perhaps, but is there enough memory bandwidth on a nanoITX to render it? I've never gotten past 1080i, and I'd love to be able to render 1080p.
As for libraries, they're there, and, IMNSHO, do not belong in the language definition.
I like that C++0x concepts will add some type-checking to the template system, though I'm not sure I follow all the examples in the referenced article.
I'm not sure I like the native iterator support that is proposed -- it looks too much like C# to me: where the acceptable syntax depends on the object's type to such a degree that the orthogonality of the language over the type system is broken -- and implicit conversion of explicit arrays (over objects of a base type in contiguous memory locations) to iterable objects strikes me as a hack.
I would much rahter have the array syntax [] extended to represent enumerable (and thus iteratable) collections of objects.
But, my biggest lamemt is no means to turn off language features in an enforcable way, much like the C# notion of "unsafe", but in a more generic fashion: nothing stops one from taking a bald pointer or reference to an object, and that busts any reference-counting memory management system right there. Either the scope of such things must be strictly controlled, or they should be selectively not permitted. That addresses the concerns of those who dislike exposure of low-level capabailities at the wrong level of abstraction, while permitting the coding of custom memory managers where necessary.
What was that, Sonny?
Subject says it all.
The 800 Mhz Nehemiah CPU runs fanless and can render 1080i with the assistance of the CN400 hardware MPEG2 decoder. VT1625 analog output provides YPbPr component outputs, though the VGA output is just fine (no HDMI).
In the Silverstone LC08 case, I also have a slim-line dual-layer DVDROM and 500 GB hard drive. The ethernet port connects to an 5 antenna 802.11n bridge which is coupled to an 8 antenna 802.11 router. I get about 100 Mb/s over that MIMO link to a server that can stream 1080i HD MPEG2 video no problem.
As far as I can tell, the nanoITX can not render 1080p for lack of sufficient memory bandwidth, but 1080i is fine.
It's currently driving a smallish Gateway 24" 16:10 1920x1200 monitor and (via a coax SPDIF digital audio connection) an Outlaw Audio 990 receiver connected to an Odessey Audio amp and a pair (no 5.1 or 7.1 yet) of Bohlender-Graebner Radia 520 speakers.
You must be new here.
IIRC: "If I Remember Correctly"
And, by extension, (though not generally used on it's own):
RC: "Remember Correctly"
Still, as others have noted, it's the amount blood that's required to prime the system that's likely the problem.
I suppose one could transfuse at the same time as starting dialisis, and at the appropriate time "close the loop", removing the source of transfused blood, but that strikes me as rather delicate in this case: IIRC, an infant has maybe two tablespoons of blood total, and the machine might require what, a pint? Maintaining a safe blood pressure range under those conditions would be damn tricky.
Actually there is a reason: it's "supercritical".
For it to turn to steam would require a phase change between it and the surrounding water, and a supercritical fluid by definition has no distinct phase change between the liquid and gasous phases.
You'd think that if the pressure would be high enough, a liquid would stay a liquid at any arbitrary temperature, but that's not what happens. If you have a vessel strong enough to withstand the increasing pressure, and you heat a liquid within it, that has a gasous phase above it, you first see boiling. Then, as the pressure in the gas phase rises, the boiling stops. But, if you keep heating it, an interesting thing happens: the line between liquid and gas phase disappears, and the fluid only has one phase. It is supercritical.
In this case, boiling never starts because the pressure is high to begin with.
Now, the supercritical water is much less dense than seawater (or plain water, for that matter), so it does rise, and if it cools slower than the pressure drops as it rises, yes, it might start to boil.
Oh, but the hurdles through which you'd have to pass!
First, most laws prohibiting an act state what the defences are. Not so child abuse laws in WA. There is no statutory defense for striking a child that causes more than transient pain, or leaves a mark. So, while there may be a separate law making the use of force to prevent harm a defense for using said force, one would have the burden of showing that it (a) was applicable, (b) trumped the anti-child abuse one. Further, one would have to show that the force used was "reasonable". Finally, if harm was prevented, how can one prove it would have occured if one did not act?
These are sufficient barriers such that even the police here will not use force against a child to prevent harm, unless the force is consistent with what kinds of discpiline are permitted.
The weight of the law is on the side that it is better to not overly injure a child than prevent a possible harm the child may cause.
As far as my ex is concerned, my judgement is not clouded. However, she does encourage our son to engage in harmful behavior out of her own sense of spite, and has engaged local police to restrain me from seeing my kids when I have every right to. They have since "come around", but can not act against her without criminal charges against her (custodial interferance). Hence, I am working my way through the courts with a civil case against her, which might also see her charged with contempt.
It is an extremely expensive process. I can only imagine how much it would cost to effectively defend against a charge of abusing a child because of the force necessary to prevent him/her from causing serious harm. We're not talking about roughhousing here -- we're talking about children arming themselves with knives, corkscrews, and even firearms, and representing a clear lethal danger to anyone who approaches them.
Forget "time outs" and "groundings". The only way to enforce them against such kids would be constant physical restraint -- literally putting them in a cage within which they can't harm themselves. Even if this were legal (which it isn't), one would have to constantly watch them for their own safety.
There are few things that my son wants, that I can deny him to mold more correct behavior (remember his mother undermines efforts to teach him right from wrong). But, when I do, I damn well need several impartial witnesses to observe the verbal threats of groundless accusations he makes (in case he makes them), as well as to observe whatever restraint methods I use when he lashes out.
Reward, as opposed to punishment, works to a point. But, remember, one can always be blackmailed to provide the reward regardless. I have found the most effective means of teaching him right from wrong is to point out that if he continues to act this way, he will suffer the wrath of other kids who act this way, without recourse of law. That appears to be working.
Purchase history yes, CC number, without a subpeona, I'd rather think not.
Thus spoke the Mathematician.
I expect that when I pay a merchant in his store (arguably a public place) with a credit card, my credit card number is kept private.
What I do not have is an expectation that others in that place, at that time, do not see me.