I wish people would get out of this mindset that you must be either a coder or an artist and never the twain shall meet. [...] Back in the days of Leonardo DaVinci there was no Berlin Wall seperating technical and creative people...
I accept "coder" and "technical" as synonyms for the purposes of this discussion, but not "artist" and "creative."
Pure hyperbole. One is a linguist of some note (Gee) and the other two are nobody assistant professors with a handful of articles in decent peer-reviewed journals.
Don't buy their conclusions based on their credentials folks.
As I noted already, the only scientific explanation for consciousness we have today is psychological
True...
and has nothing to do with neural science.
yet!
Most working cognitive psychologists believe that the neural correlates of their purely psychological theories -- including their theories of consciousness -- will one day be reducible to a neuroscientific terms. This is no big deal, a simple instance of the reductive scheme that knits together all the sciences: physics to chemistry, chemistry to biology, biology to psychology, psychology to the myriad of social sciences (economics, political science, etc.).
The tension in the field is whether development of the neuroscience and psychological levels should proceed semi-autonomously for now, with the reduction to be done in the future with the "final" theories of each enterprise, or whether psychology should be chucked out the window immediatley and all future theorizing about the mind conducted in neuroscience terms.[*]
Searle is considered a loser by both of these camps. What he champions is a view that has nothing to do with science, whatever its philosophical (and rhetorical) merits.
[*] The latter position is championed by certain extremists (e.g., the Churchlands, perhaps McClelland), some neuroscientists (for obviously self-centered reasons), and a few biologist-wannabes who for whatever reason (poor math skills?) wound up with Ph.Ds in psychology.
You know, I don't like your post. Should I be allowed to hunt you down and kill you?
Did my post offend your sensibilities? Is that all?
Or did it steal from you what what was promised, only to further line the pockets of a vanishingly small number of wealthy individuals and corporations?
There seems to be a lot of grant money out there for people who say "hey! I know! let's research X by sticking people doing X in a brain scanner!"
Not enough! It's quite expensive to do fMRI and federal funding from NSF is decreasing. It's not really as if people are throwing money around - grants are very competitive.
But I have to disagree with this one! Basic behavioral and (many forms of) computational cognitive science are starving as everyone follows the dollars to cognitive neuroimaging.
Hopefully a balance between approaches will be restored before too long.
I disagree. You reap what you sow. Bono's acts were a blow to the collective creativity of US citizens. Lo and behold his family is stalked. Karma is a bitch.
And make no mention of the fact in in absolute dollars, we give more than anybody else, and if you added up private, corporate, religious charities, the US basically wipes the floor with the rest of the world.
American generosity is simply far and away the greatest in the history of the world. That is FACT.
While I am impressed by your use of uppercase letters, how about some numbers to back up your claim.
n act of major terrorism hurts the country far more than the loss of life from automobile accidents. After 9/11 the human toll as well as the economic toll was massive and instant. Automobile deaths accumlate over time, and affect small groups of people as units. The difference in effect is massive.
You keep saying the difference is large but you don''t say why. One could argue that 9/11, as a centralized disaster, brought larger and more uniform compensation to its victims than three thousand separate automobile deaths, where those involved would have to fight the insurance companies and judicial system at every turn.
[What follows is one man's quick summary of the history of Fodor's modularity thesis and much else.]
I would distingush between the modularity of Fodor (1983) and the neuroscience notion of localism.
Fodor's was a specific thesis about the modularity of sensory/perceptual systems, but also more "central" systems, such as the parsing module. It made specific claims about what it means to be a module, including information encapsulation and penetrability. These were strong claims, which is of course a good thing. They were central to the early 1980s milieu, a time in which cognitive science meant cognitive psychology, computer science, and linguistics, and did not yet include cognitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience. Modularists like Pylyshyn offered tortured arguments against the penetrability of visual perception, trying to sweep under the rug well-known bi-stable illusions such as the Necker cube, the duck-rabbitt, the young-old woman, and faces-vases. Extreme arguments were also offered up by psycholinguists who wanted to equate Chomsky's "language organ" and "language acquisition device" with modules.
The truth is that Fodor's modularity generated very little, if any, new empirical insight, although it spurred a number of theoretical debates.
The late 1980s brought a turn from the mind and to the brain.
The connectionist approach emerged rapidly, and a caricature of the symbolic approach was set up as a foil. Fodor defended his brand of symbolic cognition against the connectionist, rather poorly. His talk of the combinatorial power of symbolic systems, which reflected his intellectual roots in logic and linguistics, was ignored not just by the connectionists, but more importantly by the symbolicists as well -- folks like Newell who actually built computational models of cognition, and understood symbolic systems from the richer, more dynamic perspective offered by computer science.
Another development, and here I join my rambling to your argument, was the rise of cognitive neuropsychology and then cognitive neuroscience. Neuropsychology was the trailblazer here. It introduced cognitive scientists to arguments about the neural localization of function and promoted (double) dissociations as the royal road. Although this seemed on the surface to have something to do with modularity, in fact it was rooted in decades old debates internal to the neuro community (e.g., Lashley). Localism does not equal modularity! It is hard to convey how much effort was spent fractionating seemingly simple cognitive processes, such as lexical access, into dozens of distinct boxes (boxology does not equal modularity either!), each distinction made on the basis of one or more dissociative patient pairs. By the early 1990s, these efforts collapsed under their own weight, and what looked like backdoor evidence for modularity at the brain level disappeared.
The rise of cognitive neuroscience, especially neuroimaging, during the 1990s and now in the current decade, tells a similar story. Image subtractions initially lead people to localist claims about the localization of cognitive functions: the FFA, the place, area, etc. (These are not Fodorian modules, mind you. Not even the most simplistic neuroimager uses the terms "information encapsulation" and "cognitive penetrability", at least in polite company.) The next round of studies suggest a more complex picture, and eventually people give up and acknowledgge that the action is in the collaborative processing of a number of areas -- the large-scale cortical network. See for example Mesulam (1990) and his intellectual predecessor Luria (1966).
Of course, this story does not hold for primary sensory cortex, which has been known to be highly localized for a half-century now (Hubel, Wiesel, Lettvin, etc.). But then, this was (1) known when Fodor published "The Modularity of Mind" and (2) was never described using Fodor's terms and criteria except perhaps by those in his immediate circle. This is where I urge you to read the f
For example, in a recent Nature Neuroscience article Grill-Spector Knouf & Kanwisher found FFA to be face specific, even in car-experts looking at cars.
Of course, the last highly publicized study that gave us a "face recognition area" of the brain turned out to be a crock.
Yes, the FFA is more than a "face recognition area." But calling that hypothesis a "crock" is too strong. It was a scientific hypothesis warranted by the initial data and provocative enough to bring better experiments. You make its sound like a lie deliberately foisted on the scientific community. The data from these newer experiments have falsified the original hypothesis. Newer, more general hypotheses have been proposed and are being empirically tested. This is not some mailicious conspiracy, as you imply. It's simply scientific progress.
It's true that some have found activations in the "fusiform face area" in reponse to other kinds of visual expertise, but that doesn't mean it isn't involved in face perception. There's good evidence that it plays a role in determining facial identity. I've seen my own fusiform lighting up in reponse to faces but not other objects.
The FFA, if I remember the work of Gauthier, Tarr, and others correctly, is better thought of as the site of visual shape knowledge. Of course, faces are one class of shapes for which we are all experts, and that is why the FFA activates when normal college sophmores participate in face recognition experiments. But you also get FFA activation if you train people to be experts on novel shape classes (e.g., "greebles").
Fodor's brand of modularity, debates about what PDP can and cannot do -- these have been passe for about 15 years in non-philosphical areas of cognitive science. (And I say this with moist eyes as I am of the older, symbolic tradition.)
The paradox of the expert is this: How can experts have both (1) more knowledge of a domain and (2) faster access to each element of that knowledge?
Cognitive psychologists began answering this question forty years ago, with De Groot's work in the 1960s and Chase and Simon's work in the early 1970s on chess experts. The answer is to notice that the acquisition of knowledge is typically accompanied by the acquisition of better indices on that knowledge. Or, said another way, you get credit for knowing something when (1) you have stored it somewhere in your long-term memory and (2) you can recall it when it is appropriate. Research since the 1970s has applied these early insights to many other domains besides chess, such as reading X-rays.
Another way to think of this is that memories are more akin to hashtables than trees or lists. With the right hash function (i.e., indexing scheme), any single item can be retrieved in constant time. [Think also of radix sort versus comparison-based sorting algorithms.]
What I'm curious about, it while he may be a walking encyclopedia of fact, how good is he at reasoning?
I know more about intelligence and working memory than autism in general and autistic savants in particular.
However, there is one absolutely fascinating case -- Temple Grandin. She is autistic, but incredibly high functioning. She has a Ph.D and is a leader in animal ethonology. This sounds like a bullshit field, but here's the payoff: she's the world's leading designer of livestock handling equipment. Meating processing plants are pretty inhumane places. She designs the part where the livestock are unloaded from trains and trucks, penned up, and then ushered to the place where the killing happens. Her designs somehow put the animals at ease. I know, I know, it sounds weird. She somehow has high empathy for the beasts, which is especially impressive given that autistics often have profound problems negotiating even trivial social situations.
I don't know about Kim Peek, but I would classify Grandin as a designer of the highest caliber. I encourage you to spend some time learning about her. Just Google for "Temple Grandin Autism" and you'll be on your way.
Depends how you define "smart". If you equate it with "intelligence" as studied by psychometricians, then it is common to distinguish two forms.
If he maintains his fascination in those areas, why would we imagine that he wouldn't gain knowlege?
"Crystallized" intelligence is roughly speaking the amount of knowledge you have. You're right, this should increase with age, or more generally with experience.
Smarter would mean something like ``better able to reason with a given set of information.''
"Fluid" intelligence is roughly speaking the flexibility of thinking, and is measured by having people solve novel problems that don't depend (much) on prior knowledge, culture background, etc. The canonical example is Ravens Progressive Matrices test.
It's fluid intelligence that you're thinking of, and that I think of too, when the word "intelligence" or "smarts" is used. Fluid intelligence is correlated with things like working memory capacity: how much information you can store and process at the same time -- roughly your "cognitive throughput".
In general, crystallized intelligence increases (or can increase) with age/experience. However, fluid intelligence (and related constructs such as working memory capacity) actually declines in the elderly.
The two forms of intelligence are likely subserved by different cortical networks in the brain -- and this is probably relevant given that the article mentions the use of MRI -- but this is the subject of another post!
Just to re-situate the discussion, here is the comment/statistic to which my series of posts was a reaction:
The top 50% pay ~99% of the tax.
I claimed this assertion was false. A major reason is because it neglects FICA. If we take your numbers (77% and 97%), then the top 50% pay 89.5% of all federal tax and the bottom 50% pay 10.5%. This is certainly a fairer distribution of the federal tax burden than the original poster claimed was the case.
Whether this is "fair" is some absolute sense is another topic (and not the one I am addressing, although you seem to be). Debating it raises the question of how one defines "fair". Should federal taxes be compared in absolute dollars or as a percentage of one's income (e.g., is Teresa Heinz Kerry paying too much or too little)? Should state and local taxes be included so that we can get an accurate picture of the overall tax burden individuals face? I was not addressing these kinds of questions.
You seem to miss the point that the higher income workers are also paying FICA.
I didn't miss the point. Look at the numbers you quote at the end of your message. People making less than $87,900 per year -- middle and lower-middle class workers -- are paying a higher rate than those who make more than this amount. The upper-middle and upper classes are getting a break under this regressive tax policy. And it is a non-trivial break because FICA accounts for 40% or more of federal revenues -- almost as much as personal income tax.
And this brings us full-circle, for my post was in response to the frequently-made assertion that the top 50% of income earners pay 99% of all federal "tax". This is (possibly) true only of personal income tax. It is untrue of federal taxes more generally because it neglects contributions through FICA.
The tax burden on the worker is demonstrably higher than it's been in the last 24 years. This is an empirical fact.
Your's is a philsophical assertion: Workers have traditionally paid less tax (just personal income, or personal plus FICA?) as a fraction of their income than "the wealthy"; taxes should be equalized across citizens; therefore, the trend is in the right direction.
Slashdot Mirror
No, the contrapositive merely has the same truth value as the original statement. Isn't that one of DeMorgan's Laws?
Maybe you're thinking of modus tollens?
P --> Q
~Q
======
~P
I wish people would get out of this mindset that you must be either a coder or an artist and never the twain shall meet.
[...]
Back in the days of Leonardo DaVinci there was no Berlin Wall seperating technical and creative people...
I accept "coder" and "technical" as synonyms for the purposes of this discussion, but not "artist" and "creative."
This is some funny shit.
Some of the leading video-game researchers...
Pure hyperbole. One is a linguist of some note (Gee) and the other two are nobody assistant professors with a handful of articles in decent peer-reviewed journals.
Don't buy their conclusions based on their credentials folks.
As I noted already, the only scientific explanation for consciousness we have today is psychological
True...
and has nothing to do with neural science.
yet!
Most working cognitive psychologists believe that the neural correlates of their purely psychological theories -- including their theories of consciousness -- will one day be reducible to a neuroscientific terms. This is no big deal, a simple instance of the reductive scheme that knits together all the sciences: physics to chemistry, chemistry to biology, biology to psychology, psychology to the myriad of social sciences (economics, political science, etc.).
The tension in the field is whether development of the neuroscience and psychological levels should proceed semi-autonomously for now, with the reduction to be done in the future with the "final" theories of each enterprise, or whether psychology should be chucked out the window immediatley and all future theorizing about the mind conducted in neuroscience terms.[*]
Searle is considered a loser by both of these camps. What he champions is a view that has nothing to do with science, whatever its philosophical (and rhetorical) merits.
[*] The latter position is championed by certain extremists (e.g., the Churchlands, perhaps McClelland), some neuroscientists (for obviously self-centered reasons), and a few biologist-wannabes who for whatever reason (poor math skills?) wound up with Ph.Ds in psychology.
You know, I don't like your post. Should I be allowed to hunt you down and kill you?
Did my post offend your sensibilities? Is that all?
Or did it steal from you what what was promised, only to further line the pockets of a vanishingly small number of wealthy individuals and corporations?
Just wondering.
Hope this clears things up.
Hopefully you don't run into someone who shares a similar philospophy when you make a mistake.
And what is my philosophy? Karma or vigilante justice?
You make a lot of good points.
There seems to be a lot of grant money out there for people who say "hey! I know! let's research X by sticking people doing X in a brain scanner!"
Not enough! It's quite expensive to do fMRI and federal funding from NSF is decreasing. It's not really as if people are throwing money around - grants are very competitive.
But I have to disagree with this one! Basic behavioral and (many forms of) computational cognitive science are starving as everyone follows the dollars to cognitive neuroimaging.
Hopefully a balance between approaches will be restored before too long.
"dantheman82", are you also "danheskett"?
Just curious.
I disagree. You reap what you sow. Bono's acts were a blow to the collective creativity of US citizens. Lo and behold his family is stalked. Karma is a bitch.
Key quote in the article.
And make no mention of the fact in in absolute dollars, we give more than anybody else, and if you added up private, corporate, religious charities, the US basically wipes the floor with the rest of the world.
American generosity is simply far and away the greatest in the history of the world. That is FACT.
While I am impressed by your use of uppercase letters, how about some numbers to back up your claim.
n act of major terrorism hurts the country far more than the loss of life from automobile accidents. After 9/11 the human toll as well as the economic toll was massive and instant. Automobile deaths accumlate over time, and affect small groups of people as units. The difference in effect is massive.
You keep saying the difference is large but you don''t say why. One could argue that 9/11, as a centralized disaster, brought larger and more uniform compensation to its victims than three thousand separate automobile deaths, where those involved would have to fight the insurance companies and judicial system at every turn.
[What follows is one man's quick summary of the history of Fodor's modularity thesis and much else.]
I would distingush between the modularity of Fodor (1983) and the neuroscience notion of localism.
Fodor's was a specific thesis about the modularity of sensory/perceptual systems, but also more "central" systems, such as the parsing module. It made specific claims about what it means to be a module, including information encapsulation and penetrability. These were strong claims, which is of course a good thing. They were central to the early 1980s milieu, a time in which cognitive science meant cognitive psychology, computer science, and linguistics, and did not yet include cognitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience. Modularists like Pylyshyn offered tortured arguments against the penetrability of visual perception, trying to sweep under the rug well-known bi-stable illusions such as the Necker cube, the duck-rabbitt, the young-old woman, and faces-vases. Extreme arguments were also offered up by psycholinguists who wanted to equate Chomsky's "language organ" and "language acquisition device" with modules.
The truth is that Fodor's modularity generated very little, if any, new empirical insight, although it spurred a number of theoretical debates.
The late 1980s brought a turn from the mind and to the brain.
The connectionist approach emerged rapidly, and a caricature of the symbolic approach was set up as a foil. Fodor defended his brand of symbolic cognition against the connectionist, rather poorly. His talk of the combinatorial power of symbolic systems, which reflected his intellectual roots in logic and linguistics, was ignored not just by the connectionists, but more importantly by the symbolicists as well -- folks like Newell who actually built computational models of cognition, and understood symbolic systems from the richer, more dynamic perspective offered by computer science.
Another development, and here I join my rambling to your argument, was the rise of cognitive neuropsychology and then cognitive neuroscience. Neuropsychology was the trailblazer here. It introduced cognitive scientists to arguments about the neural localization of function and promoted (double) dissociations as the royal road. Although this seemed on the surface to have something to do with modularity, in fact it was rooted in decades old debates internal to the neuro community (e.g., Lashley). Localism does not equal modularity! It is hard to convey how much effort was spent fractionating seemingly simple cognitive processes, such as lexical access, into dozens of distinct boxes (boxology does not equal modularity either!), each distinction made on the basis of one or more dissociative patient pairs. By the early 1990s, these efforts collapsed under their own weight, and what looked like backdoor evidence for modularity at the brain level disappeared.
The rise of cognitive neuroscience, especially neuroimaging, during the 1990s and now in the current decade, tells a similar story. Image subtractions initially lead people to localist claims about the localization of cognitive functions: the FFA, the place, area, etc. (These are not Fodorian modules, mind you. Not even the most simplistic neuroimager uses the terms "information encapsulation" and "cognitive penetrability", at least in polite company.) The next round of studies suggest a more complex picture, and eventually people give up and acknowledgge that the action is in the collaborative processing of a number of areas -- the large-scale cortical network. See for example Mesulam (1990) and his intellectual predecessor Luria (1966).
Of course, this story does not hold for primary sensory cortex, which has been known to be highly localized for a half-century now (Hubel, Wiesel, Lettvin, etc.). But then, this was (1) known when Fodor published "The Modularity of Mind" and (2) was never described using Fodor's terms and criteria except perhaps by those in his immediate circle. This is where I urge you to read the f
For example, in a recent Nature Neuroscience article Grill-Spector Knouf & Kanwisher found FFA to be face specific, even in car-experts looking at cars.
Ah, yes. I should have named Kanwisher as well.
Of course, the last highly publicized study that gave us a "face recognition area" of the brain turned out to be a crock.
Yes, the FFA is more than a "face recognition area." But calling that hypothesis a "crock" is too strong. It was a scientific hypothesis warranted by the initial data and provocative enough to bring better experiments. You make its sound like a lie deliberately foisted on the scientific community. The data from these newer experiments have falsified the original hypothesis. Newer, more general hypotheses have been proposed and are being empirically tested. This is not some mailicious conspiracy, as you imply. It's simply scientific progress.
I also do fMRI.
Your critique is too strong.
Agreed.
It's true that some have found activations in the "fusiform face area" in reponse to other kinds of visual expertise, but that doesn't mean it isn't involved in face perception. There's good evidence that it plays a role in determining facial identity. I've seen my own fusiform lighting up in reponse to faces but not other objects.
The FFA, if I remember the work of Gauthier, Tarr, and others correctly, is better thought of as the site of visual shape knowledge. Of course, faces are one class of shapes for which we are all experts, and that is why the FFA activates when normal college sophmores participate in face recognition experiments. But you also get FFA activation if you train people to be experts on novel shape classes (e.g., "greebles").
Fodor's brand of modularity, debates about what PDP can and cannot do -- these have been passe for about 15 years in non-philosphical areas of cognitive science. (And I say this with moist eyes as I am of the older, symbolic tradition.)
[Proof elided.]
Your argument is not correct.
The paradox of the expert is this: How can experts have both (1) more knowledge of a domain and (2) faster access to each element of that knowledge?
Cognitive psychologists began answering this question forty years ago, with De Groot's work in the 1960s and Chase and Simon's work in the early 1970s on chess experts. The answer is to notice that the acquisition of knowledge is typically accompanied by the acquisition of better indices on that knowledge. Or, said another way, you get credit for knowing something when (1) you have stored it somewhere in your long-term memory and (2) you can recall it when it is appropriate. Research since the 1970s has applied these early insights to many other domains besides chess, such as reading X-rays.
Another way to think of this is that memories are more akin to hashtables than trees or lists. With the right hash function (i.e., indexing scheme), any single item can be retrieved in constant time. [Think also of radix sort versus comparison-based sorting algorithms.]
What I'm curious about, it while he may be a walking encyclopedia of fact, how good is he at reasoning?
I know more about intelligence and working memory than autism in general and autistic savants in particular.
However, there is one absolutely fascinating case -- Temple Grandin. She is autistic, but incredibly high functioning. She has a Ph.D and is a leader in animal ethonology. This sounds like a bullshit field, but here's the payoff: she's the world's leading designer of livestock handling equipment. Meating processing plants are pretty inhumane places. She designs the part where the livestock are unloaded from trains and trucks, penned up, and then ushered to the place where the killing happens. Her designs somehow put the animals at ease. I know, I know, it sounds weird. She somehow has high empathy for the beasts, which is especially impressive given that autistics often have profound problems negotiating even trivial social situations.
I don't know about Kim Peek, but I would classify Grandin as a designer of the highest caliber. I encourage you to spend some time learning about her. Just Google for "Temple Grandin Autism" and you'll be on your way.
Smarter or more knowlegeable?
Depends how you define "smart". If you equate it with "intelligence" as studied by psychometricians, then it is common to distinguish two forms.
If he maintains his fascination in those areas, why would we imagine that he wouldn't gain knowlege?
"Crystallized" intelligence is roughly speaking the amount of knowledge you have. You're right, this should increase with age, or more generally with experience.
Smarter would mean something like ``better able to reason with a given set of information.''
"Fluid" intelligence is roughly speaking the flexibility of thinking, and is measured by having people solve novel problems that don't depend (much) on prior knowledge, culture background, etc. The canonical example is Ravens Progressive Matrices test.
It's fluid intelligence that you're thinking of, and that I think of too, when the word "intelligence" or "smarts" is used. Fluid intelligence is correlated with things like working memory capacity: how much information you can store and process at the same time -- roughly your "cognitive throughput".
In general, crystallized intelligence increases (or can increase) with age/experience. However, fluid intelligence (and related constructs such as working memory capacity) actually declines in the elderly.
The two forms of intelligence are likely subserved by different cortical networks in the brain -- and this is probably relevant given that the article mentions the use of MRI -- but this is the subject of another post!
Just to re-situate the discussion, here is the comment/statistic to which my series of posts was a reaction:
The top 50% pay ~99% of the tax.
I claimed this assertion was false. A major reason is because it neglects FICA. If we take your numbers (77% and 97%), then the top 50% pay 89.5% of all federal tax and the bottom 50% pay 10.5%. This is certainly a fairer distribution of the federal tax burden than the original poster claimed was the case.
Whether this is "fair" is some absolute sense is another topic (and not the one I am addressing, although you seem to be). Debating it raises the question of how one defines "fair". Should federal taxes be compared in absolute dollars or as a percentage of one's income (e.g., is Teresa Heinz Kerry paying too much or too little)? Should state and local taxes be included so that we can get an accurate picture of the overall tax burden individuals face? I was not addressing these kinds of questions.
You seem to miss the point that the higher income workers are also paying FICA.
I didn't miss the point. Look at the numbers you quote at the end of your message. People making less than $87,900 per year -- middle and lower-middle class workers -- are paying a higher rate than those who make more than this amount. The upper-middle and upper classes are getting a break under this regressive tax policy. And it is a non-trivial break because FICA accounts for 40% or more of federal revenues -- almost as much as personal income tax.
And this brings us full-circle, for my post was in response to the frequently-made assertion that the top 50% of income earners pay 99% of all federal "tax". This is (possibly) true only of personal income tax. It is untrue of federal taxes more generally because it neglects contributions through FICA.
Actually, no.
The tax burden on the worker is demonstrably higher than it's been in the last 24 years. This is an empirical fact.
Your's is a philsophical assertion: Workers have traditionally paid less tax (just personal income, or personal plus FICA?) as a fraction of their income than "the wealthy"; taxes should be equalized across citizens; therefore, the trend is in the right direction.
Thanks for the pointer. I will definitely check it out!