even if you manage to protect yourself from a "leak" password, how can you trust that the hacker is not using your opened session to send spam in your name or harvesting your contacts to spam them later?
An untrusted terminal should be used for untrusted matters that will have few consequences if leaked or broken into.
Because that's the correct answer. If you ask me how can I fix a broken egg I would say don't break it in the first place.
Seriously, when a terminal is not trusted everything you do on it can be watched. The attacker could plug into any application in the same way your debugger do and watch the bit directly from within the application, even if the executable is pristine and in you read-only USB dongle.
Don't put your password in a public computer. That's a way to be safe. The only possible solution for this would be to have a one time password solution, but this would require changing the server witch is not possible for most of people.
The problem is that spamers have a bot net with hundreds of thousands of zombies. Even if they do use the same IP now, it is quite trivial for them to create 1400 accounts each in a different ip.
The clueless user can be scared very easily, just don't put the override option in sight and put a scary warning with the option and I guess that it will be ok.
The main problem is not the clueless, the user who know just a little bit, and is convinced that he knows everything that is the one who will read the warning and disable the security and get bitten by virus and trojans.:-P
you are right, but if you take away control from the user in a manner that is possible for him to override when he want it, then it is ok. If it is not "overridable" then it is as evil as it gets.
"What good is a phone call when you're not able to talk."
GPL is there to give user the freedom to tinker, and if the box forbids you to run the newly compiled code the source code is in fact useless. Tivo is breaking the idea behind GPL, it may be completely legal but it is immoral because it uses technicalities to go against the idea behind the license.
Also it's becoming quite common for the so called "native applications" to be written in interpreted languages and run throw a VM. Lots of applications, including the latests multimedia stuff is being made using python. You just have to pass the hard stuff to a native library, like gstreamer in the multimedia case, and you will have a easily hackable UI shell and the speed advantage of compiled code.
Every object has a pointer to the vtable, if you could overwrite the position that a dangling pointer is pointed to you can overwrite the position of the vtable (probably to the same place where you are writing now) and put a pointer to the code you want to be called.
Who cares? How many of these systems need fast 3D video? How many apps are there for Open BSD that would take advantage of accelerated OpenGL? If there was enough demand then Nvidia would release a version for the OS's you listed. There isn't enough demand to justify the work involved. If you disagree, then write it yourself and you then have the choice of how you release it. You never know, nvidia might even offer to buy it from you.:) All of that could, and have been said about linux also. Fact is that an open source driver is easily adaptable to any thing you could put a card into it even if it is none of the above systems. With closed driver no one has the option of trying to adapt, you have to ask and wait for the single source of drivers to create what you need and then all the "the demand don't justify the work" talk gets into the play.
The same rationale works with closed standards, why do you think the wii has only support for flash 7? The same reason that you cannot fit you amiga with a nvdia super ultra 3d bling.
That is the problem with sequels, all people think they want a different game/movie but when they are actually different people will not get used to the new and complain that it suck but the worst part is that if the different one can have appeal to different people that did not liked that first one and those people will probably not play/watch the new one. So what most people do is to bet on more of the same.
The real problem here is a "man in the middle" attack, the bad guy can be the fellow with a big bag beside you in a crowded train he would have a friend in a store that could be anywhere in the world that accept the wireless card, with his card he would start the negotiation, the friend would relay every bit sent to his card to your card and vice versa. Those communication are low speed and since the card need to charge up to reply I would guess that even with a reasonable lag this could still work.
Things could be badder, I don't know how close one must be to actually talk to a card, would a powerful transmitter be able to talk to a card from a far away distance?
In fact a firewall can do little against this, this connection will probably be on the port 80 (web) from a server (or perhaps several servers) inside MS so unless you know witch are all the IPs that ms uses to this you can't block the service, and if they are smart they may even use the same IP of some other MS service that the customers really want/need like the windows update thinggy. So unless you have a smart proxy that can block some URLs but not others you'll have to choose.
you're correct, and there is one poit I would like to add, MS bugs database are not trustworthy simply because it uses it as a marketing tool, how can I be sure that the number of known bugs on vista is what Ms is telling me? I can't so any research that uses numbers from them is meaningless.
The solution is even easier, do a longer exposition, everything that moves will get blurred or will disappear while stationary object will be ok. Off course that is free (no work at all) with a tripod and time, but since they are probably doing it in a hurry, to many streets and from a moving van/car, they could simply combine two or more photos of the same place, preferably in different days, all the work can be done automatically.
but on the Internet the work you did to determine whether a business is acceptably safe is wasted if you end up at a typo squatter's site.
As I said, it is up to us to take responsibility for what we are doing. Who typed the address in wrong? And since the answer is the user - us - then whose fault would that be? Not the legitimate businesses, and not even the CAs; No, it is the ours. And my precise point is that we should be careful with what we do, the certs don't help in any way to ensure we are where we meant to be. For that, we need our eyes, our memories, and our wits.
the 'typo' example is a bad one, the problem is that for many reasons the site you are seeing may not be owned by the same person that bought the original certificate. That is why you have to trace it back to the origin, to make sure that the site I am seeing is owned by the person/organization that I trust.
If anyone can do a perfectly good self signed certificate then every certificate is as good as anyone's else and there is no way to be sure of who I am talking to on the other end.
limited by the relatively weak checking and the fact that virtually no customers understand it
It isn't limited by it, it never existed in the first place. Customers - IOW your average netizen today - look for the lock indicating encryption is on. If they look for that. There never was any value here, it is entirely illusory, the product of a very powerful marketing campaign. It's a scam, one that will only evaporate if the browser manufacturers wake up and realize they are the fools in this chain of fraud - they get no income, they screw the vendors, and they enable the scammers - the "certificate authorities" - to rake in huge amounts of money for no service, unless you call deceiving Internet e-commerce customers a "service."
The problem is that security is hard, much harder that people are likely to try to understand. Well you see creating a cryptographic channel between your computer and the server is the easy part, and that is what the browser is doing and indicating to user by the little lock. The problem that encription alone is not enough, as you have said, anyone can do it, so if I can fool you into using my certificate instead of the original one, say I have poison your ISP DNS server for instance, I could set up a proxy (man in the middle attack) and serve the exact same page that you're expecting to see but this time I get to see everything.
What make this impossible to happen now? Well if the system worked as designed, this would be impossible, because the certification authority would not grant me a valid certificate for a site that belongs to another person. So the best I can do is to self sign, or to create a dummy cert-authority to sign my version, and the browser will send a warning.
The real problem is that people are willing to accept invalid certs, self signed certs, and will press ok to any warning pop up that they see on their browser. In fact if you use no encryption at all and put a lockpad somewhere in your page it is a good bet that some users will accept this page as secure.
if you see a cert then you can look at the DN and know where to send a process server if something goes wrong
Again, no. Reputable people will be right where they said they would be. Which doesn't help, because you're not looking for them. Scammers will not. You can send the process server to the address on the certificate, but they won't be there. Cert authorities only check (if they do check at all) that you are where you say you are when they issue the certificate. The same day you get it, it can be installed on your laptop, and the very next day you can be taking orders a thousand miles from there. The cert authorities don't have
Some browsers do kerning while others do not and you can't prove that by putting V and A's together because what you see in your browser is not what the same that I am seeing in my. Fact is that mine here (at work, but shhh) does not do the kerning dance while my computer at home does. To test, if you are using firefox in linux (not sure about others), simply select a line with the VA up to V if the spacing changes you had kerning before the selection was made (the selection border does not follow the kerning).
The kerning information is stored in the font file, that's why you can't change it within the browser easily. My wife is a book designer and this is one of the thing she hate about the internet, the other is the fact that browsers don't do hyphenation, without this you can't properly justify a text.
Except that with encryption all the details are public, and should be, only the data used (key and secret) need to be protected, not the process it self. While in DRM that is not possible, the receiver of the data must have access to the very data the process wants to hide from him, sounds impossible, because it is, the agreed way that this works is to have key parts of the process hidden and secret, well if the process is hidden and secret it is not open.
The very idea of DRM is aggainst any ideals of open formats and interoperability, by definition. DRM is made to restrict what you, the consumer can do with your data and hardware so that people like RIAA or MPIAA can sell the same data over and over with a changed array of bit permissions so you can do what you should have been able to do with your first copy.
Once, one of my friends that are biologist (can't really remember who for it was long ago), said that evolution is not a good word to describe the phenomenon. 'Evolution' sounds like something is getting better, but in fact there is no universal "better" for the best for one environment could the worst for another. What matters is that the population survives enough to reproduce and keep the cycle, if this is achieved by a super-fine-tuned processes or by simply using a have thousands and thousands of offspring some might just survive it does not really matter.
Well technically you run a helper application that runs (or not) the desired application if you give so the permission.:-) I guess that this dialog box is probably hard coded into the file manager of vista and it does that also before running the application it self, so this is not a difference between the two.
I guess the main problem with the vista approach is that the system could probably give the setup less power over to the setup executable and it would still work the majority of the time, but to make things easier MS decided to make it work 100% of time even though it is less (or much less) secure, since it is a known fact that user trade their security to see monkey dancing.
We should offer then free trips to the sun.
We should offer then free trips to the sun. You can tell them there is no problem, since they are schedlle during nighttime.:-D
Slashdot Mirror
even if you manage to protect yourself from a "leak" password, how can you trust that the hacker is not using your opened session to send spam in your name or harvesting your contacts to spam them later?
An untrusted terminal should be used for untrusted matters that will have few consequences if leaked or broken into.
Because that's the correct answer. If you ask me how can I fix a broken egg I would say don't break it in the first place.
Seriously, when a terminal is not trusted everything you do on it can be watched. The attacker could plug into any application in the same way your debugger do and watch the bit directly from within the application, even if the executable is pristine and in you read-only USB dongle.
Don't put your password in a public computer. That's a way to be safe. The only possible solution for this would be to have a one time password solution, but this would require changing the server witch is not possible for most of people.
The problem is that spamers have a bot net with hundreds of thousands of zombies. Even if they do use the same IP now, it is quite trivial for them to create 1400 accounts each in a different ip.
The clueless user can be scared very easily, just don't put the override option in sight and put a scary warning with the option and I guess that it will be ok.
:-P
The main problem is not the clueless, the user who know just a little bit, and is convinced that he knows everything that is the one who will read the warning and disable the security and get bitten by virus and trojans.
you are right, but if you take away control from the user in a manner that is possible for him to override when he want it, then it is ok. If it is not "overridable" then it is as evil as it gets.
"What good is a phone call when you're not able to talk."
GPL is there to give user the freedom to tinker, and if the box forbids you to run the newly compiled code the source code is in fact useless. Tivo is breaking the idea behind GPL, it may be completely legal but it is immoral because it uses technicalities to go against the idea behind the license.
Even worst you are obliged to execute the content, since many blockers are in fact stopping javascript loaded to execute in the first place.
What does this url scheme does?
Also it's becoming quite common for the so called "native applications" to be written in interpreted languages and run throw a VM. Lots of applications, including the latests multimedia stuff is being made using python. You just have to pass the hard stuff to a native library, like gstreamer in the multimedia case, and you will have a easily hackable UI shell and the speed advantage of compiled code.
Guess you never heard of the adblock extension, have you?
normal operation
The same rationale works with closed standards, why do you think the wii has only support for flash 7? The same reason that you cannot fit you amiga with a nvdia super ultra 3d bling.
That is the problem with sequels, all people think they want a different game/movie but when they are actually different people will not get used to the new and complain that it suck but the worst part is that if the different one can have appeal to different people that did not liked that first one and those people will probably not play/watch the new one. So what most people do is to bet on more of the same.
Not to mention that the 1% of tech inclined people can do simpler tools that say 10% or even more can actually do the unDRMfy process by them selves.
The real problem here is a "man in the middle" attack, the bad guy can be the fellow with a big bag beside you in a crowded train he would have a friend in a store that could be anywhere in the world that accept the wireless card, with his card he would start the negotiation, the friend would relay every bit sent to his card to your card and vice versa. Those communication are low speed and since the card need to charge up to reply I would guess that even with a reasonable lag this could still work.
Things could be badder, I don't know how close one must be to actually talk to a card, would a powerful transmitter be able to talk to a card from a far away distance?
In fact a firewall can do little against this, this connection will probably be on the port 80 (web) from a server (or perhaps several servers) inside MS so unless you know witch are all the IPs that ms uses to this you can't block the service, and if they are smart they may even use the same IP of some other MS service that the customers really want/need like the windows update thinggy. So unless you have a smart proxy that can block some URLs but not others you'll have to choose.
you're correct, and there is one poit I would like to add, MS bugs database are not trustworthy simply because it uses it as a marketing tool, how can I be sure that the number of known bugs on vista is what Ms is telling me? I can't so any research that uses numbers from them is meaningless.
The solution is even easier, do a longer exposition, everything that moves will get blurred or will disappear while stationary object will be ok. Off course that is free (no work at all) with a tripod and time, but since they are probably doing it in a hurry, to many streets and from a moving van/car, they could simply combine two or more photos of the same place, preferably in different days, all the work can be done automatically.
As I said, it is up to us to take responsibility for what we are doing. Who typed the address in wrong? And since the answer is the user - us - then whose fault would that be? Not the legitimate businesses, and not even the CAs; No, it is the ours. And my precise point is that we should be careful with what we do, the certs don't help in any way to ensure we are where we meant to be. For that, we need our eyes, our memories, and our wits.
the 'typo' example is a bad one, the problem is that for many reasons the site you are seeing may not be owned by the same person that bought the original certificate. That is why you have to trace it back to the origin, to make sure that the site I am seeing is owned by the person/organization that I trust.
If anyone can do a perfectly good self signed certificate then every certificate is as good as anyone's else and there is no way to be sure of who I am talking to on the other end.
It isn't limited by it, it never existed in the first place. Customers - IOW your average netizen today - look for the lock indicating encryption is on. If they look for that. There never was any value here, it is entirely illusory, the product of a very powerful marketing campaign. It's a scam, one that will only evaporate if the browser manufacturers wake up and realize they are the fools in this chain of fraud - they get no income, they screw the vendors, and they enable the scammers - the "certificate authorities" - to rake in huge amounts of money for no service, unless you call deceiving Internet e-commerce customers a "service."
The problem is that security is hard, much harder that people are likely to try to understand. Well you see creating a cryptographic channel between your computer and the server is the easy part, and that is what the browser is doing and indicating to user by the little lock. The problem that encription alone is not enough, as you have said, anyone can do it, so if I can fool you into using my certificate instead of the original one, say I have poison your ISP DNS server for instance, I could set up a proxy (man in the middle attack) and serve the exact same page that you're expecting to see but this time I get to see everything.
What make this impossible to happen now? Well if the system worked as designed, this would be impossible, because the certification authority would not grant me a valid certificate for a site that belongs to another person. So the best I can do is to self sign, or to create a dummy cert-authority to sign my version, and the browser will send a warning.
The real problem is that people are willing to accept invalid certs, self signed certs, and will press ok to any warning pop up that they see on their browser. In fact if you use no encryption at all and put a lockpad somewhere in your page it is a good bet that some users will accept this page as secure.
Again, no. Reputable people will be right where they said they would be. Which doesn't help, because you're not looking for them. Scammers will not. You can send the process server to the address on the certificate, but they won't be there. Cert authorities only check (if they do check at all) that you are where you say you are when they issue the certificate. The same day you get it, it can be installed on your laptop, and the very next day you can be taking orders a thousand miles from there. The cert authorities don't have
Some browsers do kerning while others do not and you can't prove that by putting V and A's together because what you see in your browser is not what the same that I am seeing in my. Fact is that mine here (at work, but shhh) does not do the kerning dance while my computer at home does. To test, if you are using firefox in linux (not sure about others), simply select a line with the VA up to V if the spacing changes you had kerning before the selection was made (the selection border does not follow the kerning).
The kerning information is stored in the font file, that's why you can't change it within the browser easily. My wife is a book designer and this is one of the thing she hate about the internet, the other is the fact that browsers don't do hyphenation, without this you can't properly justify a text.
Except that with encryption all the details are public, and should be, only the data used (key and secret) need to be protected, not the process it self. While in DRM that is not possible, the receiver of the data must have access to the very data the process wants to hide from him, sounds impossible, because it is, the agreed way that this works is to have key parts of the process hidden and secret, well if the process is hidden and secret it is not open.
The very idea of DRM is aggainst any ideals of open formats and interoperability, by definition. DRM is made to restrict what you, the consumer can do with your data and hardware so that people like RIAA or MPIAA can sell the same data over and over with a changed array of bit permissions so you can do what you should have been able to do with your first copy.
Once, one of my friends that are biologist (can't really remember who for it was long ago), said that evolution is not a good word to describe the phenomenon. 'Evolution' sounds like something is getting better, but in fact there is no universal "better" for the best for one environment could the worst for another. What matters is that the population survives enough to reproduce and keep the cycle, if this is achieved by a super-fine-tuned processes or by simply using a have thousands and thousands of offspring some might just survive it does not really matter.
Witch would be quite useless if you had used a passphrase on those keys... :-D
Well technically you run a helper application that runs (or not) the desired application if you give so the permission. :-) I guess that this dialog box is probably hard coded into the file manager of vista and it does that also before running the application it self, so this is not a difference between the two.
I guess the main problem with the vista approach is that the system could probably give the setup less power over to the setup executable and it would still work the majority of the time, but to make things easier MS decided to make it work 100% of time even though it is less (or much less) secure, since it is a known fact that user trade their security to see monkey dancing.