Actually, they cannont get "maximum revenue," also known as treble damages, because they have not indicated what code is supposedly infringing, and they have not allowed an opportunity to correct the problem. In fact, I doubt they will get anything close to $1 billion. The SCO presentation is all theater and absurdity.
It shouldn't be all that hard to prove where the code came from. Anything that gets into the linux kernel is posted on the linux-kernel mailing list. I would think one could simply grep the archives, given the lines of code/comments in question.
According to Novell, SC0/Caldera only got the right to license Unix to other people. They don't own the patents (now expired) or the copyright to the code. They don't even own the trademark "UNIX," which transferred to the Open Group after UNIX Systems Laboratory settled their suit with the University of California.
The only thing SC0 owns is the XENIX/OpenServer/Unixware code that they did not get from Novell. I think the Open Source Initiative wrote about this not too long ago. Check it out at opensource.org.
I know you got modded as "Flamebait," but this is an excellent point. One wonders how long it will be before the ASIC manufacturer starts going after somebody because this hacker is using their protected "intellectual Property," contained in the design of the traces on the board.
Actually, I don't see how SCO can *NOT* distribute the source code. Is it not their obligation under the GPL to fulfil any request for the source at least three years after distribution? I guess they could always point back at another source repository.
I like the point that the Position Paper makes that the allegations SCO makes are so baseless that OSI thinks the State of Utah should review the matter for possible sactions against SCO. Isn't there also a US law about slandering your competitors in public? The Waltham Act?
Oh, I have slipped the surly bonds of earth
And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings;
Sunward I've climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth
Of sun-split clouds -- and done a hundred things
You have not dreamed of -- wheeled and soared and swung
High in the sunlit silence. Hov'ring there,
I've chased the shouting wind along, and flung
My eager craft through footless halls of air.
Up, up the long, delirious burning blue,
I've topped the windswept heights with easy grace
Where never lark, or even eagle flew.
And, while with silent, lifting mind I've trod
The high untresspassed sanctity of space,
Put out my hand, and touched the face of God.
-- RCAF Flight-Lieutenant John Gillespie Magee Jr.
(1922-1941).
This has been discussed before, I think in an article where the govenrment was going to donate old computers to schools. Someone was wondering what might be left on the hard drives of said computers.
The answer from anyone with a government security background was that the physical platter must be destroyed to truly be secure, so there wouldn't be anything left. This is done with any media that has or had classified material on it, even stuff returned for warranty.
Basically, the procedure is to grind the magnetic material off of the platters, or just dump them in an acid bath until the platters dissolve.
Of course seven writes over the same spot more or less leaves you vulnerable only to the electron microscopy or SQUID type of analysis.
One thing I worry about with 1394/FireWire is the incorpoartion of copy protection. I notice that the 1394 chipset from Philips includes the 5C copy protection. Sure, it can be hacked, but it's a pain in the ass.
Has anybody dug out their cassettes from the 70's? How well do they play? How about your record collection? I bet it doesn't degrade nearly as quickly. Ahh, yes. The great benfit of magnetic media: a five-year average life span, compared to an estimate of thirty years for CD's and DVD's. And all those moving parts compared to a solid-state disc.
I think DVHS will go over as well as DAT/DCC. Remeber those? (Okay, I know a few people still use DAT to tape concerts, but that's because it's hard to carry a CD burner in.) This is another format that will die an anonymous death.
With all this great technology, I wonder why these larger capacties are only available on IDE drives.
It seems to me, SCSI drive capacities used to outstrip IDE by quite a bit, and the price penalty wasn't all that much (~$200). Lately, all I see in the catalogs for SCSI is 18GB or 36GB, while IDE is at 80GB, 120GB, and even 160GB.
Is there something about this technology that isn't compatible with SCSI, or does SCSI not scale well, or what?
Commodore 64, baby! It was the shizznit when I got a tape drive, and then a FLOPPY DISK drive. I didn't have to type in my programs every time I turned on the computer. W00T!
Ah, you need to read the part in the EULA where you hold Microsoft harmless for any damage to your computer, even if Microsoft knew there was a problem and didn't do anything about it. And with UCITA, this would be codified in law. Doesn't that make you feel all warm and fuzzy all over?
An interesting article from a guy who masturbates with pictures of Bill Gates: Click Here.
Of course, maybe you resell WinXP to hapless companies to support your crack habit.
Here are the actual claims from the patent. Note that the abstract prior to this carries no legal weight.
What is claimed is:
1. In combination,
means for generating a substantially continuous sequence of.[.a.]. digital.[.television.]. input signal values.Iadd.representing an incoming audio or video program signal.Iaddend.,
a source of control commands,
a.[.television.]..Iadd.program.Iaddend.signal utilization device, and
a variable delay circular storage buffer.Iadd.for storing those of said digital input signal values which were received during the immediately preceding time intervals of predetermined duration, said circular storage buffer.Iaddend.having an input port connected to receive said digital.[.television.]. input signal values and an output port connected to supply a delayed replica of said input signal values to said utilization device following a variable delay interval, the duration of said interval being selectable in response to said control commands, said circular storage buffer comprising, in combination:
an addressable digital memory,
a programmed processor,
memory access means for continuously writing said sequence of digital.[.television.]. input signal values into said addressable digital memory.[.,.]. at a sequence of.Iadd.continually advancing.Iaddend.writing addresses established by said processor.Iadd.to write over the oldest of said input signal values recorded in said digital memory as said sequence of writing addresses are advanced so that said digital input signal values received during said immediately preceding time interval of predetermined duration are stored in said addressable digital memory,.Iaddend.and for concurrently reproducing and supplying to said output port an output sequence of previously written ones of signal values read from said addressable digital memory at a sequence of different reading addresses established by said processor, and
means for supplying said output sequence to said output port,
wherein said programmed processor includes means responsive to said control commands for varying the relative locations of said reading and writing addresses to selectively alter said variable delay interval.
2. The combination set forth in claim 1 wherein said means for generating said input signal values comprises, in combination,
means for receiving an analog.[.television.]. program signal,
an analog-to-digital converter for translating said program signal into
a first sequence of digital values, and
data compression means for translating said first sequence of digital
values into more compact form for storage in said addressable memory,
wherein said combination further comprises data decompression means connected between said output port and said utilization device.
3. The combination as set forth in claim 2 wherein said compression means is responsive to said processor means for varying the compression ratio at which said first sequence of digital values is translated into more compact form.
4. The combination as defined in claim 1.Iadd.wherein said program signal is a television signal and.Iaddend.wherein one of said control commands is a pause command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said pause command for maintaining said reading addresses to repeatedly send a portion of the television signal stored in said memory to said output port.
5. The combination as defined in claim 4 wherein one of said control commands is a playback speed command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said playback speed command for altering the rate at which said reading addresses are changed.
6. The combination as defined in claim 4 wherein one of said control commands is a reverse command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said playback speed command for altering said reading addresses in a reverse order from the sequence of writing addresses used to store said television input signal to thereby provide a reverse motion television signal to said output port.
7. The combination as defined in claim 1.Iadd.wherein said program signal is a television signal and.Iaddend.wherein one of said control commands include a replay selection command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means for selectively accessing data at a plurality of different frame addresses stored in said digital memory to form data representing a mosaic of reduced size images, each of said images representing data at a corresponding one of said frame addresses, and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said replay selection command for setting said reading address to a selected one of said frame addresses identified by said replay selection command.
8. The combination as set forth in claim 7 wherein said compression means includes means responsive to said processor means for varying the compression ratio at which said first sequence of digital values is translated into more compact form..Iadd.
9. The combination set forth in claim 1 wherein said variable delay circular storage buffer stores one or more incoming signals and wherein said means for concurrently reproducing and supplying to said output port an output sequence of previously written ones of signal values includes means responsive to a user command for selecting a particular one of said one or more incoming signals for reproduction..Iaddend..Iadd.
10. The combination as set forth in claim 9 further comprising an input unit composed of one or more simultaneously operating signal processors each connected to a source of programming signals for supplying said one or more incoming signals to said storage buffer..Iaddend.
This is the way most closed-circuit security systems work, like the ones in banks and 7-11's. They record in a loop, and they keep the last 30/60/90 minutes in case they need it to examine a robbery for suspects. If the recording isn't stopped, then a new feed records over the old. The "black boxes" or airlines also function this way, depending on your definition of "live feed."
Who was it who said that those who trade liberty for security deserve neither? I'm thinking Thomas Jefferson.
The basic fact is that everybody uses encryption, even if they don't know it. The two suggested ways of crippling it, short keys and key escrow both have fatal flaws.
A weaked key short enough for the Man to hack in a short period of time will also be easy for anybody else with an interest to crack.
Key escrow relies on you transmitting your "secret" key across the Internel to a government computer. This could be sniffed and collected. Since the key is static, the traffic only needs to be decrypted once, and you are toast.
Another way to break this would be to put a hacked binary into place. The encryption program can't be open source, since that would allow you to bypass the escrow part. Since you expect there to be traffic anyway to broadcast your key to the world, the hacked binary would just cc: your key to the hacker, who could then impresonate you at will.
A hacker might just break into the government database, and collect keys at will, or (even easier!) just ask for it using social engineering or bribery.
The question I keep asking is, "How will you force the terrorists to give up thier keys?"
Very silly. Most of your comments advocate increasing security, but your last point advocates weaking it.
You forget that weakened crypto in only a script kiddie away from plaintext. A back door would only be obscure, not secret. With everybody and their dogs looking for it, the exploit would be published in no time.
Meanwhile, terrorists and other Bad Guys(tm), having no concern for human life, much less crypto controls, would continue plotting with strong crypto. Now, that would be silly.
It has to do with the fact the Slashcode 2.0 is a buggy steaming pile of shit. What has happened on a regular basis since Slashdot upgraded is that the site will "crash," leaving only the front page up. Clicking on any link within the page will bounce you back to the front page, because nothing is running behind it. God only know when Taco and Co. will pull its collective head out its ass and fix the damn thing.
Slashdot Mirror
I think it's more like the saying, "No one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American public."
Actually, they cannont get "maximum revenue," also known as treble damages, because they have not indicated what code is supposedly infringing, and they have not allowed an opportunity to correct the problem. In fact, I doubt they will get anything close to $1 billion. The SCO presentation is all theater and absurdity.
It shouldn't be all that hard to prove where the code came from. Anything that gets into the linux kernel is posted on the linux-kernel mailing list. I would think one could simply grep the archives, given the lines of code/comments in question.
According to Novell, SC0/Caldera only got the right to license Unix to other people. They don't own the patents (now expired) or the copyright to the code. They don't even own the trademark "UNIX," which transferred to the Open Group after UNIX Systems Laboratory settled their suit with the University of California.
The only thing SC0 owns is the XENIX/OpenServer/Unixware code that they did not get from Novell. I think the Open Source Initiative wrote about this not too long ago. Check it out at opensource.org.
Wow... Bruce Willis will be pretty old by then.
I know you got modded as "Flamebait," but this is an excellent point. One wonders how long it will be before the ASIC manufacturer starts going after somebody because this hacker is using their protected "intellectual Property," contained in the design of the traces on the board.
Actually, I don't see how SCO can *NOT* distribute the source code. Is it not their obligation under the GPL to fulfil any request for the source at least three years after distribution? I guess they could always point back at another source repository.
I like the point that the Position Paper makes that the allegations SCO makes are so baseless that OSI thinks the State of Utah should review the matter for possible sactions against SCO. Isn't there also a US law about slandering your competitors in public? The Waltham Act?
I heard on the news that H&R Block's tax software is the most recommended, precisely because it is easier to install and costs less. What a concept!
Oh, I have slipped the surly bonds of earth
And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings;
Sunward I've climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth
Of sun-split clouds -- and done a hundred things
You have not dreamed of -- wheeled and soared and swung
High in the sunlit silence. Hov'ring there,
I've chased the shouting wind along, and flung
My eager craft through footless halls of air.
Up, up the long, delirious burning blue,
I've topped the windswept heights with easy grace
Where never lark, or even eagle flew.
And, while with silent, lifting mind I've trod
The high untresspassed sanctity of space,
Put out my hand, and touched the face of God.
-- RCAF Flight-Lieutenant John Gillespie Magee Jr.
(1922-1941).
This has been discussed before, I think in an article where the govenrment was going to donate old computers to schools. Someone was wondering what might be left on the hard drives of said computers.
The answer from anyone with a government security background was that the physical platter must be destroyed to truly be secure, so there wouldn't be anything left. This is done with any media that has or had classified material on it, even stuff returned for warranty.
Basically, the procedure is to grind the magnetic material off of the platters, or just dump them in an acid bath until the platters dissolve.
Of course seven writes over the same spot more or less leaves you vulnerable only to the electron microscopy or SQUID type of analysis.
Don't forget the Copyright Access Control Act (CACA) of 2006.
One thing I worry about with 1394/FireWire is the incorpoartion of copy protection. I notice that the 1394 chipset from Philips includes the 5C copy protection. Sure, it can be hacked, but it's a pain in the ass.
Has anybody dug out their cassettes from the 70's? How well do they play? How about your record collection? I bet it doesn't degrade nearly as quickly. Ahh, yes. The great benfit of magnetic media: a five-year average life span, compared to an estimate of thirty years for CD's and DVD's. And all those moving parts compared to a solid-state disc.
I think DVHS will go over as well as DAT/DCC. Remeber those? (Okay, I know a few people still use DAT to tape concerts, but that's because it's hard to carry a CD burner in.) This is another format that will die an anonymous death.
You heard it here first!
With all this great technology, I wonder why these larger capacties are only available on IDE drives.
It seems to me, SCSI drive capacities used to outstrip IDE by quite a bit, and the price penalty wasn't all that much (~$200). Lately, all I see in the catalogs for SCSI is 18GB or 36GB, while IDE is at 80GB, 120GB, and even 160GB.
Is there something about this technology that isn't compatible with SCSI, or does SCSI not scale well, or what?
Speaking of the C=64...
My first PC (stiil works!) was an IBM PS/2 55SX with a 60MB hard drive. I bought it (with a student discount) in 1991 for about $3,000.
Ah, you need to read the part in the EULA where you hold Microsoft harmless for any damage to your computer, even if Microsoft knew there was a problem and didn't do anything about it. And with UCITA, this would be codified in law. Doesn't that make you feel all warm and fuzzy all over?
No no no! You must call it GNU/Copy Prevention.
Thank you. Please drive through.
Bitch!
Sorry. Had to be done.
An interesting article from a guy who masturbates with pictures of Bill Gates:
Click Here.
Of course, maybe you resell WinXP to hapless companies to support your crack habit.
'Nuff said.
Of couse, I have to say more, or Slashcode will reject me.
The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog.
Here are the actual claims from the patent. Note that the abstract prior to this carries no legal weight.
.[.a.]. digital .[.television.]. input signal values .Iadd.representing an incoming audio or video program signal.Iaddend.,
.[.television.]. .Iadd.program .Iaddend.signal utilization device, and
.Iadd.for storing those of said digital input signal values which were received during the immediately preceding time intervals of predetermined duration, said circular storage buffer .Iaddend.having an input port connected to receive said digital .[.television.]. input signal values and an output port connected to supply a delayed replica of said input signal values to said utilization device following a variable delay interval, the duration of said interval being selectable in response to said control commands, said circular storage buffer comprising, in combination:
.[.television.]. input signal values into said addressable digital memory.[.,.]. at a sequence of .Iadd.continually advancing .Iaddend.writing addresses established by said processor .Iadd.to write over the oldest of said input signal values recorded in said digital memory as said sequence of writing addresses are advanced so that said digital input signal values received during said immediately preceding time interval of predetermined duration are stored in said addressable digital memory, .Iaddend.and for concurrently reproducing and supplying to said output port an output sequence of previously written ones of signal values read from said addressable digital memory at a sequence of different reading addresses established by said processor, and
.[.television.]. program signal,
.Iadd.wherein said program signal is a television signal and .Iaddend.wherein one of said control commands is a pause command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said pause command for maintaining said reading addresses to repeatedly send a portion of the television signal stored in said memory to said output port.
.Iadd.wherein said program signal is a television signal and .Iaddend.wherein one of said control commands include a replay selection command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means for selectively accessing data at a plurality of different frame addresses stored in said digital memory to form data representing a mosaic of reduced size images, each of said images representing data at a corresponding one of said frame addresses, and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said replay selection command for setting said reading address to a selected one of said frame addresses identified by said replay selection command.
.Iadd.
.Iaddend..Iadd.
.Iaddend.
What is claimed is:
1. In combination,
means for generating a substantially continuous sequence of
a source of control commands,
a
a variable delay circular storage buffer
an addressable digital memory,
a programmed processor,
memory access means for continuously writing said sequence of digital
means for supplying said output sequence to said output port,
wherein said programmed processor includes means responsive to said control commands for varying the relative locations of said reading and writing addresses to selectively alter said variable delay interval.
2. The combination set forth in claim 1 wherein said means for generating said input signal values comprises, in combination,
means for receiving an analog
an analog-to-digital converter for translating said program signal into
a first sequence of digital values, and
data compression means for translating said first sequence of digital
values into more compact form for storage in said addressable memory,
wherein said combination further comprises data decompression means connected between said output port and said utilization device.
3. The combination as set forth in claim 2 wherein said compression means is responsive to said processor means for varying the compression ratio at which said first sequence of digital values is translated into more compact form.
4. The combination as defined in claim 1
5. The combination as defined in claim 4 wherein one of said control commands is a playback speed command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said playback speed command for altering the rate at which said reading addresses are changed.
6. The combination as defined in claim 4 wherein one of said control commands is a reverse command and wherein said programmed processor further includes means responsive to said playback speed command for altering said reading addresses in a reverse order from the sequence of writing addresses used to store said television input signal to thereby provide a reverse motion television signal to said output port.
7. The combination as defined in claim 1
8. The combination as set forth in claim 7 wherein said compression means includes means responsive to said processor means for varying the compression ratio at which said first sequence of digital values is translated into more compact form.
9. The combination set forth in claim 1 wherein said variable delay circular storage buffer stores one or more incoming signals and wherein said means for concurrently reproducing and supplying to said output port an output sequence of previously written ones of signal values includes means responsive to a user command for selecting a particular one of said one or more incoming signals for reproduction.
10. The combination as set forth in claim 9 further comprising an input unit composed of one or more simultaneously operating signal processors each connected to a source of programming signals for supplying said one or more incoming signals to said storage buffer.
This is the way most closed-circuit security systems work, like the ones in banks and 7-11's. They record in a loop, and they keep the last 30/60/90 minutes in case they need it to examine a robbery for suspects. If the recording isn't stopped, then a new feed records over the old. The "black boxes" or airlines also function this way, depending on your definition of "live feed."
Who was it who said that those who trade liberty for security deserve neither? I'm thinking Thomas Jefferson.
The basic fact is that everybody uses encryption, even if they don't know it. The two suggested ways of crippling it, short keys and key escrow both have fatal flaws.
A weaked key short enough for the Man to hack in a short period of time will also be easy for anybody else with an interest to crack.
Key escrow relies on you transmitting your "secret" key across the Internel to a government computer. This could be sniffed and collected. Since the key is static, the traffic only needs to be decrypted once, and you are toast.
Another way to break this would be to put a hacked binary into place. The encryption program can't be open source, since that would allow you to bypass the escrow part. Since you expect there to be traffic anyway to broadcast your key to the world, the hacked binary would just cc: your key to the hacker, who could then impresonate you at will.
A hacker might just break into the government database, and collect keys at will, or (even easier!) just ask for it using social engineering or bribery.
The question I keep asking is, "How will you force the terrorists to give up thier keys?"
Very silly. Most of your comments advocate increasing security, but your last point advocates weaking it.
You forget that weakened crypto in only a script kiddie away from plaintext. A back door would only be obscure, not secret. With everybody and their dogs looking for it, the exploit would be published in no time.
Meanwhile, terrorists and other Bad Guys(tm), having no concern for human life, much less crypto controls, would continue plotting with strong crypto. Now, that would be silly.
It has to do with the fact the Slashcode 2.0 is a buggy steaming pile of shit. What has happened on a regular basis since Slashdot upgraded is that the site will "crash," leaving only the front page up. Clicking on any link within the page will bounce you back to the front page, because nothing is running behind it. God only know when Taco and Co. will pull its collective head out its ass and fix the damn thing.