Indeed, you could use it for the session key. But then again, the rate in which the random bits needs to be generated isn't anywhere near the 1 Mbit/sec rate. After all, how long does it take to generate 256 bits? As for OTP, getting the bits to the receiver is as mentioned earlier "The Real Problem". But contract that issue with the quote "And applications? Secure credit card transactions are only the beginning. A quantum random number generator that works at 1 Mbps can also secure emails and even phone calls." from the fine article. That quote certainly implies that we're talking about a megabit per second of information being encoded and securely transmitted. Which once again leaves the question "How are the random bits sent to the other party?" Heck, even if you use that method solely for the generation of session keys, that session key needs to be securely transmitted. Usually via public key encryption. Which in turn becomes the limiting factor in the overall security.
So what's the use of a 1mbit/sec random number generator again?
If the article is correct and it's possible to generate a megabit/second random number stream, then that's very nice. But that stream is effectively worthless for all the applications they mentioned since the real problem is arranging for both parties to have access to the exact same random bit stream. That problem is the real one.
Difference between talking to a passenger and talking on a cell phone..
Well, if things get "interesting" a passenger generally knows to SHUT UP and leave the driver alone. Whereas the person at the other end of the cell phone conversation doesn't know that there is a potential situation coming up and keeps on yapping distracting the driver.
Critical cables tend to be run in pressurized pipes. With pressure sensors. Pressure drops = alarm = lots of unfriendly people with guns arriving very soon.
The results were quite simple. No odor, or just female odor = 1 result. Male odor = another result.
Simple logic would then equate female odor = no effect (simply because the female odor had the same effect as no odor at all). So therefore, the male odor was causing a change in the results of the experiment.
The quartz watch was invented by the Swiss watch manufactures. But they decided that people wouldn't like them and kept with the mechanical models. The Japanese took the quartz idea and ran with it, and in a few years, the Swiss watch makers to relegated to a niche market. Somehow, I suspect we're going to be seeing a repeat of history.
Bill's parent isn't on how to detect cameras, it's on what to do if a camera is detected. It leaves the entire issue of camera detection undefined...
However, there are other patents and methods on how to perform the actual camera detection. For instance, there's a technique called optical augmentation. In a nutshell, it uses the "red eye" effect to detect optical systems aimed at a specified target. Basically, you shine a light and look for retro reflections. And even if a camera is hidden or concealed, if it is aimed at the detector, it will in turn be detected.
Title pretty much says it all. Only thing technology related is the fact that it's a web page. But then again, what is on the Internet that isn't a web page? (And for you pedants, I know about ftp, ntp, nntp, etc., so don't bother pointing out the slew of TLA and ETLAs out there.)
You forgot the obvious solution since a service station doesn't need to handle a lot of cars at once. Namely have the service station hold its own set of batteries. These batteries can be "slow charged" based upon the available power. Then when a car pulls up needing a fast charge, the station batteries can do the job. Yes, this will cause an extra layer of inefficiency, but it should be quite doable.
Rather misleading article and slant there. It implies that the NSA deliberately took action to make TCP/IP insecure. However, in reality, the NSA merely didn't contribute their classified work towards the specification of TCP/IP. And frankly, that's a good idea. The overhead of encryption at that time would have been too much. Additionally, cryptography only gets better with time, so whatever algorithm that would have been selected would have long since been obsolete. And due to backwards compatibility, would still have to be implemented. After all, things like routers and such are a tad more difficult to update than programs.
Looking at their web site, I notice a few things. Namely, if you want any specifics, you need to "Inquire" by providing contact information so that their horde of sales representatives can contact you with the information you desire. But for the bit of information you can get without giving them contact information, I quote the following little gem from their web site involving modes of operation.
Key Expansion
When very high rates of data encryption are necessary, key expansion can be used in which the QKD key material is expanded through a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) algorithm to produce the one time pad key. This mode reduces the amount of QKD key material necessary for encryption, yet still provides exceptionally high data confidentiality.
I find it quite enlightening that they claim that using "Key expansion" that they create a "one time pad". That immediately raises all sorts of red flags since what's created isn't a "one time pad". And the fact that they obviously don't know the actual meaning of that phrase calls into question their competence about cryptography.
Actually, both the Model I, II, III and 4 used the Z80 as the microprocessor. However, there were some fairly major differences between the Model II and the rest of the product line.
Model II - Had a 256 byte boot ROM that was fairly rapidly switched out for RAM during the boot process leaving it with 64K of actual RAM after booting. The other TRS-80 computers had a fairly large amount of RAM that remained accessible and was used during normal processing (for instance, BASIC was in ROM) and for the most part, their RAM was limited to 48K. The lower 16K of their memory space was devoted to the ROM, memory mapped IO, and video RAM.
Video - The models I, II, and 4 used memory mapped video. The Model II used a separate video controller with its own RAM. Keyboard - Models I, II, and 4 used a memory mapped switch matrix. The Model II used a keyboard controller and IO port.
With that kind of hardware differences, most software on the Model II was most certainly not compatible with the other models. But not because of the processor. But simply because of the I/O to get information to and from the user.
I believe you misspoke. I will believe that you had a TRS-80 with "Level 1" BASIC and you later upgraded it to "Level 2" BASIC, but you most certainly didn't upgrade it to a Model 2 TRS-80. The Model 2 TRS-80 was a "Business Computer" with an 8" Floppy disk drive.
Actually in a design I saw some time ago, the cross section of the ribbon would be more like an arc of a circle. No straight line path of a micrometeorite would be capable of severing the cable.
It seems to me that most of you didn't bother to read the article. In a nutshell, DARPA wants a small electrically isolated chip that acts as a RFID chip and sends an encrypted response to an interrogation. Method of use
1. Specialized probe scans chip. Obtains serial number of chip. 2. Specialized probe sends serial number information to centralized server. 3. Centralized server sends back to probe query string. 4. Probe passes onto chip, the query string. 5. Chip sends back encrypted response to query string. 6. Probe passes back to centralized server, encrypted chip response. 7. Centralized server sends back to probe "good" or "bad" results.
Notice that the encryption key may be unique for each chip. The keys are known by the centralized server, but don't need to be known by anything else.
In order to create a counterfeit, the attacker needs to do one of two things. 1. Duplicate an existing chip to include the serial number and encryption key. 2. Create a new chip with a new serial number and encryption key and implant that serial number and key into the database maintained by the centralized server.
If an attacker is capable of compromising the central server, then it's game over. But the assumption is that is a "hard task". So the security is likely to be aimed at protecting the encryption key for each chip. Perhaps store the key in TLC Nand and arrange for the value to be corrupted if it's exposed to light (and of course, encapsulate the chip in an opaque material).
So when you manufacture a "non-counterfeit" component, you 1. Manufacture component. 2. Glue a chip to the component. 3. Register the chip with the centralized server.
To verify that a component isn't a counterfeit. 1. Scan for chip and do the entire song and dance to verify the chip.
Fair? How does it count as in any way unfair? You have stops A, M, and Z, with M at the city center and A,Z two outlying suburbs. If they consider it just peachy that I can ride A-M-A or Z-M-Z all day every day for $5/trip, it costs the system not a penny more to take A-M-Z and Z-M-A, yet they think they can charge more to do it? The same trains/buses carry the same number of passengers the same distance. Fuck that.
That pig doesn't fly as you stated it. But let's look at the actual situation. Namely, that you don't have 3 stops involved. The number of stops is 5.
A - B - M - C - D
A = Suburb for 1st passenger. B = Destination for 2nd passenger M = Metro center/ticket exchange point C = Destination for 1st passenger. D = Suburb for 2nd passenger.
Now the first passenger wants to travel from A to C and the second passenger wants to travel from D to B. But by having both passengers meet at M and swap tickets, they actually pay for the trips A to B and D to C which is a lower cost than the A to C plus D to B trips.
I don't see a problem with the police using Google Glass provided that if they do, the use is non discretionary and that the unedited video is provided in full upon demand by the public or accused. After all, we don't want the police turning off their glass if they're about to do something questionable. And we don't want anything that's in the favor of the accused to be discarded because it's "not relevant"
Indeed. In fact, law enforcement seems to be the only profession in the USA where one swears an oath upon entering and immediately afterwards does everything in their power to circumvent the spirit of the oath while staying barely within the letter of the oath.
Lying? Perfectly legal for a police officer to lie to you. After all, it makes them "more effective". But don't you dare attempt to lie to the police officer.
Get pulled over at a traffic stop? One of the first things the officer will do upon interacting with you is to ask "Do you know why I pulled you over?" Can you say "voluntary self incrimination"? Well, you just waived your fifth amendment rights simply by answering a casual sounding question. After all that KNOW why they pulled you over. They just want to make you admit it to them so if you decide to fight, you'll have a harder time.
Well, the article did state that he had prescription lenses. And from my own personal experience with glasses, I have to assume that you either do not wear glasses, or if you do, you have a rather weak prescription. I have a rather strong prescription and if I change glasses, it causes me mild disorientation. In fact, when I change prescription, I will not wear my new glasses until the morning after I get them. Switching in the middle of the day is just too much eye strain. I also at one point in time purchases two identical pair of glasses with on tinted and the other clear (couldn't use autogray lenses since at the time I was working in NDI and the ultraviolet light would have caused autogray lenses to darken which would have been bad for inspections). Even though both glasses used the same prescription and had the same frame style, there was enough difference that switching glasses still caused some mild problems for me. So the comment about a "non-google glass prescription glasses" is rather short sighted of you. Some of use really can't simply swap glasses mid day without problems.
I'm gonna assume you didn't bother to actually read the article. The prototype does not include a camera. I will admit that the possibility of a camera being added in the future exists, but as currently designed, no camera.
Slashdot Mirror
Indeed, you could use it for the session key. But then again, the rate in which the random bits needs to be generated isn't anywhere near the 1 Mbit/sec rate. After all, how long does it take to generate 256 bits? As for OTP, getting the bits to the receiver is as mentioned earlier "The Real Problem". But contract that issue with the quote "And applications? Secure credit card transactions are only the beginning. A quantum random number generator that works at 1 Mbps can also secure emails and even phone calls." from the fine article. That quote certainly implies that we're talking about a megabit per second of information being encoded and securely transmitted. Which once again leaves the question "How are the random bits sent to the other party?" Heck, even if you use that method solely for the generation of session keys, that session key needs to be securely transmitted. Usually via public key encryption. Which in turn becomes the limiting factor in the overall security.
So what's the use of a 1mbit/sec random number generator again?
If the article is correct and it's possible to generate a megabit/second random number stream, then that's very nice. But that stream is effectively worthless for all the applications they mentioned since the real problem is arranging for both parties to have access to the exact same random bit stream. That problem is the real one.
have bothered to research the law.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B...
Some other publisher attempted to impose a license upon the books they sold and were slapped down over a century ago.
Difference between talking to a passenger and talking on a cell phone..
Well, if things get "interesting" a passenger generally knows to SHUT UP and leave the driver alone. Whereas the person at the other end of the cell phone conversation doesn't know that there is a potential situation coming up and keeps on yapping distracting the driver.
Critical cables tend to be run in pressurized pipes. With pressure sensors. Pressure drops = alarm = lots of unfriendly people with guns arriving very soon.
Instead of "Security through obscurity", we now have "Security though obsolescence."
Did you bother to actually read the article?
The results were quite simple. No odor, or just female odor = 1 result. Male odor = another result.
Simple logic would then equate female odor = no effect (simply because the female odor had the same effect as no odor at all).
So therefore, the male odor was causing a change in the results of the experiment.
The quartz watch was invented by the Swiss watch manufactures. But they decided that people wouldn't like them and kept with the mechanical models. The Japanese took the quartz idea and ran with it, and in a few years, the Swiss watch makers to relegated to a niche market. Somehow, I suspect we're going to be seeing a repeat of history.
Bill's parent isn't on how to detect cameras, it's on what to do if a camera is detected. It leaves the entire issue of camera detection undefined...
However, there are other patents and methods on how to perform the actual camera detection. For instance, there's a technique called optical augmentation. In a nutshell, it uses the "red eye" effect to detect optical systems aimed at a specified target. Basically, you shine a light and look for retro reflections. And even if a camera is hidden or concealed, if it is aimed at the detector, it will in turn be detected.
Nope.
Title pretty much says it all. Only thing technology related is the fact that it's a web page. But then again, what is on the Internet that isn't a web page? (And for you pedants, I know about ftp, ntp, nntp, etc., so don't bother pointing out the slew of TLA and ETLAs out there.)
You forgot the obvious solution since a service station doesn't need to handle a lot of cars at once. Namely have the service station hold its own set of batteries. These batteries can be "slow charged" based upon the available power. Then when a car pulls up needing a fast charge, the station batteries can do the job. Yes, this will cause an extra layer of inefficiency, but it should be quite doable.
Rather misleading article and slant there. It implies that the NSA deliberately took action to make TCP/IP insecure. However, in reality, the NSA merely didn't contribute their classified work towards the specification of TCP/IP. And frankly, that's a good idea. The overhead of encryption at that time would have been too much. Additionally, cryptography only gets better with time, so whatever algorithm that would have been selected would have long since been obsolete. And due to backwards compatibility, would still have to be implemented. After all, things like routers and such are a tad more difficult to update than programs.
Oh lord, the Luddites are bad enough with "normal" genetically engineered foods. I hate to imagine the kind of outcry they're do for this.
Might want to take a look at this ... When I saw the AC's comment, I couldn't help but remember this. http://freefall.purrsia.com/ff...
Looking at their web site, I notice a few things. Namely, if you want any specifics, you need to "Inquire" by providing contact information so that their horde of sales representatives can contact you with the information you desire. But for the bit of information you can get without giving them contact information, I quote the following little gem from their web site involving modes of operation.
Key Expansion
When very high rates of data encryption are necessary, key expansion can be used in which the QKD key material is expanded through a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) algorithm to produce the one time pad key. This mode reduces the amount of QKD key material necessary for encryption, yet still provides exceptionally high data confidentiality.
I find it quite enlightening that they claim that using "Key expansion" that they create a "one time pad". That immediately raises all sorts of red flags since what's created isn't a "one time pad". And the fact that they obviously don't know the actual meaning of that phrase calls into question their competence about cryptography.
Actually, both the Model I, II, III and 4 used the Z80 as the microprocessor. However, there were some fairly major differences between the Model II and the rest of the product line.
Model II - Had a 256 byte boot ROM that was fairly rapidly switched out for RAM during the boot process leaving it with 64K of actual RAM after booting. The other TRS-80 computers had a fairly large amount of RAM that remained accessible and was used during normal processing (for instance, BASIC was in ROM) and for the most part, their RAM was limited to 48K. The lower 16K of their memory space was devoted to the ROM, memory mapped IO, and video RAM.
Video - The models I, II, and 4 used memory mapped video. The Model II used a separate video controller with its own RAM.
Keyboard - Models I, II, and 4 used a memory mapped switch matrix. The Model II used a keyboard controller and IO port.
With that kind of hardware differences, most software on the Model II was most certainly not compatible with the other models. But not because of the processor. But simply because of the I/O to get information to and from the user.
I believe you misspoke. I will believe that you had a TRS-80 with "Level 1" BASIC and you later upgraded it to "Level 2" BASIC, but you most certainly didn't upgrade it to a Model 2 TRS-80. The Model 2 TRS-80 was a "Business Computer" with an 8" Floppy disk drive.
Actually in a design I saw some time ago, the cross section of the ribbon would be more like an arc of a circle. No straight line path of a micrometeorite would be capable of severing the cable.
It seems to me that most of you didn't bother to read the article. In a nutshell, DARPA wants a small electrically isolated chip that acts as a RFID chip and sends an encrypted response to an interrogation. Method of use
1. Specialized probe scans chip. Obtains serial number of chip.
2. Specialized probe sends serial number information to centralized server.
3. Centralized server sends back to probe query string.
4. Probe passes onto chip, the query string.
5. Chip sends back encrypted response to query string.
6. Probe passes back to centralized server, encrypted chip response.
7. Centralized server sends back to probe "good" or "bad" results.
Notice that the encryption key may be unique for each chip. The keys are known by the centralized server, but don't need to be known by anything else.
In order to create a counterfeit, the attacker needs to do one of two things.
1. Duplicate an existing chip to include the serial number and encryption key.
2. Create a new chip with a new serial number and encryption key and implant that serial number and key into the database maintained by the centralized server.
If an attacker is capable of compromising the central server, then it's game over. But the assumption is that is a "hard task". So the security is likely to be aimed at protecting the encryption key for each chip. Perhaps store the key in TLC Nand and arrange for the value to be corrupted if it's exposed to light (and of course, encapsulate the chip in an opaque material).
So when you manufacture a "non-counterfeit" component, you
1. Manufacture component.
2. Glue a chip to the component.
3. Register the chip with the centralized server.
To verify that a component isn't a counterfeit.
1. Scan for chip and do the entire song and dance to verify the chip.
Fair? How does it count as in any way unfair? You have stops A, M, and Z, with M at the city center and A,Z two outlying suburbs. If they consider it just peachy that I can ride A-M-A or Z-M-Z all day every day for $5/trip, it costs the system not a penny more to take A-M-Z and Z-M-A, yet they think they can charge more to do it? The same trains/buses carry the same number of passengers the same distance. Fuck that.
That pig doesn't fly as you stated it. But let's look at the actual situation. Namely, that you don't have 3 stops involved. The number of stops is 5.
A - B - M - C - D
A = Suburb for 1st passenger.
B = Destination for 2nd passenger
M = Metro center/ticket exchange point
C = Destination for 1st passenger.
D = Suburb for 2nd passenger.
Now the first passenger wants to travel from A to C and the second passenger wants to travel from D to B. But by having both passengers meet at M and swap tickets, they actually pay for the trips A to B and D to C which is a lower cost than the A to C plus D to B trips.
I don't see a problem with the police using Google Glass provided that if they do, the use is non discretionary and that the unedited video is provided in full upon demand by the public or accused. After all, we don't want the police turning off their glass if they're about to do something questionable. And we don't want anything that's in the favor of the accused to be discarded because it's "not relevant"
Indeed. In fact, law enforcement seems to be the only profession in the USA where one swears an oath upon entering and immediately afterwards does everything in their power to circumvent the spirit of the oath while staying barely within the letter of the oath.
Lying? Perfectly legal for a police officer to lie to you. After all, it makes them "more effective". But don't you dare attempt to lie to the police officer.
Get pulled over at a traffic stop? One of the first things the officer will do upon interacting with you is to ask "Do you know why I pulled you over?" Can you say "voluntary self incrimination"? Well, you just waived your fifth amendment rights simply by answering a casual sounding question. After all that KNOW why they pulled you over. They just want to make you admit it to them so if you decide to fight, you'll have a harder time.
Well, the article did state that he had prescription lenses. And from my own personal experience with glasses, I have to assume that you either do not wear glasses, or if you do, you have a rather weak prescription. I have a rather strong prescription and if I change glasses, it causes me mild disorientation. In fact, when I change prescription, I will not wear my new glasses until the morning after I get them. Switching in the middle of the day is just too much eye strain. I also at one point in time purchases two identical pair of glasses with on tinted and the other clear (couldn't use autogray lenses since at the time I was working in NDI and the ultraviolet light would have caused autogray lenses to darken which would have been bad for inspections). Even though both glasses used the same prescription and had the same frame style, there was enough difference that switching glasses still caused some mild problems for me. So the comment about a "non-google glass prescription glasses" is rather short sighted of you. Some of use really can't simply swap glasses mid day without problems.
I'm gonna assume you didn't bother to actually read the article. The prototype does not include a camera. I will admit that the possibility of a camera being added in the future exists, but as currently designed, no camera.