We had noticed that squirrels had eaten into almost every pumpkin put out on steps in my area and were stumped as to why we hadn't ever seen it before. This is an explanation.
1: Windows 1.0 2: Windows 2.0 3: Windows NT 3.x/Windows 3.x (both used internal x.x versions) 4: Windows NT 4.0/Windows 9x/Me (both used internal 4.x versions) 5: Windows 2000 6: Windows XP 7: Windows 7
You may be thinking of Windows for Workgroups which was separate from plain Windows 3, premiered at version 3.1, but was significantly upgraded at 3.11. In fact, WfW 3.11 had core features that Windows 3.11 lacked, such as some full protected mode driver stacks, for disk and the network I think.
In any event, the grandparent's recitation of versions is correct, and Windows 7 is the 7th major version of the Windows kernel.
The implementation of the sandbox in Windows is based on Windows-specific features. I suspect when they finally get it running on other platforms it will behave differenty with different levels of protection.
I haven't seen anyone saying that we are going to go to 100% renewable resources. Those seem to be the strawmen that are always trotted out in these discussions.
I'm going to issue a strategic challenge that the United States of America set a goal of getting 100 percent of our electricity from renewable resources and carbon-constrained fuels within 10 years
If they really are demonstrably not spam and follow responsible practices and they are really profitable then they should contract with Goodmail or some other accreditation system and take mistaken users out of the picture.
>>Stuffing the ballot box these days would require cross-party cooperation by observers and counters.
No it wouldn't. I've worked polling places. Observers aren't looking at everything all at the same time. And once the paper is in there you can't tell which ballots are legit and which aren't.
You're notion of corrupt code in a closed source system is flat-out paranoid speculation, but there's a long history of ballot tampering at the precinct and it's easy to see how it could work.
The main issue is that the study is based on user-agent string data from Google's logs, and Microsoft does not supply minor version information in that string, unlike Firefox, Safari and others. Microsoft considers this to be an "information disclosure vulnerability" because it would help an attacker to commit version-specific attacks.
Because of this, the authors only know about IE major versions (5, 6. 7, 8) and decided that all IE7 users were secure, while nobody else was. Microsoft is still providing security updates for IE5 and IE6; while they are not as secure as IE7 for a variety of reasons, it's not reasonable to lump them into a group with people who don't update their browser. Conversely, if you have IE7 and haven't applied any of the security updates to it, the study says you're up to date.
Be that as it may, as others have said, the issue here is that business users use IE and the other browsers have minimal footprint in it. Firefox, by default, has no support for managed updates, and IT in a big company would (make that should) never allow users to apply updates willy-nilly to their systems. Another point is that while Microsoft supports old version for years, at the demand of their customers, Mozilla withdraws all support for old versions within 6 months of a new one being released. In fact, support for Firefox 2 will end in December of this year. Businesses won't tolerate this. IE5 support on Windows 2000 will continue till 2010 and IE6 as late as 2015.
Forget the VeriSign point, i guess you had conceded that one.
The Kernel Mode Code Signing stuff you discuss here is just for 64-bit Vista. The point of it is that all code in the kernel has to be signed and, in normal non-test mode, signed by a certificate issued by a trusted CA. Where in the quote you supplied does it say that those trusted roots are not the ones listed in the dialog box I mentioned?
Or if you want to change the subject to bitching about Kernel Mode Code Signing in Vista 64 you can go ahead and do that, but it's a completely different topic.
>>I seem to remember reading that the certificates listed in Trusted Root CAs and Trusted Publishers are used for user mode, not kernel mode.
Untrue once more. In fact, I know you're wrong with respect to kernel mode drivers. Do you have an actual reference or are you just going to assert that such information exists?
Slashdot Mirror
Perhaps the post is informative and useful, but y'all should know that Brett Glass [is] a sole proprietor doing business as LARIAT, a wireless Internet service provider in Albany County, Wyoming,
He's also a major content provider through all ISPs. On balance I would assume that he has more of an interest in neutrality than against it.
This is academic to me since I don't think for a second that the WSJ would bias a story like this in the way you imply.
The RSS headline I got was "Network Neutrality Foes Quietly Backing Off?"
This was fixed by the time I got to the web.
Talk about confused...
We had noticed that squirrels had eaten into almost every pumpkin put out on steps in my area and were stumped as to why we hadn't ever seen it before. This is an explanation.
Can't we get Geico to pay for it?
Ditto. Safari is maybe a couple percent share, and it's not likely to grow much.
The story does seem newsworthy to me though, at least by /. standards.
It also now supports EV-SSL. That and the anti-phishing were two major beefs of companies like PayPal.
Sorry, I'm a doofus. XP is Windows 5.1. Vista is 6.0
Duh. Here are the versions:
1: Windows 1.0
2: Windows 2.0
3: Windows NT 3.x/Windows 3.x (both used internal x.x versions)
4: Windows NT 4.0/Windows 9x/Me (both used internal 4.x versions)
5: Windows 2000
6: Windows XP
7: Windows 7
You may be thinking of Windows for Workgroups which was separate from plain Windows 3, premiered at version 3.1, but was significantly upgraded at 3.11. In fact, WfW 3.11 had core features that Windows 3.11 lacked, such as some full protected mode driver stacks, for disk and the network I think.
In any event, the grandparent's recitation of versions is correct, and Windows 7 is the 7th major version of the Windows kernel.
Well said. Mod-U-Up.
Sorry I didn't put this into the parent.
See this blog from Microsoft's Robert Hensing on how Chrome implements sandboxing on Windows and from whom at Microsoft they ripped off the idea.
The implementation of the sandbox in Windows is based on Windows-specific features. I suspect when they finally get it running on other platforms it will behave differenty with different levels of protection.
Yeah but he's hardly nobody and he's not a strawman.
And the idea that we could do that in 10 years is absurd.
How about Al Gore and his groupies?
Go here for the actual paper and code samples.
It's a very cool paper, worth reading, but the neowin article greatly overstates matters.
If they really are demonstrably not spam and follow responsible practices and they are really profitable then they should contract with Goodmail or some other accreditation system and take mistaken users out of the picture.
>>Don't forget the sewers!
Pipes! It's all just pipes!
>>Stuffing the ballot box these days would require cross-party cooperation by observers and counters.
No it wouldn't. I've worked polling places. Observers aren't looking at everything all at the same time. And once the paper is in there you can't tell which ballots are legit and which aren't.
You're notion of corrupt code in a closed source system is flat-out paranoid speculation, but there's a long history of ballot tampering at the precinct and it's easy to see how it could work.
What nonsense. You never heard of stuffing a ballot box?
(Warning: Self-promotion)
In my eWEEK column on this study I point out numerous problems with it. Many have been mentioned by others.
The main issue is that the study is based on user-agent string data from Google's logs, and Microsoft does not supply minor version information in that string, unlike Firefox, Safari and others. Microsoft considers this to be an "information disclosure vulnerability" because it would help an attacker to commit version-specific attacks.
Because of this, the authors only know about IE major versions (5, 6. 7, 8) and decided that all IE7 users were secure, while nobody else was. Microsoft is still providing security updates for IE5 and IE6; while they are not as secure as IE7 for a variety of reasons, it's not reasonable to lump them into a group with people who don't update their browser. Conversely, if you have IE7 and haven't applied any of the security updates to it, the study says you're up to date.
Be that as it may, as others have said, the issue here is that business users use IE and the other browsers have minimal footprint in it. Firefox, by default, has no support for managed updates, and IT in a big company would (make that should) never allow users to apply updates willy-nilly to their systems. Another point is that while Microsoft supports old version for years, at the demand of their customers, Mozilla withdraws all support for old versions within 6 months of a new one being released. In fact, support for Firefox 2 will end in December of this year. Businesses won't tolerate this. IE5 support on Windows 2000 will continue till 2010 and IE6 as late as 2015.
The Microsoft Research site has a page on product contributions that have come from MS Research.
Forget the VeriSign point, i guess you had conceded that one.
The Kernel Mode Code Signing stuff you discuss here is just for 64-bit Vista. The point of it is that all code in the kernel has to be signed and, in normal non-test mode, signed by a certificate issued by a trusted CA. Where in the quote you supplied does it say that those trusted roots are not the ones listed in the dialog box I mentioned?
Or if you want to change the subject to bitching about Kernel Mode Code Signing in Vista 64 you can go ahead and do that, but it's a completely different topic.
First, that's just for 64-bit Vista. And nothing in it says that you have to use VeriSign. What point were you trying to make?
>>I seem to remember reading that the certificates listed in Trusted Root CAs and Trusted Publishers are used for user mode, not kernel mode.
Untrue once more. In fact, I know you're wrong with respect to kernel mode drivers. Do you have an actual reference or are you just going to assert that such information exists?