And yet the very reason name/address data has traditionally been collected is to ensure compliance. As has been noted below, the ABS explains that one of the main reasons of collect names remains "to ensure the Census covers the entire population" and one of the main reasons to collect addresses remains "to ensure that no household is missed in the Census." How would a fake address satisfy them that your household has complied?
I also pointed out elsewhere "given the census number was delivered (paired) to a specified address a ensuring there is no mismatch between the delivery address and the supplied address should be a routine error check... if they were competent."
As donaldm (despite confused in his response to me) put it below: "When you get the ABS letter for your address it has a unique number on it which makes it incredibly easy to know which address that number is from. So putting in a bogus address is sure to raise a huge red flag and a please explain from the Government."
Similarly with fake names: when your census id is paired with a household of people who simply don't exist in any other data source (albeit that these connections are to be established via anonymised links however that is supposed to work)... it might raise a few suspicions, no?
Perhaps not so much with a fake name, but surely a fake address should raise that red flag.
The link you provided also states that the AGS and Bureau disagrees with his conclusion, I would not put faith in what a statistician says on legal matters over what the lawyers are saying.
I agree. That is why I wrote "there is an argument." Moreover the argument, to wit, that a name is not 'statistical information' for the purposes of ss8,9 & 12 of the Act (if I understand Mr McLennan) is not hopeless IMO. Which is far from saying it would prevail.
Either way still far better off with wrong details as that is far harder to spot than blanks...
For questions apart form name (and possibly address) that may well be the case. With the name/address fields different considerations apply. Not that there's much use crying over spilt milk, but for those of us who participated in last night's DDoS... err I mean were unable yet to complete our census, these things are worth considering.
Firstly if McLennan is correct (see my other post to you) there is no liability at all for failing to disclose 'name.' So you might be infinitely worse off putting a false name (yes I know it's not actually infinite but undefined). I say 'might' because the most obvious line of defence would be that lacking the power to collect names compulsorily false name information should not be not covered under s15. Worth a shot anyway.
Moreover the name/address information was traditionally used to check compliance. Given the census number was delivered (paired) to a specified address a ensuring there is no mismatch between the delivery address and the supplied address should be a routine error check... if they were competent.
Seems $1000 was for last census, this one is $1800
I think in 2013 a penalty unit went from being $110 to $170. I was surprised that it is now $180 (not surprised it's gone up, surprised that it has gone up only by $10).
I should add, that there is an argument that "the ABS has no power to commence prosecution action for Australians not providing 'name'". This from the former Australian Statistician Bill McLennan.
The maximum penalty for providing false or misleading information is 10 penalty units ($1800) (see s15 Census and Statistics Act 1905 (Cth)) The serious offences (see s19), with a maximum penalty of "120 penalty units ($21600) or imprisonment for 2 years, or both" is for an ABS officer divulging census information.
I'm saying that in most places, you wouldn't be held equally responsible for a murder just because you gave someone a gun and thought they would do it.
At common law being an accessory before the fact carried the same liability as being a principal. As you envisage, legislative changes to the common law position vary and in some jurisdictions being an accessory before the fact to murder may carry a lower potential sentence. Now I would have thought that in most places the accessory is still subject to equal liability as the principal (which is not to say that they will receive the same treatment at sentencing). This is, of course, an empirical question which we will not answer by conjecture.
You missed the part where I wrote "absent any contractual obligations." In any case that is not a right to free speech, inherited or otherwise, but a right of speech bounded by the terms and conditions of the putative contract.
I don't know since I've never bothered to read Twitter's terms of service or their ads.
Since Twitter acted, no doubt on legal advice better than we here could confabulate, and since Mr Yiannopoulos failed to sue --in a context where given the least possibility of success one would expect him to --we can probably save our time and continue not to bother to read the terms.
The operative law is "congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...".
No, the operative law is the interpretation courts have given to those words, which very clearly deviate from any obvious (even learned judicial obvious) reading of the constitutional text (note for example defamation law post NYT v Sullivan).
Persons are not mentioned.
Obviously not, it's implicit. Without legal personality you can't approach a court for it even to consider those words. This after all is half the motivation (the other half being limited liability) of conjuring the corporate form into being: to bestow upon a company the right to litigate.
Also by writing that you are arguing, if anything, against corporate free speech rights. Remember corporations are persons too!
Worse still, IMO, you would be arguing that dogs have free speech rights. Next thing some Animal Rights Activists will come along with a case overturning some municipal restriction on barking dogs...:o (You realise there was recently a case in the US where Animal Rights bods sued to have the legal personality of an animal recognised? Fortunately sanity and law prevailed and animals remain non-persons.)
The reason I wrote that speaking of human rights is "misleading" is because we tend to think of freedom of speech as a human right, when in fact it may, in particular jurisdictions, be a right corporate persons enjoy as well. Indeed your argument is that it should be. And perhaps, on one view, freedom of speech is not a specifically human right in the US (again sorry, I'm a non-US lawyer so I can't be certain). However, surely the words following those you quoted, to wit, "... or of the press" restrain the legislature at the very least with regard to the "speech" of media companies acting in that capacity. Thus, on an alternative view, we might construe 'freedom of speech' as a human right, and 'freedom of the press' as a right pertaining to persons generally.
Twitter is a corporation. People on Slashdot keep telling me corporations aren't people and don't have any rights
Allow me to explain...
People qua people don't have rights.* People have rights as persons (and people who are not persons are called 'slaves'). Corporations are persons (which is one of the two characteristics which makes them corporations as opposed to mere companies). Ergo corporations have rights. Most notably the right to enter into contracts and have those contracts enforced. Corporations are corporate persons not natural persons. Therefore those rights which pertain specifically to natural persons (we might call them human rights, but that could be a bit misleading) cannot be claimed by corporations. But none of this is particularly germane to the point at hand.
If corporations don't have rights because corporations aren't people, then Milo's rights to free speech and due process should be respected because Milo is a person and Twitter isn't.
Non sequitur. Even if it were the case that one party had a specific right, and another did not, this argument is questionable. However in the present case...
While I'm not a US lawyer, my understanding is that Milo has no right to free speech at large, but only a right to stop government from impinging upon his "freedom" of speech. Corporations are private persons not government (though one might be forgiven for failing to apprehend the difference these days).
Now given that corporations do exercise so large an impact on public expression, of which this is a case in point, and given that corporations do not exist in nature but are creatures of the legislature, an argument could certainly be made that safeguards inhibiting the arbitrary exercise of power to shut down speech might be imposed on corporations. However (and absent any contractual obligations), unless the rights of corporations involved in publication, are legislatively constrained to the extent that they lack the right to determine whom they should and should not publish, there can be no right for Milo to prevail against Twitter. It's a business decision.
[*I'm using 'right' in a legal positivist sense, i.e. that which you can get enforced in your favour in a court of law]
Reductio ad Hitlerum, a fallacious argument. Hitler was a vegetarian, therefore vegetarians are fascists.
Hitler was a vegetarian, therefore vegetarians are fascistsis an invalid argument (notwithstanding the facts), but it is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. And what should we call the fallacy that any argument that contains the string 'hitler' is thereby invalid?
Your claim "that complaining about a free and fair election and trying to overthrow the legitimate government with armed force" is given the lie by the observation that Hitler --and more pertinently Mussolini --came to power in free and fair elections and headed the legitimate governments of their country until they were overthrown by force. It is neither the fact of being democratically elected (or not), nor the fact of being overthrown by force (successfully or not), which defines 'fascism.' Stop digging deeper!
Note, I'm not arguing that Erdogan is literally a fascist (strictly speaking he is not); But his behaviour, especially post-coup, sure make him look a lot more like a fascist than the men with "uniforms, tanks [&] guns," who landed on Omaha Beach with the aim of overthrowing the government of Germany. (Or the mutinous faction of the Turkish army for that matter.)
Nope, just the etymological fallacy. When you wrote "LGBT" did the 'G' mean 'happy?'
You're quoting a political entity rather than a factual entity.
I'm quoting one of the most widely accepted definitions of the distinction. What's more, you understand full well that this is how the term is being employed... you're entering 'bad faith' territory here. But if you want authoritative, let's see what the OED has to say:
3 b. Psychol. and Sociol. (orig. U.S.). The state of being male or female as expressed by social or cultural distinctions and differences, rather than biological ones...
For which a 1945 example is given as an early usage:
Amer. Jrnl. Psychol.58 228 In the grade-school years, too, gender (which is the socialized obverse of sex) is a fixed line of demarkation, the qualifying terms being ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’.
What in the ever loving hell are you on? It's a cultural fashion, skirts are detached from Gender.
No, the cultural fashion is gender, it's as detached form sex.
Gender is not a social construct, it's the X or Y that you were born with.
No, X and Y are not, to use the OED defn: "social or cultural distinctions and differences, rather than biological ones. " X and Y are not, to use the WHO defn, socially constructed roles &c. X and Y are very clearly biological.
What in the ever loving hell are you on?
One might ask the same of you. You know stuff. You know: 1. that wearing skirts is not universally considered feminine, but that this is a cultural given. You know: 2. that sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, feminists, public health specialists and countless other -ists use the word 'gender' to describe situation 1 above. How can you keep arguing that gender, in the particular sense of the word in which it describes that which is cultural and socially constructed in distinction to biological sex, is not socially constructed.
You're not doing the LGBT / Feminist movement any justice.
Neither are you.
There is no distinction between sex and gender. Sex and gender are two words to describe the same thing.
They can be used to mean the same thing but generally are not. The etymology notwithstanding, a check of almost any contemporary dictionary will qualify that 'gender' is "typically used with reference to social and cultural differences rather than biological ones."
But more to the point, it is the very usage of gender as social construct in distinction to biological sex, not some other less formal use, to which you are objecting. This one:
"Sex" refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women.
"Gender" refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women. http://apps.who.int/gender/wha...
Roman Armor Skirts; Scottish Kilts; Arabic Thawb;
What?! You mean the propensity of skirts to be worn by women but not men, in our culture, is not universal? You mean construing skirt-wearing being feminine is a.... gasp...social construct, and not biology? Aha!
Ok, so let's say that I'm holding a black pen in my hand...
Silly attempt at an analogy... what is supposed to stand for the physical state of being 'sex' and what is supposed to stand for the cultural practices which surround that physical state 'gender?'
Having a penis but wanting to have a vagina makes you a man that wants to be a woman, nothing more, nothing less.
Stop the obsession about wanting to have dick chopped off already. Jeebus... you need only mention the word 'gender' and these guys immediately think the conversation is about trannies... leave it off!
Sex and gender are both nouns referring to the same thing, the physical configuration of an organisms body.
'Blue' and 'sad' are both adjectives referring to the same thing, a negative emotional state.
When, OTOH, 'blue' is being used to indicate colour, or 'gender' is being used to indicate the social constructs which surround biological 'sex' the words no longer refer to the same thing. And when 'gender' is being used specifically to distinguish that which is biologically given from what is culturally supplied then insisting that "gender is not a social construct" is just like insisting that "blue is not a colour."
So once again... In the relevant use of the word 'gender' is defined to mean that which "refers to the socially constructed characteristics of women and men," and this is done precisely because of the need to distinguish those culturally constructed aspects of masculinity and femininity (e.g. skirt wearing) from the physical sexual characteristics of male and female, it is no silly to insist that "the social construct gender is not a social construct."
You are not seriously insisting that skirt-wearing is a biologically encoded physical characteristic of women (and not of men) are you?
Thank you for the wonderful analogy to help highlight my point.
Analogy to what? It certainly doesn't analogise the distinction between 'sex' and 'gender.'
What do you call the propensity of female humans in our culture to wear skirts and the propensity of of male humans not to? Because that is what is being referred to by the concept of 'gender.' Do you believe that this propensity is a physical property (inasmuch as 'black' or 'blue' are physical properties)? Do you believe the propensity for women to wear skirts is biologically determined? Do you think we will soon be able to point to a specific gene that encodes for skirt-wearing behaviour?
... they are going to identify the remains as male or female by the subtle differences unique to each and identify the person as 'male' or 'female' based on their physiology.
Male and female yes, but those are not genders. They are sexes.
The very point of the modern construct of 'gender' was to isolate that which is social construct (masculine/feminine) from physiological sex (male/female). This really is not a difficult concept to grasp. Why is this such a challenge for you? [Rhetorical question: I realise you are not too stupid to understand the distinction, you are motivated to misunderstand].
Gender is not a social construct.
Doublethink! Gender, at least in the usage you to which are objecting (not grammatical gender etc), is a social construct by definition. Of course you might object to the usefulness of the concept, or its impact on the object of study (i.e. society), perhaps even its theoretical coherence, but just stamping your feet and insisting "black is white" is simply unintelligent.
It is noteworthy that the first link you supply does not make the error of your second link of conflating 'gender' with 'sex.' The anthropologists understand they are determining sex (which is, of course, highly correlated with gender, particularly in traditional societies*, but thankfully** also in ours). The ignorant error in the second link, if it is not ideologically motivated ignorance (but merely sloppy English), is probably due to a lack of relevant education: that anthropologists would not make this error, but forensic scientists might is telling.
While social constructs such as gender are not directly to be determined by looking at bones --one cannot examine the pelvis of a body from the 1950s and tell that being a nurse was considered a normal form of employment for women but not men --if you have a knowledge of 1950s society, in addition to the bones, you might reasonably infer questions of gender. Eg. you may be able to exclude the probability that the male (and presumably also masculine) skeleton you are examining was not a nurse by occupation... or that he ordinary wore a dress... or all those other facts of gender which are not determined (outside of culture) by physiological sex.
[*But not all traditional societies, note the Polynesian and Indian traditions of tripartite genders.]
[**If tranny sex is your thing you may not be as thankful as I am.]
Seriously though, the Cogito does go to the heart of the matter, and in fact Descartes derives it by considering whether he is in a simulation (that conducted by the infinitely deceitful demon).
This all comes down to the Big Question in AI. Personally I tend towards that side which would answer Musk's question --"Tell me what's wrong with that argument" --by observing that there is no good reason to believe the dot in Pong was a self-aware reflective consciousness.
In fact the legal definition of rape has been warped so that men can not be raped.
"In fact" you are mistaken. The very opposite is the case. At common law rape involved the penetration of a woman's vagina by a penis, forcibly and without the consent to the woman. Since sodomy was an offence per se, questions of consent were simply immaterial. The law has been "warped" (not necessarily in a bad way) where it is possible for men to be the victims of 'rape' (at least in the CL world).
In NSW, the jurisdiction in which I'm admitted to practise (which in the event I don't), the crime of rape was abolished and replaced by the sex/gender-neutral offence of sexual assault, which can be committed by inserting any body part (or object) into either a vagina or an anus, or when oral sex if forcibly engaged in. Different methods have been used in various jurisdictions to "warp" rape law to such an extent as to allow men to be raped. In England the law has been warped only to the extent that the penis might be placed in mouth or anus in addition to the vagina (i.e. while either sex* can be the victim only a man* can be a rapist). The English law, however, does envisage other sexual offences which cover situations in which women might be the perpetrator.
[* I speak here of 'sex' rather than 'gender' to avoid any ambiguities of terminology that might surround a person who has a penis.]
I disagree, for two reasons. 1) Wheras sex is bounded by physical reality, gender is bounded only by human imagination. and 2) Empirically, sex clusters strongly around two poles while gender lies on a continuum. But first let me repeat the WHO definition, (just as a working definition, which we might in turn dispute) I quoted elsewhere:
Sex refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women.
Now if, either by examing either chromosomes, morphology, or some combination thereof, we will, as I wrote above, find sex highly clustered very tightly around two poles. On the other hand results to gender identification surveys, ("What would you rather do on Sunday m) watch sports, f) read a fashion magazine; Waht movie would you rather watch m)action b)romcom; Which colour do you prefer m)blue, f) pink; Do you prefer... &c), we don't get many 100% male or female responses (take one yourself if you don't believe me). I did see a test the other day someone put up for a lark (to make the most charitable presumption) which only ever gave 100% male and 100% female outcomes...
As should be clear too, the above defintion of gender makes it possible that "gender criminals" (those who refuse culturally pre-assigned roles) might possibly exist. Thus, perhaps not any more in modern western societies, but certainly in the 1950s, a stay-at-home house husband could not accurately have been descrived as a "man" (and wouldn't have been thought of as a proper man). Stepping away from the notion of a continuum for a moment, 'tomboy' and 'sissy' are arguably genders.
Now sometimes I wonder if this (imho mistaken) binary thinking about gender may influence the certainty of transpeople that they are 'women' or 'men' as opposed to their biological sex (as if feeling more comfortable with some aspects of a 'woman's role' in a society is a good reason to have your dick chopped off). But then I remind myself that I'm not in their heads, and my conjecture about why they are so convinced is somewhat impertinent.
Slashdot Mirror
"If at first you don't succeed then skydiving definitely isn't for you." --Steven Wright
Yes, the meanings can be different.
That's the sort of problem you run in to when you believe that talking about 330 in every 100 even makes sense. :ducks for cover ;)
And yet the very reason name/address data has traditionally been collected is to ensure compliance. As has been noted below, the ABS explains that one of the main reasons of collect names remains "to ensure the Census covers the entire population" and one of the main reasons to collect addresses remains "to ensure that no household is missed in the Census." How would a fake address satisfy them that your household has complied?
I also pointed out elsewhere "given the census number was delivered (paired) to a specified address a ensuring there is no mismatch between the delivery address and the supplied address should be a routine error check ... if they were competent."
As donaldm (despite confused in his response to me) put it below: "When you get the ABS letter for your address it has a unique number on it which makes it incredibly easy to know which address that number is from. So putting in a bogus address is sure to raise a huge red flag and a please explain from the Government."
Similarly with fake names: when your census id is paired with a household of people who simply don't exist in any other data source (albeit that these connections are to be established via anonymised links however that is supposed to work)... it might raise a few suspicions, no?
Perhaps not so much with a fake name, but surely a fake address should raise that red flag.
How does this establish the contention that "you are far less likely to be caught [if you enter fake names] than should you leave them blank"?
The link you provided also states that the AGS and Bureau disagrees with his conclusion, I would not put faith in what a statistician says on legal matters over what the lawyers are saying.
I agree. That is why I wrote "there is an argument." Moreover the argument, to wit, that a name is not 'statistical information' for the purposes of ss8,9 & 12 of the Act (if I understand Mr McLennan) is not hopeless IMO. Which is far from saying it would prevail.
Either way still far better off with wrong details as that is far harder to spot than blanks ...
For questions apart form name (and possibly address) that may well be the case. With the name/address fields different considerations apply. Not that there's much use crying over spilt milk, but for those of us who participated in last night's DDoS ... err I mean were unable yet to complete our census, these things are worth considering.
Firstly if McLennan is correct (see my other post to you) there is no liability at all for failing to disclose 'name.' So you might be infinitely worse off putting a false name (yes I know it's not actually infinite but undefined). I say 'might' because the most obvious line of defence would be that lacking the power to collect names compulsorily false name information should not be not covered under s15. Worth a shot anyway.
Moreover the name/address information was traditionally used to check compliance. Given the census number was delivered (paired) to a specified address a ensuring there is no mismatch between the delivery address and the supplied address should be a routine error check ... if they were competent.
Seems $1000 was for last census, this one is $1800
I think in 2013 a penalty unit went from being $110 to $170. I was surprised that it is now $180 (not surprised it's gone up, surprised that it has gone up only by $10).
I should add, that there is an argument that "the ABS has no power to commence prosecution action for Australians not providing 'name'". This from the former Australian Statistician Bill McLennan.
you are far less likely to be caught [if you enter fake names] than should you leave them blank
Please explain.
The fine for false data is $1000, So getting caught with fake data is actually cheaper than not providing it.
No, not quite.
The maximum penalty for providing false or misleading information is 10 penalty units ($1800) (see s15 Census and Statistics Act 1905 (Cth)) The serious offences (see s19), with a maximum penalty of "120 penalty units ($21600) or imprisonment for 2 years, or both" is for an ABS officer divulging census information.
I'm saying that in most places, you wouldn't be held equally responsible for a murder just because you gave someone a gun and thought they would do it.
At common law being an accessory before the fact carried the same liability as being a principal. As you envisage, legislative changes to the common law position vary and in some jurisdictions being an accessory before the fact to murder may carry a lower potential sentence. Now I would have thought that in most places the accessory is still subject to equal liability as the principal (which is not to say that they will receive the same treatment at sentencing). This is, of course, an empirical question which we will not answer by conjecture.
You missed the part where I wrote "absent any contractual obligations." In any case that is not a right to free speech, inherited or otherwise, but a right of speech bounded by the terms and conditions of the putative contract.
I don't know since I've never bothered to read Twitter's terms of service or their ads.
Since Twitter acted, no doubt on legal advice better than we here could confabulate, and since Mr Yiannopoulos failed to sue --in a context where given the least possibility of success one would expect him to --we can probably save our time and continue not to bother to read the terms.
The operative law is "congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...".
No, the operative law is the interpretation courts have given to those words, which very clearly deviate from any obvious (even learned judicial obvious) reading of the constitutional text (note for example defamation law post NYT v Sullivan).
Persons are not mentioned.
Obviously not, it's implicit. Without legal personality you can't approach a court for it even to consider those words. This after all is half the motivation (the other half being limited liability) of conjuring the corporate form into being: to bestow upon a company the right to litigate.
Also by writing that you are arguing, if anything, against corporate free speech rights. Remember corporations are persons too!
Worse still, IMO, you would be arguing that dogs have free speech rights. Next thing some Animal Rights Activists will come along with a case overturning some municipal restriction on barking dogs ... :o (You realise there was recently a case in the US where Animal Rights bods sued to have the legal personality of an animal recognised? Fortunately sanity and law prevailed and animals remain non-persons.)
The reason I wrote that speaking of human rights is "misleading" is because we tend to think of freedom of speech as a human right, when in fact it may, in particular jurisdictions, be a right corporate persons enjoy as well. Indeed your argument is that it should be. And perhaps, on one view, freedom of speech is not a specifically human right in the US (again sorry, I'm a non-US lawyer so I can't be certain). However, surely the words following those you quoted, to wit, "... or of the press" restrain the legislature at the very least with regard to the "speech" of media companies acting in that capacity. Thus, on an alternative view, we might construe 'freedom of speech' as a human right, and 'freedom of the press' as a right pertaining to persons generally.
Twitter is a corporation. People on Slashdot keep telling me corporations aren't people and don't have any rights
Allow me to explain ...
People qua people don't have rights.* People have rights as persons (and people who are not persons are called 'slaves'). Corporations are persons (which is one of the two characteristics which makes them corporations as opposed to mere companies). Ergo corporations have rights. Most notably the right to enter into contracts and have those contracts enforced. Corporations are corporate persons not natural persons. Therefore those rights which pertain specifically to natural persons (we might call them human rights, but that could be a bit misleading) cannot be claimed by corporations. But none of this is particularly germane to the point at hand.
If corporations don't have rights because corporations aren't people, then Milo's rights to free speech and due process should be respected because Milo is a person and Twitter isn't.
Non sequitur. Even if it were the case that one party had a specific right, and another did not, this argument is questionable. However in the present case ...
While I'm not a US lawyer, my understanding is that Milo has no right to free speech at large, but only a right to stop government from impinging upon his "freedom" of speech. Corporations are private persons not government (though one might be forgiven for failing to apprehend the difference these days).
Now given that corporations do exercise so large an impact on public expression, of which this is a case in point, and given that corporations do not exist in nature but are creatures of the legislature, an argument could certainly be made that safeguards inhibiting the arbitrary exercise of power to shut down speech might be imposed on corporations. However (and absent any contractual obligations), unless the rights of corporations involved in publication, are legislatively constrained to the extent that they lack the right to determine whom they should and should not publish, there can be no right for Milo to prevail against Twitter. It's a business decision.
[*I'm using 'right' in a legal positivist sense, i.e. that which you can get enforced in your favour in a court of law]
Reductio ad Hitlerum, a fallacious argument. Hitler was a vegetarian, therefore vegetarians are fascists.
Hitler was a vegetarian, therefore vegetarians are fascists is an invalid argument (notwithstanding the facts), but it is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. And what should we call the fallacy that any argument that contains the string 'hitler' is thereby invalid?
Your claim "that complaining about a free and fair election and trying to overthrow the legitimate government with armed force" is given the lie by the observation that Hitler --and more pertinently Mussolini --came to power in free and fair elections and headed the legitimate governments of their country until they were overthrown by force. It is neither the fact of being democratically elected (or not), nor the fact of being overthrown by force (successfully or not), which defines 'fascism.' Stop digging deeper!
Note, I'm not arguing that Erdogan is literally a fascist (strictly speaking he is not); But his behaviour, especially post-coup, sure make him look a lot more like a fascist than the men with "uniforms, tanks [&] guns," who landed on Omaha Beach with the aim of overthrowing the government of Germany. (Or the mutinous faction of the Turkish army for that matter.)
I lied, almost done here.
Sorry gender dysphoria, despite your apparent obsession with it, is only tangentially relevant here.
Facts be damned...
Nope, just the etymological fallacy. When you wrote "LGBT" did the 'G' mean 'happy?'
You're quoting a political entity rather than a factual entity.
I'm quoting one of the most widely accepted definitions of the distinction. What's more, you understand full well that this is how the term is being employed ... you're entering 'bad faith' territory here. But if you want authoritative, let's see what the OED has to say:
3 b. Psychol. and Sociol. (orig. U.S.). The state of being male or female as expressed by social or cultural distinctions and differences, rather than biological ones ...
For which a 1945 example is given as an early usage:
Amer. Jrnl. Psychol. 58 228 In the grade-school years, too, gender (which is the socialized obverse of sex) is a fixed line of demarkation, the qualifying terms being ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’.
What in the ever loving hell are you on? It's a cultural fashion, skirts are detached from Gender.
No, the cultural fashion is gender, it's as detached form sex.
Gender is not a social construct, it's the X or Y that you were born with.
No, X and Y are not, to use the OED defn: "social or cultural distinctions and differences, rather than biological ones. " X and Y are not, to use the WHO defn, socially constructed roles &c. X and Y are very clearly biological.
What in the ever loving hell are you on?
One might ask the same of you. You know stuff. You know: 1. that wearing skirts is not universally considered feminine, but that this is a cultural given. You know: 2. that sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, feminists, public health specialists and countless other -ists use the word 'gender' to describe situation 1 above. How can you keep arguing that gender, in the particular sense of the word in which it describes that which is cultural and socially constructed in distinction to biological sex, is not socially constructed.
Your position is untenable.
You're not doing the LGBT / Feminist movement any justice.
Neither are you.
There is no distinction between sex and gender. Sex and gender are two words to describe the same thing.
They can be used to mean the same thing but generally are not. The etymology notwithstanding, a check of almost any contemporary dictionary will qualify that 'gender' is "typically used with reference to social and cultural differences rather than biological ones."
But more to the point, it is the very usage of gender as social construct in distinction to biological sex, not some other less formal use, to which you are objecting. This one:
"Sex" refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women.
"Gender" refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women.
http://apps.who.int/gender/wha...
Roman Armor Skirts; Scottish Kilts; Arabic Thawb;
What?! You mean the propensity of skirts to be worn by women but not men, in our culture, is not universal? You mean construing skirt-wearing being feminine is a .... gasp ...social construct, and not biology? Aha!
Well done!
Ok, so let's say that I'm holding a black pen in my hand ...
Silly attempt at an analogy ... what is supposed to stand for the physical state of being 'sex' and what is supposed to stand for the cultural practices which surround that physical state 'gender?'
Having a penis but wanting to have a vagina makes you a man that wants to be a woman, nothing more, nothing less.
Stop the obsession about wanting to have dick chopped off already. Jeebus ... you need only mention the word 'gender' and these guys immediately think the conversation is about trannies ... leave it off!
Sex and gender are both nouns referring to the same thing, the physical configuration of an organisms body.
'Blue' and 'sad' are both adjectives referring to the same thing, a negative emotional state.
When, OTOH, 'blue' is being used to indicate colour, or 'gender' is being used to indicate the social constructs which surround biological 'sex' the words no longer refer to the same thing. And when 'gender' is being used specifically to distinguish that which is biologically given from what is culturally supplied then insisting that "gender is not a social construct" is just like insisting that "blue is not a colour."
So once again ... In the relevant use of the word 'gender' is defined to mean that which "refers to the socially constructed characteristics of women and men," and this is done precisely because of the need to distinguish those culturally constructed aspects of masculinity and femininity (e.g. skirt wearing) from the physical sexual characteristics of male and female, it is no silly to insist that "the social construct gender is not a social construct."
You are not seriously insisting that skirt-wearing is a biologically encoded physical characteristic of women (and not of men) are you?
Thank you for the wonderful analogy to help highlight my point.
Analogy to what? It certainly doesn't analogise the distinction between 'sex' and 'gender.'
What do you call the propensity of female humans in our culture to wear skirts and the propensity of of male humans not to? Because that is what is being referred to by the concept of 'gender.' Do you believe that this propensity is a physical property (inasmuch as 'black' or 'blue' are physical properties)? Do you believe the propensity for women to wear skirts is biologically determined? Do you think we will soon be able to point to a specific gene that encodes for skirt-wearing behaviour?
Male and female yes, but those are not genders. They are sexes.
The very point of the modern construct of 'gender' was to isolate that which is social construct (masculine/feminine) from physiological sex (male/female). This really is not a difficult concept to grasp. Why is this such a challenge for you? [Rhetorical question: I realise you are not too stupid to understand the distinction, you are motivated to misunderstand].
Gender is not a social construct.
Doublethink! Gender, at least in the usage you to which are objecting (not grammatical gender etc), is a social construct by definition . Of course you might object to the usefulness of the concept, or its impact on the object of study (i.e. society), perhaps even its theoretical coherence, but just stamping your feet and insisting "black is white" is simply unintelligent.
It is noteworthy that the first link you supply does not make the error of your second link of conflating 'gender' with 'sex.' The anthropologists understand they are determining sex (which is, of course, highly correlated with gender, particularly in traditional societies*, but thankfully** also in ours). The ignorant error in the second link, if it is not ideologically motivated ignorance (but merely sloppy English), is probably due to a lack of relevant education: that anthropologists would not make this error, but forensic scientists might is telling.
While social constructs such as gender are not directly to be determined by looking at bones --one cannot examine the pelvis of a body from the 1950s and tell that being a nurse was considered a normal form of employment for women but not men --if you have a knowledge of 1950s society, in addition to the bones, you might reasonably infer questions of gender. Eg. you may be able to exclude the probability that the male (and presumably also masculine) skeleton you are examining was not a nurse by occupation ... or that he ordinary wore a dress ... or all those other facts of gender which are not determined (outside of culture) by physiological sex.
[*But not all traditional societies, note the Polynesian and Indian traditions of tripartite genders.]
[**If tranny sex is your thing you may not be as thankful as I am.]
You're very clever Nutria, but it's simulations all the way down.
Cognito ergo sum
Don't you mean incongnito.:p
Seriously though, the Cogito does go to the heart of the matter, and in fact Descartes derives it by considering whether he is in a simulation (that conducted by the infinitely deceitful demon).
This all comes down to the Big Question in AI. Personally I tend towards that side which would answer Musk's question --"Tell me what's wrong with that argument" --by observing that there is no good reason to believe the dot in Pong was a self-aware reflective consciousness.
Obviously...
Well I got it ... and laughed. :)
In fact the legal definition of rape has been warped so that men can not be raped.
"In fact" you are mistaken. The very opposite is the case. At common law rape involved the penetration of a woman's vagina by a penis, forcibly and without the consent to the woman. Since sodomy was an offence per se, questions of consent were simply immaterial. The law has been "warped" (not necessarily in a bad way) where it is possible for men to be the victims of 'rape' (at least in the CL world).
In NSW, the jurisdiction in which I'm admitted to practise (which in the event I don't), the crime of rape was abolished and replaced by the sex/gender-neutral offence of sexual assault, which can be committed by inserting any body part (or object) into either a vagina or an anus, or when oral sex if forcibly engaged in. Different methods have been used in various jurisdictions to "warp" rape law to such an extent as to allow men to be raped. In England the law has been warped only to the extent that the penis might be placed in mouth or anus in addition to the vagina (i.e. while either sex* can be the victim only a man* can be a rapist). The English law, however, does envisage other sexual offences which cover situations in which women might be the perpetrator.
[* I speak here of 'sex' rather than 'gender' to avoid any ambiguities of terminology that might surround a person who has a penis.]
gender is also binary (with rare exceptions)
I disagree, for two reasons. 1) Wheras sex is bounded by physical reality, gender is bounded only by human imagination. and 2) Empirically, sex clusters strongly around two poles while gender lies on a continuum. But first let me repeat the WHO definition, (just as a working definition, which we might in turn dispute) I quoted elsewhere:
Sex refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women.
Now if, either by examing either chromosomes, morphology, or some combination thereof, we will, as I wrote above, find sex highly clustered very tightly around two poles. On the other hand results to gender identification surveys, ("What would you rather do on Sunday m) watch sports, f) read a fashion magazine; Waht movie would you rather watch m)action b)romcom; Which colour do you prefer m)blue, f) pink; Do you prefer ... &c), we don't get many 100% male or female responses (take one yourself if you don't believe me). I did see a test the other day someone put up for a lark (to make the most charitable presumption) which only ever gave 100% male and 100% female outcomes ...
As should be clear too, the above defintion of gender makes it possible that "gender criminals" (those who refuse culturally pre-assigned roles) might possibly exist. Thus, perhaps not any more in modern western societies, but certainly in the 1950s, a stay-at-home house husband could not accurately have been descrived as a "man" (and wouldn't have been thought of as a proper man). Stepping away from the notion of a continuum for a moment, 'tomboy' and 'sissy' are arguably genders.
Now sometimes I wonder if this (imho mistaken) binary thinking about gender may influence the certainty of transpeople that they are 'women' or 'men' as opposed to their biological sex (as if feeling more comfortable with some aspects of a 'woman's role' in a society is a good reason to have your dick chopped off). But then I remind myself that I'm not in their heads, and my conjecture about why they are so convinced is somewhat impertinent.