Damn you are optomistic. The Third Riech had the V2 rocket that went into space, but they sure didn't have ICBMs.
Third Reich certainly did not have rockets, capable of launching satellites, merely reaching high altitude. Big difference. Also they did not have anything being worth delivered by ICBMs -- their nuclear program never was completed. Nazi tried to use small missiles with conventional explosives, however they didn't even bother to provide a matching military strategy for those, dooming them to failure.
It's a LOT harder to hit something on the face of the earth with a terminal velocity nuclear warhead than it is to put a payload in orbit. The fact that you don't think it is doesn't make it so.
It's not a matter of what I think, it's the basic nature of the tasks involved. No one makes a goal of throwing rocks into space to fly at some random orbit, and the level of precision necessary for a decent communications satellite is at least the same as for an ICBM.
If you need further proof, the fact that NO ONE other than the US and Russia have world spanning ICBMs should be at least circumstantial evidence. Do you have any clue?
And the clue is -- only US and USSR were not in the close proximity with all possible enemies for decades. No one else needed ICBMs, all imaginable targets were right across the border from them, so why bother?
US defense contractors during the Clinton adminstration provided technical assistance to the Chinese on their satellite program. There is some argument about exactly what was provided, but there is a pretty universal consensus that where China was not previously capable of striking the US with an ICBM, they are now.
There is a pretty universal consensus (what means -- among US Republicans) that Clinton and his administration is the source of every problem in the world that appeared since the Middle Ages, and will be for at least next two years. The fact is, all "technology" that is really necessary to build "a missile" (some missile capable of launching satellites) is in the textbooks, published and used in universities all over the globe. The information about particular materials necessary to build a missile with acceptable size, may not be as open, but certainly is easily obtainable. Everything else is merely details, that are pointless to copy, and usually not transferrable between different programs.
With the state of the former USSR, one hardly needs it. Hell the Russians admit that they have gaps in their radar coverage! That doesn't guarantee that they do, but it is better than your riposte which you just pulled out of your ass.
All "information" based on the idea what is "the state of former USSR", is at least unreliable. Americans overestimate the scale of disasters in former USSR economy, and Russians often were way more eager to admit how much they have screwed up than what the situation warranted. In any case, this is hardly relevant to the ability to launch missiles, and any reduction in capabilities of radars makes a war more likely to be started, not less.
You don't have a clue do you? ICBMs are actually DAMN hard to detect without both a satellite warning system (to track via infrared during boost phase) AND radar (to track during terminal decent). Go ahead, try to see these "easy to detect" warheads without radar in terminal phase.
There is a difference between things needing a large system with full and precise coverage of all potential launch points and all parts of trajectories, and things needing merely to see small parts of those with any precision. For things like SDI first is mandatory (and still guarantees nothing). For merely following an MAD scenario (neither side is capable of destroying the other's offensive capabilities before they are used to the extent that makes the attack pointless) the second is more than sufficient. This is a pretty big difference. Worse yet, if one side's millile detection capabilities are impaired
Decide -- perhaps. "Arrest" him once he is already in their hands, for the time that would be illegal for detainment of a suspect -- no. If that was possible, the limits for the time before the person must be charged would have no meaning -- all suspects will be just taken as "witnesses", then "upgraded" to suspects, and there would be no incentive for police to ever arrest people in any other way.
Missles in general may be trivial to build, but I assure you, ICBMs are not. Hence the fact that only the US and the USSR have built ones that are truly capable of hitting anywhere on the planet. The ones China has are barely capable of hitting the US West coast,
Anything that can launch a satellite into space is based on the same technology as ICBM, plus some, therefore any country that launched its satellites on their missiles can use the same technology for ICBMs.
and they are only capable of doing that thanks to our technological help.
Huh? What help, buying plastic toys from there?
I read that Russia has a massive radar/satellite hole in a recent IEEE Spectrum magazine (the magazine of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers),
Last time I have checked, IEEE has a lot of things, however it certainly does not have its own intelligence service.
where they were discussing the various times during the cold war where the US almost nuked the USSR out of existence due to various systems errors and vice-versa.
Radars and satelites are neither required, nor useful for anything related to launching ICBMs. ICBMs are self-contained devices, flying without any communications to the outside world from the moment of launch. Radars and satellites are useful for _detecting_ incoming ICBMs, however due to large size, huge amount of infrared radiation and high speed they are extremely hard not to notice. And since after those missiles are detected it's pretty much pointless to try to intercept them, the only imaginable response is to launch your own ones.
Therefore MAD, that kept things in balance as long as people on both sides of a potential war were more or less sane (I apologize for the pun). At this point same can be said about all possible sides of a large-scale nuclear conflict, not just two initial participants. There is however a woeful lack of sanity, especially recently on the part of US, where religiously driven nuts and war-profiteering ideologues pretty much filled the top of the Bush administration. USSR, Israel, China, India and Pakistan (another nuclear-capable country, BTW) had their shares of nuts, yet even those understood that some limits apply to every country.
Currently, Russia is totally blind to a Trident attack from the Atlantic and Pacific, and, for all practical purposes, it is equally blind to a Minuteman or MX attack from the continental United States."
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/mar00/earl.html#f2
This is a pretty wild speculation, based on the premise that radars can be "blinded" by nuclear explosions far away from it, and on the idea that information about precise targets is of any value at the moment when missiles are in flight. First is at least dubious, second is false -- once it's known that the missiles are incoming, details don't matter, it's already pointless to chase them or their sources, and response options do not change.
France would have to use aircraft and not even China currently has a delivery system to get a nuclear missile to the East coast (although they can hit the west coast just fine, thank you Mr. Clinton).
Missiles are trivial to build, submarines can launch medium-range missiles, and each of those countries have long-range bombers. ICBMs may make starting a nuclear war more convenient, but hardly are crucial to that, and US itself planned all kinds of nuclear war scenarios long before ICBMs existed.
Only the former USSR (and maybe Britain) maintains an ICBM delivery system capable of hitting the east coast of the United States. And frankly from what I've read of Russia's ICBM system (i.e. they have a massive radar hole in their southeast perimeter because of dead satellites and no money to operate their equipment), I wouldn't give good odds on their stuff actually working.
I am not sure where did you read that (Tom Clancy comes to mind as a likely "source"), or how do you think, radars are related to satellites and especially to ICBMs.
Yes, Amerika is Savage and Evil (tm)! That's why with the ability to literally snap its fingers and destroy the entire planet or any portion (Country) thereof, it never has.
So can any country that possesses nuclear weapons, such as France, Russia, or China. Or even India. If someone did not notice, government of any of those countries is either few keypresses, or few months of missile-building away from turning Washington, DC and NYC into two holes in the ground, not to mention various other nasty things that can be done with existing nuclear weapons. I don't see any of those countries demanding to be treated as The Owners Of The Earth, or randomly attacking the rest of the world.
If indeed they want to claim that people captured and placed in Guantanamo camp are not member of militia or resistance, it all falls back to US performing mass kidnapping and intending to murder some foreign individuals. Sounds any better?
"The world" never asks US to do any of that -- in fact, most of the neighbors of attacked countries are usually begging US to leave those countries alone. Of course, this is not what Fox News proclaims.
POW's rights are supported by Geneva convention, and the laws of the territory where they are located. Any government's claims of otherwise "because we say so" don't matter.
Guess what happened to 97% of all the nazi solders
captured by the russians. They were in POW labor camps till they died. Kinda sad but they were still nazi right? or should we have cared? you decide the russians decided to kill them.
Yeah right. And the other 3% were eaten alive by the bears that still walk across the Red Square.
Once coercion comes into play -- nothing except an independent material evidence. What in this case is impossible to get, all that can be proven is that he hiked in China (not a crime) and tried to cross the border to Afghanistan (minor offense). Murderers (and mass-murderers) were declared innocent just because morons in police (and FBI, and other countries' equivalents) messed with evidence, suspects and witnesses.
At this point the mess that was created makes it impossible to convict him with any credibility, regardless of what he really did, or intended to do, any conviction, right or wrong, will be nevertheless fabricated.
Re:Ahh yes, the classic American Revolution refere
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And then the new aristocracy figured out how to change things back, despite the existence of elections. Big whooping deal, you are just another country, ruled by just another government, get off your high horse and look around -- you are not better than the rest of the world, and your government has political inbreeding going on, at the scale not seen since 17-18th century Europe.
Not to mention that this would make their "sample applications" images impossible, unless they have already found a way to manipulate the air to reflect light in their pattern -- what I don't think, is even possible without applying the amount of energy sufficient to kill the viewer.
Personal Opinion Section: Can't see how the liquid - crystal monitors can be as clear as a CRT, however, they are just the same as laptop screens, and a lot of us would not want to spend a lot of time using that kind of screen.
They are not the same. Laptop screens are designed to keep the power consumption low. Desktop panels do not have this limitation.
It doesn't work that way. When an organization with iron-fisted discipline, shared interests and deep-rooted ideology (military, religious cults, organized crime, Republican party leadership in US) is criticized, its members cooperate, defending the organization and each other from the outside attacker. However when a large, amorphous, undisciplined organization (such as any government or industry) is criticized, its members and factions may choose to support the criticism, and concentrate the blame on their opponents and enemies within the organization, especially if those can't mount a credible defense.
...and very little thought. Really people who develop such projects should realize that the things they want and things they can get are two very different things, and no matter how much they want the former, they will get nothing but a false sense of security unless they will realize that they can only get the latter, and should pursue that instead.
Once something is broken into, it can not be trusted. This is the definition -- it won't be "broken into" if it was possible to trust it after the intrusion, it will be "operating as intended". Therefore if someone admits that a system may have vulnerable parts, he can either make sure that their vulnerabilities are eliminated (what is both impossible at the scale of existing setups, and beyond the scope of this kind of work), or make it impossible to access the vulnerable parts of the system (what is the reason for all kinds of firewalls, and this direction of work already reached its limitations without producing anything close to a desired effect), or to reduce the amount of damage that can be caused by a successful attack on a vulnerable part of the system (what is the only direction left that is still worth pursuing).
Obviously, the first thing that comes to mind is to separate parts and provide interfaces that do not propagate trust unnecessarily between those parts. Subsystems running under minimally necessary privileges, privileges separation within parts of subsystems, etc. are already used in various secure setups, however there is a lot left to be done, mostly in standardization and implementation of those ideas. Too bad, none of that activity looks attractive enough for bigwigs, and the theory and amount of work involved is hard to explain to people that can only understand network security through bad metaphors.
Another issue is DoS tolerance. This is a very complex problem because DoS by their nature can not be counteracted without a risk of becoming the source of another DoS -- for almost every imaginable DoS there can be a worse DoS that relies on the response mechanism that is supposed to react on the first DoS. Simulate a DoS against some host, and see that host "responding", creating a real DoS. This means that DoS can be only counteracted by proactive measures, such as SYN floods being prevented by the use of cryptographic SYN cookies. Also elimination of a large number of vulnerabilities in comsumers' computers goes a long way toward decreasing the effectiveness of DDoS, a kind of attack that has no possible response of the victim that is not exactly the same as the goal of the attacker -- making the victim unaccessible to the legitimate users.
Detection of the attacks is of much less importance than what it usually assigned to it. In fact, any attack detection that does not go through a human system administrator has a potential of being a part of an attack -- in most of cases the automated response to an attack can produce a more dangerous attack by itself than the attack being detected (similar to DoS response issue), this is a situation when not knowing about the attack is much better than knowing. Even with humans involved, a system that will cry wolf every ten seconds will become at most a nuisance.
Same in a large part applies to intrusion detection -- even a _successful_ attack may still be less dangerous than the heavy-handed automated response to it. The real value of intrusion detection is in allowing the sysadmin (or sometimes an automated system) to revert the compromised subsystem to pre-attack state, keep the whole system consistent after this change, and replace the vulnerable part with an alternative that supposedly does not have exactly the same vulnerability, allowing the time for analysis and elimination of vulnerability. AFAIK, absolutely nothing is done in the direction of automating this task, and none of the "security" companies provide this kind of service. This is a very valid area to apply new research, development and businesses' efforts, however it doesn't look like anyone interested in
Typical uneducated conservatives supporter -- can't parse simple sentences yet gets his kicks out of proclaiming that the whole "America" does, or does not something that happens to match his own Murdoch-induced opinion.
Any chance I can vote, online, from overseas, via my bank?
Yes, it's called a political bribe, and your vote will really matter, as opposed to hundreds of millions that won't. But you should better cast that vote with a shitload of money.
So if Dubya (or McCain, if Republicans will try to put a less-hated candidate forward) won't win, it will be blamed on hackers/crackers/terrorists/pirates/communists/lib erals from the target of the month country and followed with Dubya remaining the president and leading a war against supposed enemies of democratic voting.
gobbles up public domain works (what percentage of their recently made animation is based on public domain works?), they are more concerned about getting more "money per unit of creativity" than about the future possibility of doing anything creative without being sued.
2. Transmit it to the plane. 3. Use an amplifier and a parabolic dish to send an amplified signal to the GPS antenna. 4. The plane thinks, it is flying wherever the GPS signal is collected.
This would also work on GPS-guided weapons, but there it would be less practical -- sending an amplified precisely reproduced GPS signal to a bunch of bombs and missiles few kilometers above you and tens of kilometers away , moving at high speed is a bit harder than doing the same for few meters inside the plane.
...are already implemented in Cyrus. RTFM if you haven't noticed. The unproductive one, and I mean specifically an intrusive scheduler/calendar, no one bothered to implement because no engineer willfully will use such a thing.
...that everything a person may own should not be designed with a specific goal to hurt him in any way, be it physical or legal?
I mean, a bent bumper of my car can be used as an evidence that it hit something, but the bumper is not specifically designed to be used as such evidence. EDR's functionality that records speed beyond the immediate few seconds when the car impacted something, and makes it accessible, has no excuse to exist other than to provide evidence against the driver -- the data about what happened before the accident is absolutely useless for the car manufacturer. I don't think, when 5th amendment was written anyone thought that it's possible to sneak some "snitch" functionality into things that people own, and this is the only reason why it doesn't extend to such things.
why? this would mean that you have to build many users that are not here for users but for programs. Effectively you misuse a security mechanism for something else, because there is nothing else there.
This is precisely the purpose of this mechanism. "Users" in Unix never were supposed to directly correspond to people.
The problem with "just ask the user" is twofold. First, user usually can't determine if a program should be allowed to read any particular file in the first place. Should Mozilla be able to read/etc/passwd?/home/luser/.gtkrc? I know that it should, but how would the user know? And how will he be able to answer all those questions in the first place? Second, it's impossible even to find out if there is a user at the console to ask him -- where is he anyway if the box has 7 virtual consoles, 10 ssh sessions, and two local X sessions? And where is the "user" who will tell if, say, http server can respond to something (few hundred times a second)?
Why is it so hard to adopt the thought that programs have rights that you can manage?
Because "rights" can be only defined as attributes of an object. "Program" is not really such an object, it can call other programs, and no one would know which rights should be applied to what they do. User however can only be changed if the program called other setuid programs (that are supposed to manage permissions by themselves), or the original user is root (that no untrusted program should run as). This means that once something is started as some user, it can't gain another user's access no matter what. On the other hand, any program can at least copy itself, hide its name from monitors, etc. -- those things are not reliable, and can't be used as the base for restrictions.
Creating the lists of programs that _can_ access certain files and network will be a horrible mess -- first of all, it will be a giant list in any reasonable system, and second, any program that may be used with pipes or any other kind of modularized work may happen to end up potentially reading and writing any file on the system. Interpreters, including shells and perl, will be yet another can of worms -- though single executables, they may run all kinds of programs, and are usually called from other programs (CGI scripts and mail/news/http clients, to name just a few examples of programs that are hardly supposed to be "trusted") so their access can be only based on the userids. One can argue that there should be a "token" that kernel passes to everything called from a program, and that should be an object that permissions are attached to. I wholeheartedly agree with this, and can name two such tokens that exist already -- it's userid and group.
his would be a natural extension to rights for users and files
Files have no rights -- they have permissions, users have rights. This means, there is nothing attached to the file that "allows" it to access anything, only allows certain sets of users to access this file.
- rights for executables, stating what ressources they can and cannot access.
Executables have nothing that ties rights to them -- when called by different users they are supposed to be treated as those users. It would be ridiculous to create an additional layer of permissions that breaks the existing two (Unix permissions and ACLs). It will be something like, "this file can be read by all users in group staff, however everyone can run grep on it" -- what will in effect make it world-readable. Or, worse, "this file can _not_ be grep'ed by anyone" (and then someone/something will simply rename grep).
would expect a conservative attitude like this from hard-core Windows users ("user ids? we dont need that for the home edition...")
This is just the opposite kinf of problem -- having versions of Windows where userids don't exist, makes it impossible to use them for uses that would make sense in Windows (like running the a
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Damn you are optomistic. The Third Riech had the V2 rocket that went into space, but they sure didn't have ICBMs.
Third Reich certainly did not have rockets, capable of launching satellites, merely reaching high altitude. Big difference. Also they did not have anything being worth delivered by ICBMs -- their nuclear program never was completed. Nazi tried to use small missiles with conventional explosives, however they didn't even bother to provide a matching military strategy for those, dooming them to failure.
It's a LOT harder to hit something on the face of the earth with a terminal velocity nuclear warhead than it is to put a payload in orbit. The fact that you don't think it is doesn't make it so.
It's not a matter of what I think, it's the basic nature of the tasks involved. No one makes a goal of throwing rocks into space to fly at some random orbit, and the level of precision necessary for a decent communications satellite is at least the same as for an ICBM.
If you need further proof, the fact that NO ONE other than the US and Russia have world spanning ICBMs should be at least circumstantial evidence. Do you have any clue?
And the clue is -- only US and USSR were not in the close proximity with all possible enemies for decades. No one else needed ICBMs, all imaginable targets were right across the border from them, so why bother?
US defense contractors during the Clinton adminstration provided technical assistance to the Chinese on their satellite program. There is some argument about exactly what was provided, but there is a pretty universal consensus that where China was not previously capable of striking the US with an ICBM, they are now.
There is a pretty universal consensus (what means -- among US Republicans) that Clinton and his administration is the source of every problem in the world that appeared since the Middle Ages, and will be for at least next two years. The fact is, all "technology" that is really necessary to build "a missile" (some missile capable of launching satellites) is in the textbooks, published and used in universities all over the globe. The information about particular materials necessary to build a missile with acceptable size, may not be as open, but certainly is easily obtainable. Everything else is merely details, that are pointless to copy, and usually not transferrable between different programs.
With the state of the former USSR, one hardly needs it. Hell the Russians admit that they have gaps in their radar coverage! That doesn't guarantee that they do, but it is better than your riposte which you just pulled out of your ass.
All "information" based on the idea what is "the state of former USSR", is at least unreliable. Americans overestimate the scale of disasters in former USSR economy, and Russians often were way more eager to admit how much they have screwed up than what the situation warranted. In any case, this is hardly relevant to the ability to launch missiles, and any reduction in capabilities of radars makes a war more likely to be started, not less.
You don't have a clue do you? ICBMs are actually DAMN hard to detect without both a satellite warning system (to track via infrared during boost phase) AND radar (to track during terminal decent). Go ahead, try to see these "easy to detect" warheads without radar in terminal phase.
There is a difference between things needing a large system with full and precise coverage of all potential launch points and all parts of trajectories, and things needing merely to see small parts of those with any precision. For things like SDI first is mandatory (and still guarantees nothing). For merely following an MAD scenario (neither side is capable of destroying the other's offensive capabilities before they are used to the extent that makes the attack pointless) the second is more than sufficient. This is a pretty big difference. Worse yet, if one side's millile detection capabilities are impaired
Decide -- perhaps. "Arrest" him once he is already in their hands, for the time that would be illegal for detainment of a suspect -- no. If that was possible, the limits for the time before the person must be charged would have no meaning -- all suspects will be just taken as "witnesses", then "upgraded" to suspects, and there would be no incentive for police to ever arrest people in any other way.
Missles in general may be trivial to build, but I assure you, ICBMs are not. Hence the fact that only the US and the USSR have built ones that are truly capable of hitting anywhere on the planet. The ones China has are barely capable of hitting the US West coast,
Anything that can launch a satellite into space is based on the same technology as ICBM, plus some, therefore any country that launched its satellites on their missiles can use the same technology for ICBMs.
and they are only capable of doing that thanks to our technological help.
Huh? What help, buying plastic toys from there?
I read that Russia has a massive radar/satellite hole in a recent IEEE Spectrum magazine (the magazine of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers),
Last time I have checked, IEEE has a lot of things, however it certainly does not have its own intelligence service.
where they were discussing the various times during the cold war where the US almost nuked the USSR out of existence due to various systems errors and vice-versa.
Radars and satelites are neither required, nor useful for anything related to launching ICBMs. ICBMs are self-contained devices, flying without any communications to the outside world from the moment of launch. Radars and satellites are useful for _detecting_ incoming ICBMs, however due to large size, huge amount of infrared radiation and high speed they are extremely hard not to notice. And since after those missiles are detected it's pretty much pointless to try to intercept them, the only imaginable response is to launch your own ones.
Therefore MAD, that kept things in balance as long as people on both sides of a potential war were more or less sane (I apologize for the pun). At this point same can be said about all possible sides of a large-scale nuclear conflict, not just two initial participants. There is however a woeful lack of sanity, especially recently on the part of US, where religiously driven nuts and war-profiteering ideologues pretty much filled the top of the Bush administration. USSR, Israel, China, India and Pakistan (another nuclear-capable country, BTW) had their shares of nuts, yet even those understood that some limits apply to every country.
Currently, Russia is totally blind to a Trident attack from the Atlantic and Pacific, and, for all practical purposes, it is equally blind to a Minuteman or MX attack from the continental United States." http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature /mar00/earl.html#f2
This is a pretty wild speculation, based on the premise that radars can be "blinded" by nuclear explosions far away from it, and on the idea that information about precise targets is of any value at the moment when missiles are in flight. First is at least dubious, second is false -- once it's known that the missiles are incoming, details don't matter, it's already pointless to chase them or their sources, and response options do not change.
France would have to use aircraft and not even China currently has a delivery system to get a nuclear missile to the East coast (although they can hit the west coast just fine, thank you Mr. Clinton).
Missiles are trivial to build, submarines can launch medium-range missiles, and each of those countries have long-range bombers. ICBMs may make starting a nuclear war more convenient, but hardly are crucial to that, and US itself planned all kinds of nuclear war scenarios long before ICBMs existed.
Only the former USSR (and maybe Britain) maintains an ICBM delivery system capable of hitting the east coast of the United States. And frankly from what I've read of Russia's ICBM system (i.e. they have a massive radar hole in their southeast perimeter because of dead satellites and no money to operate their equipment), I wouldn't give good odds on their stuff actually working.
I am not sure where did you read that (Tom Clancy comes to mind as a likely "source"), or how do you think, radars are related to satellites and especially to ICBMs.
Yes, Amerika is Savage and Evil (tm)! That's why with the ability to literally snap its fingers and destroy the entire planet or any portion (Country) thereof, it never has.
So can any country that possesses nuclear weapons, such as France, Russia, or China. Or even India. If someone did not notice, government of any of those countries is either few keypresses, or few months of missile-building away from turning Washington, DC and NYC into two holes in the ground, not to mention various other nasty things that can be done with existing nuclear weapons. I don't see any of those countries demanding to be treated as The Owners Of The Earth, or randomly attacking the rest of the world.
If indeed they want to claim that people captured and placed in Guantanamo camp are not member of militia or resistance, it all falls back to US performing mass kidnapping and intending to murder some foreign individuals. Sounds any better?
"The world" never asks US to do any of that -- in fact, most of the neighbors of attacked countries are usually begging US to leave those countries alone. Of course, this is not what Fox News proclaims.
If he was a witness, how come they charged him while he was locked up, and even entered into a plea bargain? Can't have a cake and eat it, too.
Those POWS have no us legal rights.
POW's rights are supported by Geneva convention, and the laws of the territory where they are located. Any government's claims of otherwise "because we say so" don't matter.
Guess what happened to 97% of all the nazi solders captured by the russians. They were in POW labor camps till they died. Kinda sad but they were still nazi right? or should we have cared? you decide the russians decided to kill them.
Yeah right. And the other 3% were eaten alive by the bears that still walk across the Red Square.
Once coercion comes into play -- nothing except an independent material evidence. What in this case is impossible to get, all that can be proven is that he hiked in China (not a crime) and tried to cross the border to Afghanistan (minor offense). Murderers (and mass-murderers) were declared innocent just because morons in police (and FBI, and other countries' equivalents) messed with evidence, suspects and witnesses.
At this point the mess that was created makes it impossible to convict him with any credibility, regardless of what he really did, or intended to do, any conviction, right or wrong, will be nevertheless fabricated.
And then the new aristocracy figured out how to change things back, despite the existence of elections. Big whooping deal, you are just another country, ruled by just another government, get off your high horse and look around -- you are not better than the rest of the world, and your government has political inbreeding going on, at the scale not seen since 17-18th century Europe.
Not to mention that this would make their "sample applications" images impossible, unless they have already found a way to manipulate the air to reflect light in their pattern -- what I don't think, is even possible without applying the amount of energy sufficient to kill the viewer.
Personal Opinion Section: Can't see how the liquid - crystal monitors can be as clear as a CRT, however, they are just the same as laptop screens, and a lot of us would not want to spend a lot of time using that kind of screen.
They are not the same. Laptop screens are designed to keep the power consumption low. Desktop panels do not have this limitation.
-- Who holds back electric car?
-- We do! We do!
It doesn't work that way. When an organization with iron-fisted discipline, shared interests and deep-rooted ideology (military, religious cults, organized crime, Republican party leadership in US) is criticized, its members cooperate, defending the organization and each other from the outside attacker. However when a large, amorphous, undisciplined organization (such as any government or industry) is criticized, its members and factions may choose to support the criticism, and concentrate the blame on their opponents and enemies within the organization, especially if those can't mount a credible defense.
...or having almost every second letter as "l" (all blots look like certain characters from Evangelion).
...and very little thought. Really people who develop such projects should realize that the things they want and things they can get are two very different things, and no matter how much they want the former, they will get nothing but a false sense of security unless they will realize that they can only get the latter, and should pursue that instead.
Once something is broken into, it can not be trusted. This is the definition -- it won't be "broken into" if it was possible to trust it after the intrusion, it will be "operating as intended". Therefore if someone admits that a system may have vulnerable parts, he can either make sure that their vulnerabilities are eliminated (what is both impossible at the scale of existing setups, and beyond the scope of this kind of work), or make it impossible to access the vulnerable parts of the system (what is the reason for all kinds of firewalls, and this direction of work already reached its limitations without producing anything close to a desired effect), or to reduce the amount of damage that can be caused by a successful attack on a vulnerable part of the system (what is the only direction left that is still worth pursuing).
Obviously, the first thing that comes to mind is to separate parts and provide interfaces that do not propagate trust unnecessarily between those parts. Subsystems running under minimally necessary privileges, privileges separation within parts of subsystems, etc. are already used in various secure setups, however there is a lot left to be done, mostly in standardization and implementation of those ideas. Too bad, none of that activity looks attractive enough for bigwigs, and the theory and amount of work involved is hard to explain to people that can only understand network security through bad metaphors.
Another issue is DoS tolerance. This is a very complex problem because DoS by their nature can not be counteracted without a risk of becoming the source of another DoS -- for almost every imaginable DoS there can be a worse DoS that relies on the response mechanism that is supposed to react on the first DoS. Simulate a DoS against some host, and see that host "responding", creating a real DoS. This means that DoS can be only counteracted by proactive measures, such as SYN floods being prevented by the use of cryptographic SYN cookies. Also elimination of a large number of vulnerabilities in comsumers' computers goes a long way toward decreasing the effectiveness of DDoS, a kind of attack that has no possible response of the victim that is not exactly the same as the goal of the attacker -- making the victim unaccessible to the legitimate users.
Detection of the attacks is of much less importance than what it usually assigned to it. In fact, any attack detection that does not go through a human system administrator has a potential of being a part of an attack -- in most of cases the automated response to an attack can produce a more dangerous attack by itself than the attack being detected (similar to DoS response issue), this is a situation when not knowing about the attack is much better than knowing. Even with humans involved, a system that will cry wolf every ten seconds will become at most a nuisance.
Same in a large part applies to intrusion detection -- even a _successful_ attack may still be less dangerous than the heavy-handed automated response to it. The real value of intrusion detection is in allowing the sysadmin (or sometimes an automated system) to revert the compromised subsystem to pre-attack state, keep the whole system consistent after this change, and replace the vulnerable part with an alternative that supposedly does not have exactly the same vulnerability, allowing the time for analysis and elimination of vulnerability. AFAIK, absolutely nothing is done in the direction of automating this task, and none of the "security" companies provide this kind of service. This is a very valid area to apply new research, development and businesses' efforts, however it doesn't look like anyone interested in
Typical uneducated conservatives supporter -- can't parse simple sentences yet gets his kicks out of proclaiming that the whole "America" does, or does not something that happens to match his own Murdoch-induced opinion.
Any chance I can vote, online, from overseas, via my bank?
Yes, it's called a political bribe, and your vote will really matter, as opposed to hundreds of millions that won't. But you should better cast that vote with a shitload of money.
So if Dubya (or McCain, if Republicans will try to put a less-hated candidate forward) won't win, it will be blamed on hackers/crackers/terrorists/pirates/communists/lib erals from the target of the month country and followed with Dubya remaining the president and leading a war against supposed enemies of democratic voting.
Brilliant.
gobbles up public domain works (what percentage of their recently made animation is based on public domain works?), they are more concerned about getting more "money per unit of creativity" than about the future possibility of doing anything creative without being sued.
2. Transmit it to the plane.
3. Use an amplifier and a parabolic dish to send an amplified signal to the GPS antenna.
4. The plane thinks, it is flying wherever the GPS signal is collected.
This would also work on GPS-guided weapons, but there it would be less practical -- sending an amplified precisely reproduced GPS signal to a bunch of bombs and missiles few kilometers above you and tens of kilometers away , moving at high speed is a bit harder than doing the same for few meters inside the plane.
...are already implemented in Cyrus. RTFM if you haven't noticed. The unproductive one, and I mean specifically an intrusive scheduler/calendar, no one bothered to implement because no engineer willfully will use such a thing.
...that everything a person may own should not be designed with a specific goal to hurt him in any way, be it physical or legal?
I mean, a bent bumper of my car can be used as an evidence that it hit something, but the bumper is not specifically designed to be used as such evidence. EDR's functionality that records speed beyond the immediate few seconds when the car impacted something, and makes it accessible, has no excuse to exist other than to provide evidence against the driver -- the data about what happened before the accident is absolutely useless for the car manufacturer. I don't think, when 5th amendment was written anyone thought that it's possible to sneak some "snitch" functionality into things that people own, and this is the only reason why it doesn't extend to such things.
why? this would mean that you have to build many users that are not here for users but for programs. Effectively you misuse a security mechanism for something else, because there is nothing else there.
This is precisely the purpose of this mechanism. "Users" in Unix never were supposed to directly correspond to people.
The problem with "just ask the user" is twofold. First, user usually can't determine if a program should be allowed to read any particular file in the first place. Should Mozilla be able to read /etc/passwd? /home/luser/.gtkrc? I know that it should, but how would the user know? And how will he be able to answer all those questions in the first place? Second, it's impossible even to find out if there is a user at the console to ask him -- where is he anyway if the box has 7 virtual consoles, 10 ssh sessions, and two local X sessions? And where is the "user" who will tell if, say, http server can respond to something (few hundred times a second)?
Why is it so hard to adopt the thought that programs have rights that you can manage?
Because "rights" can be only defined as attributes of an object. "Program" is not really such an object, it can call other programs, and no one would know which rights should be applied to what they do. User however can only be changed if the program called other setuid programs (that are supposed to manage permissions by themselves), or the original user is root (that no untrusted program should run as). This means that once something is started as some user, it can't gain another user's access no matter what. On the other hand, any program can at least copy itself, hide its name from monitors, etc. -- those things are not reliable, and can't be used as the base for restrictions.
Creating the lists of programs that _can_ access certain files and network will be a horrible mess -- first of all, it will be a giant list in any reasonable system, and second, any program that may be used with pipes or any other kind of modularized work may happen to end up potentially reading and writing any file on the system. Interpreters, including shells and perl, will be yet another can of worms -- though single executables, they may run all kinds of programs, and are usually called from other programs (CGI scripts and mail/news/http clients, to name just a few examples of programs that are hardly supposed to be "trusted") so their access can be only based on the userids. One can argue that there should be a "token" that kernel passes to everything called from a program, and that should be an object that permissions are attached to. I wholeheartedly agree with this, and can name two such tokens that exist already -- it's userid and group.
his would be a natural extension to rights for users and files
Files have no rights -- they have permissions, users have rights. This means, there is nothing attached to the file that "allows" it to access anything, only allows certain sets of users to access this file.
- rights for executables, stating what ressources they can and cannot access.
Executables have nothing that ties rights to them -- when called by different users they are supposed to be treated as those users. It would be ridiculous to create an additional layer of permissions that breaks the existing two (Unix permissions and ACLs). It will be something like, "this file can be read by all users in group staff, however everyone can run grep on it" -- what will in effect make it world-readable. Or, worse, "this file can _not_ be grep'ed by anyone" (and then someone/something will simply rename grep).
would expect a conservative attitude like this from hard-core Windows users ("user ids? we dont need that for the home edition ...")
This is just the opposite kinf of problem -- having versions of Windows where userids don't exist, makes it impossible to use them for uses that would make sense in Windows (like running the a