My post wasn't a straw man, nor was my reply to yours. For what it's worth, my response was actually intended to be a child of this post (thus my choice of subject, in context), not a generic response to the article. (I wasn't logged in, and when I did and was redirected to the page, the form apparently wasn't posted properly.)
Mea culpa.
But even as a reply directly to this article, my post is still completely on-point: there is no reason to be irrationally afraid of nuclear power, as reared its head again globally after Fukushima. Issues with Fukushima could have been mitigated, AND "look at this blog post" illustrating deaths/TWh of a variety of energy sources. How, specifically, is that not relevant? Nowhere does this imply that a proper and serious discussion of safety, governance, implementation, etc., should not be a part of the process. Except we in the West are barely having even that discussion, and many Western nations are backing away from nuclear power altogether because of political and other pressures. Given that energy needs are going to be a critical and increasing global concern for the foreseeable future, especially in the context of Asia, why is this not a valid discussion to have? Or do we hang ourselves with asinine attitudes like yours, fighting an imaginary absolutist position that no one has?
The other "side", however, does have an absolutist position: "No nuclear anything, ever. SCARY NUCLEAR BAD! You might not see ill health effects for . . . years! You don't know how nuclear is hurting you. The government lies about nuclear." You get my point.
Also, you're continuing in your trend of putting words into my mouth: you're acting as if I think nuclear is oh-so-much more safe than other energy sources, we should therefore ignore any and every safety concern and consideration. Except I said nothing of the sort, nor do I believe that.
And wow — equating a sensible post on why nuclear energy isn't something to be afraid of, albeit accidentally posted as a comment on the article rather than as a reply to another comment, to the Westboro Baptist Church is just — wow, I don't know where to go with that. Why don't you throw Nazis in there too, for good measure.
I also didn't say — or imply — anything which you attribute to me. The simple fact is that other sources of energy — ridiculously and absurdly, even solar — have more deaths per TWh than nuclear. It's a simple fact.
If we're serious about addressing the world's energy needs while moving away from fossil fuels, nuclear MUST be a part of the discussion, because it's not all going to be wind farms, hydro, and solar panels.
It's about energy density. But be my guest and keep vilifying nuclear in the face of the evidence. And speaking of "dense", in case you don't get it, this doesn't mean there shouldn't be safety and oversight. It means we should look at the true risks of nuclear vs. the long term risks from other energy sources, particularly fossil fuels...not only in terms of deaths (which, compared to other energy sources, are minimal), but the risk from unstable geopolitical situations, wars for resources, and so on.
There are many different tasks and functions for which the military and government agencies use the public/commodity internet. There are also various levels of privatenetworks for more sensitive requirements.
NSA has two separate missions that are both in conflict and complementary.
Folks here will immediate assume "OMG BACKDOORZ!@!@!!111" when in reality NSA's job is BOTH to break other peoples' systems while protecting our own. Having intentional vulnerabilities in our own encryption schemes is counterproductive on a number of levels.
That won't stop people from believing what they want to believe, however.
Yes, but the example you gave is clear-cut: other than in exigent circumstances, one does not have to allow law enforcement personnel onto/into private property without a proper warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction.
The situation here of clearing an Occupy camp and issuing a dispersal order is anything but clear-cut. Assuming for a moment that it's possible this dispersal order was lawful, at least as far as it goes, why would you claim that they can't compel this person to clear the area as well? How, specifically, was the arrest inappropriate if this was a lawful order to disperse?
Now, if you're saying the order to disperse wasn't lawful, what's your basis for that, given that nearly all municipalities that have cleared Occupy camps have ensured that they at least have a justification for removal that can withstand some scrutiny? Again, without having sat in on all of the council meetings that resulted in this order, I can't comment for certain.
My stance is in no way based on the fact that people are any of those things you claim. But you don't get to decide on your own that something doesn't apply to you. This was not about a legal or constitutional violation (UNLESS the dispersal order was unlawful). There was what was very likely a LAWFUL order to disperse issued by appropriate authority, and this guy chose to say, essentially, "I'm not doing anything wrong," and refused to disperse instead of obeying the order. Well, 99% of the people in the camp probably weren't "doing anything wrong" at that very moment, either, other than being there. If I walked in just to "observe" the camp and refused to leave when directed by a police officer, I can guarantee you I would be arrested on the spot, no matter what I said.
Now we're getting to places where someone might say, hey, the "law" is made by those in "power", and these Occupy camps are just people trying to "take back" their power, so someone needs to stand up and fight the system, document the struggle, etc., etc., etc. Okay, fine. But if you're going to actively oppose civil society and the system of laws that are in place, regardless of from where they stem, expect that there will be consequences to those actions.
That's an accurate assessment. The reality is that if a police officer is issuing a direct order and you choose to disobey it, there will likely be consequences. Indeed, even if you think the police officer's order really is unlawful, you're probably still going to be detained or arrested if you refuse to obey it.
Even if one makes this argument from a moral/ethical perspective, in such frameworks there is still the notion that as an independent, thinking being, one has the ability to do anything that they physically can do — whether it's take a walk, kill someone, leak a secret, tell a lie, or disobey the police. The key is recognizing that the event can have consequences.
In this case, my only concern comes from the police attempting to delete imagery from the camera. The courts can now decide whether or not this arrest is legitimate.
The laws for when and under what circumstances police may issue a dispersal order vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They can indeed be lawfully used for mass public gatherings, on public or private property, even in cases where no imminent danger exists. In the case of some of the Occupy camps, municipalities justified removal on the grounds of the camps being a "public nuisance", or a public health hazard.
Clearly some disagree with these judgments, but once that judgment is made by a duly elected or appointed authority, police may lawfully clear the area. Those who disobey the order would be subject to arrest, and it's not the job of the police to discern whether someone may or may nor be press, affiliated with the camp, an innocent observer, etc. If someone is refusing to obey the dispersal order, they'll be arrested.
It's that simple. Again, this isn't a value judgment — just the facts.
Also, following the directions of law enforcement officers is required in many states and jurisdictions, and this isn't a new or recent construct. There are varying degrees, some of which include provisions for presenting identification and similar. It's your opinion, like the submitter's, that this is somehow "illegal". The rule of law doesn't work when individuals get to decide what applies to them on a whim.
No, what I'm saying is that it is possible for police to issue a lawful dispersal order to a group or area (not passing judgement on whether or not this one was, since I don't have all of the information), and you're not exempt because you happen to have a camera in your hand.
Traffic metadata (things like email "envelope" information, source and destination IPs, etc.) has long been fair game without a warrant as the digital analogue of a "pen register" under Smith v. Maryland 442 US 735 (1979), and is part of the provision that supports lawful NSA data collection under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and other law, in conjunction with telecommunication operators like AT&T. The content of traffic of US Persons is NOT fair game, without a properly adjudicated warrant.
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress, allows for foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons without a warrant, no matter where the collection occurs. The longstanding Smith v. Maryland allows for the collection and examination of communications metadata without a warrant. The FISC ruling explicitly finds legal such collection under the now-sunset Protect America Act and the current FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
In order to determine which traffic content may be collected for foreign intelligence purposes, the traffic metadata must be examined. Even when a target in question is a specific non-US Person of foreign intelligence interest, traffic metadata must first be examined in order to target that person! Because examining traffic metadata was found explicitly legal and Constitutional three decades ago by the United States Supreme Court, doing so in order to target legitimate foreign intelligence collection is a legal application in the digital world.
The major issues for foreign SIGINT were twofold:
- A lot of traffic is now digital versus analog, and cannot be targeted by aiming a directional antenna at a particular geographic locale. It is now traveling largely via things like fiber optic cables, intermixed with all manner of other communications. In order to target the collection, it is no longer a case of tapping a single landline telephone, or sitting on a Navy vessel offshore from some area of interest between individuals talking on two-way radios; it's finding that traffic in a sea of global digital communications.
- Foreign communications of non-US Persons physically outside of the US was increasingly traveling through the US. Previously fair game for foreign intelligence collection throughout the history of such collection in the United States, it suddenly became off-limits without a warrant because it was incidentally routed through locations in the United States. Foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside of the US does not require a warrant, and fundamentally still shouldn't simply because their traffic happens to enter the US.
This was a case of changing technology necessitating an update to a law. A supermajority of both houses of Congress agreed. Some comments:
Sen. Dianne Feinstein:
"This bill, in some respects, improves even on the base bill, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It provides clear protections for U.S. persons both at home and abroad. It ensures that the Government cannot conduct electronic surveillance on an American anywhere in the world without a warrant. No legislation has done that up to this point."
Then-DNI Mike McConnell:
"Now here's the other thing that most Americans don't appreciate, haven't been exposed to. When we redid that law, the law now says any U.S. person, any U.S. person, that's targeted for foreign intelligence must be protected by a warrant anywhere on the globe. So we actually have a much more stringent law today protecting Americans and civil liberties."
"The debate and the dilemma for us is how do you modernize that law for the modern age? And we debated. For two years we debated and we finally came to closure. The good news is when it was finally voted, two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate voted for it and here's what it says today: if it's a U.S. person anywhere in the globe, you must have a warrant."
Unfortunately, this discussion is so mired in politics, pe
There's a saying in Washington, first articulated by Thomas Fingar:
"I learned something a long time ago in this town. There are only two possibilities: policy success and intelligence failure."
If we're going to be "honest" about it, the fact is that you can say that "the CIA is almost always wrong" is because the public generally only sees the failures, and almost never the successes.
...except that this office wasn't needed to make the case on Iraqi WMD. Intelligence analysis doesn't always equal reality. I explain this in great detail here.
Forget about your own political leanings or personal biases. Without intelligence that was questionable or even potentially "manipulated" (a strong charge which requires strong evidence), the case for Iraqi WMD was still strong.
Further, the US and its partners discovered 700,000 tons of non-WMD UN-banned weapons when we invaded. Iraq was in violation of not one, not two, but THREE binding and in-force UN Security council resolutions, any one of which allowed for the use of force with no further justification.
Don't mistake my comment for making the claim that invading Iraq was/wasn't a good idea: just focus on what I'm saying, and don't read into it.
The fact that I can't believe we're equating Stratfor with the entire Intelligence Community aside...perhaps an examination of the Iraq WMD situation is in order.
There is no truth. There is only perception. — Gustave Flaubert
The motto of CIA's National Clandestine Service is the Latin Veritatem Cognoscere: Know the truth. It's no wonder that so many believe the function of intelligence services is to discover the "truth".
Mark Lowenthal spends time explaining that intelligence is not about truth at all, but rather about arriving at some informed conclusion about reality, or possible future realities, neither of which can be considered strictly to be "truth".
"Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve. It is better — and more accurate — to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest (that is, free from politicization). These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth." (Lowenthal 2009)
Perhaps the biggest issue with "truth" in intelligence work is the absolute nature of "truth". If it is an analyst's job to find the "truth", then any deviation from that analysis by actual events means that the analysis was a "lie".
"Is intelligence truth-telling? One of the common descriptions of intelligence is that it is the job of 'telling truth to power'. (This sounds fairly noble, although it is important to recall that court jesters once had the same function.) Intelligence, however, is not about truth. (If something is known to be true then we do not need intelligence services to find it out.) Yet the image persists and carries with it some important ethical implications. If truth were the objective of intelligence, does that raise the stakes for analysis? [...] A problem with setting truth as a goal is that it has a relentless quality. [...if] an analyst's goal is to tell the truth — especially to those in power who might not want to hear it — then there is no room for compromise, no possible admission of alternative views." (Lowenthal 2009)
This creates an environment where success is impossible, because discovering "truth" by every measure is a standard that can never be reached. It also discourages differing analytic viewpoints, each of which may be equally valid. Ultimately, someone needs to look at the available information and make a decision:
"[T]he role of intelligence is not to tell the truth but to provide informed analysis to policy makers to aid their decision making." (Lowenthal 2009)
The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. — William James
Clark (2010) takes a different approach, likening analysis to legal wrangling in a courtroom, where the truth is discovered by the back-and-forth of the adversarial process. Like truth itself, defining the barriers to finding it can be just as subjective. Clark highlights three important facets which must be ascertained before ultimately arriving at the "truth":
Is it the truth? — Is the information in question a fact, or an opinion? Does it conflict with other information? Or does other information support the same conclusion? All-source analysis can help confirm information that is collected via one discipline, helping to establish a hypothesis as fact.
Is it the whole truth? — The reliability of the source, whether technical or human, must be critically considered. Is the information incomplete? A lie of omission, or significant missing information, can erase whatever "truth" is being supp
Traffic metadata (things like email "envelope" information, source and destination IPs, etc.) has long been fair game without a warrant as the digital analogue of a "pen register" under Smith v. Maryland 442 US 735 (1979), and is part of the provision that supports lawful NSA data collection under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and other law, in conjunction with telecommunication operators like AT&T. The content of traffic of US Persons is NOT fair game, without a properly adjudicated warrant.
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress, allows for foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons without a warrant, no matter where the collection occurs. The longstanding Smith v. Maryland allows for the collection and examination of communications metadata without a warrant. The FISC ruling explicitly finds legal such collection under the now-sunset Protect America Act and the current FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
In order to determine which traffic content may be collected for foreign intelligence purposes, the traffic metadata must be examined. Even when a target in question is a specific non-US Person of foreign intelligence interest, traffic metadata must first be examined in order to target that person! Because examining traffic metadata was found explicitly legal and Constitutional three decades ago by the United States Supreme Court, doing so in order to target legitimate foreign intelligence collection is a legal application in the digital world.
The major issues for foreign SIGINT were twofold:
- A lot of traffic is now digital versus analog, and cannot be targeted by aiming a directional antenna at a particular geographic locale. It is now traveling largely via things like fiber optic cables, intermixed with all manner of other communications. In order to target the collection, it is no longer a case of tapping a single landline telephone, or sitting on a Navy vessel offshore from some area of interest between individuals talking on two-way radios; it's finding that traffic in a sea of global digital communications.
- Foreign communications of non-US Persons physically outside of the US was increasingly traveling through the US. Previously fair game for foreign intelligence collection throughout the history of such collection in the United States, it suddenly became off-limits without a warrant because it was incidentally routed through locations in the United States. Foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside of the US does not require a warrant, and fundamentally still shouldn't simply because their traffic happens to enter the US.
This was a case of changing technology necessitating an update to a law. A supermajority of both houses of Congress agreed. Some comments:
Sen. Dianne Feinstein:
"This bill, in some respects, improves even on the base bill, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It provides clear protections for U.S. persons both at home and abroad. It ensures that the Government cannot conduct electronic surveillance on an American anywhere in the world without a warrant. No legislation has done that up to this point."
Then-DNI Mike McConnell:
"Now here's the other thing that most Americans don't appreciate, haven't been exposed to. When we redid that law, the law now says any U.S. person, any U.S. person, that's targeted for foreign intelligence must be protected by a warrant anywhere on the globe. So we actually have a much more stringent law today protecting Americans and civil liberties."
"The debate and the dilemma for us is how do you modernize that law for the modern age? And we debated. For two years we debated and we finally came to closure. The good news is when it was finally voted, two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate voted for it and here's what it says today: if it's a U.S. person anywhere in the globe, you must have a warrant."
Unfortunately, this discussion is so mired in polit
Security theater, from this perspective, is an attempt to convey a message: “We are doing everything possible to protect you.” When 9/11 shattered the public’s confidence in flying, Slovic says, the handful of anti-terror measures that actually work—hardening the cockpit door, positive baggage matching, more-effective intelligence—would not have addressed the public’s dread, because the measures can’t really be seen. Relying on them would have been the equivalent of saying, “Have confidence in Uncle Sam,” when the problem was the very loss of confidence. So a certain amount of theater made sense.
After witnessing enough conversations about how TSA is worthless, or worse, yet another part of an effort to acclimate hapless Americans to living in a police state, I think it's valid to consider the reasons for even "appearances" of security, and I'm glad this article laid them out clearly. Even appearances can be a deterrent.
The other points in the article are also valid. I believe we need to ask ourselves the question that if at least some amount of "theater" is appropriate, what is that amount, and what would the damage been to the air transport sector if nothing (visible) had been done? Note I don't pretend to know the answer.
Some say that money might better have been spent "educating" people why such security measures don't work, so they won't be a afraid when they don't see it. That's a task far easier said than done. Alongside the constant drumbeat in some circles that the government is out to get them, it's important to understand there are actual legitimate reasons for things the TSA is doing, seen and unseen.
None of this means that our homeland security efforts should be exempt from criticism or thoughtful scrutiny, but it needs to be done against a backdrop of reason.
Does anyone believe that the fact he is in UK custody doesn't effectively place him in US custody, more than Swedish custody would?
Assange has said more than once, as if speaking to his supporters in America, that "they" are going to be the ones to stop "the government" from "getting him". So, he and his lawyers use things that will strike a chord, like claiming he'll be sent to Guantanamo Bay (as the current administration is so keen to do) or that he'll be killed, whether by the death penalty or otherwise (when it isn't clear that there is any legal basis on which to prosecute him).
This is just another part of his campaign to influence US public opinion, which is exactly what he does with Wikileaks. This is the real Julian Assange.
And so does Steven Aftergood, a veteran crusader against excessive government secrecy and director of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy: "WikiLeaks must be counted among the enemies of open society because it does not respect the rule of law nor does it honor the rights of individuals."
Anonymous, indiscriminate document leaking subverts the social contract in open and democratic societies. It results in is an environment where closed and repressive societies have a significant advantage in the information realm, and in the conduct of their national and diplomatic affairs, over open and democratic societies.
The linked text was "Ice Cube Neutrino Observatory". The text linked to the official page of the observatory. The summary is about the observatory being complete. No indirection here.
Nothing implied that the link should be to an article. You assume that they "should" have linked to a news article, instead of the observatory itself. There is no such requirement of slashdot summaries, either implicit or explicit, and there is plenty of information about IceCube on the IceCube site. If the linked text implied that there was a news article behind it, you would have a point.
As for the content of slashdot summaries being bad or needing more informaton, I believe that is a perennial issue that transcends what submitters choose to link to.
How is the official home page of the observatory, which includes that story and more in the "News" column right smack-dab in the middle of the home page the "wrong link"?
Sure, maybe the summary could have included more information, or a link to a summarizing news story, but linking to the observatory's official presence on the internet is hardly the "wrong link".
Not only that, but if you look at the actual study, even non-FOX News viewers believe a lot of crazy stuff, and it's more indicative the personal biases and beliefs of people who choose to watch FOX News, not that FOX News "makes you stupid".
"All of the news outlets except Fox News Special Report received a score to the left of the average member of Congress. Moreover, by one of our measures all but three of these media outlets (Special Report, the Drudge Report, and ABCs World News Tonight) were closer to the average Democrat in Congress than to the median member of the House of Representatives. One of our measures found that the Drudge Report is the most centrist of all media outlets in our sample. Our other measure found that Fox News Special Report is the most centrist."
and
"Based on sentences as the level of observation (the results of which are listed in Table 8), the Drudge Report is the most centrist, Fox News Special Report is second, ABC World News Tonight is third, and CBS Evening is last.
Given that the conventional wisdom is that the Drudge Report and Fox News are conservative news outlets, this ordering might be surprising. Perhaps more surprising is the degree to which the mainstream press is liberal. The results of Table 8 show that the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, USA Today, and CBS Evening News are not only liberal, they are closer to the average Democrat in Congress (who has a score of 74.1) than they are to the median of the whole House (who has a score of 39.0)....the New York Times is twice as far from the center as Fox News Special Report, to gain a balanced perspective, one would need to spend twice as much time watching Special Report as he or she spends reading the New York Times....Our results contrast strongly with the prior expectations of many others. It is easy to find quotes from prominent journalists and academics who claim that there is no systematic bias among media outlets in the U.S.... The main conclusion of our paper is that our results simply reject such claims."
Keep in mind that they are ONLY looking at the evening news shows; if you included the opinion/editorial shows from FOX News, which constitutes nearly all of the evening/prime-time programming, I'm not sure what would happen to the results...;-)
Slashdot Mirror
...but the USS Constitution is the "world's oldest commissioned warship afloat", having been launched 21 October 1797.
As for the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), some video memories:
USS Enterprise at Sea
USS Enterprise Flight Operations
"Fate protects fools, little children, and ships named Enterprise."
Fair winds and following seas.
My post wasn't a straw man, nor was my reply to yours. For what it's worth, my response was actually intended to be a child of this post (thus my choice of subject, in context), not a generic response to the article. (I wasn't logged in, and when I did and was redirected to the page, the form apparently wasn't posted properly.)
Mea culpa.
But even as a reply directly to this article, my post is still completely on-point: there is no reason to be irrationally afraid of nuclear power, as reared its head again globally after Fukushima. Issues with Fukushima could have been mitigated, AND "look at this blog post" illustrating deaths/TWh of a variety of energy sources. How, specifically, is that not relevant? Nowhere does this imply that a proper and serious discussion of safety, governance, implementation, etc., should not be a part of the process. Except we in the West are barely having even that discussion, and many Western nations are backing away from nuclear power altogether because of political and other pressures. Given that energy needs are going to be a critical and increasing global concern for the foreseeable future, especially in the context of Asia, why is this not a valid discussion to have? Or do we hang ourselves with asinine attitudes like yours, fighting an imaginary absolutist position that no one has?
The other "side", however, does have an absolutist position: "No nuclear anything, ever. SCARY NUCLEAR BAD! You might not see ill health effects for . . . years! You don't know how nuclear is hurting you. The government lies about nuclear." You get my point.
Also, you're continuing in your trend of putting words into my mouth: you're acting as if I think nuclear is oh-so-much more safe than other energy sources, we should therefore ignore any and every safety concern and consideration. Except I said nothing of the sort, nor do I believe that.
And wow — equating a sensible post on why nuclear energy isn't something to be afraid of, albeit accidentally posted as a comment on the article rather than as a reply to another comment, to the Westboro Baptist Church is just — wow, I don't know where to go with that. Why don't you throw Nazis in there too, for good measure.
It ought to work well as a scarecrow, too.
I also didn't say — or imply — anything which you attribute to me. The simple fact is that other sources of energy — ridiculously and absurdly, even solar — have more deaths per TWh than nuclear. It's a simple fact.
If we're serious about addressing the world's energy needs while moving away from fossil fuels, nuclear MUST be a part of the discussion, because it's not all going to be wind farms, hydro, and solar panels.
It's about energy density. But be my guest and keep vilifying nuclear in the face of the evidence. And speaking of "dense", in case you don't get it, this doesn't mean there shouldn't be safety and oversight. It means we should look at the true risks of nuclear vs. the long term risks from other energy sources, particularly fossil fuels...not only in terms of deaths (which, compared to other energy sources, are minimal), but the risk from unstable geopolitical situations, wars for resources, and so on.
It's not like we're going crazy building new plants in the US; we just approved the first new nuclear plant in three decades. That's ridiculous. Meanwhile, China has at least 25 reactors under construction, with many more planned...
Stop being afraid of nuclear.
Deaths per terawatt-hour for all energy sources
There are many different tasks and functions for which the military and government agencies use the public/commodity internet. There are also various levels of private networks for more sensitive requirements.
None of that, however stops the NSA from operating under the assumption that its networks are compromised.
Brookings just put out a great paper on a related topic, Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations (PDF). It's worth a read.
Exactly right, and it's not a dodge at all.
NSA has two separate missions that are both in conflict and complementary.
Folks here will immediate assume "OMG BACKDOORZ!@!@!!111" when in reality NSA's job is BOTH to break other peoples' systems while protecting our own. Having intentional vulnerabilities in our own encryption schemes is counterproductive on a number of levels.
That won't stop people from believing what they want to believe, however.
Fair enough — and as someone else noted, I think we're in fundamental agreement here.
— wait, what's happening here? A rational discussion on slashdot?!?
Yes, but the example you gave is clear-cut: other than in exigent circumstances, one does not have to allow law enforcement personnel onto/into private property without a proper warrant from a court of competent jurisdiction.
The situation here of clearing an Occupy camp and issuing a dispersal order is anything but clear-cut. Assuming for a moment that it's possible this dispersal order was lawful, at least as far as it goes, why would you claim that they can't compel this person to clear the area as well? How, specifically, was the arrest inappropriate if this was a lawful order to disperse?
Now, if you're saying the order to disperse wasn't lawful, what's your basis for that, given that nearly all municipalities that have cleared Occupy camps have ensured that they at least have a justification for removal that can withstand some scrutiny? Again, without having sat in on all of the council meetings that resulted in this order, I can't comment for certain.
My stance is in no way based on the fact that people are any of those things you claim. But you don't get to decide on your own that something doesn't apply to you. This was not about a legal or constitutional violation (UNLESS the dispersal order was unlawful). There was what was very likely a LAWFUL order to disperse issued by appropriate authority, and this guy chose to say, essentially, "I'm not doing anything wrong," and refused to disperse instead of obeying the order. Well, 99% of the people in the camp probably weren't "doing anything wrong" at that very moment, either, other than being there. If I walked in just to "observe" the camp and refused to leave when directed by a police officer, I can guarantee you I would be arrested on the spot, no matter what I said.
Now we're getting to places where someone might say, hey, the "law" is made by those in "power", and these Occupy camps are just people trying to "take back" their power, so someone needs to stand up and fight the system, document the struggle, etc., etc., etc. Okay, fine. But if you're going to actively oppose civil society and the system of laws that are in place, regardless of from where they stem, expect that there will be consequences to those actions.
That's an accurate assessment. The reality is that if a police officer is issuing a direct order and you choose to disobey it, there will likely be consequences. Indeed, even if you think the police officer's order really is unlawful, you're probably still going to be detained or arrested if you refuse to obey it.
Even if one makes this argument from a moral/ethical perspective, in such frameworks there is still the notion that as an independent, thinking being, one has the ability to do anything that they physically can do — whether it's take a walk, kill someone, leak a secret, tell a lie, or disobey the police. The key is recognizing that the event can have consequences.
In this case, my only concern comes from the police attempting to delete imagery from the camera. The courts can now decide whether or not this arrest is legitimate.
The laws for when and under what circumstances police may issue a dispersal order vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They can indeed be lawfully used for mass public gatherings, on public or private property, even in cases where no imminent danger exists. In the case of some of the Occupy camps, municipalities justified removal on the grounds of the camps being a "public nuisance", or a public health hazard.
Clearly some disagree with these judgments, but once that judgment is made by a duly elected or appointed authority, police may lawfully clear the area. Those who disobey the order would be subject to arrest, and it's not the job of the police to discern whether someone may or may nor be press, affiliated with the camp, an innocent observer, etc. If someone is refusing to obey the dispersal order, they'll be arrested.
It's that simple. Again, this isn't a value judgment — just the facts.
Also, following the directions of law enforcement officers is required in many states and jurisdictions, and this isn't a new or recent construct. There are varying degrees, some of which include provisions for presenting identification and similar. It's your opinion, like the submitter's, that this is somehow "illegal". The rule of law doesn't work when individuals get to decide what applies to them on a whim.
No, what I'm saying is that it is possible for police to issue a lawful dispersal order to a group or area (not passing judgement on whether or not this one was, since I don't have all of the information), and you're not exempt because you happen to have a camera in your hand.
Wow, great job reading and interpreting my comment!
(Not.)
"Collusion". LOL. Now then:
Traffic metadata (things like email "envelope" information, source and destination IPs, etc.) has long been fair game without a warrant as the digital analogue of a "pen register" under Smith v. Maryland 442 US 735 (1979), and is part of the provision that supports lawful NSA data collection under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and other law, in conjunction with telecommunication operators like AT&T. The content of traffic of US Persons is NOT fair game, without a properly adjudicated warrant.
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress, allows for foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons without a warrant, no matter where the collection occurs. The longstanding Smith v. Maryland allows for the collection and examination of communications metadata without a warrant. The FISC ruling explicitly finds legal such collection under the now-sunset Protect America Act and the current FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
In order to determine which traffic content may be collected for foreign intelligence purposes, the traffic metadata must be examined. Even when a target in question is a specific non-US Person of foreign intelligence interest, traffic metadata must first be examined in order to target that person! Because examining traffic metadata was found explicitly legal and Constitutional three decades ago by the United States Supreme Court, doing so in order to target legitimate foreign intelligence collection is a legal application in the digital world.
The major issues for foreign SIGINT were twofold:
- A lot of traffic is now digital versus analog, and cannot be targeted by aiming a directional antenna at a particular geographic locale. It is now traveling largely via things like fiber optic cables, intermixed with all manner of other communications. In order to target the collection, it is no longer a case of tapping a single landline telephone, or sitting on a Navy vessel offshore from some area of interest between individuals talking on two-way radios; it's finding that traffic in a sea of global digital communications.
- Foreign communications of non-US Persons physically outside of the US was increasingly traveling through the US. Previously fair game for foreign intelligence collection throughout the history of such collection in the United States, it suddenly became off-limits without a warrant because it was incidentally routed through locations in the United States. Foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside of the US does not require a warrant, and fundamentally still shouldn't simply because their traffic happens to enter the US.
This was a case of changing technology necessitating an update to a law. A supermajority of both houses of Congress agreed. Some comments:
Sen. Dianne Feinstein:
"This bill, in some respects, improves even on the base bill, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It provides clear protections for U.S. persons both at home and abroad. It ensures that the Government cannot conduct electronic surveillance on an American anywhere in the world without a warrant. No legislation has done that up to this point."
Then-DNI Mike McConnell:
"Now here's the other thing that most Americans don't appreciate, haven't been exposed to. When we redid that law, the law now says any U.S. person, any U.S. person, that's targeted for foreign intelligence must be protected by a warrant anywhere on the globe. So we actually have a much more stringent law today protecting Americans and civil liberties."
"The debate and the dilemma for us is how do you modernize that law for the modern age? And we debated. For two years we debated and we finally came to closure. The good news is when it was finally voted, two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate voted for it and here's what it says today: if it's a U.S. person anywhere in the globe, you must have a warrant."
Unfortunately, this discussion is so mired in politics, pe
There's a saying in Washington, first articulated by Thomas Fingar:
"I learned something a long time ago in this town. There are only two possibilities: policy success and intelligence failure."
If we're going to be "honest" about it, the fact is that you can say that "the CIA is almost always wrong" is because the public generally only sees the failures, and almost never the successes.
...except that this office wasn't needed to make the case on Iraqi WMD. Intelligence analysis doesn't always equal reality. I explain this in great detail here.
Forget about your own political leanings or personal biases. Without intelligence that was questionable or even potentially "manipulated" (a strong charge which requires strong evidence), the case for Iraqi WMD was still strong.
Further, the US and its partners discovered 700,000 tons of non-WMD UN-banned weapons when we invaded. Iraq was in violation of not one, not two, but THREE binding and in-force UN Security council resolutions, any one of which allowed for the use of force with no further justification.
Don't mistake my comment for making the claim that invading Iraq was/wasn't a good idea: just focus on what I'm saying, and don't read into it.
The fact that I can't believe we're equating Stratfor with the entire Intelligence Community aside...perhaps an examination of the Iraq WMD situation is in order.
There is no truth. There is only perception. — Gustave Flaubert
The motto of CIA's National Clandestine Service is the Latin Veritatem Cognoscere: Know the truth. It's no wonder that so many believe the function of intelligence services is to discover the "truth".
Mark Lowenthal spends time explaining that intelligence is not about truth at all, but rather about arriving at some informed conclusion about reality, or possible future realities, neither of which can be considered strictly to be "truth".
"Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve. It is better — and more accurate — to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest (that is, free from politicization). These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth." (Lowenthal 2009)
Perhaps the biggest issue with "truth" in intelligence work is the absolute nature of "truth". If it is an analyst's job to find the "truth", then any deviation from that analysis by actual events means that the analysis was a "lie".
"Is intelligence truth-telling? One of the common descriptions of intelligence is that it is the job of 'telling truth to power'. (This sounds fairly noble, although it is important to recall that court jesters once had the same function.) Intelligence, however, is not about truth. (If something is known to be true then we do not need intelligence services to find it out.) Yet the image persists and carries with it some important ethical implications. If truth were the objective of intelligence, does that raise the stakes for analysis? [...] A problem with setting truth as a goal is that it has a relentless quality. [...if] an analyst's goal is to tell the truth — especially to those in power who might not want to hear it — then there is no room for compromise, no possible admission of alternative views." (Lowenthal 2009)
This creates an environment where success is impossible, because discovering "truth" by every measure is a standard that can never be reached. It also discourages differing analytic viewpoints, each of which may be equally valid. Ultimately, someone needs to look at the available information and make a decision:
"[T]he role of intelligence is not to tell the truth but to provide informed analysis to policy makers to aid their decision making." (Lowenthal 2009)
The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. — William James
Clark (2010) takes a different approach, likening analysis to legal wrangling in a courtroom, where the truth is discovered by the back-and-forth of the adversarial process. Like truth itself, defining the barriers to finding it can be just as subjective. Clark highlights three important facets which must be ascertained before ultimately arriving at the "truth":
Is it the truth? — Is the information in question a fact, or an opinion? Does it conflict with other information? Or does other information support the same conclusion? All-source analysis can help confirm information that is collected via one discipline, helping to establish a hypothesis as fact.
Is it the whole truth? — The reliability of the source, whether technical or human, must be critically considered. Is the information incomplete? A lie of omission, or significant missing information, can erase whatever "truth" is being supp
And, as I said on the Wired piece:
Traffic metadata (things like email "envelope" information, source and destination IPs, etc.) has long been fair game without a warrant as the digital analogue of a "pen register" under Smith v. Maryland 442 US 735 (1979), and is part of the provision that supports lawful NSA data collection under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and other law, in conjunction with telecommunication operators like AT&T. The content of traffic of US Persons is NOT fair game, without a properly adjudicated warrant.
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress, allows for foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons without a warrant, no matter where the collection occurs. The longstanding Smith v. Maryland allows for the collection and examination of communications metadata without a warrant. The FISC ruling explicitly finds legal such collection under the now-sunset Protect America Act and the current FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
In order to determine which traffic content may be collected for foreign intelligence purposes, the traffic metadata must be examined. Even when a target in question is a specific non-US Person of foreign intelligence interest, traffic metadata must first be examined in order to target that person! Because examining traffic metadata was found explicitly legal and Constitutional three decades ago by the United States Supreme Court, doing so in order to target legitimate foreign intelligence collection is a legal application in the digital world.
The major issues for foreign SIGINT were twofold:
- A lot of traffic is now digital versus analog, and cannot be targeted by aiming a directional antenna at a particular geographic locale. It is now traveling largely via things like fiber optic cables, intermixed with all manner of other communications. In order to target the collection, it is no longer a case of tapping a single landline telephone, or sitting on a Navy vessel offshore from some area of interest between individuals talking on two-way radios; it's finding that traffic in a sea of global digital communications.
- Foreign communications of non-US Persons physically outside of the US was increasingly traveling through the US. Previously fair game for foreign intelligence collection throughout the history of such collection in the United States, it suddenly became off-limits without a warrant because it was incidentally routed through locations in the United States. Foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside of the US does not require a warrant, and fundamentally still shouldn't simply because their traffic happens to enter the US.
This was a case of changing technology necessitating an update to a law. A supermajority of both houses of Congress agreed. Some comments:
Sen. Dianne Feinstein:
"This bill, in some respects, improves even on the base bill, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It provides clear protections for U.S. persons both at home and abroad. It ensures that the Government cannot conduct electronic surveillance on an American anywhere in the world without a warrant. No legislation has done that up to this point."
Then-DNI Mike McConnell:
"Now here's the other thing that most Americans don't appreciate, haven't been exposed to. When we redid that law, the law now says any U.S. person, any U.S. person, that's targeted for foreign intelligence must be protected by a warrant anywhere on the globe. So we actually have a much more stringent law today protecting Americans and civil liberties."
"The debate and the dilemma for us is how do you modernize that law for the modern age? And we debated. For two years we debated and we finally came to closure. The good news is when it was finally voted, two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate voted for it and here's what it says today: if it's a U.S. person anywhere in the globe, you must have a warrant."
Unfortunately, this discussion is so mired in polit
Security theater, from this perspective, is an attempt to convey a message: “We are doing everything possible to protect you.” When 9/11 shattered the public’s confidence in flying, Slovic says, the handful of anti-terror measures that actually work—hardening the cockpit door, positive baggage matching, more-effective intelligence—would not have addressed the public’s dread, because the measures can’t really be seen. Relying on them would have been the equivalent of saying, “Have confidence in Uncle Sam,” when the problem was the very loss of confidence. So a certain amount of theater made sense.
After witnessing enough conversations about how TSA is worthless, or worse, yet another part of an effort to acclimate hapless Americans to living in a police state, I think it's valid to consider the reasons for even "appearances" of security, and I'm glad this article laid them out clearly. Even appearances can be a deterrent.
The other points in the article are also valid. I believe we need to ask ourselves the question that if at least some amount of "theater" is appropriate, what is that amount, and what would the damage been to the air transport sector if nothing (visible) had been done? Note I don't pretend to know the answer.
Some say that money might better have been spent "educating" people why such security measures don't work, so they won't be a afraid when they don't see it. That's a task far easier said than done. Alongside the constant drumbeat in some circles that the government is out to get them, it's important to understand there are actual legitimate reasons for things the TSA is doing, seen and unseen.
None of this means that our homeland security efforts should be exempt from criticism or thoughtful scrutiny, but it needs to be done against a backdrop of reason.
Interesting semi-related story:
Skies Are Now So Safe on U.S. Flights That Experts Turn Focus to 'Surface Threats'
The US GPS constellation (NAVSTAR) has photodetectors to detect the distinctive flash of an above-ground nuclear test, among other detectors.
Not useful for an underground test, but a little known function nonetheless.
Does anyone believe that the fact he is in UK custody doesn't effectively place him in US custody, more than Swedish custody would?
Assange has said more than once, as if speaking to his supporters in America, that "they" are going to be the ones to stop "the government" from "getting him". So, he and his lawyers use things that will strike a chord, like claiming he'll be sent to Guantanamo Bay (as the current administration is so keen to do) or that he'll be killed, whether by the death penalty or otherwise (when it isn't clear that there is any legal basis on which to prosecute him).
This is just another part of his campaign to influence US public opinion, which is exactly what he does with Wikileaks. This is the real Julian Assange.
And so does Steven Aftergood, a veteran crusader against excessive government secrecy and director of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy: "WikiLeaks must be counted among the enemies of open society because it does not respect the rule of law nor does it honor the rights of individuals."
Anonymous, indiscriminate document leaking subverts the social contract in open and democratic societies. It results in is an environment where closed and repressive societies have a significant advantage in the information realm, and in the conduct of their national and diplomatic affairs, over open and democratic societies.
How WikiLeaks Just Set Back Democracy in Zimbabwe, The Atlantic, December 28, 2010
The linked text was "Ice Cube Neutrino Observatory". The text linked to the official page of the observatory. The summary is about the observatory being complete. No indirection here.
Nothing implied that the link should be to an article. You assume that they "should" have linked to a news article, instead of the observatory itself. There is no such requirement of slashdot summaries, either implicit or explicit, and there is plenty of information about IceCube on the IceCube site. If the linked text implied that there was a news article behind it, you would have a point.
As for the content of slashdot summaries being bad or needing more informaton, I believe that is a perennial issue that transcends what submitters choose to link to.
How is the official home page of the observatory, which includes that story and more in the "News" column right smack-dab in the middle of the home page the "wrong link"?
Sure, maybe the summary could have included more information, or a link to a summarizing news story, but linking to the observatory's official presence on the internet is hardly the "wrong link".
Not only that, but if you look at the actual study, even non-FOX News viewers believe a lot of crazy stuff, and it's more indicative the personal biases and beliefs of people who choose to watch FOX News, not that FOX News "makes you stupid".
You might find this study an interesting read.
Notable:
"All of the news outlets except Fox News Special Report received a score to the left of the average member of Congress. Moreover, by one of our measures all but three of these media outlets (Special Report, the Drudge Report, and ABCs World News Tonight) were closer to the average Democrat in Congress than to the median member of the House of Representatives. One of our measures found that the Drudge Report is the most centrist of all media outlets in our sample. Our other measure found that Fox News Special Report is the most centrist."
and
"Based on sentences as the level of observation (the results of which are listed in Table 8), the Drudge Report is the most centrist, Fox News Special Report is second, ABC World News Tonight is third, and CBS Evening is last.
Given that the conventional wisdom is that the Drudge Report and Fox News are conservative news outlets, this ordering might be surprising. Perhaps more surprising is the degree to which the mainstream press is liberal. The results of Table 8 show that the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, USA Today, and CBS Evening News are not only liberal, they are closer to the average Democrat in Congress (who has a score of 74.1) than they are to the median of the whole House (who has a score of 39.0). ...the New York Times is twice as far from the center as Fox News Special Report, to gain a balanced perspective, one would need to spend twice as much time watching Special Report as he or she spends reading the New York Times. ...Our results contrast strongly with the prior expectations of many others. It is easy to find quotes from prominent journalists and academics who claim that there is no systematic bias among media outlets in the U.S. ... The main conclusion of our paper is that our results simply reject such claims."
Keep in mind that they are ONLY looking at the evening news shows; if you included the opinion/editorial shows from FOX News, which constitutes nearly all of the evening/prime-time programming, I'm not sure what would happen to the results... ;-)