For those wanting some context, here is a collection of articles from a variety of sources. For those saying "show me the evidence", they wouldn't believe any evidence -- or are themselves Russian trolls.
What Does Putin Want? 5 Oct 2016
The United States should pursue confrontation where necessary and mutual interests without illusions where possible.
However therapeutic and tempting, especially during election season and after Russiaâ(TM)s direct complicity in the Syria horror, the understandable impulse to confront and isolate President Vladamir Putinâ(TM)s Russia is not wise policy. Notwithstanding the many areas of altercation as well as the doomed attempt by President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to âoeresetâ U.S.-Russia relations after the George W. Bush administration, the next president should pursue a dual strategy designed both to challenge Putin where U.S. national interests demand it but find areas of collaboration where interests coincide. The United States should pursue confrontation where necessary and mutual interests without illusions where possible.
Russia Suspends Nuclear Agreement, Ends Uranium Research Pact With United States 5 Oct 2016
âoeThe regular renewal of sanctions against Russia... demands the adoption of countermeasures against the U.S. side.â
Russia further curtailed its cooperation with the United States in nuclear energy on Wednesday, suspending a research agreement and terminating one on uranium conversion, two days after the Kremlin shelved a plutonium pact with Washington.
The Russian government said that as counter-measures to the U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia over Ukraine, it was putting aside a nuclear and energy-related research pact with the United States.
Russiaâ(TM)s Military Sophistication in the Arctic Sends Echoes of the Cold War 4 Oct 2016
Norwegian, NATO and U.S. officials express concerns over Moscowâ(TM)s increased sophistication in region
When the U.S. wants to learn what Russia is doing in the Arctic, it often turns to the Norwegian military, which has been conducting operations for decades from this Arctic town amid the fiords.
These days, it isnâ(TM)t the volume of Russian military activity in the region that concerns Norway and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Adm. Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, Norwayâ(TM)s chief of defense, says Russian military activity in the Barents Sea has grown in recent years but still pales in comparison to Cold War levels.
Except, from TFA, "The data I see suggests China, an assessment shared by the people I spoke with."
But that's impossible in your mind...it has to be the US. It could never be a US adversary with principles that run decided counter to internet freedom, human rights, and so on. Clearly this is a US effort to leave itself a capability to "take down the internet", when we are the ones ceding control of ICANN and IANA.
No one actually has to "hack" anything -- just get the thought out there. No matter who wins, stories like this will be cited by the losing side as "proof" the election was "rigged" or "hacked", and that the winner didn't win legitimately. I can think of few things more damaging to the democratic institution.
So...it's NSA's fault when foreign intelligence services conduct espionage against US political parties, media organizations, etc., and actively try to influence the outcomes of US elections, and manipulate the opinions of US citizens? You realize that no matter who wins in November, possibly millions of Americans will believe the election was stolen or rigged, and possibly by foreign influence?
I know, I know -- in this crowd, the US is the enemy, here, and we don't actually need to have any kind of foreign intelligence capability; NSA's sole purpose for being is to figure out ways to illegally spy on Americans so it can solidify the power base of shadowy elites. Or something. Whenever I need to be reminded of just how out of touch many people are with history, reality, or both, I read Slashdot comments.
I guess law enforcement shouldn't be able to use aircraft or cameras. Maybe they shouldn't be able to use cars or computers, either.
I'll say it again: it is not the technology or capability that is at issue. In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is the LAW that is paramount.
It is a remotely-controlled device, jury rigged for a purpose that is not at all its use.
I know people will become uncontrollably outraged about this, but it's a standoff weapon. Just like a spear, a bow and arrow, an explosive tossed through a door or window, a gun, or even a vehicle employed as a weapon.
The legal standard for lethal force is the same. Beware of academics or other commentators who will claim this is some kind of new territory for which there is no legal standard and that we have no idea how to approach.
But by all means: pretend this is an "Unprecedented Shift in Policing" instead of an improvisation under nightmarish circumstances.
The combination of iOS 8/9 with iPhone 6 and newer (HW security enclave) is designed to not be able to be broken by Apple, even if it wanted to.
That's not to say that nothing is breakable, ever; it's all about the level of effort required and whether or not one can bypass the crypto altogether.
No, the phone is running iOS 9 -- this is the San Bernardino phone. The phone running iOS 7 was the case in the Eastern District of New York -- which of course Apple's own law enforcement compliance statement says it will unlock when presented with a warrant, but I guess it didn't feel like it this time.
The next release of what? The iPhone 5c? Remember that part of the shortcoming here isn't in crypto or the OS, it was a combination of the newer iOS (8/9) with older hardware without the new security enclave (iPhone 5 and older).
Section 702 facilitates targeting and collection on non-US Persons outside the United States whose communications enters, traverses, or otherwise touches the United States, as over 70% of international internet traffic does, or as does any non-US Person outside the US using any US-based cloud or internet service.
Where US Persons come in is because US corporations and organizations are also "US Persons". But if we suddenly say that doing foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside the US should require the same individualized warrant protections as Americans citizens living in the US, it absurdly turns the entire purpose and function of foreign intelligence collection on its head.
And if you already don't trust the government, you won't care about anything in this explanation anyway.
I. Extracting Data from Passcode Locked iOS Devices
[...]
For iOS devices running iOS versions earlier than iOS 8.0, upon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices. Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Appleâ(TM)s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (âoeuser generated active filesâ), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 through iOS 7. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, iMessage, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party app data.
You again reiterated the false choice. I explained exactly why it is a false choice, and why some possible solutions, which may or may not be available under all circumstances, can address some of the problems without weakening crypto standards themselves, or weakening existing complete crypto systems. That you don't want to acknowledge this is so does not make it untrue. You are focused on backdoors, various key escrow solutions, and the like, and not on practical reality.
Liberty and Safety are not at two ends of a zero-sum sliding scale, wherein one must be sacrificed in discrete and equal units for the other. We can and should have a good measure of both, and it is government's charge to provide for the latter, while protecting (or, depending on your view, not infringing upon) the former. To say nothing of the fact that our very existence has been an exercise in the sacrifice of "liberty" for an orderly civil society governed by the rule of law, except in the fantasies of internet tech-libertarians.
And what a worthless survey: "warrantless surveillance" of what? Of who? Foreign intelligence targets do not require and never have required a warrant.
Gone are the days where the US targeted foreign communications on distant shores, or cracked codes used only by our enemies. No one would have questioned the legitimacy of the US and its allies breaking the German or Japanese codes or exploiting enemy communications equipment during WWII. The difference today is that US adversaries -- from terrorists to nation-states -- use many of the same systems, services, networks, operating systems, devices, software, hardware, cloud services, encryption standards, and so on, as Americans and much of the rest of the world. They use iPhones, Windows, Dell servers, Android tablets, Cisco routers, Netgear wireless access points, Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, Gmail, and so on.
The distinction is no longer the technology or the place, but the person(s) using a capability: the target. In a free society based on the rule of law, it is not the capability, but the law, that is paramount.
US adversaries use the very same technologies we use. The fact that Americans or others also use them does not suddenly or magically mean that no element of the US Intelligence Community should ever target them. When a terrorist in foreign country is using Hotmail or an iPhone instead of a walkie-talkie, that cannot mean we pack our bags and go home. That means that, within clear and specific legal authorities and duly authorized missions of the Intelligence Community, we aggressively pursue any and all possible avenues, within the law, that allow us to intercept and exploit the communications of foreign intelligence targets.
If they are using hand couriers, we target them. If they are using walkie-talkies, we target them. If they are using their own custom methods for protecting their communications, we target them. If they are using HF radios, VSATs, satellite phones, or smoke signals, we target them. If they are using Gmail, Facebook, iPhones, Android, SSL, web forums running on Amazon Web Services, etc., we target them -- within clear and specific legal frameworks that govern the way our intelligence agencies operate, including with regard to US Persons.
That doesn't mean it's always perfect; that doesn't mean things are not up for debate; that doesn't mean everyone will agree with every possible legal interpretation; that doesn't mean that some may fundamentally disagree with the US approach to, e.g., counterterrorism. But the intelligence agencies do not make the rules, and while we may inform issues, we do not define national policy or priorities.
And on backdoors, we don't need "backdoors".
What we do need is this:
A clear acknowledgment that what increasingly exists essentially amounts to a virtual fortress impenetrable by the legal mechanisms of free society, that many of those systems are developed and employed by US companies, and that US adversaries use those systems -- sometimes specifically and deliberately because they are in the US -- against the US and our allies, and for a discussion to start from that point.
The US has a clear and compelling interest in strong encryption, and especially in protecting US encryption systems used by our government, our citizens, and people around the world, from defeat. But the assumption that the only alternatives are either universal strong encryption, or wholesale and deliberate weakening of encryption systems and/o
No. No limits on speech. That is exactly the wrong idea. But being on a CT watchlist if you're immersed in ISIS propaganda, and don't have a clear reason otherwise for doing so? Yep, that's gonna happen.
Problem with watchlists?
Quiz:
1. Should the government have the ability to keep ANY list(s), to include names and other attributes of people, for counterterrorism and intelligence purposes?
2. Should the government be able to watch non-protected aspects of a US Person suspected of terrorism, foreign intelligence ties, etc., without a warrant?
3. Should the government be able to watch protected aspects of a US Person suspected of terrorism, foreign intelligence ties, etc., with a warrant?
4. Can the government keep secret the fact that a US Person (or any other person) is on any CT watchlist and/or is subject of a CT/CI investigation?
5. Should the government be able to deprive a US Person of Constitutional rights without due process, or by virtue of appearance on a CT watchlist?
Your whole extended statement fell apart with the title.
"NSL = for things that DO NOT require a warrant"
Actually, warrants are the mechanism by which a free society achieves balance between personal and collective rights. Absent that...
Nope. Not everything government does requires a warrant. That is an undeniable fact. The case law which says metadata, for example, affirmatively does not require a warrant, has no expectation of privacy, and is not covered by the Fourth Amendment, is over 35 years old.
It got even weaker when you stated that "NSLs DO have massive amounts of LEGAL oversight..." States facts not in evidence. What, exactly, are these "massive" oversight mechanisms?
"Hey, can you help us out..." is laughable because you characterize this as a friendly understanding between actors who know each other. In fact an NSL is 100% coercive, cannot be challenged, and it's secrecy is the ultimate weapon. An NSL compels the recipient to do as demanded and never tell anyone else. The NSL itself could be illegal but the recipient cannot even inform a lawyer, as that would violate the secrecy provisions. Oh, but do tell us about the "massive" oversight.
But NSLs -- which are nothing more than a letter -- are not illegal. That's the point. In fact, the only thing found unconstitutional about NSLs were the extent and length of the gag orders accompanying them.
By your logic, any law enforcement or government entity should NEVER be able to approach a business about anything and ask for help. It should ALWAYS require a court order, no matter the information requested. That's how you might think it should work, but that is not compatible with reality.
When you state "...if a NSL is used, the person is almost certainly a foreign intelligence target under active investigation..." you put the cart before the horse. Your language is that of conclusions concerning a criminal, as found by a court of law. Except this comes before a court of law has had any chance to hear a case. This is lazy argumentation to support a flawed process.
No, you are putting the cart before the horse by implying that a warrant is required for information or persons who fundamentally DO NOT require a warrant. What you are essentially saying is that a warrant-like approval process needs to happen for any sort of action or information request government takes or makes, ever, to ensure that the government isn't "lying" about it not needing a warrant...which defeats the whole purpose, and timeliness, of not needing a warrant.
Finally, you mention FISA. This joke of a process has a 97% warrant approval rate. Standard court warrants have about a 60% approval rate. Literally nothing else needs be said about how weak the FISA process is; statistically, this approval rate cannot be explained or justified. Except, by repeating what the FISA court really is: A one-sided process meant to produce a Yes answer, with no right of reply or rebuttal. Retroactive FISA warrants are further evidence of the corrupt/flawed/lazy thinking that produced FISA in the first place.
This comment truly shows your ignorance, because you have no idea how FISA works. At all. The IC does not approach FISA with requests that will probably get denied, because it is a massive waste of time and resources for the literal armies of lawyers who submit FISA requests -- for FOREIGN intelligence collection -- on behalf of IC agencies. Law enforcement agencies, however, do this all the time because they have no other choice but to try. So your assumption that just because the approval rate is high is because it's a "rubber stamp" and really doesn't care about what it's approving is false.
Of course, you have already made up your mind and use a lot of specious and absolutely false logic to arrive at your conclusions, so this conversation is moot.
Note what this (or any) NSL does not request, for good or ill given the explosion in digital communications since Smith v Maryland in 1979 and subsequent case law (which effectively says that metadata, as "business records" provided to a third party, do not have an expectation of privacy and are not covered by the Fourth Amendment): CONTENT of communications.
Note what is also missing here: the target. People assume it's an innocent US Person. The fact is, if a NSL is used, the person is almost certainly a foreign intelligence target under active investigation, and the reason why requests are "dropped" is because IF a NSL was used in the first place, we don't want to reveal any further sources, methods, or what we know.
Unless and until the Supreme Court of the United States speaks on this matter again -- and it very well may, and it very well may rule differently given how the communications landscape has changed in 35+ years -- that is the law of the land. Not peoples' opinions, not tech commentator know-it-alls, not self-proclaimed security experts.
If something doesn't legally require a warrant, it amounts to a formal request. I'm not saying it's always perfect execution, but the whole purpose of a NSL is so that it runs through its own legal process -- which, again, is for information that does NOT require a warrant. I know people think it has no oversight, but either something requires judicial oversight, or it doesn't. And NSLs DO have massive amounts of LEGAL oversight, just not a warrant signed by a judge -- repeating myself here -- because one isn't required for information sought by a NSL.
And like information that we seek under Intelligence Community authorities, we don't want the target of the collection or surveillance knowing we are targeting them, or where, or how. Yeah, it sucks, and it's imperfect, and all that, but even in a democratic society, you can't just say every single national security or intelligence issue has to be in the open. That's not how even democratic societies work, or can work, or should work, when it comes to national security matters. Some things tilt too far in one direction based on national events, or politics, etc. Then they tilt back. It's never fast enough for proponents or critics.
The main issue is that people say that something like a NSL is "bad" because it doesn't have judicial oversight in the form of a warrant. If the information sought doesn't legally require a warrant, I don't know what to tell them. Then when we do actual court orders and warrants when required for foreign intelligence collection, issued by the very court whose sole purpose is to protect the rights of Americans under the law and Constitution in the context of foreign intelligence collection, they complain because the evidence is heard and rulings are issued in secret.
A NSL at its core is nothing more than a formal process and notification, with a lot of other legal considerations surrounding it, that is the equivalent of someone saying, "Hey, can you help us out...and oh, by the way, here's a bunch of other legal crap which justifies this. And don't tell anyone, because this is a national security issue." I understand why people make an issue of it, because they'll say, ok, even if it's used for all "bad guys" it still "could be abused". Uh, and? Any government power at all "can be abused". Secret ones "can be abused" in secret.
And yet, the government still has to have powers, and some of them on the national security and intelligence side are necessarily cloaked in secrecy. And in the conduct of war, diplomacy, law enforcement, and counterterrorism as the United States, with our myriad interests at home and abroad, we do all of these things for a reason. No, it's never perfect, and it never will be. People act surprised when the use of something like NSLs skyrockets since the late 90s...well, guess what else skyrocketed since the late 90s? The goddamned internet, which we invented, and our enemies are literally using it against us. No, not bullshit lik
Put simply, there exist plenty of systems and techniques that don't depend on a third-party who could possibly grant access to secure communications. These systems aren't going to disappear. Why would terrorists or other criminals use a system that could be monitored by authorities when secure alternatives exist? Why would ordinary people?
That's a really easy answer -- terrorists use these simple platforms for the same reason normal people do: because they're easy to use. Obviously a lot of our techniques and capabilities have been laid bare, but people use things like WhatsApp, iMessage, and Telegram because they're easy. It's the same reason that ordinary people -- and terrorists -- don't use Ello instead of Facebook, or ProtonMail instead of Gmail. And when people switch to more complicated, non-turnkey encryption solutions -- no matter how "simple" the more savvy may think them -- they make mistakes that can render their communications security measures vulnerable to defeat.
I'm not saying that the vendors and cloud providers ALWAYS can provide assistance; but sometimes they can, given a particular target (device, email address, etc.), and they can do so in a way that comports with the rule of law in free society, doesn't require creating backdoors in encryption, and doesn't require "weakening" their products. And of course, it would be good if we were able to leverage certain things against legitimate foreign intelligence targets without the entire world knowing exactly what we are doing, so our enemies know exactly how to avoid it. Secrecy is required for the successful conduct of intelligence operations, even in free societies.
This is ULA saying, essentially, "You give us the Russian-sourced RD-180s because they're cheaper and less of a hassle for us, or we're taking our ball and going home."
The communication has to be decrypted somewhere; the endpoint(s) can be exploited in various ways. That can be done now. US vendors could, in theory, be at least a partial aid in that process on a device-by-device basis, within clear and specific legal authorities, without doing anything like key escrow, wholesale weakening of encryption, or similar with regard to software or devices themselves.
The point is that when US adversaries use systems and services physically located in the US, designed and operated by US companies, there are many things that could be discussed depending on the precise system, service, software, or device. Pretending that there is absolutely nothing that can be done, and it's either unbreakable, universal encryption for all, or nothing, is a false choice.
To sit here and pretend that it's some kind of "people's victory" when a technical system renders itself effectively impenetrable to the legitimate legal, judicial, and intelligence processes of even democratic governments operating under the rule of law in free civil society is curious indeed.
Slashdot Mirror
There isn't any "evidence" in the press release. It's an announcement; an accusation.
With regard to your last question, here is a starting point:
https://www.washingtonpost.com...
If you're looking for more, start here:
https://slashdot.org/comments....
Yes, there couldn't be any other reason for anyone to collect such articles...
Foiled again!
For those wanting some context, here is a collection of articles from a variety of sources. For those saying "show me the evidence", they wouldn't believe any evidence -- or are themselves Russian trolls.
What Does Putin Want?
5 Oct 2016
The United States should pursue confrontation where necessary and mutual interests without illusions where possible.
However therapeutic and tempting, especially during election season and after Russiaâ(TM)s direct complicity in the Syria horror, the understandable impulse to confront and isolate President Vladamir Putinâ(TM)s Russia is not wise policy. Notwithstanding the many areas of altercation as well as the doomed attempt by President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to âoeresetâ U.S.-Russia relations after the George W. Bush administration, the next president should pursue a dual strategy designed both to challenge Putin where U.S. national interests demand it but find areas of collaboration where interests coincide. The United States should pursue confrontation where necessary and mutual interests without illusions where possible.
http://nationalinterest.org/fe...
---
Russia Suspends Nuclear Agreement, Ends Uranium Research Pact With United States
5 Oct 2016
âoeThe regular renewal of sanctions against Russia ... demands the adoption of countermeasures against the U.S. side.â
Russia further curtailed its cooperation with the United States in nuclear energy on Wednesday, suspending a research agreement and terminating one on uranium conversion, two days after the Kremlin shelved a plutonium pact with Washington.
The Russian government said that as counter-measures to the U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia over Ukraine, it was putting aside a nuclear and energy-related research pact with the United States.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/...
---
Russian state newspapers predict âdirect military conflictâ(TM) with US as it compares Syria stalemate to Cuban missile crisis
5 Oct 2016
'Third World War' fears have been voiced by the newspapers over the growing tensions with the USA
A RUSSIAN newspaper fears a Third World War with the US over Syria.
Tabloid Moskovsky Komsomolets predicts a âoedirect military confrontationâ on par with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/...
---
Russiaâ(TM)s Military Sophistication in the Arctic Sends Echoes of the Cold War
4 Oct 2016
Norwegian, NATO and U.S. officials express concerns over Moscowâ(TM)s increased sophistication in region
When the U.S. wants to learn what Russia is doing in the Arctic, it often turns to the Norwegian military, which has been conducting operations for decades from this Arctic town amid the fiords.
These days, it isnâ(TM)t the volume of Russian military activity in the region that concerns Norway and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Adm. Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, Norwayâ(TM)s chief of defense, says Russian military activity in the Barents Sea has grown in recent years but still pales in comparison to Cold War levels.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ru...
---
Amid Deteriorating U.S.-Russia Relations, Questions Grow About Cyberwar
4 Oct 2016
Just when you thought U.S.-Russia relations couldn't get worse, diplomatic deals on both Syria and nuclear security fell apart this week.
Moscow went first, announcing that it was pulling out of a landmark agreement on plutonium. Russia's President V
Except, from TFA, "The data I see suggests China, an assessment shared by the people I spoke with."
But that's impossible in your mind...it has to be the US. It could never be a US adversary with principles that run decided counter to internet freedom, human rights, and so on. Clearly this is a US effort to leave itself a capability to "take down the internet", when we are the ones ceding control of ICANN and IANA.
"The data I see suggests China, an assessment shared by the people I spoke with."
Of course, that will be buried in these comments that it's a US false flag, that obviously it's the US that's responsible, etc.
It couldn't possibly be someone like China.
No one actually has to "hack" anything -- just get the thought out there. No matter who wins, stories like this will be cited by the losing side as "proof" the election was "rigged" or "hacked", and that the winner didn't win legitimately. I can think of few things more damaging to the democratic institution.
See also:
A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories
So...it's NSA's fault when foreign intelligence services conduct espionage against US political parties, media organizations, etc., and actively try to influence the outcomes of US elections, and manipulate the opinions of US citizens? You realize that no matter who wins in November, possibly millions of Americans will believe the election was stolen or rigged, and possibly by foreign influence?
I know, I know -- in this crowd, the US is the enemy, here, and we don't actually need to have any kind of foreign intelligence capability; NSA's sole purpose for being is to figure out ways to illegally spy on Americans so it can solidify the power base of shadowy elites. Or something. Whenever I need to be reminded of just how out of touch many people are with history, reality, or both, I read Slashdot comments.
Yes, the Russian intelligence services have the best interests of democracy and the United States at heart!
Note to nimbius: look up the term "useful idiot".
Read:
http://observer.com/2016/08/ns...
https://www.lawfareblog.com/ve...
I guess law enforcement shouldn't be able to use aircraft or cameras. Maybe they shouldn't be able to use cars or computers, either.
I'll say it again: it is not the technology or capability that is at issue. In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is the LAW that is paramount.
It is a remotely-controlled device, jury rigged for a purpose that is not at all its use.
I know people will become uncontrollably outraged about this, but it's a standoff weapon. Just like a spear, a bow and arrow, an explosive tossed through a door or window, a gun, or even a vehicle employed as a weapon.
The legal standard for lethal force is the same. Beware of academics or other commentators who will claim this is some kind of new territory for which there is no legal standard and that we have no idea how to approach.
But by all means: pretend this is an "Unprecedented Shift in Policing" instead of an improvisation under nightmarish circumstances.
I was referring to the iOS 7 device, which they can easily unlock/break (see Section I), but declined to do so this time (the EDNY case).
The combination of iOS 8/9 with iPhone 6 and newer (HW security enclave) is designed to not be able to be broken by Apple, even if it wanted to.
That's not to say that nothing is breakable, ever; it's all about the level of effort required and whether or not one can bypass the crypto altogether.
No, the phone is running iOS 9 -- this is the San Bernardino phone. The phone running iOS 7 was the case in the Eastern District of New York -- which of course Apple's own law enforcement compliance statement says it will unlock when presented with a warrant, but I guess it didn't feel like it this time.
The next release of what? The iPhone 5c? Remember that part of the shortcoming here isn't in crypto or the OS, it was a combination of the newer iOS (8/9) with older hardware without the new security enclave (iPhone 5 and older).
Section 702 facilitates targeting and collection on non-US Persons outside the United States whose communications enters, traverses, or otherwise touches the United States, as over 70% of international internet traffic does, or as does any non-US Person outside the US using any US-based cloud or internet service.
Where US Persons come in is because US corporations and organizations are also "US Persons". But if we suddenly say that doing foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside the US should require the same individualized warrant protections as Americans citizens living in the US, it absurdly turns the entire purpose and function of foreign intelligence collection on its head.
And if you already don't trust the government, you won't care about anything in this explanation anyway.
...I guess it's time for Apple to update its law enforcement compliance guide:
I. Extracting Data from Passcode Locked iOS Devices
[...]
For iOS devices running iOS versions earlier than iOS 8.0, upon receipt of a valid search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices. Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Appleâ(TM)s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (âoeuser generated active filesâ), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 through iOS 7. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, iMessage, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party app data.
You again reiterated the false choice. I explained exactly why it is a false choice, and why some possible solutions, which may or may not be available under all circumstances, can address some of the problems without weakening crypto standards themselves, or weakening existing complete crypto systems. That you don't want to acknowledge this is so does not make it untrue. You are focused on backdoors, various key escrow solutions, and the like, and not on practical reality.
Yes, because you certainly wouldn't want your echo chamber sullied by someone who actually understands the issues! My apologies!
Liberty and Safety are not at two ends of a zero-sum sliding scale, wherein one must be sacrificed in discrete and equal units for the other. We can and should have a good measure of both, and it is government's charge to provide for the latter, while protecting (or, depending on your view, not infringing upon) the former. To say nothing of the fact that our very existence has been an exercise in the sacrifice of "liberty" for an orderly civil society governed by the rule of law, except in the fantasies of internet tech-libertarians.
And what a worthless survey: "warrantless surveillance" of what? Of who? Foreign intelligence targets do not require and never have required a warrant.
Gone are the days where the US targeted foreign communications on distant shores, or cracked codes used only by our enemies. No one would have questioned the legitimacy of the US and its allies breaking the German or Japanese codes or exploiting enemy communications equipment during WWII. The difference today is that US adversaries -- from terrorists to nation-states -- use many of the same systems, services, networks, operating systems, devices, software, hardware, cloud services, encryption standards, and so on, as Americans and much of the rest of the world. They use iPhones, Windows, Dell servers, Android tablets, Cisco routers, Netgear wireless access points, Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, Gmail, and so on.
The distinction is no longer the technology or the place, but the person(s) using a capability: the target. In a free society based on the rule of law, it is not the capability, but the law, that is paramount.
US adversaries use the very same technologies we use. The fact that Americans or others also use them does not suddenly or magically mean that no element of the US Intelligence Community should ever target them. When a terrorist in foreign country is using Hotmail or an iPhone instead of a walkie-talkie, that cannot mean we pack our bags and go home. That means that, within clear and specific legal authorities and duly authorized missions of the Intelligence Community, we aggressively pursue any and all possible avenues, within the law, that allow us to intercept and exploit the communications of foreign intelligence targets.
If they are using hand couriers, we target them. If they are using walkie-talkies, we target them. If they are using their own custom methods for protecting their communications, we target them. If they are using HF radios, VSATs, satellite phones, or smoke signals, we target them. If they are using Gmail, Facebook, iPhones, Android, SSL, web forums running on Amazon Web Services, etc., we target them -- within clear and specific legal frameworks that govern the way our intelligence agencies operate, including with regard to US Persons.
That doesn't mean it's always perfect; that doesn't mean things are not up for debate; that doesn't mean everyone will agree with every possible legal interpretation; that doesn't mean that some may fundamentally disagree with the US approach to, e.g., counterterrorism. But the intelligence agencies do not make the rules, and while we may inform issues, we do not define national policy or priorities.
And on backdoors, we don't need "backdoors".
What we do need is this:
A clear acknowledgment that what increasingly exists essentially amounts to a virtual fortress impenetrable by the legal mechanisms of free society, that many of those systems are developed and employed by US companies, and that US adversaries use those systems -- sometimes specifically and deliberately because they are in the US -- against the US and our allies, and for a discussion to start from that point.
The US has a clear and compelling interest in strong encryption, and especially in protecting US encryption systems used by our government, our citizens, and people around the world, from defeat. But the assumption that the only alternatives are either universal strong encryption, or wholesale and deliberate weakening of encryption systems and/o
No. No limits on speech. That is exactly the wrong idea. But being on a CT watchlist if you're immersed in ISIS propaganda, and don't have a clear reason otherwise for doing so? Yep, that's gonna happen.
Problem with watchlists?
Quiz:
1. Should the government have the ability to keep ANY list(s), to include names and other attributes of people, for counterterrorism and intelligence purposes?
2. Should the government be able to watch non-protected aspects of a US Person suspected of terrorism, foreign intelligence ties, etc., without a warrant?
3. Should the government be able to watch protected aspects of a US Person suspected of terrorism, foreign intelligence ties, etc., with a warrant?
4. Can the government keep secret the fact that a US Person (or any other person) is on any CT watchlist and/or is subject of a CT/CI investigation?
5. Should the government be able to deprive a US Person of Constitutional rights without due process, or by virtue of appearance on a CT watchlist?
Answer key: 1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. Yes. 4. Yes. 5. No.
Your whole extended statement fell apart with the title.
"NSL = for things that DO NOT require a warrant"
Actually, warrants are the mechanism by which a free society achieves balance between personal and collective rights. Absent that...
Nope. Not everything government does requires a warrant. That is an undeniable fact. The case law which says metadata, for example, affirmatively does not require a warrant, has no expectation of privacy, and is not covered by the Fourth Amendment, is over 35 years old.
It got even weaker when you stated that "NSLs DO have massive amounts of LEGAL oversight..." States facts not in evidence. What, exactly, are these "massive" oversight mechanisms?
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/in...
"Hey, can you help us out..." is laughable because you characterize this as a friendly understanding between actors who know each other. In fact an NSL is 100% coercive, cannot be challenged, and it's secrecy is the ultimate weapon. An NSL compels the recipient to do as demanded and never tell anyone else. The NSL itself could be illegal but the recipient cannot even inform a lawyer, as that would violate the secrecy provisions. Oh, but do tell us about the "massive" oversight.
But NSLs -- which are nothing more than a letter -- are not illegal. That's the point. In fact, the only thing found unconstitutional about NSLs were the extent and length of the gag orders accompanying them.
By your logic, any law enforcement or government entity should NEVER be able to approach a business about anything and ask for help. It should ALWAYS require a court order, no matter the information requested. That's how you might think it should work, but that is not compatible with reality.
When you state "...if a NSL is used, the person is almost certainly a foreign intelligence target under active investigation..." you put the cart before the horse. Your language is that of conclusions concerning a criminal, as found by a court of law. Except this comes before a court of law has had any chance to hear a case. This is lazy argumentation to support a flawed process.
No, you are putting the cart before the horse by implying that a warrant is required for information or persons who fundamentally DO NOT require a warrant. What you are essentially saying is that a warrant-like approval process needs to happen for any sort of action or information request government takes or makes, ever, to ensure that the government isn't "lying" about it not needing a warrant...which defeats the whole purpose, and timeliness, of not needing a warrant.
Finally, you mention FISA. This joke of a process has a 97% warrant approval rate. Standard court warrants have about a 60% approval rate. Literally nothing else needs be said about how weak the FISA process is; statistically, this approval rate cannot be explained or justified. Except, by repeating what the FISA court really is: A one-sided process meant to produce a Yes answer, with no right of reply or rebuttal. Retroactive FISA warrants are further evidence of the corrupt/flawed/lazy thinking that produced FISA in the first place.
This comment truly shows your ignorance, because you have no idea how FISA works. At all. The IC does not approach FISA with requests that will probably get denied, because it is a massive waste of time and resources for the literal armies of lawyers who submit FISA requests -- for FOREIGN intelligence collection -- on behalf of IC agencies. Law enforcement agencies, however, do this all the time because they have no other choice but to try. So your assumption that just because the approval rate is high is because it's a "rubber stamp" and really doesn't care about what it's approving is false.
Of course, you have already made up your mind and use a lot of specious and absolutely false logic to arrive at your conclusions, so this conversation is moot.
Note what this (or any) NSL does not request, for good or ill given the explosion in digital communications since Smith v Maryland in 1979 and subsequent case law (which effectively says that metadata, as "business records" provided to a third party, do not have an expectation of privacy and are not covered by the Fourth Amendment): CONTENT of communications.
Note what is also missing here: the target. People assume it's an innocent US Person. The fact is, if a NSL is used, the person is almost certainly a foreign intelligence target under active investigation, and the reason why requests are "dropped" is because IF a NSL was used in the first place, we don't want to reveal any further sources, methods, or what we know.
Unless and until the Supreme Court of the United States speaks on this matter again -- and it very well may, and it very well may rule differently given how the communications landscape has changed in 35+ years -- that is the law of the land. Not peoples' opinions, not tech commentator know-it-alls, not self-proclaimed security experts.
If something doesn't legally require a warrant, it amounts to a formal request. I'm not saying it's always perfect execution, but the whole purpose of a NSL is so that it runs through its own legal process -- which, again, is for information that does NOT require a warrant. I know people think it has no oversight, but either something requires judicial oversight, or it doesn't. And NSLs DO have massive amounts of LEGAL oversight, just not a warrant signed by a judge -- repeating myself here -- because one isn't required for information sought by a NSL.
And like information that we seek under Intelligence Community authorities, we don't want the target of the collection or surveillance knowing we are targeting them, or where, or how. Yeah, it sucks, and it's imperfect, and all that, but even in a democratic society, you can't just say every single national security or intelligence issue has to be in the open. That's not how even democratic societies work, or can work, or should work, when it comes to national security matters. Some things tilt too far in one direction based on national events, or politics, etc. Then they tilt back. It's never fast enough for proponents or critics.
The main issue is that people say that something like a NSL is "bad" because it doesn't have judicial oversight in the form of a warrant. If the information sought doesn't legally require a warrant, I don't know what to tell them. Then when we do actual court orders and warrants when required for foreign intelligence collection, issued by the very court whose sole purpose is to protect the rights of Americans under the law and Constitution in the context of foreign intelligence collection, they complain because the evidence is heard and rulings are issued in secret.
A NSL at its core is nothing more than a formal process and notification, with a lot of other legal considerations surrounding it, that is the equivalent of someone saying, "Hey, can you help us out...and oh, by the way, here's a bunch of other legal crap which justifies this. And don't tell anyone, because this is a national security issue." I understand why people make an issue of it, because they'll say, ok, even if it's used for all "bad guys" it still "could be abused". Uh, and? Any government power at all "can be abused". Secret ones "can be abused" in secret.
And yet, the government still has to have powers, and some of them on the national security and intelligence side are necessarily cloaked in secrecy. And in the conduct of war, diplomacy, law enforcement, and counterterrorism as the United States, with our myriad interests at home and abroad, we do all of these things for a reason. No, it's never perfect, and it never will be. People act surprised when the use of something like NSLs skyrockets since the late 90s...well, guess what else skyrocketed since the late 90s? The goddamned internet, which we invented, and our enemies are literally using it against us. No, not bullshit lik
Put simply, there exist plenty of systems and techniques that don't depend on a third-party who could possibly grant access to secure communications. These systems aren't going to disappear. Why would terrorists or other criminals use a system that could be monitored by authorities when secure alternatives exist? Why would ordinary people?
That's a really easy answer -- terrorists use these simple platforms for the same reason normal people do: because they're easy to use. Obviously a lot of our techniques and capabilities have been laid bare, but people use things like WhatsApp, iMessage, and Telegram because they're easy. It's the same reason that ordinary people -- and terrorists -- don't use Ello instead of Facebook, or ProtonMail instead of Gmail. And when people switch to more complicated, non-turnkey encryption solutions -- no matter how "simple" the more savvy may think them -- they make mistakes that can render their communications security measures vulnerable to defeat.
I'm not saying that the vendors and cloud providers ALWAYS can provide assistance; but sometimes they can, given a particular target (device, email address, etc.), and they can do so in a way that comports with the rule of law in free society, doesn't require creating backdoors in encryption, and doesn't require "weakening" their products. And of course, it would be good if we were able to leverage certain things against legitimate foreign intelligence targets without the entire world knowing exactly what we are doing, so our enemies know exactly how to avoid it. Secrecy is required for the successful conduct of intelligence operations, even in free societies.
...so I don't really understand this.
No, wait, I do.
This is ULA saying, essentially, "You give us the Russian-sourced RD-180s because they're cheaper and less of a hassle for us, or we're taking our ball and going home."
http://aviationweek.com/awin/u...
Sure. One hypothetical example:
The communication has to be decrypted somewhere; the endpoint(s) can be exploited in various ways. That can be done now. US vendors could, in theory, be at least a partial aid in that process on a device-by-device basis, within clear and specific legal authorities, without doing anything like key escrow, wholesale weakening of encryption, or similar with regard to software or devices themselves.
The point is that when US adversaries use systems and services physically located in the US, designed and operated by US companies, there are many things that could be discussed depending on the precise system, service, software, or device. Pretending that there is absolutely nothing that can be done, and it's either unbreakable, universal encryption for all, or nothing, is a false choice.
To sit here and pretend that it's some kind of "people's victory" when a technical system renders itself effectively impenetrable to the legitimate legal, judicial, and intelligence processes of even democratic governments operating under the rule of law in free civil society is curious indeed.