Well http does not work either. So it's not simply a UDP ping drop issue as you guess. Http just hangs the browser waiting for a response. Go through an anonymous proxy like Zund2 and the piratebay.org page comes right up.
Well at some point it has to get onto a network backbone and you won't have any control over the path it takes. Having a server elsewhere may not really help as this practice spreads.
Forget Shaping, how about active censorship of some websites. here's the traceroute:...snip...
5 pos-5-0-0-ar01.albuquerque.nm.albuq.comcast.net
6 te-0-7-0-0-cr01.atlanta.ga.ibone.comcast.net
7 te-0-0-0-0-cr01.stratford.tx.ibone.comcast.net
8 comcast-ip-services-llc-los-angles.tengigabitethernet6-3.ar4.lax1.gblx.net
9 tengigabitethernet6-3.ar4.lax1.gblx.net (64.211.110.153) 10 port80.ge-2-0-0.407ar1.arn1.gblx.net (207.138.144.102) 11 * *
As you can see it dies in comcasts network. I can still get to piratebay.org via anonymous proxy, so it's definitely a comcast issue.
If this is such a great hypothesis then why did things like the AMD geode or the recent (forgetting the name) $20/month balck box computer catch fire?
was the time just not right?
Also if you look at these mini PCs it seems like their are teirs on these. Some are low cost low power, some are higher cost higher power. when people talk about these on slashdot the conversation goes like this:
nerd 1: oooh the XO is only $100 or $200 dollars.
nerd 2: yeah but it's a dog. I could get an fluvio flivitron for only $100 more and it has a real graphics card.
etc...
so no one on slashdot is really interested in the low end machine other than to talk about it's price. (Except of course when the price-tards are trying to put down macs by claiming this or that POS is "the same" but costs less)
Parliamentary elections tend to be infrequent and usualy have about 2 questions on the ballot. Moreover the districting is simpler.
IN the US, there tend to be about 60 to 120 elected offices and questions on the ballot. Any given precint can have many different ballots depending on what jurisdiction you live in (e.g. congressional, legislative, school, judicial, and city districts can casue ballot permuations). Additionally there can be ballots in multiple languages and handicap access rules.
we also have elections a lot more frequently and we also have most elections three times: two to select the candidates for each party and once to choose between parties.
There are a variety of reasons why publishing in a low tech way before submitting is good.
The main reasons are to make it transparent that avenues of reverse information flow are being as foreclosed as possible.
There are a number of examples where machines ostensibly only receiving data are actually changing data on the primary source. IN voting systems this is especially a risk because the machines that collate votes tend to be more sophisticated general purpose systems, thus ripe for more attacks, and are a single point of failure. While the data is still in low tech form, before being connected to a higher tech instrument is the time to publish it.
For example, some diebold systems network all the terminals together to a master terminal. There's already demo viruses that back propoagate during this transaction.
And example of this outside the voting area is the case of the guy who robbed casion machines. He used the testing machine to corrupt the firmware of the one armed bandits it was supposedly just "testing".
In your case, even though know electronic connection is involved, it forces a commitment to the proposed transaction before the operator has a placed the phone call during which some sort of collusion could occur.
it's not that collusion could not occur other ways. It's just that the protocol forecloses some opportunities and enhances transparency. it cuts down on the time for collusion that might occur with later reporting sites.
The chances of election tampering happening in your berg are pretty slim. People are just not sophisticated enough and the system is in too much flux to pull is off easily. As things settle and people gain experience the security holes will be bigger issues.
The bigger issues are two fold. Errors and the Appearance of fraud. These are indistinguishable on electronic voting machines.
So you job is to stay calm and go the extra mile to keep everything transparent. It does me no good if your deputy, the guy you've know since you were 8, donated his kidney to you, and married your kid sister seem trustworthy to you. You still have to do things the long boring way. Two people do operations, other witness. No ones word is taken for granted.
post results on the precint door if the law allows, BEFORE you transmit any results.
transparency is the key to trustworthy elections. Don't worry so much about fraud as making people see how the process works.
First your question holds the telescope at the wrong end. Tampering by voters is much less likely to occur because it is unlikely to change an election out come or occur in an undetectable manner. The people to watch are the election officials, with pre-a nd post voting access to the machines.
That said what a voter can do depends on what machines you have in use. Lets consider the big three Diebold, Seqouia edge or ES&S ivotronic and no voter verified paper trails.
On the ES&S, the voter is usually facing the machine in a privacy carrel and the machine is a flat block. It very possible for a voter to complete obscure the following transaction ( I know because I've done it). Flip the 5 pound machine over and you find little plastic door. you can easily force this open. Behind it is the Flash memory cards. Yank these out and put them in your pocket. close the food and flip the machine over. Leave and the election is screwed.
It's also possible a diabolically well outfitted voter could have a second PBS device in his pocket. Armed with that, he can can admin access to the machine and do anything they like and vote as many times as they wish.
With Sequoias edges, depending on the model revision number there can be a little yellow button on the back. Pressing that causes the machine to go in to supervisor mode. If I lean forward I can just reach around and get that button. If you were watching you could see me execute this clumsy maneauver.
I've never had the chance to play with diebolds so I can't offer specifics Some diebolds have an unguarded IR port that a hacker might be able to do something interesting with on their palm pilot. But I don't think there's any known attacks yet.
On all of these machines, it's possible to miscalibrate the screens. The screens can be miscalibrated by heat or scratching them with keys. In the neighboring county we had one guy running for office actually carve his name into the machine. Unfucking believable.
That same county had a vote buying operation going on (a few people got arrested and convicted). So make sure people vote alone.
For systems with paper tapes (not paper ballots) you can sell your vote if you have a camera or cell-phone camera because a picture of the voted paper tape before it scrolls out of sight is proof of vote. So no cameras!
But the problem with all these is that there's a huge risk to the bad voter and they can only affect a few votes. At worst they wreck one machine and probably get caught. Vote flipping is hard if not impossible at the retail level.
THe really fun things happen when supervisors can reprogram systems, get access to the flash media and have the ability to replace it.
Perhaps the best way to sabotage an election is the Denial of Service attack. Simply having machines not boot in the morning tends to filter out working wage-class folks over seniors or people on salaries. Having long lines in the late afternoon filters out working moms that have to go pick up the kids and take them to soccer practice. Likewise breakdowns in the evening are cool because you can close the polls while there are still people who have not voted. (see Ohio for example).
I wonder how the 5% was chosen? I mean how does one actually sample this in a meaningful way. For example, suppose one enumerated every possible webpage and sampled those randomly. Or, given that that is impossible, suppose one enumerated every TLD and samlpled those.
This still would not accord with user experience. User experience is you start from some place on the web and click outward following links. Usually the starting place is some aggregator like Google.
Following that kind of trajectory is not the same as uniformly sampling TLDs or webapges, but is how users interact.
I can say with certainty that 5% of the links I click are not "dangerous".
Faxs come with a telephone number of the sender as well. and often the personal cover letter. To forge a fax that is perpetually unquestionable you have to forge the phone number, signature, and stationary.
People are comfortable with that because they understand what is involved in doing that. With e-mail and digitial docs its harder for an untrained person to evaluate the threat. Also with digital docs it's harder later to raise questions about the authenticity. With the fax, one can later check for example fax logs on the sending machines and other trails of evidence.
In both cases forgeries are possible but in the case of faxes most humans are able to evaluate the threat.
Essentially, Apple does not see unsolicited downloads of hundreds or even thousands of executable files to users' desktops as being a security problem. The registers characterization chooses some pretty inflamatory prose. (surprise! it is the reg). But somehow I doubt apple does not see it as a problem. They just have not fixed it yet.
There are lots of reasons to say pythons sucks. The white space issue is not one of them. it merely seems radical. once you buy in, you wish every language was that way.
I would argue that the value of information isn't declining. Rather, the ability of humans to store less valuable information is increasing
Using image resolution as a metaphor: before, we couldn't store all those pixels. Now, we can.
Certainly, the change in benefit of going from say.. 32px by 32px to 128px by 128px is more than the change from a 10Mpixel image to 11Mpixel image. This is because we're storing less valuable/more redundant information. However, this does not mean information in general is declining in value, just that we're throwing less of it away
There's a distinction to be made here:
whereas the average value per bit of stored information may be going down, the average value per bit of information (that may or may not be stored) is not
Is information that is not stored information?
I'd argue no it's not. only things that are stored are informative. Hypothetical data that can never be retrieved and whose existence in unknown is not information.
That is if it is not stored it does not exist. It may be stored in your brain or the the floppy or in someone elses brain.
So to compute the average value of a bit, you need to see what is stored. If we are storing less and less valuable bits then the average value of information is declining.
One could imagine a lawsuit where the jury had to put a price on the erasure of 100K of information just in an abstract sense not in reference to a specific kind of information. You'd get a different answer in 1960 and 2008 or 3010.
As a rough estimate, information needs to have a value greater than the media it is written on (on average)
I hate any language that places significance on whitespace I used to feel exactly the same way. Then I got used to it and man is it such a good idea. It not only is easy to scan, but it has the effect of making everyone's code look the same. That is, I can scan your code almost as easily as I can scan mine.
Yaml does the same thing with whites space and the power of it is really evident when you compare it to JSON or XML. indeed you can put XML and JSON or HTML right into YAML without doing anything other than indenting it. No quoting, escapes, etc. so the other code looks "native" to the reader not encoded.
So I totally understand your fear of it. But it's just not justified and you are missing out on a big deal in language enforced, clean coding style that pays big dividends.
if the value of the information on a floppy was at least equal to the value of the floppy disk, then we can say that 1megbyte of information = $1. Note that is not the storage cost per se. I'm just using the storage cost to estimate the minimum value of information.
now if as you say that information is not declining in value that 1 terrabyte information is worth $1 million dollars at a minimum.
Since that's probably not true, it means were storing less and less valuable information. That is the value of stored information is declining.
If we apply the same argument then to the terrabyte disk and assum it's process at say $100 and not $1million, then the value of information is now one thousanth of one cent per megabyte. (since if it was worth less one would not bother to store it on something that cost more)
Does the value of information (per bit) decline as we gain the ability to store more information?
If not then presumably one of these disks ought to be worth a fortune if a Floppy was worth anything. Should they have scratch proof containers?
since this is not the case, one assumes the value of information to humans is declining with time?
Does this mean what a given person knows is also declining in value, or are we discarding information from our brains that has less value. If so then why do you still remembers that Speed Racer's little brother's name.
Eventually we will be able to store the neural state of any human. At that point if someone were to invent a method of reading out this state it could be recorded onto a Disk and preserved after death. Like Cryonics this disk would then await a time in the distanct future when the neural state could be restored from the disk to clone or simulated human.
Actually, that was just the long winded way of explaining to you Mr Smith that when we were restoring you from your disk we noticed a small scratch on made by an heir you stiffed in your will. We're pretty sure the amount of information loss is small however, though were not sure what it might have been.
Sorry for the inconvenience and thank you for selecting TotalRecall. Your bill will be in the ether.
Back when there rotary telephones companies used to offer these cardboard circular menus you could tuck behind the dial to act as a menu for accessing features on their phone-sites.
seems to me that wedge shaped text windows and western linear text is just not going to be a good meet up once the wedge get small. (asian pictograms might be another story however) maybe it will work for the top level file-edit-view type menu however or a few contextual items like cut-paste.
plus usage studies how it take 47 muscles to make a rotary motion and only 4 to give the finger.
Apple has been patenting a lot of aspects of multi-touch. I assume this is possible because they purchased the right to do so from the original "inventors".
IN any case when asked how Windows7 will support the "pinch" feature they demoed without violating apple's patent, the spokesman said that like Longhorn, windows 7 won't arrive till those patents are well expired.
Or be even more of a smartass, and write a bot that links all Wikipedia articles to Kevin Bacon's! The way to do this is to have every page list it's bacon number at the bottom, and then have the "bacon" be linked to kevin. Of course this would be construction mean every article had a bacon number of one.
Slashdot Mirror
Well http does not work either. So it's not simply a UDP ping drop issue as you guess. Http just hangs the browser waiting for a response. Go through an anonymous proxy like Zund2 and the piratebay.org page comes right up.
Well at some point it has to get onto a network backbone and you won't have any control over the path it takes. Having a server elsewhere may not really help as this practice spreads.
checking who owns the last stop on the traceroute:
whois 207.138.144.102
OrgName: Global Crossing
OrgID: GBLX
Address: 14605 South 50th Street
City: Phoenix
StateProv: AZ
PostalCode: 85044-6471
Country: US
ReferralServer: rwhois://rwhois.gblx.net:4321
NetRange: 207.138.0.0 - 207.138.255.255
CIDR: 207.138.0.0/16
NetName: GBLX-8
NetHandle: NET-207-138-0-0-1
Parent: NET-207-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Allocation
NameServer: NAME.ROC.GBLX.NET
NameServer: NAME.PHX.GBLX.NET
NameServer: NAME.SNV.GBLX.NET
NameServer: NAME.JFK1.GBLX.NET
Comment: THESE ADDRESSES ARE NON-PORTABLE
RegDate: 1996-05-20
Updated: 2005-03-02
RTechHandle: IA12-ORG-ARIN
RTechName: GBLX-IPADMIN
RTechPhone: +1-800-404-7714
RTechEmail: ipadmin@gblx.net
OrgAbuseHandle: GBLXA-ARIN
OrgAbuseName: GBLX-Abuse
OrgAbusePhone: +1-800-404-7714
OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@gblx.net
OrgNOCHandle: GBLXN-ARIN
OrgNOCName: GBLX-NOC
OrgNOCPhone: +1-800-404-7714
OrgNOCEmail: gc-noc@gblx.net
http://news.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/06/08/1354257#
OrgTechHandle: IA12-ORG-ARIN
OrgTechName: GBLX-IPADMIN
OrgTechPhone: +1-800-404-7714
OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@gblx.net
# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2008-06-07 19:10
# Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN's WHOIS database.
Forget Shaping, how about active censorship of some websites. ...snip...
here's the traceroute:
5 pos-5-0-0-ar01.albuquerque.nm.albuq.comcast.net
6 te-0-7-0-0-cr01.atlanta.ga.ibone.comcast.net
7 te-0-0-0-0-cr01.stratford.tx.ibone.comcast.net
8 comcast-ip-services-llc-los-angles.tengigabitethernet6-3.ar4.lax1.gblx.net
9 tengigabitethernet6-3.ar4.lax1.gblx.net (64.211.110.153)
10 port80.ge-2-0-0.407ar1.arn1.gblx.net (207.138.144.102)
11 * *
As you can see it dies in comcasts network. I can still get to piratebay.org via anonymous proxy, so it's definitely a comcast issue.
If this is such a great hypothesis then why did things like the AMD geode or the recent (forgetting the name) $20/month balck box computer catch fire?
was the time just not right?
Also if you look at these mini PCs it seems like their are teirs on these. Some are low cost low power, some are higher cost higher power. when people talk about these on slashdot the conversation goes like this:
nerd 1: oooh the XO is only $100 or $200 dollars.
nerd 2: yeah but it's a dog. I could get an fluvio flivitron for only $100 more and it has a real graphics card.
etc...
so no one on slashdot is really interested in the low end machine other than to talk about it's price. (Except of course when the price-tards are trying to put down macs by claiming this or that POS is "the same" but costs less)
Parliamentary elections tend to be infrequent and usualy have about 2 questions on the ballot. Moreover the districting is simpler.
IN the US, there tend to be about 60 to 120 elected offices and questions on the ballot. Any given precint can have many different ballots depending on what jurisdiction you live in (e.g. congressional, legislative, school, judicial, and city districts can casue ballot permuations). Additionally there can be ballots in multiple languages and handicap access rules.
we also have elections a lot more frequently and we also have most elections three times: two to select the candidates for each party and once to choose between parties.
There are a variety of reasons why publishing in a low tech way before submitting is good.
The main reasons are to make it transparent that avenues of reverse information flow are being as foreclosed as possible.
There are a number of examples where machines ostensibly only receiving data are actually changing data on the primary source. IN voting systems this is especially a risk because the machines that collate votes tend to be more sophisticated general purpose systems, thus ripe for more attacks, and are a single point of failure. While the data is still in low tech form, before being connected to a higher tech instrument is the time to publish it.
For example, some diebold systems network all the terminals together to a master terminal. There's already demo viruses that back propoagate during this transaction.
And example of this outside the voting area is the case of the guy who robbed casion machines. He used the testing machine to corrupt the firmware of the one armed bandits it was supposedly just "testing".
In your case, even though know electronic connection is involved, it forces a commitment to the proposed transaction before the operator has a placed the phone call during which some sort of collusion could occur.
it's not that collusion could not occur other ways. It's just that the protocol forecloses some opportunities and enhances transparency. it cuts down on the time for collusion that might occur with later reporting sites.
The chances of election tampering happening in your berg are pretty slim. People are just not sophisticated enough and the system is in too much flux to pull is off easily. As things settle and people gain experience the security holes will be bigger issues.
The bigger issues are two fold. Errors and the Appearance of fraud. These are indistinguishable on electronic voting machines.
So you job is to stay calm and go the extra mile to keep everything transparent. It does me no good if your deputy, the guy you've know since you were 8, donated his kidney to you, and married your kid sister seem trustworthy to you. You still have to do things the long boring way. Two people do operations, other witness. No ones word is taken for granted.
post results on the precint door if the law allows, BEFORE you transmit any results.
transparency is the key to trustworthy elections. Don't worry so much about fraud as making people see how the process works.
First your question holds the telescope at the wrong end. Tampering by voters is much less likely to occur because it is unlikely to change an election out come or occur in an undetectable manner. The people to watch are the election officials, with pre-a nd post voting access to the machines.
That said what a voter can do depends on what machines you have in use. Lets consider the big three Diebold, Seqouia edge or ES&S ivotronic and no voter verified paper trails.
On the ES&S, the voter is usually facing the machine in a privacy carrel and the machine is a flat block. It very possible for a voter to complete obscure the following transaction ( I know because I've done it). Flip the 5 pound machine over and you find little plastic door. you can easily force this open. Behind it is the Flash memory cards. Yank these out and put them in your pocket. close the food and flip the machine over. Leave and the election is screwed.
It's also possible a diabolically well outfitted voter could have a second PBS device in his pocket. Armed with that, he can can admin access to the machine and do anything they like and vote as many times as they wish.
With Sequoias edges, depending on the model revision number there can be a little yellow button on the back. Pressing that causes the machine to go in to supervisor mode. If I lean forward I can just reach around and get that button. If you were watching you could see me execute this clumsy maneauver.
I've never had the chance to play with diebolds so I can't offer specifics Some diebolds have an unguarded IR port that a hacker might be able to do something interesting with on their palm pilot. But I don't think there's any known attacks yet.
On all of these machines, it's possible to miscalibrate the screens. The screens can be miscalibrated by heat or scratching them with keys. In the neighboring county we had one guy running for office actually carve his name into the machine. Unfucking believable.
That same county had a vote buying operation going on (a few people got arrested and convicted). So make sure people vote alone.
For systems with paper tapes (not paper ballots) you can sell your vote if you have a camera or cell-phone camera because a picture of the voted paper tape before it scrolls out of sight is proof of vote. So no cameras!
But the problem with all these is that there's a huge risk to the bad voter and they can only affect a few votes. At worst they wreck one machine and probably get caught. Vote flipping is hard if not impossible at the retail level.
THe really fun things happen when supervisors can reprogram systems, get access to the flash media and have the ability to replace it.
Perhaps the best way to sabotage an election is the Denial of Service attack. Simply having machines not boot in the morning tends to filter out working wage-class folks over seniors or people on salaries. Having long lines in the late afternoon filters out working moms that have to go pick up the kids and take them to soccer practice. Likewise breakdowns in the evening are cool because you can close the polls while there are still people who have not voted. (see Ohio for example).
Show MS the validation it craves, tell them you love XP. call now, your love operator is standing by. Tell them how you really feel.
5% seems absurdly high.
I wonder how the 5% was chosen? I mean how does one actually sample this in a meaningful way. For example, suppose one enumerated every possible webpage and sampled those randomly. Or, given that that is impossible, suppose one enumerated every TLD and samlpled those.
This still would not accord with user experience. User experience is you start from some place on the web and click outward following links. Usually the starting place is some aggregator like Google.
Following that kind of trajectory is not the same as uniformly sampling TLDs or webapges, but is how users interact.
I can say with certainty that 5% of the links I click are not "dangerous".
Faxs come with a telephone number of the sender as well. and often the personal cover letter. To forge a fax that is perpetually unquestionable you have to forge the phone number, signature, and stationary.
People are comfortable with that because they understand what is involved in doing that. With e-mail and digitial docs its harder for an untrained person to evaluate the threat. Also with digital docs it's harder later to raise questions about the authenticity. With the fax, one can later check for example fax logs on the sending machines and other trails of evidence.
In both cases forgeries are possible but in the case of faxes most humans are able to evaluate the threat.
Boss: were have a problem. how do we get a persistence API for our silverlight environment?
Young turk: I know! we could tie the rail and silverlight APIs
Crusty the Unix programmer: yes you could, but then you'd have two problems.
There are lots of reasons to say pythons sucks. The white space issue is not one of them. it merely seems radical. once you buy in, you wish every language was that way.
I would argue that the value of information isn't declining. Rather, the ability of humans to store less valuable information is increasing
Using image resolution as a metaphor: before, we couldn't store all those pixels. Now, we can.
Certainly, the change in benefit of going from say.. 32px by 32px to 128px by 128px is more than the change from a 10Mpixel image to 11Mpixel image. This is because we're storing less valuable/more redundant information. However, this does not mean information in general is declining in value, just that we're throwing less of it away
There's a distinction to be made here:
Is information that is not stored information?whereas the average value per bit of stored information may be going down, the average value per bit of information (that may or may not be stored) is not
I'd argue no it's not. only things that are stored are informative.
Hypothetical data that can never be retrieved and whose existence in unknown is not information.
That is if it is not stored it does not exist. It may be stored in your brain or the the floppy or in someone elses brain.
So to compute the average value of a bit, you need to see what is stored. If we are storing less and less valuable bits then the average value of information is declining.
One could imagine a lawsuit where the jury had to put a price on the erasure of 100K of information just in an abstract sense not in reference to a specific kind of information. You'd get a different answer in 1960 and 2008 or 3010.
As a rough estimate, information needs to have a value greater than the media it is written on (on average)
Yaml does the same thing with whites space and the power of it is really evident when you compare it to JSON or XML. indeed you can put XML and JSON or HTML right into YAML without doing anything other than indenting it. No quoting, escapes, etc. so the other code looks "native" to the reader not encoded.
So I totally understand your fear of it. But it's just not justified and you are missing out on a big deal in language enforced, clean coding style that pays big dividends.
if the value of the information on a floppy was at least equal to the value of the floppy disk, then we can say that 1megbyte of information = $1. Note that is not the storage cost per se. I'm just using the storage cost to estimate the minimum value of information.
now if as you say that information is not declining in value that 1 terrabyte information is worth $1 million dollars at a minimum.
Since that's probably not true, it means were storing less and less valuable information. That is the value of stored information is declining.
If we apply the same argument then to the terrabyte disk and assum it's process at say $100 and not $1million, then the value of information is now one thousanth of one cent per megabyte. (since if it was worth less one would not bother to store it on something that cost more)
a Beowulf cluster of these.
Pinch Pinch pinch pinch. Your head keeps getting smaller.
Now do you get it? I'm crushing your head.
Dear Mr, Smith,
What is the value of information?
Does the value of information (per bit) decline as we gain the ability to store more information?
If not then presumably one of these disks ought to be worth a fortune if a Floppy was worth anything. Should they have scratch proof containers?
since this is not the case, one assumes the value of information to humans is declining with time?
Does this mean what a given person knows is also declining in value, or are we discarding information from our brains that has less value. If so then why do you still remembers that Speed Racer's little brother's name.
Eventually we will be able to store the neural state of any human. At that point if someone were to invent a method of reading out this state it could be recorded onto a Disk and preserved after death. Like Cryonics this disk would then await a time in the distanct future when the neural state could be restored from the disk to clone or simulated human.
Actually, that was just the long winded way of explaining to you Mr Smith that when we were restoring you from your disk we noticed a small scratch on made by an heir you stiffed in your will. We're pretty sure the amount of information loss is small however, though were not sure what it might have been.
Sorry for the inconvenience and thank you for selecting TotalRecall. Your bill will be in the ether.
Back when there rotary telephones companies used to offer these cardboard circular menus you could tuck behind the dial to act as a menu for accessing features on their phone-sites.
seems to me that wedge shaped text windows and western linear text is just not going to be a good meet up once the wedge get small. (asian pictograms might be another story however) maybe it will work for the top level file-edit-view type menu however or a few contextual items like cut-paste.
plus usage studies how it take 47 muscles to make a rotary motion and only 4 to give the finger.
Apple has been patenting a lot of aspects of multi-touch. I assume this is possible because they purchased the right to do so from the original "inventors".
IN any case when asked how Windows7 will support the "pinch" feature they demoed without violating apple's patent, the spokesman said that like Longhorn, windows 7 won't arrive till those patents are well expired.
why 29