Okay, but your example was not something that a Bible thumper would do either. It was contrived and falacious. I was questioning your need to invent contradictions where none exist.
Ah, good, I'm glad I wasn't the only one who wondered about that.
I also found it interesting that when I pointed out that the uniqueness thing isn't really a Christian belief[1], mine was the only response to which Moraelin didn't reply. (At least, the only response that dealt with the Christianity aspect of his post.)
[1] Not that no Christians have ever believed it in the history of the world, but that it's not a Christian doctrine--not a doctrine I've ever heard of from any group.
I don't know, it's basically fascinating how people can basically force themselves in a thoroughly schizophrenic frame of mind where they believe two completely opposite things at the same time. E.g., simultaneously that (1) Mary's virgin conception was such a unique and inexplicable thing that can only possibly be explained by divine intervention, yet at the same time (2) thousands of other virgin girls got pregnant too, e.g., via incubi. Hello? How can one have unyielding faith that something is unique and non-unique at the same time? Or that it could have been possible only by divine intervention, yet at the same time the same happens without divine intervention all the time? (E.g., via demons.) Mind boggles.
Uh, where do you get the idea that (1) is Christian doctrine?
Certainly, it's a Christian belief that Mary was a virgin, and that she conceived Jesus by the Spirit of God. So we believe it was a virgin birth, and that it was miraculous. But for myself, I've never heard anyone claim that virgin birth must be unique; it's not what the Bible claims, AFAIK. You almost seem to be implying that belief in the deity of Christ rests primarily or solely relies on the virgin birth. I suppose I can imagine how someone could get that impression, especially if you grew up outside the church. But I think that's a misconception on your part.
No, "virgin" was not "indisputably" a mistranslation. And it is most certain that your "young woman" is a poor translation--to my mind, worse than "virgin".
The issue is not with the New Testament; there is no question that Mary is reported to have been a virgin in the New Testament. The issue originates with the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced by Jews before the time of Christ, and it has to do with the translation of Isaiah 7:14, an ostensibly Messianic prophecy. (The Septuagint was the translation used by New Testament writers.) It translates the Hebrew "almah" with the Greek "parthenos". Parthenos almost always means "virgin", while almah has a slightly different but overlapping semantic range. It's closer to "maid, unmarried girl, young woman of marriageable age". (Your "young woman" leaves out the unmarried/of marriable age implications.) Culturally speaking, an almah most likely would be a virgin--that would be the strong expectation, and it's enough to make "virgin" a connotation of "almah". While parthenos is not a precise translation, it is not a mistranslation. At the very least, not indisputably so. My goodness, man, just read the Wikipedia entry on almah and follow the references! This is not obscure information.
Sure, if you limit the meaning of "almah" to "young woman", it makes for a better game of "Hee hee, look at the silly Christians," but if you're interested in honest scholarship, you'll have to open your mind a bit.
I would agree, "Because God doesn't like it," or "Because God will reward/punish me" is entirely pragmatic. And, I would say, that's an immature attitude for any Christian to take. The kind of objective principle I had in mind is closer to, "Because human beings actually matter, have real value"--such that there's something wrong with someone who doesn't value, respect, care for their fellow man.
Whoops! I should stop posting so quickly. Never mind, I was reading the prescriptivist definition incorrectly. I understand what you meant, now.
To a certain extent, though, I would say that my Christian theist view of morality isn't very far from prescriptivism. If you translate "Killing is wrong" as a command, it doesn't fit. But if you translate it with a "should", it's close. "You should not kill" instead of "Don't kill". Because I would say that human beings have an objective value, something violated when they are killed. (I'm ignoring the issue of justifiable homicide for simplicity.) That real, objective value is what motivates the "should".
On that note, I can understand if you were to translate "That's wrong" as "Don't do that!" I can't understand how you could translate it as "You shouldn't do that," because "shouldn't" seems to be inherently an appeal to some objective principle. Which you said you don't have.
I'd say all judgements and decisions are derived from a personal and subjective base - saying a biscuit is defective because it is mising half the normal chocolate coating, or a particular song is horrible, is in the same league, in that way, as saying someone is morally defective. "Noncognitivism" and "Prescriptivism" generally agree with my ideas about morality, and it is also seems to be what you are talking about: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noncognitivismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prescriptivism_(philo sophy)
From noncognitivism "Killing is wrong," can be rephrased as "Boo to killing!" or "Killing, yuck!".
From precriptivism "Killing is wrong" means something more like "You shouldn't kill".
Yes, thank you. I wasn't aware of those terms, but they do describe well what I'm talking about. I'm talking about a prescriptivist view, and you seem to be advocating a noncognitivist view. (Did you misspeak when you said that both generally agree with your view? If that is what you meant, how do you combine the two?)
What makes something warranted? I care/empathize because my instincts/genetics/upbringing make me, sure it's not rational, but does that make it less warranted? Is finding beauty in a sunset warranted/unwarranted?
I was speaking of "warrant" in the sense of being rooted in objective values. You can base a moral system on "I empathize with other human beings" or "I want to live in a 'moral' society", and it will work. But what can you say about someone who does not share that empathy or desire? Can you ever say that such a person is "wrong" not to empathize? Does that make sense?
Do human beings (or animals, or plants, for that matter) have an objective value that we "should" respect in and of itself? Such that you can criticize someone who doesn't respect that value?
That, I think, is what most people mean when they say "That was wrong". They're saying that it should not have been done. They're saying that someone who doesn't care about that moral rule is defective, in a sense other than "evolutionarily unfit".
I'm not saying this means I'm right; I'm attempting to accurately understand the implications of the various views of morality.
Um...I may have missed it, did you answer my question? What do you mean when you say that something is wrong?
This is the closest I can find: "Do you want to live in a world where people rape|murder|torture|steal|lie|cheat? No? Neither do I. Ergo I don't do those things. The way the world is, morally, is a direct result of the way we are."
Unless I'm misunderstanding you, you're basically saying that you try to be a moral person because you want to live in a world where people act morally--in short, the golden rule. You're explaining why you want to follow moral principles. But I told you that I can understand why you would want to do that. (Hmm...I may have communicated poorly in my last paragraph. When I said I don't see the rational grounds for an athiests' morality, I didn't mean to say that I don't see why an atheist would want people to follow moral rules. That's straightforward. I meant that I don't see how you could have objective grounds for telling a sociopath, "What you're doing is wrong." If someone doesn't care about the kind of society they live in, I don't see what you could tell them.)
I've been wondering about this topic for a long time. I don't know how you think here, and I genuinely want to know. Not that you speak for any atheist but yourself, but I think it's worth asking. I want to understand.
So, again. I think I do understand why you would want to be moral. I think that's rational. I can understand you saying, "I don't want to live in that kind of world." I can understand empathy. What I'm curious about is, what do you mean when you say that something is wrong?
P.S. I didn't say anything about belief in God leading to better moral behavior. If any Christians out there think that way, it's hard for me to see why they do. Yes, I think God is the objective ground in which moral principles rest. But how do they get from that to, "If you think God exists, you'll be less selfish"? Or "If you think God exists, you'll be more loving"? "Religion" doesn't mean you approach God with humility, a repentant heart, and a desire to conform your life to Christ. "Religion"--including the social phenomenon of "Christianity"--is often just something you do because it's socially expected. Or it's just an excuse to feel self-righteous, which entirely misses the point. I think that's partly why James said, "Faith without words is dead," and, "You show me your faith without works, and I will show you my faith by my works." The Bible's full of condemnation of that kind of religious hypocrisy. (This is a side topic for me. It's not relevant to my question.)
What you discussed was a phenomenological explanation for morality. Read my other comments on this article; I'm fully aware of this evolutionary explanation for morality. But I wasn't asking for an explanation of why human beings are predisposed to be moral creatures. I was asking the grandparent what he means when he says that something is wrong or right.
By the evolutionary explanation of the source of morality, it seems to me that "wrong" means nothing more than "damages the community's chances for survival," and by extension, "damages one's own genes' chances for survival". (If that's true, what do we do with situation where one community--one genetic subgroup--conquers another? Can we say that anything they do is wrong? Will the discussion become entirely focused on pragmatic judgments of overall survival risks?) If the grandparent has another way of seeing it, I would be very interested to know what it is.
In particular, I will be very interested to see whether "That is wrong" turns out to mean "I don't like that". I'm curious to know what would he say to someone who doesn't care whether their genes survive.
See, when most people say that something is wrong, they mean something more than that they don't like it. They're appealing to a principle--and not a pragmatic principle, as the evolutionary explanation seems to be.
Now, that has no bearing on whether the evolutionary explanation is correct. But I do want to clearly understand what's being said.
OK, I have a question for you. To give you an idea of where I'm coming from, I'm a generally theologically conservative Christian. I fully recognize that any given non-Christian (including atheists) can be--and often is--as nice, moral, etc. as any given Christian. (And, FYI, I hear other Christians saying that quite often. I know many Christians are prejudiced in this area, but many of us are just as concerned about correcting that error as you are.)
Can you explain for me what you mean when you say that you recognize right and wrong?
I'm not asking this as a challenge, as an attempt to debate you. I'm genuinely curious to know how it is you think about this.
I can understand you empathizing with victims of crimes. I can understand if you care about people, and don't want to see them hurt. I can understand you adhering to the golden rule. I can understand you approaching moral questions from that kind of subjective standpoint. It reduces to, "I like this" or "I don't like this," or to "I want to see this happen" or "I don't want to see this happen."
But I don't understand your grounds for ever saying that something is "wrong" or "right". I don't understand how you could say to any of those power-mad wackos, "What you did was wrong." If they don't empathize with their victims, if they don't care, what reason could you give them to explain why they shouldn't have done it? (Even if it's true that their actions hurt their genes' chances of surviving, what can you say to them if they just don't care?)
When you say, "That was wrong," what do you actually mean? Do you mean anything other than "I don't like that"?
That's my question. I also have a comment on what you said about whether atheism means we can all do what we want. I agree with you that simply being an atheist does not mean you won't care about morality. But that doesn't imply that atheists have consistent rational grounds for morality. That is, just because they care, doesn't mean they have a reason to. The biological or psychological mechanism may be present, but that doesn't tell us there's any principle in atheism on which moral principles can rest. You may believe in right and wrong, but that doesn't mean your belief is warranted.
Eh? How does evolutionary morality get you out of the nihilist camp? It provides a rationale for particular moral rules, and it provides a phenomenological explanation of why people have a moral sense, but it doesn't provide a grounding for why you should care. It reduces to, "This will help me survive," or "This will help my genes survive."
I can't see how evolutionary morality can be anything other than a phenomenological explanation for why things are the way they are. The morality it provides is pragmatic...But it does not introduce any "meaning"--so how is it getting you away from nihilism?
(To clarify: What you said about community survival aiding your own survival is true, but that doesn't give a sociopath a reason to be moral, unless he (1) cares about his own survival, and (2) can be persuaded that his actions pose a significant risk to himself. But that's not anything new; we've always understood that you can talk to a sociopath on those grounds.)
That gets at an important distinction we need to make when we're talking about this subject. There are the moral principles themselves, and there are the creatures who think about or attempt to live by those principles. So, the various questions to ask:
1.) Where do the moral principles themselves come from? What is their nature?
2.) Why do human beings care about morality?
3.) How do human being learn about moral principles? To what extent (if at all) is morality hardwired?
So, if you're going for an evolutionary explanation, you'll probably answer 2.) by saying that at least the desire to be moral comes from a biological mechanism. (You may say that the principles themselves are also hardwired.) And you'll probably answer 1.) by saying that the content of the moral principles simply reflects that which is evolutionary advantageous. Things that tend to damage the community "fitness" tend to be regarded as "immoral".
If we look at sociopaths, we would then say that they have a broken mechanism for 2.).
And if you're going to accept this explanation of morality, you have to give serious consideration to whether the phrase "That was wrong" really belongs in your vocabulary. In this view, it's hard to see how you can claim that "evil" actually exists. You can say that a murderer, a genocidal maniac, or a rapist harm the community's chances of survival, and that you don't like it, but that's really about it. Any feelings of moral repugnance you may have are of little significance. If you meet a sociopath who just doesn't care, then there's nothing you can appeal to that would let you condemn them--you can't justify why they should care about community survival.
I'm not saying this is a reason to reject the explanation. If that's the way it is, then that's the way it is. But we should think clearly about these implications.
If God always existed, why should the universe not be eternal as well?
Right. As I said, that's why the Big Bang faced opposition from philosophical naturalists. They didn't want to give up "The universe is eternal."
Now, even with the universe being eternal, theists can respond with fine-tuning arguments. ("Why are the physical constants so finely tuned for the appearance of stars, life, etc.?") Atheists can respond with a multiverse. ("With multiple universes and multiple sets of constants, one of them is bound to hit the jackpot.") Theists can respond with incredulity. ("A multiverse? Now you're engaging in rank speculation without a shred of evidence! So much for being scientific about it.") Atheists can respond in kind. ("Yeah, well how much silly stuff do you believe about God?")
At that point, it's approximately at the level of a "yer momma" exchange.
I mean, I understand that from a common sense point of view, things don't just pop into existence. But from a common sense point of view, Gods don't just go around existing eternally, either.
Well...I'm actually hesitant about using this argument, precisely because I'm not sure how well we can judge which of these explanations is "simpler".
I don't think I agree with you that "Gods don't just go around existing eternally" is as common-sense as "things don't just pop into existence". Supposing that something has no beginning doesn't seem to violate any rational principle I can think of, the way that supposing everything just started to exist does. (Even the arguably acausal events in quantum mechanics happen according to a framework of natural law; they have a context. "The universe popped into existence" doesn't have that.) But I don't know how to judge the validity of my thinking here. I don't understand eternality.
I'd say it's silly for Christians to try to prove anything about God using arguments that entirely ignore the matter of revelation.
Personally, I think the idea of God comes from our ability to model the Universe in our heads. For that model to work, it must contain a model of us. In that model, we are separate from the universe. Our model is out of balance: bad things happen to good people and so on. So we need to come up with something to balance things out, lest we feel that, not only are we alone and separate from the Universe, but the Universe is cruel and arbitrary.
There are two basic tactics to take at this point: impersonal karma or a personal creator God. Buddhism takes a completely different tack: the initial model we've constructed is incorrect, there is no separate self, and thus no need for balance.
But you leave out other options: Animism and something like the Greek pantheon. In both, the universe can still be cruel and arbitrary.
I'd say there are more complete ways to try to explain why religion would arise in a purely naturalistic universe. Even though I don't happen to believe any of them.:)
Well, that'll teach me to post too quickly. I missed something important: By the "multiplication of entities" standard, you're actually right. 2 & 4 has both God and the universe, where 1 & 3 just has the universe. Stupid mistake on my part.
However, that brings out an important aspect of Occam's razor. It's not enough simply to compare numbers of entities, because the razor has an "All things being equal" clause. In other words, given two satisfactory explanations, the one with fewer entities (or the "simpler" one) is preferred.
So, that's where we get into what I said at the end of my post. Option 4 has more entities, but does not require anything to just spontaneously start existing. Applying Occam's razor is not clear-cut.
Umm...Perhaps. I mean, I certainly see where you're coming from, and there's some sense to it. But not quite.
Occam's razor actually speaks of the multiplication of entities, not "complexity". In that definition, Occam's razor doesn't seem to apply at all. But if you want, we can set that precise definition aside and adopt the common paraphrase that involves "simplicity".
If we don't limit ourselves to the biblical God, it's not remotely clear that "universe" must be simpler than "deity". Especially if we consider less personal conceptions of deity, as in Buddhism.
Assuming we're talking about a personal, more biblical God, we have to figure out how to compare the simplicity God to the simplicity of the universe. How do we do that? Based on the most basic laws & principle of the universe and the most basic aspects of God? Based on the emergent complexity of both, arising from those basic elements? Does God even have basic aspects and emergent complexity? And are the basic laws of the universe actually simple? Sure, as we dig deeper, we tend to find that macro-scale phenomenon are based on simple mathematical laws, but how on earth can we judge when we don't know what lies at the bottom? When we make the next big advance in particle theory, is that trend necessarily going to hold?
However, all this misses a more important point. It's not at all valid simply to compare the set of 1 & 3 to the set of 2 & 4. We could just as easily group them into 1 & 2 and 3 & 4. In other words, is it simpler to suppose that something always existed than that it just popped spontaneously into existence? Does Occam's razor prefer 3 & 4, because it doesn't require anything to spontaneously start to exist?
Christians claim that "God always existed (and made the universe)" is a simpler explanation than "The universe just popped into existence." And it seems to me that even your version of Occam's razor doesn't clearly decide between the two.
What on earth? Sorry, Lord Ender, but you not only don't quite understand what theists claim, you don't even accurately list the other possibilities. You left out the other two major possibilities, and your #2 isn't claimed by anyone I've ever read.
The universe popped into existence from nothing, or
A complex, intelligent, powerful creature (presumably with a beard) popped into existence from nothing, then one day decided to create the universe from nothing, or
The universe has always existed, or
God has always existed, and created the universe from nothing.
Now, maybe you left out 3 because you're assuming the Big Bang. If so, that's fair enough.
But the claim of every major theistic group I know is #4, not #2. You seem to be aping Dawkins' arguments, with a similar ignorance of the actual set of alternatives. No one claims that the order/complexity/whatever of God just popped into existence. People (Hawking, Dawkins, apparently you) do claim that the order of the physical universe & natural law just popped into existence. If you're going to compare your views to other people's, and if you care about honesty and intellectual integrity, please accurately represent them.
And if you think the distinction I'm making between 2 and 4 is irrelevant or meaningless, keep this in mind: The Big Bang was resisted because people wanted to have a universe that always existed. They could accept an eternal universe; they did not want to have to explain a universe that started to exist. (Of course, we can also suppose an eternal chain of Big Bangs, universes spawning other universes, etc., so the Big Bang doesn't actually settle this question of eternality.) So, those philosophical naturalists thought 3 was more reasonable than 1 for precisely the reason that theists claim 4 is more reasonable than 2.
But an equal amount of energy is transferred back to you in the opposite direction (remember "equal and opposite reaction"). When you hit something, which side is traveling at what speed doesn't matter, only their energy relative to each other. So you're absorbing the same amount of energy as you're dishing out. That's why your hand hurts when you hit the punching bag too.
With a small amount of force, you can easily brace yourself against the ground and your body and the ground then absorb that energy. With enough force to knock somebody across the room, though, you'd probably break a few bones before you'd get the ground to absorb all that energy.
I'll expand on why ThosLives shook his head in dismay at your comments.
You're mixing together energy, momentum, and force. No, energy is not transferred back to you in the opposite direction. Your fist exerts a force on the bag, and the bag exerts an equal and opposite force on your first. The energy involved is the kinetic energy of your moving fist. That kinetic energy will either be transferred into the bag or be transformed into heat and sound. Energy has no direction--it's a scalar, not a vector.
The purpose of bracing yourself is so that your body does not acquire backwards momentum. Momentum does have direction.
Just FYI...I'm sure that's true for many people out there, but for myself, yes, of course there could be evidence to convince me that Jesus wasn't God. Partly that means that if some of the evidence we do have were different, I wouldn't believe. But as for the Cameron documentary--if the ossuary belonging to the guy named Jesus still had the bones in it, and those bones showed nail holes from crucifixion... Well, I would wait for verification the bones hadn't been tampered with, but there's fair chance I would no longer be a Christian after that. Combining the names with crucifixion would be a bit much.
I haven't seen the documentary or read the book yet, so I can only evaluate the statements they've made so far, but they've said some truly silly things, so I'm not expecting much from the documentary. (For example, Cameron claimed on the Today Show that a document called the Acts of Phillip "definitely identifies Mary Magdalene as Mariamne". Go look up the text online, it's linked from the Wikipedia article. It includes a woman named Mariamne, but it definitely doesn't identify her as Mary Magdalene. The word "Magdalene" doesn't even appear. The Mariamne in the story is the sister of Phillip, and she turns into a glass box full of light and fire when she's threatened. Some scholars think that she's Mary Magdalene, others identify her as Mary of Bethany...But it's all quite speculative.)
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Okay, but your example was not something that a Bible thumper would do either. It was contrived and falacious. I was questioning your need to invent contradictions where none exist.
Ah, good, I'm glad I wasn't the only one who wondered about that.
I also found it interesting that when I pointed out that the uniqueness thing isn't really a Christian belief[1], mine was the only response to which Moraelin didn't reply. (At least, the only response that dealt with the Christianity aspect of his post.)
[1] Not that no Christians have ever believed it in the history of the world, but that it's not a Christian doctrine--not a doctrine I've ever heard of from any group.
I don't know, it's basically fascinating how people can basically force themselves in a thoroughly schizophrenic frame of mind where they believe two completely opposite things at the same time. E.g., simultaneously that (1) Mary's virgin conception was such a unique and inexplicable thing that can only possibly be explained by divine intervention, yet at the same time (2) thousands of other virgin girls got pregnant too, e.g., via incubi. Hello? How can one have unyielding faith that something is unique and non-unique at the same time? Or that it could have been possible only by divine intervention, yet at the same time the same happens without divine intervention all the time? (E.g., via demons.) Mind boggles.
Uh, where do you get the idea that (1) is Christian doctrine?
Certainly, it's a Christian belief that Mary was a virgin, and that she conceived Jesus by the Spirit of God. So we believe it was a virgin birth, and that it was miraculous. But for myself, I've never heard anyone claim that virgin birth must be unique; it's not what the Bible claims, AFAIK. You almost seem to be implying that belief in the deity of Christ rests primarily or solely relies on the virgin birth. I suppose I can imagine how someone could get that impression, especially if you grew up outside the church. But I think that's a misconception on your part.
No, "virgin" was not "indisputably" a mistranslation. And it is most certain that your "young woman" is a poor translation--to my mind, worse than "virgin".
The issue is not with the New Testament; there is no question that Mary is reported to have been a virgin in the New Testament. The issue originates with the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced by Jews before the time of Christ, and it has to do with the translation of Isaiah 7:14, an ostensibly Messianic prophecy. (The Septuagint was the translation used by New Testament writers.) It translates the Hebrew "almah" with the Greek "parthenos". Parthenos almost always means "virgin", while almah has a slightly different but overlapping semantic range. It's closer to "maid, unmarried girl, young woman of marriageable age". (Your "young woman" leaves out the unmarried/of marriable age implications.) Culturally speaking, an almah most likely would be a virgin--that would be the strong expectation, and it's enough to make "virgin" a connotation of "almah". While parthenos is not a precise translation, it is not a mistranslation. At the very least, not indisputably so. My goodness, man, just read the Wikipedia entry on almah and follow the references! This is not obscure information.
Sure, if you limit the meaning of "almah" to "young woman", it makes for a better game of "Hee hee, look at the silly Christians," but if you're interested in honest scholarship, you'll have to open your mind a bit.
My mistake for thinking you had to be saying something more than "taking something without paying for it".
Some people use language to elucidate, others use it to obfuscate.
I would agree, "Because God doesn't like it," or "Because God will reward/punish me" is entirely pragmatic. And, I would say, that's an immature attitude for any Christian to take. The kind of objective principle I had in mind is closer to, "Because human beings actually matter, have real value"--such that there's something wrong with someone who doesn't value, respect, care for their fellow man.
Whoops! I should stop posting so quickly. Never mind, I was reading the prescriptivist definition incorrectly. I understand what you meant, now.
To a certain extent, though, I would say that my Christian theist view of morality isn't very far from prescriptivism. If you translate "Killing is wrong" as a command, it doesn't fit. But if you translate it with a "should", it's close. "You should not kill" instead of "Don't kill". Because I would say that human beings have an objective value, something violated when they are killed. (I'm ignoring the issue of justifiable homicide for simplicity.) That real, objective value is what motivates the "should".
On that note, I can understand if you were to translate "That's wrong" as "Don't do that!" I can't understand how you could translate it as "You shouldn't do that," because "shouldn't" seems to be inherently an appeal to some objective principle. Which you said you don't have.
I'd say all judgements and decisions are derived from a personal and subjective base - saying a biscuit is defective because it is mising half the normal chocolate coating, or a particular song is horrible, is in the same league, in that way, as saying someone is morally defective. "Noncognitivism" and "Prescriptivism" generally agree with my ideas about morality, and it is also seems to be what you are talking about: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noncognitivism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prescriptivism_(philo sophy)
From noncognitivism "Killing is wrong," can be rephrased as "Boo to killing!" or "Killing, yuck!".
From precriptivism "Killing is wrong" means something more like "You shouldn't kill".
Yes, thank you. I wasn't aware of those terms, but they do describe well what I'm talking about. I'm talking about a prescriptivist view, and you seem to be advocating a noncognitivist view. (Did you misspeak when you said that both generally agree with your view? If that is what you meant, how do you combine the two?)
What makes something warranted? I care/empathize because my instincts/genetics/upbringing make me, sure it's not rational, but does that make it less warranted? Is finding beauty in a sunset warranted/unwarranted?
I was speaking of "warrant" in the sense of being rooted in objective values. You can base a moral system on "I empathize with other human beings" or "I want to live in a 'moral' society", and it will work. But what can you say about someone who does not share that empathy or desire? Can you ever say that such a person is "wrong" not to empathize? Does that make sense?
Do human beings (or animals, or plants, for that matter) have an objective value that we "should" respect in and of itself? Such that you can criticize someone who doesn't respect that value?
That, I think, is what most people mean when they say "That was wrong". They're saying that it should not have been done. They're saying that someone who doesn't care about that moral rule is defective, in a sense other than "evolutionarily unfit".
I'm not saying this means I'm right; I'm attempting to accurately understand the implications of the various views of morality.
Thanks for your comments. (Especially the one to melikamp. ^_^)
This tantalizing phrase caught my interest: "a change in fiscal spectrum without corresponding change in wealth"
Am I correct in assuming that a change in fiscal spectrum with corresponding change in wealth would be related to rewarding those who produce wealth?
I can appreciate a form of mathematical elegance in that kind of enlightened pragmatic self-interest.
:)
But then, I don't make decisions about the nature of the world, God, and religion based on what seems awe-inspiring to me.
Um...I may have missed it, did you answer my question? What do you mean when you say that something is wrong?
This is the closest I can find: "Do you want to live in a world where people rape|murder|torture|steal|lie|cheat? No? Neither do I. Ergo I don't do those things. The way the world is, morally, is a direct result of the way we are."
Unless I'm misunderstanding you, you're basically saying that you try to be a moral person because you want to live in a world where people act morally--in short, the golden rule. You're explaining why you want to follow moral principles. But I told you that I can understand why you would want to do that. (Hmm...I may have communicated poorly in my last paragraph. When I said I don't see the rational grounds for an athiests' morality, I didn't mean to say that I don't see why an atheist would want people to follow moral rules. That's straightforward. I meant that I don't see how you could have objective grounds for telling a sociopath, "What you're doing is wrong." If someone doesn't care about the kind of society they live in, I don't see what you could tell them.)
I've been wondering about this topic for a long time. I don't know how you think here, and I genuinely want to know. Not that you speak for any atheist but yourself, but I think it's worth asking. I want to understand.
So, again. I think I do understand why you would want to be moral. I think that's rational. I can understand you saying, "I don't want to live in that kind of world." I can understand empathy. What I'm curious about is, what do you mean when you say that something is wrong?
P.S. I didn't say anything about belief in God leading to better moral behavior. If any Christians out there think that way, it's hard for me to see why they do. Yes, I think God is the objective ground in which moral principles rest. But how do they get from that to, "If you think God exists, you'll be less selfish"? Or "If you think God exists, you'll be more loving"? "Religion" doesn't mean you approach God with humility, a repentant heart, and a desire to conform your life to Christ. "Religion"--including the social phenomenon of "Christianity"--is often just something you do because it's socially expected. Or it's just an excuse to feel self-righteous, which entirely misses the point. I think that's partly why James said, "Faith without words is dead," and, "You show me your faith without works, and I will show you my faith by my works." The Bible's full of condemnation of that kind of religious hypocrisy. (This is a side topic for me. It's not relevant to my question.)
Out of curiosity, did you notice how in my question to misanthrope1 I discussed empathy?
Thanks for your comments.
What you discussed was a phenomenological explanation for morality. Read my other comments on this article; I'm fully aware of this evolutionary explanation for morality. But I wasn't asking for an explanation of why human beings are predisposed to be moral creatures. I was asking the grandparent what he means when he says that something is wrong or right.
By the evolutionary explanation of the source of morality, it seems to me that "wrong" means nothing more than "damages the community's chances for survival," and by extension, "damages one's own genes' chances for survival". (If that's true, what do we do with situation where one community--one genetic subgroup--conquers another? Can we say that anything they do is wrong? Will the discussion become entirely focused on pragmatic judgments of overall survival risks?) If the grandparent has another way of seeing it, I would be very interested to know what it is.
In particular, I will be very interested to see whether "That is wrong" turns out to mean "I don't like that". I'm curious to know what would he say to someone who doesn't care whether their genes survive.
See, when most people say that something is wrong, they mean something more than that they don't like it. They're appealing to a principle--and not a pragmatic principle, as the evolutionary explanation seems to be.
Now, that has no bearing on whether the evolutionary explanation is correct. But I do want to clearly understand what's being said.
OK, I have a question for you. To give you an idea of where I'm coming from, I'm a generally theologically conservative Christian. I fully recognize that any given non-Christian (including atheists) can be--and often is--as nice, moral, etc. as any given Christian. (And, FYI, I hear other Christians saying that quite often. I know many Christians are prejudiced in this area, but many of us are just as concerned about correcting that error as you are.)
Can you explain for me what you mean when you say that you recognize right and wrong?
I'm not asking this as a challenge, as an attempt to debate you. I'm genuinely curious to know how it is you think about this.
I can understand you empathizing with victims of crimes. I can understand if you care about people, and don't want to see them hurt. I can understand you adhering to the golden rule. I can understand you approaching moral questions from that kind of subjective standpoint. It reduces to, "I like this" or "I don't like this," or to "I want to see this happen" or "I don't want to see this happen."
But I don't understand your grounds for ever saying that something is "wrong" or "right". I don't understand how you could say to any of those power-mad wackos, "What you did was wrong." If they don't empathize with their victims, if they don't care, what reason could you give them to explain why they shouldn't have done it? (Even if it's true that their actions hurt their genes' chances of surviving, what can you say to them if they just don't care?)
When you say, "That was wrong," what do you actually mean? Do you mean anything other than "I don't like that"?
That's my question. I also have a comment on what you said about whether atheism means we can all do what we want. I agree with you that simply being an atheist does not mean you won't care about morality. But that doesn't imply that atheists have consistent rational grounds for morality. That is, just because they care, doesn't mean they have a reason to. The biological or psychological mechanism may be present, but that doesn't tell us there's any principle in atheism on which moral principles can rest. You may believe in right and wrong, but that doesn't mean your belief is warranted.
Eh? How does evolutionary morality get you out of the nihilist camp? It provides a rationale for particular moral rules, and it provides a phenomenological explanation of why people have a moral sense, but it doesn't provide a grounding for why you should care. It reduces to, "This will help me survive," or "This will help my genes survive."
I can't see how evolutionary morality can be anything other than a phenomenological explanation for why things are the way they are. The morality it provides is pragmatic...But it does not introduce any "meaning"--so how is it getting you away from nihilism?
(To clarify: What you said about community survival aiding your own survival is true, but that doesn't give a sociopath a reason to be moral, unless he (1) cares about his own survival, and (2) can be persuaded that his actions pose a significant risk to himself. But that's not anything new; we've always understood that you can talk to a sociopath on those grounds.)
That gets at an important distinction we need to make when we're talking about this subject. There are the moral principles themselves, and there are the creatures who think about or attempt to live by those principles. So, the various questions to ask:
1.) Where do the moral principles themselves come from? What is their nature?
2.) Why do human beings care about morality?
3.) How do human being learn about moral principles? To what extent (if at all) is morality hardwired?
So, if you're going for an evolutionary explanation, you'll probably answer 2.) by saying that at least the desire to be moral comes from a biological mechanism. (You may say that the principles themselves are also hardwired.) And you'll probably answer 1.) by saying that the content of the moral principles simply reflects that which is evolutionary advantageous. Things that tend to damage the community "fitness" tend to be regarded as "immoral".
If we look at sociopaths, we would then say that they have a broken mechanism for 2.).
And if you're going to accept this explanation of morality, you have to give serious consideration to whether the phrase "That was wrong" really belongs in your vocabulary. In this view, it's hard to see how you can claim that "evil" actually exists. You can say that a murderer, a genocidal maniac, or a rapist harm the community's chances of survival, and that you don't like it, but that's really about it. Any feelings of moral repugnance you may have are of little significance. If you meet a sociopath who just doesn't care, then there's nothing you can appeal to that would let you condemn them--you can't justify why they should care about community survival.
I'm not saying this is a reason to reject the explanation. If that's the way it is, then that's the way it is. But we should think clearly about these implications.
Your material intrigues me, and I wish to subscribe to your newsletter.
If God always existed, why should the universe not be eternal as well?
Right. As I said, that's why the Big Bang faced opposition from philosophical naturalists. They didn't want to give up "The universe is eternal."
Now, even with the universe being eternal, theists can respond with fine-tuning arguments. ("Why are the physical constants so finely tuned for the appearance of stars, life, etc.?") Atheists can respond with a multiverse. ("With multiple universes and multiple sets of constants, one of them is bound to hit the jackpot.") Theists can respond with incredulity. ("A multiverse? Now you're engaging in rank speculation without a shred of evidence! So much for being scientific about it.") Atheists can respond in kind. ("Yeah, well how much silly stuff do you believe about God?")
At that point, it's approximately at the level of a "yer momma" exchange.
I mean, I understand that from a common sense point of view, things don't just pop into existence. But from a common sense point of view, Gods don't just go around existing eternally, either.
:)
Well...I'm actually hesitant about using this argument, precisely because I'm not sure how well we can judge which of these explanations is "simpler".
I don't think I agree with you that "Gods don't just go around existing eternally" is as common-sense as "things don't just pop into existence". Supposing that something has no beginning doesn't seem to violate any rational principle I can think of, the way that supposing everything just started to exist does. (Even the arguably acausal events in quantum mechanics happen according to a framework of natural law; they have a context. "The universe popped into existence" doesn't have that.) But I don't know how to judge the validity of my thinking here. I don't understand eternality.
I'd say it's silly for Christians to try to prove anything about God using arguments that entirely ignore the matter of revelation.
Personally, I think the idea of God comes from our ability to model the Universe in our heads. For that model to work, it must contain a model of us. In that model, we are separate from the universe. Our model is out of balance: bad things happen to good people and so on. So we need to come up with something to balance things out, lest we feel that, not only are we alone and separate from the Universe, but the Universe is cruel and arbitrary.
There are two basic tactics to take at this point: impersonal karma or a personal creator God. Buddhism takes a completely different tack: the initial model we've constructed is incorrect, there is no separate self, and thus no need for balance.
But you leave out other options: Animism and something like the Greek pantheon. In both, the universe can still be cruel and arbitrary.
I'd say there are more complete ways to try to explain why religion would arise in a purely naturalistic universe. Even though I don't happen to believe any of them.
Well, that'll teach me to post too quickly. I missed something important: By the "multiplication of entities" standard, you're actually right. 2 & 4 has both God and the universe, where 1 & 3 just has the universe. Stupid mistake on my part.
However, that brings out an important aspect of Occam's razor. It's not enough simply to compare numbers of entities, because the razor has an "All things being equal" clause. In other words, given two satisfactory explanations, the one with fewer entities (or the "simpler" one) is preferred.
So, that's where we get into what I said at the end of my post. Option 4 has more entities, but does not require anything to just spontaneously start existing. Applying Occam's razor is not clear-cut.
- Occam's razor actually speaks of the multiplication of entities, not "complexity". In that definition, Occam's razor doesn't seem to apply at all. But if you want, we can set that precise definition aside and adopt the common paraphrase that involves "simplicity".
- If we don't limit ourselves to the biblical God, it's not remotely clear that "universe" must be simpler than "deity". Especially if we consider less personal conceptions of deity, as in Buddhism.
- Assuming we're talking about a personal, more biblical God, we have to figure out how to compare the simplicity God to the simplicity of the universe. How do we do that? Based on the most basic laws & principle of the universe and the most basic aspects of God? Based on the emergent complexity of both, arising from those basic elements? Does God even have basic aspects and emergent complexity? And are the basic laws of the universe actually simple? Sure, as we dig deeper, we tend to find that macro-scale phenomenon are based on simple mathematical laws, but how on earth can we judge when we don't know what lies at the bottom? When we make the next big advance in particle theory, is that trend necessarily going to hold?
However, all this misses a more important point. It's not at all valid simply to compare the set of 1 & 3 to the set of 2 & 4. We could just as easily group them into 1 & 2 and 3 & 4. In other words, is it simpler to suppose that something always existed than that it just popped spontaneously into existence? Does Occam's razor prefer 3 & 4, because it doesn't require anything to spontaneously start to exist?Christians claim that "God always existed (and made the universe)" is a simpler explanation than "The universe just popped into existence." And it seems to me that even your version of Occam's razor doesn't clearly decide between the two.
Now, maybe you left out 3 because you're assuming the Big Bang. If so, that's fair enough.
But the claim of every major theistic group I know is #4, not #2. You seem to be aping Dawkins' arguments, with a similar ignorance of the actual set of alternatives. No one claims that the order/complexity/whatever of God just popped into existence. People (Hawking, Dawkins, apparently you) do claim that the order of the physical universe & natural law just popped into existence. If you're going to compare your views to other people's, and if you care about honesty and intellectual integrity, please accurately represent them.
And if you think the distinction I'm making between 2 and 4 is irrelevant or meaningless, keep this in mind: The Big Bang was resisted because people wanted to have a universe that always existed. They could accept an eternal universe; they did not want to have to explain a universe that started to exist. (Of course, we can also suppose an eternal chain of Big Bangs, universes spawning other universes, etc., so the Big Bang doesn't actually settle this question of eternality.) So, those philosophical naturalists thought 3 was more reasonable than 1 for precisely the reason that theists claim 4 is more reasonable than 2.
But an equal amount of energy is transferred back to you in the opposite direction (remember "equal and opposite reaction"). When you hit something, which side is traveling at what speed doesn't matter, only their energy relative to each other. So you're absorbing the same amount of energy as you're dishing out. That's why your hand hurts when you hit the punching bag too.
With a small amount of force, you can easily brace yourself against the ground and your body and the ground then absorb that energy. With enough force to knock somebody across the room, though, you'd probably break a few bones before you'd get the ground to absorb all that energy.
I'll expand on why ThosLives shook his head in dismay at your comments.
You're mixing together energy, momentum, and force. No, energy is not transferred back to you in the opposite direction. Your fist exerts a force on the bag, and the bag exerts an equal and opposite force on your first. The energy involved is the kinetic energy of your moving fist. That kinetic energy will either be transferred into the bag or be transformed into heat and sound. Energy has no direction--it's a scalar, not a vector.
The purpose of bracing yourself is so that your body does not acquire backwards momentum. Momentum does have direction.
Just FYI...I'm sure that's true for many people out there, but for myself, yes, of course there could be evidence to convince me that Jesus wasn't God. Partly that means that if some of the evidence we do have were different, I wouldn't believe. But as for the Cameron documentary--if the ossuary belonging to the guy named Jesus still had the bones in it, and those bones showed nail holes from crucifixion... Well, I would wait for verification the bones hadn't been tampered with, but there's fair chance I would no longer be a Christian after that. Combining the names with crucifixion would be a bit much.
I haven't seen the documentary or read the book yet, so I can only evaluate the statements they've made so far, but they've said some truly silly things, so I'm not expecting much from the documentary. (For example, Cameron claimed on the Today Show that a document called the Acts of Phillip "definitely identifies Mary Magdalene as Mariamne". Go look up the text online, it's linked from the Wikipedia article. It includes a woman named Mariamne, but it definitely doesn't identify her as Mary Magdalene. The word "Magdalene" doesn't even appear. The Mariamne in the story is the sister of Phillip, and she turns into a glass box full of light and fire when she's threatened. Some scholars think that she's Mary Magdalene, others identify her as Mary of Bethany...But it's all quite speculative.)
that all of one man's ancestors are born in sin,
:)
Er...Adam had no ancestors. Perhaps you mean descendants?