ISAs already have ways to indicate static branch likelihood for conditional branches. Some ISAs have a "likely to take" flag, indicating that a branch is more likely to be taken than not taken, while others have rules like "if branch backwards, then taken is more likely, else not taken is more likely". A compiler can make use of these to do what you're suggesting.
Maybe that's true in the US. Here in the UK, it's decidedly not true. I have ADSL (2MBit down), but I live in a non-cabled area (NTL decided not to bother with my street), and I can't put a satellite dish up at a sane price (no windows in the south facing wall, which backs onto someone else's house, so install was quoted at ~£700 which equals $1,300).
As a result, I can grab high-def video (~10MBit/s) via BitTorrent, but I don't have the choice of pay TV at an affordable price.
A derived work is a copyright matter; talk to a good copyright lawyer if you need to know.
For your C# example, your hello world application is a derived work of the runtime; you can put an exception in your licence to allow you to link against it (see section 2 of the GPL for an example, where it talks about "a special exception").
Some of us studied Latin when we were young. And as it happens, the site is right about the Latin, even if its English is bad; if you don't trust it, go down to your local library and look things up in a book on Latin grammar. Or read and comprehend something like this online Latin grammar.
Only works if the originator has a globally unique MAC address. Think dial-up modems, point to point links, private systems using administrator defined addresses (UML hosts for example)...
Here in the UK, we've started using Chip and Pin credit cards; the entire point of these cards is that there is a three way handshake between the card reader, the chip on the card, and the bank. Provided the store compiles with VISA/Mastercard regulations on the PIN reader they use, the PIN is never disclosed. Instead, the card verifies the PIN, and uses it to create a verification code that the bank can check. Result? Fraud is hard, because you need to crack the chip and create a fake chip, rather than just copy a strip.
Buggy drivers hurt, regardless of the standard of the hardware; if the hardware is any good, the specs needed to write a driver do not contain any "super precious IP"
All a decent specification document reveals is how to tell a particular chip what to do, not how that chip does it. Any competitor knows what a chip is supposed to do (you can get that information by disassembling a binary driver, or by monitoring the bus while you send the binary driver commands), so the only "IP" you risk losing is the discovery that your "hardware" features are implemented by the device driver.
I'd go further than you; not only does it not create more criminals, but it provides a mechanism to expose more criminals; because of the apparent anonymity, dangerous people are going to take more risks (publish more pictures of molestation, try and build up a reputation behind a pseudonym, otherwise provides routes for the police to trace them). Thus, although the numbers don't change much, the percentage caught is up.
I'm afraid it's you who has completely misunderstood; the technology is irrelevant here, and the issue would be the same whether or not the filter is Bayesian, keyword based, random, or whatever.
The filters have false positives. These false positives include mail that is very similar to stuff that CBS News should be reporting on; if I discover a scandal about a politician, CBS News do not want to be ignoring it if there's a good story there.
I fully understand the technology; I know why there are false positives and false negatives. However, this is a political issue; a corrupt politician can pay a spammer to poison spam filters such that discussion of their corrupt behaviour is treated as spam, thus increasing the likelyhood that they'll get away with it. Regardless of why or how a system generates false positives, these false positives are bad, as CBS News should be reporting on corrupt politicians.
Do you understand yet? Strings are part of content, and if CBS News's Bayesian filter ends up ignoring mail about a genuine news story (confusing it with spam), this is politically bad, even though the technology is apolitical.
Go look at a real loser pays system (as in, one that's already running in somewhere like Australia or the UK). Our rules are simple: usually, the loser pays costs for all; if the judge feels that's unjust for whatever reason, they can award costs differently. A costs order can be appealed, just like any other judge's order, so judges can't go overboard.
And I don't see how a "pay your own costs" or "winner pays" system helps in either of the two cases you mention; a big company can screw you over by threatening you with a lawsuit, then just dragging it out (SCO vs IBM style) until you run out of money. Likewise, a company that's gone into the gray area of law can afford to just drag a case out until you can no longer pay your costs. Again, no worse than your worst case scenario under loser pays.
The big difference that loser pays makes is in providing access for poor people with a strong case; a lawyer will take it on, but will not demand payment until completion of the case. Thus, when you take on a big, rich company, and you have a strong case, you can afford lots of legal costs because the lawyers will leave taking payment until the costs order comes round; they can claim interest on their costs at that point, too.
We're talking about interfaces, not underlying complexity, and a car is a good example to use.
Compare the interface of a 1920s car with a modern automatic. In the 1920s car you have to double-declutch gears, you have to understand how the starting process works so that you don't flood the engine while you crank it, and the vehicle generally requires you to have much more understanding of how the mechanics work. Contrast the modern auto; much more complex under the hood (your chances of understanding the vehicle as well as you could understand a 1920s car are minimal), but a much simpler interface.
How does the parser distinguish random whitespace after the colon from fields that begin with whitespace?
How do I extend the syntax to cover MySQL over both IP and domain sockets? In XML, I'd add an attribute to the "type" element, allowing for a default (omitted) meaning "any", and providing an enumerated list of available connection types.
It means that the device cannot become dangerous as a result of interference, and cannot use any sort of active countermeasures to block the other signal.
Put simply, if there's interference, it is allowed to not work (in a safe fashion), and that's about all it can do. You're allowed to use passive countermeasures to protect yourself from interference (shielding etc), but you're not allowed to do things like signal jamming, except as a consequence of normal operation (so a WiFi AP can up its power output to the licenced limit, and see if that works, but it can't broadcast a jamming signal designed to stop the other APs working). It also can't (e.g.) make the antenna dangerously hot, make the case live, or do anything else that makes the equipment dangerous as against failed.
It allows a malicious web page to do anything on your system that you can do locally; if the user you run IE as can do it, the attacker can do it too. So, if you can read these critical files, the attacker can, too. If you can modify them, guess what? The attacker can change them too.
If I were a black-hat planning to exploit this vulnerability, I'd put a remote control program like Back Orifice and a HTTP tunnelling program onto the web for BO to use for connectivity. Then the exploit downloads and installs them, and I have full control of your system whenever I want it.
You don't need to have a monopoly to be using a dominant position in one marketplace to drive your sales in another.
There are two get outs from this position:
The goods that you're driving sales of are not yours; if Wal-Mart is strong-arming labels to get low prices in order to sell more CDs, that's fine. It's only illegal if you're strong-arming labels to get low prices to sell your CD players (and only your CD players, so if the CDs you sell work fine in Best Buy CD players, you're clear).
Demonstrate that any other manufacturer can obtain access to the market you're supposed to be driving with the goods you're using to drive it for the same price as you are. Thus, if the Sony music store pays (for example) 80c/song to Sony Music, and an outsider is asked to pay 80c/song to Sony Music, Sony is clear.
Thus, Wal-Mart is doing nothing illegal; they hope that by selling cheap CDs, they'll get you to buy other goods from them too, but you can still buy everything buy CDs from someone else, and spend your remaining money on CDs from Wal-Mart.
If Sony's music store is not tied to Sony player hardware, Sony are in the clear. If it is, and it gains a dominant market position, they could be found to be abusing their position, too. Likewise, if they have a dominant position in player hardware, and the store is tied to the hardware, this is also abuse of a dominant position. If neither the store nor the players dominate the market, then Sony are clear.
In the case of Apple, if the iPod does not dominate the player market, then the iPod's market position cannot be abused. If the iTMS does not dominate the online music sales market, then the iTMS's market position cannot be abused. If both of these hold, the case is stupid; if one of other of them does not hold, then it is equivalent to the Microsoft anti-trust case.
Except that I have friends with MiniDisc players that aren't from Sony (as in not rebrands of Sony players, either). I know of no music player that's not made by Apple and can play iTMS tracks; the HP iPod doesn't count, as it's a rebrand of the Apple iPod.
It can therefore be argued that Apple are abusing the iTMS to drive iPod sales illegally, and that the goal is to use iTMS to obtain a monopoly position in the portable music player market, then to lock out other companies from providing music for the iPod in any form.
As tepples said, US copyright law includes the right for a purchaser of software to make copies to hard disc and to RAM in order to run the software. Copyright in the UK has similar provisions for "incidental copies", which permit you to make whatever copies are needed to use copyrighted material, provided you are not redistributing said material in the process.
Note that in both cases, you are not permitted to redistribute, only to run the program.
Don't forget that audiophile CD/DVD players are often PC drives with an embedded computer reading the disc; Meridian have certainly done this on some models, which means that the really stupidly rich audiophiles will get upset too.
The aim is to get secure messaging to the same level of deniability as insecure, so there are three attack scenarios:
My end logs messages, yours doesn't.
Your end log messages, mine doesn't.
Both ends log messages.
Obviously, if neither end logs messages, the argument is that neither of us sent messages in the first place; part of the point of the scheme is that there's no way to show after the fact that you and I both had the key, and knew it belong to each other. All the logging party in the middle has is a stack of encrypted messages, and no way to show that you or I ever had the key. They can prove that they have the encryption key, but that doesn't help with evidence, as you and I both claim that we've not got encryption or decryption keys. This is the most common scenario, and leaves you no worse off than you were with plaintext messages, since you've got as much denability as before, but the investigator cannot read the messages you sent.
In scenarios 1 and 2, the person who didn't log messages claims that they never had the decryption key; again, we can prove that they had the encryption key, but not that they could read the messages. So, as the party that didn't log the messages, you claim that you never received them, and that the party who logged the messages forged them. Again, no worse off than plain text messaging, since the possibility of forgery is identical, but this time a key is needed to read the messages
In scenario 3, you're doomed anyway, but you would be with plain text messaging too.
Thus, no matter where the attacker is, your privacy and security is always at the same level as it would be with OpenPGP type messaging, and deniability at the same level as plaintext messaging.
As you rightly point out, I forgot to mention that the published key is only useful for encrypting new messages, not for decrypting the stack you have already. Thus, a new person cannot read the existing messages, but can add to the set.
Slashdot Mirror
ISAs already have ways to indicate static branch likelihood for conditional branches. Some ISAs have a "likely to take" flag, indicating that a branch is more likely to be taken than not taken, while others have rules like "if branch backwards, then taken is more likely, else not taken is more likely". A compiler can make use of these to do what you're suggesting.
As a result, I can grab high-def video (~10MBit/s) via BitTorrent, but I don't have the choice of pay TV at an affordable price.
Microsoft has beat Sony the same way it's beat AOL; bear in mind that if MSN had "won", AOL would be a minor player on the Internet.
For your C# example, your hello world application is a derived work of the runtime; you can put an exception in your licence to allow you to link against it (see section 2 of the GPL for an example, where it talks about "a special exception").
Some of us studied Latin when we were young. And as it happens, the site is right about the Latin, even if its English is bad; if you don't trust it, go down to your local library and look things up in a book on Latin grammar. Or read and comprehend something like this online Latin grammar.
Only works if the originator has a globally unique MAC address. Think dial-up modems, point to point links, private systems using administrator defined addresses (UML hosts for example)...
Here in the UK, we've started using Chip and Pin credit cards; the entire point of these cards is that there is a three way handshake between the card reader, the chip on the card, and the bank. Provided the store compiles with VISA/Mastercard regulations on the PIN reader they use, the PIN is never disclosed. Instead, the card verifies the PIN, and uses it to create a verification code that the bank can check. Result? Fraud is hard, because you need to crack the chip and create a fake chip, rather than just copy a strip.
My Gentoo box drags down just under 3GB/month, including daily updates; I think you are wrong.
Buggy drivers hurt, regardless of the standard of the hardware; if the hardware is any good, the specs needed to write a driver do not contain any "super precious IP"
All a decent specification document reveals is how to tell a particular chip what to do, not how that chip does it. Any competitor knows what a chip is supposed to do (you can get that information by disassembling a binary driver, or by monitoring the bus while you send the binary driver commands), so the only "IP" you risk losing is the discovery that your "hardware" features are implemented by the device driver.
I'd go further than you; not only does it not create more criminals, but it provides a mechanism to expose more criminals; because of the apparent anonymity, dangerous people are going to take more risks (publish more pictures of molestation, try and build up a reputation behind a pseudonym, otherwise provides routes for the police to trace them). Thus, although the numbers don't change much, the percentage caught is up.
The filters have false positives. These false positives include mail that is very similar to stuff that CBS News should be reporting on; if I discover a scandal about a politician, CBS News do not want to be ignoring it if there's a good story there.
I fully understand the technology; I know why there are false positives and false negatives. However, this is a political issue; a corrupt politician can pay a spammer to poison spam filters such that discussion of their corrupt behaviour is treated as spam, thus increasing the likelyhood that they'll get away with it. Regardless of why or how a system generates false positives, these false positives are bad, as CBS News should be reporting on corrupt politicians.
Do you understand yet? Strings are part of content, and if CBS News's Bayesian filter ends up ignoring mail about a genuine news story (confusing it with spam), this is politically bad, even though the technology is apolitical.
And I don't see how a "pay your own costs" or "winner pays" system helps in either of the two cases you mention; a big company can screw you over by threatening you with a lawsuit, then just dragging it out (SCO vs IBM style) until you run out of money. Likewise, a company that's gone into the gray area of law can afford to just drag a case out until you can no longer pay your costs. Again, no worse than your worst case scenario under loser pays.
The big difference that loser pays makes is in providing access for poor people with a strong case; a lawyer will take it on, but will not demand payment until completion of the case. Thus, when you take on a big, rich company, and you have a strong case, you can afford lots of legal costs because the lawyers will leave taking payment until the costs order comes round; they can claim interest on their costs at that point, too.
Compare the interface of a 1920s car with a modern automatic. In the 1920s car you have to double-declutch gears, you have to understand how the starting process works so that you don't flood the engine while you crank it, and the vehicle generally requires you to have much more understanding of how the mechanics work. Contrast the modern auto; much more complex under the hood (your chances of understanding the vehicle as well as you could understand a 1920s car are minimal), but a much simpler interface.
In digital cinema, people already use 4Kp24 for some work; the current progress is towards 8Kp24 in production.
Put simply, if there's interference, it is allowed to not work (in a safe fashion), and that's about all it can do. You're allowed to use passive countermeasures to protect yourself from interference (shielding etc), but you're not allowed to do things like signal jamming, except as a consequence of normal operation (so a WiFi AP can up its power output to the licenced limit, and see if that works, but it can't broadcast a jamming signal designed to stop the other APs working). It also can't (e.g.) make the antenna dangerously hot, make the case live, or do anything else that makes the equipment dangerous as against failed.
If I were a black-hat planning to exploit this vulnerability, I'd put a remote control program like Back Orifice and a HTTP tunnelling program onto the web for BO to use for connectivity. Then the exploit downloads and installs them, and I have full control of your system whenever I want it.
There are two get outs from this position:
Thus, Wal-Mart is doing nothing illegal; they hope that by selling cheap CDs, they'll get you to buy other goods from them too, but you can still buy everything buy CDs from someone else, and spend your remaining money on CDs from Wal-Mart.
If Sony's music store is not tied to Sony player hardware, Sony are in the clear. If it is, and it gains a dominant market position, they could be found to be abusing their position, too. Likewise, if they have a dominant position in player hardware, and the store is tied to the hardware, this is also abuse of a dominant position. If neither the store nor the players dominate the market, then Sony are clear.
In the case of Apple, if the iPod does not dominate the player market, then the iPod's market position cannot be abused. If the iTMS does not dominate the online music sales market, then the iTMS's market position cannot be abused. If both of these hold, the case is stupid; if one of other of them does not hold, then it is equivalent to the Microsoft anti-trust case.
It can therefore be argued that Apple are abusing the iTMS to drive iPod sales illegally, and that the goal is to use iTMS to obtain a monopoly position in the portable music player market, then to lock out other companies from providing music for the iPod in any form.
Note that in both cases, you are not permitted to redistribute, only to run the program.
Don't forget that audiophile CD/DVD players are often PC drives with an embedded computer reading the disc; Meridian have certainly done this on some models, which means that the really stupidly rich audiophiles will get upset too.
- My end logs messages, yours doesn't.
- Your end log messages, mine doesn't.
- Both ends log messages.
Obviously, if neither end logs messages, the argument is that neither of us sent messages in the first place; part of the point of the scheme is that there's no way to show after the fact that you and I both had the key, and knew it belong to each other. All the logging party in the middle has is a stack of encrypted messages, and no way to show that you or I ever had the key. They can prove that they have the encryption key, but that doesn't help with evidence, as you and I both claim that we've not got encryption or decryption keys. This is the most common scenario, and leaves you no worse off than you were with plaintext messages, since you've got as much denability as before, but the investigator cannot read the messages you sent.In scenarios 1 and 2, the person who didn't log messages claims that they never had the decryption key; again, we can prove that they had the encryption key, but not that they could read the messages. So, as the party that didn't log the messages, you claim that you never received them, and that the party who logged the messages forged them. Again, no worse off than plain text messaging, since the possibility of forgery is identical, but this time a key is needed to read the messages
In scenario 3, you're doomed anyway, but you would be with plain text messaging too.
Thus, no matter where the attacker is, your privacy and security is always at the same level as it would be with OpenPGP type messaging, and deniability at the same level as plaintext messaging.
As you rightly point out, I forgot to mention that the published key is only useful for encrypting new messages, not for decrypting the stack you have already. Thus, a new person cannot read the existing messages, but can add to the set.
You have in your possession some encrypted messages from time past. How do you prove that I encrypted those messages?