The money they pay you will be income to you. The money you pay back will be deductible -- but only as an itemized deduction, and subject to various limits.
Bottom line: doing this might make you owe more in taxes and might have no effect but cannot possibly lower your tax bill.
Note, though, that even eBay's consent is probably not needed. If they illegally seized evidence from eBay's computer, they couldn't use what they found against eBay, but I can't see why it wouldn't be admissible against a seller. This is the doctrine formerly known as "standing to assert a Fourth Amendment right."
If the cops illegally break into my house, they can use what they find against you, unless you have a particularly close connection to either me or my house.
Well, that's one reasonable position, but it's far from clear that it's where the law is.
_Nimmer on Copyright_, the most respected treatise on the subject, takes the position that, as a matter of federal copyright law, licenses can't restrict use of published works which claim the benefits of copyright (as distinguished from narrowly-circulated works which can plausibly claim to be secret). He says (or, anyway, said in the edition I looked at 3 years ago) that a "license" restricting how often you could read a normally-published book, for example, would be void. I, for one, think he's right.
No, it's worse than that. Even in a system with serial numbers truly anonymous at funding-time, the anonymity disappears (or is diminished, anyway) if different purchases can be connected to each other.
For example, say I use the same card twice: once in a non-secret purchase connectable to my identity, such as having groceries delivered to me, and the second time for a payment I do not want connected to me -- in person at a porn shop, say. Now, the porn shop can learn my identity if it is cooperating with the grocery store. If I'm required to trust it not to, I might as well trust it not to use against me information it would get from a completely non-anonymous payment such as a check.
It appears that this is an offline system, relying solely on information on the card, so it may well be truly anonymous but is unlikely to be very hack-proof.
Well, remember, whatever the facts, ONE side must be better off flipping a coin, and it only takes one to insist on trial by jury. It used to be that jury trials in patent cases were rare, but now they happen most of the time.
In fact, the standard advice in jury selection for patent cases is to always do your best to keep college grads and other technically-minded types off the jury. I guess we all just believe we're better at the gobbledy-gook than the other guy.
"Suits at common law" does indeed refer to civil suits, but only those "at law."
The more significant exception is the word "preserved": you are entitled to a jury trial only in those cases for which the common law provided one at the time the amendment was adopted. This makes the analysis of "at common law" extraneous, because only the law courts provided for trials by jury: the equity and ecclesiastical courts provided trials only by (their equivalents of) judges. (Equity courts heard, among other things, cases involving remedies other than money damages; Delaware still has a separate "chancery" court. The ecclesiastical courts heard divorce actions, and other stuff no longer relevant.)
The seminal recent case interpreting the amendment is, in fact, from a few years ago on patent law. The trouble was, of course, that patent law in its present form did not exist in 1790, but the Supreme Court found the issue of infringement close enough to cases handled in law courts then. Thus, either the plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury trial.
The Supreme Court hears patent cases having nothing to do with the Constitution regularly, probably a meaningful one every other year. (There's nothing particularly interesting about this case, legally, of course.)
_ALL_ (well, at least almost all) of the Federal Circuit judges are patent experts (and are the only patent experts in the court system).
Prices do go below zero once in a while, at least for REMIC residual interests. (Of course, they tend not to be good buys even when you're paid to take them.)
Either that, or our poster meant this as an abbreviation for some much more complicated strawman argument: sodomy and Linux are disapproved of by some but not others; those that are against them want everyone to stop; those that are for them want to be left alone to do what they want, and are substantively right.
It has nothing to do with the Sherman Act or other antitrust laws. It is the judicially-created doctrine of "copyright misuse," which a small number of courts have modelled on the existing doctrine of patent misuse. Congress sharply curtailed the breadth of patent misuse, but has not addressed copyright misuse; it is unclear whether it is viable.
Either way, though, it is obvious that this is hopeless, since the record and movie companies do not engage in the prohibited conduct (such as tying, in certain cases, or pooling). Merely enforcing copyrights is not copyright misuse; that's what they're there for. And suing can NEVER be punished unless the cause of action is "objectively unreasonable," which the AAs' actions are plainly not, EVEN IF THE SUIT IS ONLY FILED TO STIFLE COMPETITION. (This is the Noerr-Pennington rule.)
My inbox is less clearly my "property" than my front door, and laws banning door-to-door solicitation, commercial and otherwise, are unconstitutional beyond debate.
There may be a way to sneak a spam-ban through the First Amendment, but it's going to take some careful drafting and creative lawyering in the Supreme Court.
In theory, all bankruptcies follow the "absolute priority rule": senior claims have to be paid back in full, or the claims junior to them must not get any value at all. Except in very weird situations, all stock is junior to all debt, so the stockholders are wiped out completely unless the debt can be repaid completely.
The "in theory" above is because the American Chapter 11 system is flawed in several ways. The most important is that the stockholders (through the managers they chose) generally remain in control of the company until a "plan of reorganization" is approved by the court, even if it's clear that they aren't entitled to receive anything. That doesn't actually entitle the stockholders to benefit, but it does allow them to "hold up" the creditors. Often, the creditors will agree to let the stockholders keep a small fraction of the company to get them to agree to a plan and get the company out of bankruptcy.
Of course, specific stockholders can get new stock for reasons other than their old stock: by buying creditors' claims, or by investing new money. I was under the impression that Fortsmann had bought up lots of bonds so as to own a lot of post-bankruptcy stock.
I am familiar with this case. He was not acquited: he was convicted, and his conviction was thrown out, as the article says. Retrials in that situation are routine.
See the difference?
Re:You can appeal an ACQUITTAL in Norway?
on
"DVD-Jon" Faces Retrial
·
· Score: 3, Informative
Look, son, I'll tell you what a wise man once told me: There's no shame in not knowing the law, but you still don't need to proclaim it to the world, see?
In the U.S., Double jeopardy absolutely bars prosecution appeals. Totally and completely. That's why you never hear about them, or see them in movies: they don't exist.
That's right. Even if the judge totally screws up. Whether it's law or fact. (And, for that matter, defendants are free to appeal decisions of fact; they just face a higher burden of persuasion.)
Now, why don't you wait until we're discussing something you know something about for your next post, huh?
Re:You can appeal an ACQUITTAL in Norway?
on
"DVD-Jon" Faces Retrial
·
· Score: 2, Informative
No, no, no. A criminal defendant cannot be retried for the same crime by the same sovereign no matter how wrong the original trial was.
ONE recent case (in the Seventh Circuit) allowed a retrial where the acquital was a result of bribery (!!!) (on the grounds that the tainted trial was no "trial" at all), but the court didn't reach the merits of the issue, and the better rule is to prohibit retrial even in this situation.
Actually, it's even earlier: the swearing of a witness, or the swearing in of a jury if there is one.
There are several other kinds of "manifest necessity" that will lead to mistrials with retrial possible; the biggest category is those that come on defense motion.
Once acquited, acquited for good. No appeals by the prosecution as to any issue, law or fact. The cases you refer to are all appeals by defendants, not prosecutors.
Well, you're batting.333. I guess that's good enough for "informative."
1) You cannot be tried for the *same* crime twice, however, prosecutors can amend or change the crimes in which you are being tried for ie: you are no longer tried for the murder of Joe, just maybe a nice inditement of manslaughter.
Wrong. Since the facts needed to prove murder are sufficient to prove manslaughter, this prosecution would indeed violate double jeopardy. The second charge needn't be identical to the first.
2)Double Jeopardy doesn't count on appeal. Normally the losing side can appeal if there was a trial error or they want to fight a ruling the judge made on a point in the trial (including evidence that shouldn't have been, allowing a surprise witness - a procedural error).
Wrong again. Once jeopardy has "attached" -- the swearing of the jury, or of the first witness in a bench trial -- the prosecution cannot appeal. Again, it makes no difference how profound the alleged errors are. In a well-known case, the judge dismissed the charges because he wrongly believed the prosecution had done something unethical, which the judge didn't even have jurisdiction to do; but a retrial was barred nevertheless.
OT, but "allowing a surprise witness" would not typically be reversible error in any case.
You are completely, totally incorrect. No matter how much new evidence is found -- even if you confess on the way out of court -- once you are acquitted, you can NEVER be retried by the same sovereign.
As you say, a second sovereign -- e.g., the federal government, after a state trial -- can try you separately, whether or not you are acquited in the first trial, without violating double jeopardy, but many states' laws still would prevent them from being the second trial. In copyright cases, though, this is irrelevant, since states can't enforce copyright laws (as defined in federal law).
For CS in general, Cornell and Princeton are just behind the Big 4; for some specialized areas, they (and Brown, Yale and, possibly, Penn and others) are the places to be.
Of course, for computer engineering, none of them is particularly respected.
That is incorrect, or at least seriously misleading.
Yes, it's possible for a legal defense fund to be a tax-exempt entity and eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. No, the requirements you listed are not sufficient. For contributions to be deductible, the fund itself would need to meet the requirements of sec. 170 -- organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, or educational purposes, or a war vetereans' post, or a cemetary company, or...
Legal defense funds established to support a cause, like those of the NOW, NAACP, IJ, and ACLU, can meet this standard. Those established merely to benefit a particular corporation cannot, and, even if they did, would fall afoul of the common law "private benefit" rule.
Conceivably, "freeing the world from unfair domination by Google" might possibly be a "charitable" purpose, and a fund established for that purpose might be able to pay SearchKing's expenses. There is no reason to believe, however, that these donations go to anything but SearchKing itself, and anyone attempting to deduct this contribution without documentation it qualifies has filed a false return.
Slashdot Mirror
There's no tax savings there.
The money they pay you will be income to you. The money you pay back will be deductible -- but only as an itemized deduction, and subject to various limits.
Bottom line: doing this might make you owe more in taxes and might have no effect but cannot possibly lower your tax bill.
Yes, IAAL. No, you're not my client.
Exactly.
Note, though, that even eBay's consent is probably not needed. If they illegally seized evidence from eBay's computer, they couldn't use what they found against eBay, but I can't see why it wouldn't be admissible against a seller. This is the doctrine formerly known as "standing to assert a Fourth Amendment right."
Force isn't the issue.
If the cops illegally break into my house, they can use what they find against you, unless you have a particularly close connection to either me or my house.
Well, that's one reasonable position, but it's far from clear that it's where the law is.
_Nimmer on Copyright_, the most respected treatise on the subject, takes the position that, as a matter of federal copyright law, licenses can't restrict use of published works which claim the benefits of copyright (as distinguished from narrowly-circulated works which can plausibly claim to be secret). He says (or, anyway, said in the edition I looked at 3 years ago) that a "license" restricting how often you could read a normally-published book, for example, would be void. I, for one, think he's right.
No, it's worse than that. Even in a system with serial numbers truly anonymous at funding-time, the anonymity disappears (or is diminished, anyway) if different purchases can be connected to each other.
For example, say I use the same card twice: once in a non-secret purchase connectable to my identity, such as having groceries delivered to me, and the second time for a payment I do not want connected to me -- in person at a porn shop, say. Now, the porn shop can learn my identity if it is cooperating with the grocery store. If I'm required to trust it not to, I might as well trust it not to use against me information it would get from a completely non-anonymous payment such as a check.
It appears that this is an offline system, relying solely on information on the card, so it may well be truly anonymous but is unlikely to be very hack-proof.
Indeed, it brought to mind this.
Nothing too secret about that, though, I suppose.
Well, remember, whatever the facts, ONE side must be better off flipping a coin, and it only takes one to insist on trial by jury. It used to be that jury trials in patent cases were rare, but now they happen most of the time.
In fact, the standard advice in jury selection for patent cases is to always do your best to keep college grads and other technically-minded types off the jury. I guess we all just believe we're better at the gobbledy-gook than the other guy.
"Suits at common law" does indeed refer to civil suits, but only those "at law."
The more significant exception is the word "preserved": you are entitled to a jury trial only in those cases for which the common law provided one at the time the amendment was adopted. This makes the analysis of "at common law" extraneous, because only the law courts provided for trials by jury: the equity and ecclesiastical courts provided trials only by (their equivalents of) judges. (Equity courts heard, among other things, cases involving remedies other than money damages; Delaware still has a separate "chancery" court. The ecclesiastical courts heard divorce actions, and other stuff no longer relevant.)
The seminal recent case interpreting the amendment is, in fact, from a few years ago on patent law. The trouble was, of course, that patent law in its present form did not exist in 1790, but the Supreme Court found the issue of infringement close enough to cases handled in law courts then. Thus, either the plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury trial.
Huh?
The Supreme Court hears patent cases having nothing to do with the Constitution regularly, probably a meaningful one every other year. (There's nothing particularly interesting about this case, legally, of course.)
_ALL_ (well, at least almost all) of the Federal Circuit judges are patent experts (and are the only patent experts in the court system).
Prices do go below zero once in a while, at least for REMIC residual interests. (Of course, they tend not to be good buys even when you're paid to take them.)
Methinks we have been trolled.
Either that, or our poster meant this as an abbreviation for some much more complicated strawman argument: sodomy and Linux are disapproved of by some but not others; those that are against them want everyone to stop; those that are for them want to be left alone to do what they want, and are substantively right.
It has nothing to do with the Sherman Act or other antitrust laws. It is the judicially-created doctrine of "copyright misuse," which a small number of courts have modelled on the existing doctrine of patent misuse. Congress sharply curtailed the breadth of patent misuse, but has not addressed copyright misuse; it is unclear whether it is viable.
Either way, though, it is obvious that this is hopeless, since the record and movie companies do not engage in the prohibited conduct (such as tying, in certain cases, or pooling). Merely enforcing copyrights is not copyright misuse; that's what they're there for. And suing can NEVER be punished unless the cause of action is "objectively unreasonable," which the AAs' actions are plainly not, EVEN IF THE SUIT IS ONLY FILED TO STIFLE COMPETITION. (This is the Noerr-Pennington rule.)
That doesn't work.
My inbox is less clearly my "property" than my front door, and laws banning door-to-door solicitation, commercial and otherwise, are unconstitutional beyond debate.
There may be a way to sneak a spam-ban through the First Amendment, but it's going to take some careful drafting and creative lawyering in the Supreme Court.
In theory, all bankruptcies follow the "absolute priority rule": senior claims have to be paid back in full, or the claims junior to them must not get any value at all. Except in very weird situations, all stock is junior to all debt, so the stockholders are wiped out completely unless the debt can be repaid completely.
The "in theory" above is because the American Chapter 11 system is flawed in several ways. The most important is that the stockholders (through the managers they chose) generally remain in control of the company until a "plan of reorganization" is approved by the court, even if it's clear that they aren't entitled to receive anything. That doesn't actually entitle the stockholders to benefit, but it does allow them to "hold up" the creditors. Often, the creditors will agree to let the stockholders keep a small fraction of the company to get them to agree to a plan and get the company out of bankruptcy.
Of course, specific stockholders can get new stock for reasons other than their old stock: by buying creditors' claims, or by investing new money. I was under the impression that Fortsmann had bought up lots of bonds so as to own a lot of post-bankruptcy stock.
I am familiar with this case. He was not acquited: he was convicted, and his conviction was thrown out, as the article says. Retrials in that situation are routine.
See the difference?
Look, son, I'll tell you what a wise man once told me: There's no shame in not knowing the law, but you still don't need to proclaim it to the world, see?
In the U.S., Double jeopardy absolutely bars prosecution appeals. Totally and completely. That's why you never hear about them, or see them in movies: they don't exist.
That's right. Even if the judge totally screws up. Whether it's law or fact. (And, for that matter, defendants are free to appeal decisions of fact; they just face a higher burden of persuasion.)
Now, why don't you wait until we're discussing something you know something about for your next post, huh?
No, no, no. A criminal defendant cannot be retried for the same crime by the same sovereign no matter how wrong the original trial was.
ONE recent case (in the Seventh Circuit) allowed a retrial where the acquital was a result of bribery (!!!) (on the grounds that the tainted trial was no "trial" at all), but the court didn't reach the merits of the issue, and the better rule is to prohibit retrial even in this situation.
Actually, it's even earlier: the swearing of a witness, or the swearing in of a jury if there is one.
There are several other kinds of "manifest necessity" that will lead to mistrials with retrial possible; the biggest category is those that come on defense motion.
No, no, no.
Once acquited, acquited for good. No appeals by the prosecution as to any issue, law or fact. The cases you refer to are all appeals by defendants, not prosecutors.
Well, you're batting .333. I guess that's good enough for "informative."
1) You cannot be tried for the *same* crime twice, however, prosecutors can amend or change the crimes in which you are being tried for ie: you are no longer tried for the murder of Joe, just maybe a nice inditement of manslaughter.
Wrong. Since the facts needed to prove murder are sufficient to prove manslaughter, this prosecution would indeed violate double jeopardy. The second charge needn't be identical to the first.
2)Double Jeopardy doesn't count on appeal. Normally the losing side can appeal if there was a trial error or they want to fight a ruling the judge made on a point in the trial (including evidence that shouldn't have been, allowing a surprise witness - a procedural error).
Wrong again. Once jeopardy has "attached" -- the swearing of the jury, or of the first witness in a bench trial -- the prosecution cannot appeal. Again, it makes no difference how profound the alleged errors are. In a well-known case, the judge dismissed the charges because he wrongly believed the prosecution had done something unethical, which the judge didn't even have jurisdiction to do; but a retrial was barred nevertheless.
OT, but "allowing a surprise witness" would not typically be reversible error in any case.
You are completely, totally incorrect. No matter how much new evidence is found -- even if you confess on the way out of court -- once you are acquitted, you can NEVER be retried by the same sovereign.
As you say, a second sovereign -- e.g., the federal government, after a state trial -- can try you separately, whether or not you are acquited in the first trial, without violating double jeopardy, but many states' laws still would prevent them from being the second trial. In copyright cases, though, this is irrelevant, since states can't enforce copyright laws (as defined in federal law).
Yes, IAAL.
Does Pulver's Free World Dialup not do what you want?
Finally, an explanation that makes sense! That would explain the alleged speedup and number of lines, but can it explain the crashing-at-7x nonsense?
For CS in general, Cornell and Princeton are just behind the Big 4; for some specialized areas, they (and Brown, Yale and, possibly, Penn and others) are the places to be.
Of course, for computer engineering, none of them is particularly respected.
That is incorrect, or at least seriously misleading.
...
Yes, it's possible for a legal defense fund to be a tax-exempt entity and eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. No, the requirements you listed are not sufficient. For contributions to be deductible, the fund itself would need to meet the requirements of sec. 170 -- organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, or educational purposes, or a war vetereans' post, or a cemetary company, or
Legal defense funds established to support a cause, like those of the NOW, NAACP, IJ, and ACLU, can meet this standard. Those established merely to benefit a particular corporation cannot, and, even if they did, would fall afoul of the common law "private benefit" rule.
Conceivably, "freeing the world from unfair domination by Google" might possibly be a "charitable" purpose, and a fund established for that purpose might be able to pay SearchKing's expenses. There is no reason to believe, however, that these donations go to anything but SearchKing itself, and anyone attempting to deduct this contribution without documentation it qualifies has filed a false return.
IAAL, but TINLA (This Is Not Legal Advice).