Actually, if you read your Windows EULA, they only give you a limited, 90-day warranty, and all you can recover from them is the cost of the software that you're using:
This sounds right to me. I mean, is a parent really supposed to say "Yeah, go ahead, stick your tongue in as many electric outlets as you like!" just because they did?
Hypocrisy would only apply if you were your own parent as a child, and now, without having changed any of your beliefs, you act in ways that contradict those beliefs. So, a hypocrite is someone who says "X should not be done" and then goes out and does it. (Ted Haggard is a classic case of this, but there are of course many others.)
Plagiarism isn't just about using the the same words, it is presenting the work of others as your own. Even if you paraphrase, you must cite your sources. (This is pretty standard in university academic honesty policies.)
Granted, this is tricky to master---and the details of the case make all the difference. If a student tries to slide by a sophisticated bit of reasoning from the secondary literature, that's going to cause more problems than failing to cite the source for what appears to be (but isn't) a more commonly believed datum.
No, you've missed the point---your first paragraph doesn't seem to contradict what I say. And my examples aren't about philosophy exclusively. So, please, don't quote me out of context and think you're teh hotness. Because that's just the straw man fallacy.
Actually, there is little relationship between epistemic issues in wikipedia and appeal to authority fallacy. That fallacy requires inference from "Authority X says Y" to "Y is true." However, it is not fallacious to put higher degrees of belief into a genuine authority's claim than just any old person you find on the street. In fact, a person who is incapable of distinguishing between those with expertise and those who lack it is a pretty incompetent epistemic agent. (Just to hold off a potential misunderstanding: I'm not saying that the parent post is an incompetent epistemic agent; rather just characterizing what we should make of someone who thinks that the A student and the F student are equally good to cheat off of during an exam.)
The problem is that on wikipedia, anyone with access to a computer in supposed to be in an equally good position to judge the veracity of claims or validity of arguments. But we aren't; I am in less good of a position to judge claims about physics than Hawking, my students are in a less good position to judge the quality of philosophical arguments than I am, and so on. (While I'd love for people to buy my book on physics (well, if I wrote one), I think they should, if they are in the market for a physics book, buy Hawking's instead.)
Of course, no degree or academic position conveys infallibility, and, as the interesting post about the Society for Creative Anachronism suggests, there are many ways of becoming expert that do not involve academic credentials. But it is does seem to be a methodological error to throw away the idea of expertise and the relevant sort of authority that comes with it.
Given your dichotomy, libel has to be free speech or there is no free speech. I agree that there are laws against it (and I'm totally pro those laws), but that hardly helps your dichotomy. Libel is a form of speech act, as is slander for that matter. Does freedom of speech not protect lies? (Okay, fine, then you're against "free speech" by your own lights.)
Moreover, there are plenty of speech acts that are rightfully not permitted: speech that causes imminent danger (the "yelling fire when there isn't in a crowded theater" example comes to mind) comes to mind. You might also think that posting someone else's credit card #, address, phone number, SSN, etc without their permission falls under this category. How about making viable threats against the vulnerable---those to be protected too?
The dichotomy you've raised is far too simplistic to be any good---unless you're going to define "free speech" as all speech that is free BESIDES those cases (and whatever other counterexamples people come up with). In that case, you've won a pyrrhic victory for free speech indeed. I mean, even the most repressive regimes can say that they have free speech, with the exception of blaspheming against the Flying Spaghetti Monster, which isn't the same thing as free speech.
Actually, that was my initial response. I mean, being excited about 2 whole months of uptime? Expecting computer performance to degrade without a reboot?
Look, there's a huge literature on this that is being referenced, and before you jump in with your "i've had 5 minutes of intro to philosophy" comments about ill-defined concepts you could bother to do the reading (Searle, Dreyfus, Turing, etc.). Because you don't come off as clever, you come off as the person who missed the origins of a conversation and offers the first move as a cool new insight. So, sit down, amateur hour, and try to pay attention.
The point about simulation, since you've got trouble reading, is that the post I was responding to kept sliding into saying that intelligence could be simulated. Hardly anybody denies that---because simulations aren't the phenomena they simulate. Even Searle agrees that a computer could simulate intelligence, just like it can simulate fires or lactation. The question being discussed here is whether simulation of intelligence (sufficient to pass the Turing Test) constitutes intelligence. (This would make the simulation of intelligence unlike every other sort of simulation.)
As for whether you're simulating intelligence, um, no.
Let me now clarify and start again, because there are some points here that are worth some disambiguation.
The real question of import to strong AI research is the following: is Turing completeness enough to simulate intelligence, or is a Turing complete machine still somehow crippled? The answer, at least to me, is damn straight it's enough, since anything that shows up in nature appears to be computable in that framework. Right, and what is the fundamental issue here is the word SIMULATE. The question whether simulation of intelligence is sufficient for the presence of intelligence. (Hence Searle's admittedly peculiar citation of simulating lactation.) Is simulation of intelligence sufficient for the PRESENCE of intelligence? (In that case, intelligence is rather unlike orgasms. . ..)
You're kidding, right? To be fair, I know very little of Dreyfus' work, but Searle's work most definitely does deny that our minds are like computers. Alas, I'm not kidding. Let me point you back to the passage that YOU JUST QUOTED:
him:'Could a machine think?' My own view is that only a machine could think, and indeed only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines that had the same causal powers as brains. Yes, Searle thinks that our minds aren't like SOME computers (e.g. digital computers running formal programs) and yes, he thinks that computing machines could think---IF they have the same causal powers as brains. That is, perhaps minds have to be made up of grey goo; perhaps they have to be analog rather than digital; perhaps they have to be evolved; I don't know (he's cagey about this, which is why maybe we need to be suspicious of his views about constitutions of mind). But the target is: GOFAI and the idea that you can capture semantics in syntax. THAT is the target of the Chinese room; what the guy in the room has is the syntax for manipulating Chinese symbols without their semantic content. (BTW: there's an interesting reply to the Chinese room by Paul Churchland entitled "The Rediscovery of Light," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 93, No. 5, which is quite good and quite interesting.)
As to whether our minds can be captured with formal logic, I'll ask again, what else is there? Informal logic? I.e. of the kind that we can simulate quite nicely by mixing formal logic with pseudorandom number generation? No, the issue wasn't logical processing but rather one could capture all of the relevant parts of experience in unambiguous, finite sentences that describe all of the possible states of a mind that would go into logical inference. (AI workers have been aware of the "frame problem" for decades.) Consider, again, the difference between understanding fluid dynamics from a theoretical perspective and understanding it from the perspective of a swimmer. Would knowing all the propositional facts about fluid dynamics make you a better swimmer than someone who practiced swimming all the time? We teach people to swim by having them move their bodies around in water---unless swimming education has changed from my childhood (which is entirely possible). Knowledge of propositions about fluid dynamics might help one's swimming, but what really helps is learning how to move your body.
So what Dreyfus is going on about is that (i) some aspects of experience aren't capturable by propositional claims, and, moreover, (ii) even if they COULD, that isn't how actual minds do those activities. This again calls into question whether the goal of AI is simulations that pass the Turing Test---or something that passes because it has a mind. (Of course, maybe all there is to intelligence is simulation, but that is a distinct and significant thesis.)
Right. What Computers Still Can't Do was published in the early 1990s.
Re:WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T DO
on
Marvin Minsky On AI
·
· Score: 4, Informative
I'm afraid you've misunderstood Dreyfus's work. His work, like Searle's, does not deny that our minds are *like* (to use your locution) computers. What he denies is that our minds engage the world in a way that is (totally) capturable in propositional form and so are formal programs of the sort
What Dreyfus argues is that there are parts of human experience that aren't capturable in in an unambiguous and propositional form, and so the sort of artificial intelligence that proceeds by trying to code frame systems will fail (unless the AI is specialized for a task that can be brute forced, like chess playing). Put another way: having a theoretical grasp of an activity isn't the same as knowing how to do it (you can be brilliant with fluid dynamics theory and suck at swimming); it is this latter element that Dreyfus calls "skillful coping" and he argues that this isn't capturable by traditional AI programs. Moreover, there is a difference between the cognition of expert humans and such AI systems; chess masters, for example, don't brute force the computations.
Notice that this doesn't mean he argues that it is impossible that machines could think or that robot doppelgangers couldn't be built---just that the mainstream approaches won't work. I believe that Dreyfus would be pleased with the approaches that Mark Tilden and Rodney Brooks have taken to AI, for example.
(None of this is to say that he's right, though I suspect he is. )
Yeah, that was my thought too. OTOH, having access to a shadowed/etc/passwd file would give hints as to what logins are valid; this could make brute forcing easier. (Of course, why bother when there's easy access to files on Windows?)
The test page only works with Windows because it is looking for a specific file, but the exploit is general:
"Both examples [IE & Firefox] are Windows-specific, and require C:\BOOT.INI to exist and be readable by users. The attack itself is not limited to a particular operating system, but I decided to provide a demonstration for the most popular desktop OS - *nix versions that access/etc/hosts or/etc/passwd are easy to develop."
I've never been audited (since I'm just a faculty member and I don't use proprietary software), so I cannot vouch for its accuracy, but here's a description from an attorney that works in the field:
Lets say PJ is a crack whore who gives blowjobs for drugs. In that case the lawyers will probably treat her more nicely out of a sense of professional courtesy.
I've heard this argument before and I still think it's a load of crap. The people who download anime freely are most often those who are least likely to buy it. Yeah, that's probably true (I don't know much about anime downloading vs purchasing) but why doesn't that point to a different phenomenon: that if people were going to have to pay for it they wouldn't. A substantial amount of downloaded media simply cannot count as a "loss" to the artist/label/movie studio since it wasn't going to be purchased in the first place. I don't generally download music/movies illegally, but there are music and movies that I could see myself downloading that I would never listen to or watch if the only option was to pay for it.
And as the article mentioned in this post earlier today shows, there is probably minimal effect of P2P sharing on (at least) music sales:
Funny you should mention philosophy papers and wikipedia; crooked timber posted a brief piece a few days ago on David Chalmers's brief attempts to make some contribution to the 'pedia in ~2005:
(For those who want to read the piece and aren't exactly up to speed on academic philosophy: Chalmers is one of the big figures in contemporary philosophy, and in particular is an important figure in contemporary work on consciousness. For those who aren't up on their cinema: the "Marshal McLuhan" line is a reference to Woody Allen's _Annie_Hall_; at one point in the movie, Allen is arguing about McLuhan's work with some guy in line for a movie, and Allen pulls McLuhan in from off screen.)
Slashdot Mirror
Actually, if you read your Windows EULA, they only give you a limited, 90-day warranty, and all you can recover from them is the cost of the software that you're using:
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/home/eula.mspx
You have to dig around further in their website to get the Office EULA, but it is equivalent in this regard to the one I've linked to.
Yeah, just imagine how long it would take to compile and install Gentoo THEN!
(ducks for cover)
This sounds right to me. I mean, is a parent really supposed to say "Yeah, go ahead, stick your tongue in as many electric outlets as you like!" just because they did?
Hypocrisy would only apply if you were your own parent as a child, and now, without having changed any of your beliefs, you act in ways that contradict those beliefs. So, a hypocrite is someone who says "X should not be done" and then goes out and does it. (Ted Haggard is a classic case of this, but there are of course many others.)
Actually, the issue was a cut-n-paste issue---and the email doesn't have a license to violate.
Just like rain on your wedding day.
Plagiarism isn't just about using the the same words, it is presenting the work of others as your own. Even if you paraphrase, you must cite your sources. (This is pretty standard in university academic honesty policies.)
Granted, this is tricky to master---and the details of the case make all the difference. If a student tries to slide by a sophisticated bit of reasoning from the secondary literature, that's going to cause more problems than failing to cite the source for what appears to be (but isn't) a more commonly believed datum.
I just added pin-stripes and a big-ass wing instead. . . .
Oh, and speed holes. Lots and lots of speed holes.
No, you've missed the point---your first paragraph doesn't seem to contradict what I say. And my examples aren't about philosophy exclusively. So, please, don't quote me out of context and think you're teh hotness. Because that's just the straw man fallacy.
Actually, there is little relationship between epistemic issues in wikipedia and appeal to authority fallacy. That fallacy requires inference from "Authority X says Y" to "Y is true." However, it is not fallacious to put higher degrees of belief into a genuine authority's claim than just any old person you find on the street. In fact, a person who is incapable of distinguishing between those with expertise and those who lack it is a pretty incompetent epistemic agent. (Just to hold off a potential misunderstanding: I'm not saying that the parent post is an incompetent epistemic agent; rather just characterizing what we should make of someone who thinks that the A student and the F student are equally good to cheat off of during an exam.)
The problem is that on wikipedia, anyone with access to a computer in supposed to be in an equally good position to judge the veracity of claims or validity of arguments. But we aren't; I am in less good of a position to judge claims about physics than Hawking, my students are in a less good position to judge the quality of philosophical arguments than I am, and so on. (While I'd love for people to buy my book on physics (well, if I wrote one), I think they should, if they are in the market for a physics book, buy Hawking's instead.)
Of course, no degree or academic position conveys infallibility, and, as the interesting post about the Society for Creative Anachronism suggests, there are many ways of becoming expert that do not involve academic credentials. But it is does seem to be a methodological error to throw away the idea of expertise and the relevant sort of authority that comes with it.
Oh, man Kreator. Now *THAT* takes me back.
But they're no Linkin Park!
(YES, I'm kidding about Linkin Park.)
At least he won't stick to the walls as he roasts . . . .
Um, what?
Given your dichotomy, libel has to be free speech or there is no free speech. I agree that there are laws against it (and I'm totally pro those laws), but that hardly helps your dichotomy. Libel is a form of speech act, as is slander for that matter. Does freedom of speech not protect lies? (Okay, fine, then you're against "free speech" by your own lights.)
Moreover, there are plenty of speech acts that are rightfully not permitted: speech that causes imminent danger (the "yelling fire when there isn't in a crowded theater" example comes to mind) comes to mind. You might also think that posting someone else's credit card #, address, phone number, SSN, etc without their permission falls under this category. How about making viable threats against the vulnerable---those to be protected too?
The dichotomy you've raised is far too simplistic to be any good---unless you're going to define "free speech" as all speech that is free BESIDES those cases (and whatever other counterexamples people come up with). In that case, you've won a pyrrhic victory for free speech indeed. I mean, even the most repressive regimes can say that they have free speech, with the exception of blaspheming against the Flying Spaghetti Monster, which isn't the same thing as free speech.
Actually, that was my initial response. I mean, being excited about 2 whole months of uptime? Expecting computer performance to degrade without a reboot?
Look, there's a huge literature on this that is being referenced, and before you jump in with your "i've had 5 minutes of intro to philosophy" comments about ill-defined concepts you could bother to do the reading (Searle, Dreyfus, Turing, etc.). Because you don't come off as clever, you come off as the person who missed the origins of a conversation and offers the first move as a cool new insight. So, sit down, amateur hour, and try to pay attention.
The point about simulation, since you've got trouble reading, is that the post I was responding to kept sliding into saying that intelligence could be simulated. Hardly anybody denies that---because simulations aren't the phenomena they simulate. Even Searle agrees that a computer could simulate intelligence, just like it can simulate fires or lactation. The question being discussed here is whether simulation of intelligence (sufficient to pass the Turing Test) constitutes intelligence. (This would make the simulation of intelligence unlike every other sort of simulation.)
As for whether you're simulating intelligence, um, no.
I was waiting for the obligatory Admiral Ackbar reference.
Wait, is this FARK?
So what Dreyfus is going on about is that (i) some aspects of experience aren't capturable by propositional claims, and, moreover, (ii) even if they COULD, that isn't how actual minds do those activities. This again calls into question whether the goal of AI is simulations that pass the Turing Test---or something that passes because it has a mind. (Of course, maybe all there is to intelligence is simulation, but that is a distinct and significant thesis.)
Right. What Computers Still Can't Do was published in the early 1990s.
I'm afraid you've misunderstood Dreyfus's work. His work, like Searle's, does not deny that our minds are *like* (to use your locution) computers. What he denies is that our minds engage the world in a way that is (totally) capturable in propositional form and so are formal programs of the sort
What Dreyfus argues is that there are parts of human experience that aren't capturable in in an unambiguous and propositional form, and so the sort of artificial intelligence that proceeds by trying to code frame systems will fail (unless the AI is specialized for a task that can be brute forced, like chess playing). Put another way: having a theoretical grasp of an activity isn't the same as knowing how to do it (you can be brilliant with fluid dynamics theory and suck at swimming); it is this latter element that Dreyfus calls "skillful coping" and he argues that this isn't capturable by traditional AI programs. Moreover, there is a difference between the cognition of expert humans and such AI systems; chess masters, for example, don't brute force the computations.
Notice that this doesn't mean he argues that it is impossible that machines could think or that robot doppelgangers couldn't be built---just that the mainstream approaches won't work. I believe that Dreyfus would be pleased with the approaches that Mark Tilden and Rodney Brooks have taken to AI, for example.
(None of this is to say that he's right, though I suspect he is. )
Yeah, that was my thought too. OTOH, having access to a shadowed /etc/passwd file would give hints as to what logins are valid; this could make brute forcing easier. (Of course, why bother when there's easy access to files on Windows?)
The test page only works with Windows because it is looking for a specific file, but the exploit is general:
/etc/hosts or /etc/passwd
"Both examples [IE & Firefox] are Windows-specific, and require C:\BOOT.INI to exist and
be readable by users. The attack itself is not limited to a particular
operating system, but I decided to provide a demonstration for the most
popular desktop OS - *nix versions that access
are easy to develop."
See:
o thes
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Emperor's_New_Cl
I've never been audited (since I'm just a faculty member and I don't use proprietary software), so I cannot vouch for its accuracy, but here's a description from an attorney that works in the field:
h tml
http://blawg.bsadefense.com/2006/12/bsa_timeline.
Personally, I'd be tempted to farm out the communication with the BSA to the chaps who write the responses for the Pirate Bay. . . .
And as the article mentioned in this post earlier today shows, there is probably minimal effect of P2P sharing on (at least) music sales:
http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/02/13/13322
And, really, the one line in the Vanity Fair article that says it all is the one about Ben Affleck's payday for Gigli.
Funny you should mention philosophy papers and wikipedia; crooked timber posted a brief piece a few days ago on David Chalmers's brief attempts to make some contribution to the 'pedia in ~2005:
http://crookedtimber.org/2007/02/04/wikipedia/
(For those who want to read the piece and aren't exactly up to speed on academic philosophy: Chalmers is one of the big figures in contemporary philosophy, and in particular is an important figure in contemporary work on consciousness. For those who aren't up on their cinema: the "Marshal McLuhan" line is a reference to Woody Allen's _Annie_Hall_; at one point in the movie, Allen is arguing about McLuhan's work with some guy in line for a movie, and Allen pulls McLuhan in from off screen.)