You're talking about science fiction, or, at best, about things on a miniature scale that are wildly experimental and astronomical in cost.
Thorium, breeder reactors, cold fusion - all of these are favorite slashdot topics, but they have two invariable things in common - they've been a hot topic of popular magazines since the Manhattan project - and none of these are even conceptually on the horizon of viable energy sources.
The legend that nuclear energy is in any way alternative does not reflect the sad reality of rapidly disappearing cheap fissile materials, and (in)availability of technology that is even potentially affordable. Even the newest nuclear plants -- e.g. those Turkey just negotiated with Russia -- are built on assumptions of electricity prices that are close current costs of wind/solar.
Besides, nuclear never really made sense on its own. Practically all of the existing nuclear infrastructure is there only as a by-product of nuclear weapons research. Cost was never a consideration in this industry, and I don't know of a single nuclear plant that works without serious government backing. And this backing has never fully accounted for the environmental risks and costs, so I won't bother with them either.
I wish it was otherwise, but alas, it isn't. Nuclear is no more an option than petrol.
More money in research is needed - I agree with that 100%. But a lot of thought should be put into how to allocate resources so that they reflect technological and financial realities, and not dreams.
Nuclear, in all forms that are available or, well, within reach at the moment is not very wise investment.
There is no parallel here. The Nuremberg trials had a legal foothold in the international and military laws of the time (beginning with the Hague conventions). Besides, they were conducted by an international tribunal, against the military leaders of Germany.
Even the so called "Subsequent" Nuremberg trials (during which the US prosecuted various companies and individuals who allegedly assisted the Nazi regime) were conducted under the powers of the US occupational authority, and, if memory serves, were limited in scope to violations of the laws of war. So, nope, no parallel here either.
In this case, a private party is bringing private litigation against companies in a third country for something (communication interception by the government), which most of the time isn't a crime even in the US.
The only remotely relevant case I can think of is the infamous judgment from a few years ago, in which a US court seize priceless Iran museum art in the US, and that was closer to a highway robbery than to the Nuremberg trials.
Apparently, some people have the notion that it is easy to sue and collect if the people you dislike are not favorites of the US government.
"sophisticated equipment for unlawful intercepting, monitoring, and filtering of electronic communications "
Unlawful export, I would understand. That would probably violate some or other US law, if there were components, exported from the US used in those products.
But unlawful monitoring? What would the logic behind this be?
Not really. Remember, a lot of left-wing movements in Western Europe were heavily infiltrated (some sponsored) by the KGB, who (correctly) judged that people who would participate in such a movement would already be interested in or supportive of the regime; so they used those as pools of potential agents.
On the other hand, what would you do with a guy who went in after a random girl's picture on a website? To me it only shows a lot of plain stupidity and high hormone level, neither a particularly valuable characteristic.
"and you have failed to show that his job would have required access to the 90k documents he's alleged to have leaked."
Well, I've been saying exactly the opposite all the time - his job most definitely did not require access to all the shit he leaked.
"You have failed to show that he had access to data far above and beyond what he would have needed for his job"
Well, it is obvious, unless to the poor in spirit. Your wild suppositions that the US army in the Eyerack and Afghanistan are facing an "enemy" that has common tactics has no factual basis.
Afghanistan is not Iraq, the alleged Al Qaeda is not a single entity with united command, Al Quaeda and the Taliban are not the same thing and there is little evidence they share a whole lot of intelligence of tactics.
Even if that weren't so, dumping the same tens of thousands of raw reports on everyone everywhere is the most inefficient way to go about "knowing your enamy!11!!".
That's why they have local analysts, so they actually analyze and send out analytical reports, not drawn everyone in raw data.
If the rate of decay is allegedly millions of years, there is no way to prove or disprove it an
Actually, rate of decay is directly measurable -- because there are so many atoms to observe decaying, there are always some that decay. Once you know how many actually decay over a period in your sample, it is quite straightforward to deduce rate from the total number of atoms in your rock.
You can account for statistical errors by averaging over many samples, until you get the level of certainty (aka confidence level) you desire.
Sort of like the way we make conclusions about star evolution -- although a single star evolves for a very long period of time to observe directly, there are so many stars, that we can study stars of virtually any kind at nearly all stages of evolution in one point of time.
As a result, we have a pretty good idea of how stars evolve, despite the fact that not one single individual has documented the whole life of a single star at any point of time.
In either case, the large sample makes it possible to run (and people have run) real, falsifiable experiments.
I would say that if I was forced to choose between the security people and the leakers, I would be entirely justified in my anger at the leaker more so than the security people.
So, you say criminal negligence which exposes people's lives to risk is somehow less reprehensible than exposing the said negligence? Your standards, I like them.
"It's not. How Manning got his hands on it is certainly curious"
So, you agree with my point that Mr. Manning had access to intelligence that he did not need to know, eh? Good.
" - whether the information was mis-classified, or he broke into an area of the system where he was not supposed to be"
Heh, so we realize now that it is only possible because of lax security procedures or bad system design? Also good.
Since the rest of my argument follows logically from these two assumptions -- the leaks happened because of bad system design and bad security policies, and you've agreed to both, I'm sure you can now figure it out without further help from me, and see where you were wrong.
"If the enemy in the eastern mountains suddenly starts showing that they're equipped with shoulder-fired missiles and armored vehicles"
And you talk about wild-ass guesses and assumptions and incoherent ramblings:D
Can you explain _coherently_ how are the communications of US embassy in Iceland relevant to the battle commander of a small unit in Eyerack?
Can you explain _coherently_ what is the relevance of intel on the operations of a small Taliban group on the Pakistan border two years ago relevant to Mr. Manning's battalion, strategically located 2500km away in the Eyerack?
Hehe, you don't give up easily, but the AC is right. In any organization that deals with secret data there are two criteria that determine access:
1. clearance - which says how sikrit data you can access and
2. compartmentalization - which says who sees what, regardless of the clearance. this is also known as "need-to-know".
The rule is that even if you have clearance, you do not have access unless you also have a need-to-know.
Both are top-down things - you receive clearance and need-to-know judgment, you don't generate it yourself.
In the case of Mr. Manning, the scope is his combat battalion, in a village 80km from Baghdad.
What he needs to know is information that will be immediately useful to him to support his battle commander.
Anything else would be a distraction that will make him less effective doing his work - which is to prepare his battalion commander to better kill brown people.
This "anything else" almost certainly includes access to the happenings in remote villages in Afghanistan and certainly includes US embassy cables.
He saw more than he needed, he got distracted by bleeding heart shit like caring for brown people, data got leaked - it is that simple.
I can only guess how exactly are the US army intelligence communications implemented, but from the wired article it seems like it is a message system where anyone with clearance can read AND save all messages on any kind of media.
When I was in the military (and it was a long time ago when 16 bit computers were big deal and NATO was the enemy) compartmentalization was bigger than clearance.
To get a copy of a classified report, you needed authorization (ordinarily, a direct order) from a superior. Since copy facilities were also guarded well, that was quite enough to protect large-scale leakages from the low ranks. I am sure it was similar in the US army.
A properly organized computerized system should have worked just like that --
1. it would have had all classified information tagged with both need-to-know and clearance
2. it would have validated both against the ID of the person logged into it before allowing access and
3. it would have not allowed unauthorized copying of data on private media without doing something that would look unnatural and easy to spot.
If the sikrit communication system wasn't designed along these lines, the Pentagon people who ordered such system and the suppliers who were paid to advise them are clearly responsible.
Even if it was designed as it should have been, it is obvious that it was badly misused. So the officers in charge in the Eyerack - from the lowly and upwards to the commander who allowed the low-ranking officers to slack it - should be held responsible.
It is obvious how a properly designed and implemented system would have prevented a huge leak -- the helicopter video would probably have been leaked by Manning anyway, but Assagne would have had to work much, much harder for the Afghan reports or the embassy cables.
Instead of focusing on the real problem and solving their shit, the Pentagon is projecting ire and PR on an insignificant entity like the Wikileaks (incidentally, raising their profile).
I think you should be. Wikileaks has done your country a service by showing your military's IT security is quite bad, and the understanding of the issues by senior brass is on the level of every other PHB out there.
Given this leak, it seems quite likely that other intelligence services are able to access information from similar security failures on all levels of your command, and it is certain that they would not be so kind as to inform you of the fact that you're leaking.
So you should thank Assange for getting a free indication that so much is available from the lowest ranks, and ask the top brass WTF are they doing with your money.
"but currently, he is the only one not being punished for his part."
I was not aware that the superior officers of Mr. Bradley Mannings were arrested and facing court martial or other disciplinary action. Can you provide a link?
"There is simply no reason why Assange should go unprosecuted."
Under the laws of which country could that happen, and what would be his crime?
The job description (http://www.us-army-info.com/pages/mos/intelligence/96b.html) says the scope of his "intelligence" is his immediate battle command.
For Mr. Manning, that'd be "all of the intelligence" related to battle operations of his support battalion in some backwater in the Eyerack.
Instead, he got US diplomatic telegrams, reports about shit all over Afghanistan and what not, for years.
And, as far as bank positions are concerned, he wouldn't be an auditor, but a junior analyst of a major NYC bank in Dumbfark, Nebraska.
His reading material would include crop-dusting industry sales brochure, not the insider information about the portfolio of risky assets a major client wants to short-sell to small investors.
Come on, if you are a minor clerk in a local office of a large international bank, there's no way in hell you'll end up with all the sales and PR communications of the bank over a 5 or 6 year period. NO WAY AT ALL.
So, how is it possible that a lowly bolt (or nut) in the mighty US army machine did just that? Only one way - criminal negligence on the part of his superiors, and those who work for them.
I am sure that the of the people who are responsible for this are the same people who are leveraging all their Pentagon power to shift the blame from the sick sheep to the healthy one.
They, and not Assagne are at fault and should be blamed for eventual harm done, because keeping those data safe is squarely THEIR responsibility, not Wikileaks'. Wikileaks' responsibility, whatever their agenda is, is leaking data.
Too bad the lot of you people who pay for those jerks are ready to bend over and swallow whatever BS they dump your way, when, instead, you should be thinking something along the lines of "OMG HOW MANY LOWLY SOLDIERS HAVE GOTTEN RICH BY SELLING THIS SHIT TO PEOPLE WHO DONT LEAK IT"
You sound angry, but your anger is directed at the wrong people.
Instead of asking for the extradition of Assange, you should be asking for the court martial for the officers (high and low) who are in charge of IT security of the US army.
You should be asking for hefty refunds from the companies (undoubtedly laced with a lot of former brass) that were paid money to supply the hardware and software for the said information processing. Maybe they should cover part of the costs for helping your informants.
Those "heroes" are the people who are responsible for the data leakage and for the danger to everyone who is assisting them in Afghanistan.
Slashdot Mirror
You're talking about science fiction, or, at best, about things on a miniature scale that are wildly experimental and astronomical in cost.
Thorium, breeder reactors, cold fusion - all of these are favorite slashdot topics, but they have two invariable things in common - they've been a hot topic of popular magazines since the Manhattan project - and none of these are even conceptually on the horizon of viable energy sources.
The legend that nuclear energy is in any way alternative does not reflect the sad reality of rapidly disappearing cheap fissile materials, and (in)availability of technology that is even potentially affordable. Even the newest nuclear plants -- e.g. those Turkey just negotiated with Russia -- are built on assumptions of electricity prices that are close current costs of wind/solar.
Besides, nuclear never really made sense on its own. Practically all of the existing nuclear infrastructure is there only as a by-product of nuclear weapons research. Cost was never a consideration in this industry, and I don't know of a single nuclear plant that works without serious government backing. And this backing has never fully accounted for the environmental risks and costs, so I won't bother with them either.
I wish it was otherwise, but alas, it isn't. Nuclear is no more an option than petrol.
More money in research is needed - I agree with that 100%. But a lot of thought should be put into how to allocate resources so that they reflect technological and financial realities, and not dreams.
Nuclear, in all forms that are available or, well, within reach at the moment is not very wise investment.
The estimates are that the cheaply available fissile material will be gone in about 70 years at the current rates of production.
And, if memory servers, we've already burned through most of the fuel from decommissioned nukes.
Oil is likely to last longer.
What's your plan for the long term?
Where's the DIY howto? If possible, powered by an Arduino or two, all parts made on a reprap.
That was in 2007. Now, because of the inflation of the Universe and the Moore effect the flight time has almost doubled.
There is no parallel here. The Nuremberg trials had a legal foothold in the international and military laws of the time (beginning with the Hague conventions). Besides, they were conducted by an international tribunal, against the military leaders of Germany.
Even the so called "Subsequent" Nuremberg trials (during which the US prosecuted various companies and individuals who allegedly assisted the Nazi regime) were conducted under the powers of the US occupational authority, and, if memory serves, were limited in scope to violations of the laws of war. So, nope, no parallel here either.
In this case, a private party is bringing private litigation against companies in a third country for something (communication interception by the government), which most of the time isn't a crime even in the US.
The only remotely relevant case I can think of is the infamous judgment from a few years ago, in which a US court seize priceless Iran museum art in the US, and that was closer to a highway robbery than to the Nuremberg trials.
Apparently, some people have the notion that it is easy to sue and collect if the people you dislike are not favorites of the US government.
"sophisticated equipment for unlawful intercepting, monitoring, and filtering of electronic communications "
Unlawful export, I would understand. That would probably violate some or other US law, if there were components, exported from the US used in those products.
But unlawful monitoring? What would the logic behind this be?
Not really. Remember, a lot of left-wing movements in Western Europe were heavily infiltrated (some sponsored) by the KGB, who (correctly) judged that people who would participate in such a movement would already be interested in or supportive of the regime; so they used those as pools of potential agents.
On the other hand, what would you do with a guy who went in after a random girl's picture on a website? To me it only shows a lot of plain stupidity and high hormone level, neither a particularly valuable characteristic.
But then they'd get access of all my friends and activities.
With all the kidnapping they've done in Japan, Korea and elsewhere, who knows what is the real purpose of that page.
I'd say collecting information on potential targets is high on the list.
/ puts on the multi-ply tinfoil hat.
Well, true, the Wikileaks leak did not only expose security negligence, it exposed quite a lot of criminal negligence with respect to human life.
Than one I'll concede.
"and you have failed to show that his job would have required access to the 90k documents he's alleged to have leaked."
Well, I've been saying exactly the opposite all the time - his job most definitely did not require access to all the shit he leaked.
"You have failed to show that he had access to data far above and beyond what he would have needed for his job"
Well, it is obvious, unless to the poor in spirit. Your wild suppositions that the US army in the Eyerack and Afghanistan are facing an "enemy" that has common tactics has no factual basis.
Afghanistan is not Iraq, the alleged Al Qaeda is not a single entity with united command, Al Quaeda and the Taliban are not the same thing and there is little evidence they share a whole lot of intelligence of tactics.
Even if that weren't so, dumping the same tens of thousands of raw reports on everyone everywhere is the most inefficient way to go about "knowing your enamy!11!!".
That's why they have local analysts, so they actually analyze and send out analytical reports, not drawn everyone in raw data.
If the rate of decay is allegedly millions of years, there is no way to prove or disprove it an
Actually, rate of decay is directly measurable -- because there are so many atoms to observe decaying, there are always some that decay. Once you know how many actually decay over a period in your sample, it is quite straightforward to deduce rate from the total number of atoms in your rock.
You can account for statistical errors by averaging over many samples, until you get the level of certainty (aka confidence level) you desire.
Sort of like the way we make conclusions about star evolution -- although a single star evolves for a very long period of time to observe directly, there are so many stars, that we can study stars of virtually any kind at nearly all stages of evolution in one point of time.
As a result, we have a pretty good idea of how stars evolve, despite the fact that not one single individual has documented the whole life of a single star at any point of time.
In either case, the large sample makes it possible to run (and people have run) real, falsifiable experiments.
I would say that if I was forced to choose between the security people and the leakers, I would be entirely justified in my anger at the leaker more so than the security people.
So, you say criminal negligence which exposes people's lives to risk is somehow less reprehensible than exposing the said negligence? Your standards, I like them.
"It's not. How Manning got his hands on it is certainly curious"
So, you agree with my point that Mr. Manning had access to intelligence that he did not need to know, eh? Good.
" - whether the information was mis-classified, or he broke into an area of the system where he was not supposed to be"
Heh, so we realize now that it is only possible because of lax security procedures or bad system design? Also good.
Since the rest of my argument follows logically from these two assumptions -- the leaks happened because of bad system design and bad security policies, and you've agreed to both, I'm sure you can now figure it out without further help from me, and see where you were wrong.
Cheers, Americano intelligento experto :D
"If the enemy in the eastern mountains suddenly starts showing that they're equipped with shoulder-fired missiles and armored vehicles"
And you talk about wild-ass guesses and assumptions and incoherent ramblings :D
Can you explain _coherently_ how are the communications of US embassy in Iceland relevant to the battle commander of a small unit in Eyerack?
Can you explain _coherently_ what is the relevance of intel on the operations of a small Taliban group on the Pakistan border two years ago relevant to Mr. Manning's battalion, strategically located 2500km away in the Eyerack?
I'm all ears, kiddo.
It is so good that you refuted all my points with facts and logic :)
And yep, I can only guess, but, unlike you, I have enough knowledge that my guess is reasonable.
Hehe, you don't give up easily, but the AC is right. In any organization that deals with secret data there are two criteria that determine access:
1. clearance - which says how sikrit data you can access and
2. compartmentalization - which says who sees what, regardless of the clearance. this is also known as "need-to-know".
The rule is that even if you have clearance, you do not have access unless you also have a need-to-know.
Both are top-down things - you receive clearance and need-to-know judgment, you don't generate it yourself.
In the case of Mr. Manning, the scope is his combat battalion, in a village 80km from Baghdad.
What he needs to know is information that will be immediately useful to him to support his battle commander.
Anything else would be a distraction that will make him less effective doing his work - which is to prepare his battalion commander to better kill brown people.
This "anything else" almost certainly includes access to the happenings in remote villages in Afghanistan and certainly includes US embassy cables.
He saw more than he needed, he got distracted by bleeding heart shit like caring for brown people, data got leaked - it is that simple.
I can only guess how exactly are the US army intelligence communications implemented, but from the wired article it seems like it is a message system where anyone with clearance can read AND save all messages on any kind of media.
When I was in the military (and it was a long time ago when 16 bit computers were big deal and NATO was the enemy) compartmentalization was bigger than clearance.
To get a copy of a classified report, you needed authorization (ordinarily, a direct order) from a superior. Since copy facilities were also guarded well, that was quite enough to protect large-scale leakages from the low ranks. I am sure it was similar in the US army.
A properly organized computerized system should have worked just like that --
1. it would have had all classified information tagged with both need-to-know and clearance
2. it would have validated both against the ID of the person logged into it before allowing access and
3. it would have not allowed unauthorized copying of data on private media without doing something that would look unnatural and easy to spot.
If the sikrit communication system wasn't designed along these lines, the Pentagon people who ordered such system and the suppliers who were paid to advise them are clearly responsible.
Even if it was designed as it should have been, it is obvious that it was badly misused. So the officers in charge in the Eyerack - from the lowly and upwards to the commander who allowed the low-ranking officers to slack it - should be held responsible.
It is obvious how a properly designed and implemented system would have prevented a huge leak -- the helicopter video would probably have been leaked by Manning anyway, but Assagne would have had to work much, much harder for the Afghan reports or the embassy cables.
Instead of focusing on the real problem and solving their shit, the Pentagon is projecting ire and PR on an insignificant entity like the Wikileaks (incidentally, raising their profile).
Maybe Iraq wasn't a Bush fault after all.
And - here's the real moral of the story:
If your users request a feature often and with a passion, you either give it to them, or someone else does :D
It isn't an outrage, it is a quiet laugh (as in, laughing in disbelief).
Also, I wasn't aware large software companies give junior code monkeys access to the CVS root.
"Actually I'm glad this material got out"
I think you should be. Wikileaks has done your country a service by showing your military's IT security is quite bad, and the understanding of the issues by senior brass is on the level of every other PHB out there.
Given this leak, it seems quite likely that other intelligence services are able to access information from similar security failures on all levels of your command, and it is certain that they would not be so kind as to inform you of the fact that you're leaking.
So you should thank Assange for getting a free indication that so much is available from the lowest ranks, and ask the top brass WTF are they doing with your money.
Well, it is written in the first paragraph - his job was to support his _immediate_ command.
Anything that doesn't support his immediate command is quite obviously outside of the scope his duties.
"but currently, he is the only one not being punished for his part."
I was not aware that the superior officers of Mr. Bradley Mannings were arrested and facing court martial or other disciplinary action. Can you provide a link?
"There is simply no reason why Assange should go unprosecuted."
Under the laws of which country could that happen, and what would be his crime?
"Allowed to read all of the intelligence"
Don't be silly.
The job description (http://www.us-army-info.com/pages/mos/intelligence/96b.html) says the scope of his "intelligence" is his immediate battle command.
For Mr. Manning, that'd be "all of the intelligence" related to battle operations of his support battalion in some backwater in the Eyerack.
Instead, he got US diplomatic telegrams, reports about shit all over Afghanistan and what not, for years.
And, as far as bank positions are concerned, he wouldn't be an auditor, but a junior analyst of a major NYC bank in Dumbfark, Nebraska.
His reading material would include crop-dusting industry sales brochure, not the insider information about the portfolio of risky assets a major client wants to short-sell to small investors.
Well, yours is more of a value judgment, so is harder to justify.
I prefer obvious arguments, based on more or less objective, professional criteria. Those are usually easier to prove, and harder to deflect.
And I am lazy.
Come on, if you are a minor clerk in a local office of a large international bank, there's no way in hell you'll end up with all the sales and PR communications of the bank over a 5 or 6 year period. NO WAY AT ALL.
So, how is it possible that a lowly bolt (or nut) in the mighty US army machine did just that? Only one way - criminal negligence on the part of his superiors, and those who work for them.
I am sure that the of the people who are responsible for this are the same people who are leveraging all their Pentagon power to shift the blame from the sick sheep to the healthy one.
They, and not Assagne are at fault and should be blamed for eventual harm done, because keeping those data safe is squarely THEIR responsibility, not Wikileaks'. Wikileaks' responsibility, whatever their agenda is, is leaking data.
Too bad the lot of you people who pay for those jerks are ready to bend over and swallow whatever BS they dump your way, when, instead, you should be thinking something along the lines of "OMG HOW MANY LOWLY SOLDIERS HAVE GOTTEN RICH BY SELLING THIS SHIT TO PEOPLE WHO DONT LEAK IT"
Alas, patriotism kills reason.
You sound angry, but your anger is directed at the wrong people.
Instead of asking for the extradition of Assange, you should be asking for the court martial for the officers (high and low) who are in charge of IT security of the US army.
You should be asking for hefty refunds from the companies (undoubtedly laced with a lot of former brass) that were paid money to supply the hardware and software for the said information processing. Maybe they should cover part of the costs for helping your informants.
Those "heroes" are the people who are responsible for the data leakage and for the danger to everyone who is assisting them in Afghanistan.