Unknown only if you never read The Fantastic Four or Watchmen.
I know nothing about "Watchmen", but "The incredibles" is nothing like the "Fantastic Four". They might have similar superpowers, but that's it. The similarities are there because it's pretty clear the idea of the movie is to spoof classic comic characters.
You've got to admit the plot is definitely NOT a copy.
There's a new thing about the movies that REALLY made me stay home. I used to go to the movies regularily, mostly to the good ones but then hollywood started REPEATING THE SAME MOVIES ALL OVER AGAIN. Think about it. Four years ago you might see a new bomb and hate it, but ut would be a new script. Today, the only thing they show is remakes of old series or films. We have a TV channel specialized on old shows here (Retro, is you want to know). Watching that channel you can easily see two things:
Lots of new films are just remakes of 60s and 70s hit shows.
There was lots of experimentation in that years not present today, most shows are bad, but sometimes they hit gold. Today they just reuse the same recipe
Think about it.
Charlie and the cholocate factory: seen it when I was a child. War of the worlds: remake, no need to comment more. King Kong: (yet another) remake. Bewitched: we can see it on retro here.
We just need "Get Smart" and "I dream of Jeannie" and we can make a retro movie festival.....
I really miss some original plots, like "The Incredibles" where ALL of characters are completely unknown.
The worst part of it is that those MPAA bastards are not only not doing anything, but they are also preventing everyone el from doing it.
So, basically, we're not barking up the wrong tree. People is so fed up that they're not bothering to go to the cinema anymore.
Re:Security versus the ability to work
on
Too Many Passwords
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· Score: 1
The main reason was that we evaluated (for a range of typical users) the potential financial cost and likelihood of being prevented from working by our password regime, against the potential financial cost and likelihood of suffering a security breach. And in almost all cases, our security policy turned out to be much more damaging than any plausible security breach.
And that's not counting the way users were subverting the password scheme in order to be tolerable (yes, they were subverting it, with rules like that it always ends like that). You are probably safer right now.
What most people fail to realize is that password security cannot be too relaxed or too strict. Erring on the relaxed side you get stupid passwords, while on the opposite you get stupid passwords translated to 1337.
Personally, six months periods and random passwords are good enough. The root passwords are all random and changed periodically. So are the important passwords (like vpn access, we (the admins) choose them). As for other passwords, it's better not to try to force things. Just make sure that nobody does stupid things (post-it on monitor, etc) and an ocasional John the Ripper run is usually enough.
Thsi is why i use a free a free program called Password Safe
I do exactly the same as you do, except I run a similar program on my PDA. Pretty good idea, and the most often used password usually end memorized, minimizing the need to unlock the database. You should probably try random passwords also.
Regarding Password Safe, it's encrypted with blowfish. Unless the author (Schneier) made a design mistake your passwords should be safe. Tried to get it used at work, without success, though.
Another thing I also use is Mozilla's password manager (in FIPS mode). Easy to use, too.
I also complement things with OPIE (also known as S/KEY) for my root account, which I don't use unless necessary, and with SSH public keys and GPG (but that's another story).
If you don't trust you terminal you should always assume the worst. You can apply some measures to minimize the exposure, though.
In my case I've set up my server to require SSH public keys for external logins and OPIE for root access everywhere except in the console. In the unfortunate event that the terminal I'm using is compromised, at most the intruders will get to the non-root account (if they manage to copy my private key and passphrase, nothing if they don't). They won't get root because a one time password can't be reused (and it is calculated on my PDA). That of course unless the terminal hijacks my session, so the best defense is not to use an unknown terminal if possible.
That means that I need a SSH key available at the terminal and my PDA on me whenever I need access. Then again, if those conditions are not met, it's usually because I shouldn't be logging in from there.
Yes, I'm pretty paranoid. I carry enough crypto in my PDA for World War III (Hey, crypto is a munition, go ask the USA).
I've been reading the posts in this thread and I've noticed that there are two types of posters here: the ones who got it 100% right, and the clueless ones (there appear to be little or no posters in the middle ground).
Now, the clueless ones are thinking of lots of "attacks" using this vulnerability, some of them really wrong. Since this has the potential of getting lots of people to do stupid things (like not trusting MD5 when they should), let's talk a little bit about the vulnerability and its effects.
First of all: this is not new. There was an article here explaining the same attack a few months ago (about x.509 certificate collisions and how to fake postscript orders, if you know what I am refering to, please post a link).
The attack goes like this:
You have a block B1 that is known to collide with another block B2. You have some custom made code that looks like this:
-----BEGIN SNEAKY CODE--------------- If DATA[1] = DATA[2] then
do something good else
do something bad end DATA[1] DATA[2] -----END SNEAKY CODE-----------------
The trick is that since there's a collision between B1 and B2 and MD5 makes the hash by reading sequentially, the hash for the whole program will be the same whether you fill DATA[1] and DATA[2] with B1 or B2 (in any combination). Since the code is DESIGNED to do different things depending on the collision area, by changing the contents of DATA[1] and DATA[2] you can have programs that do "good" or "bad" things, with the same hash. Please note it's been DESIGNED with that in mind.
From now on I'll talk on absolute terms, while in reality there is a very small probability of things being right for an attack without being planned that way, so keep in mind that before saying "but that's not the whole truth.....".
Now let's discuss what's possible to do and what's not:
1.Oh no! Now, someone will create a virus that has the same hash than my favorite app!
False: the app (or installer) would have to have been designed with that "feature" in advance.
2.MD5 is worthless and should not be used anymore.
False: MD5 is useless in the situation presented above. There are some very good uses of MD5 that are safe (like access control: this attack does nothing practical to you salted MD5 shadow file). MD5 should probably be watched for other undesirable properties, though. An alternate cryptographically secure function should be kept in reserve.
3.I'll use another hash function, I'll be invulnerable to this attack.
(somewhat) False: You'll be invulnerable until someone finds ONE collision in your new hash function (it might take a long time but....). Then you'll be vulnerable again. But now we all know what can be done with ONE collision. What you're thinking is probably good, but it's no silver bullet.
4.Microsoft will forbid the use of MD5 and DES, and use SHA-1 and AES. We should do the same.
(somewhat) True: Not for the reasons you're thinking though. If MS is really doing this, this attack is a lame excuse to do it. MD5 is still useable for some things, and SHA-1 is not much better than MD5 in the things related to this attack. IIRC these collisions were found using an attack derived from an attack on SHA-1. Right now, SHA-1 collisions can be found in 2^63 operations (and the clock is ticking). We should probably consider using a new hash function someday, but leave the decision to the cryptologists. About AES, it's about time. DES can be brute forced in reasonable time, and that's been like that for a few years. 3DES is slow. That's the reason for the AES contest, we should use since we have it.
5.Someone could distribute some sort of binary and the switch it so it does lots of damage to unsuspecting people.
True: That's exactly what the attack is about. Maybe you were wrong to trust [insert a name here].
You're not the only one thinking about that. A friend of mine considered the same scenario once. I think it wouldn't be too bad if someone released a killer worm. The insecure machines would be erased, while the properly secured ones would remain.
In fact, it's the standard policy at home: I let my folks do whatever they want with their PC, if it starts acting funny, though, it gets reformatted and reinstalled (with a previous DATA ONLY backup, strictly). I don't let them choose the basic software (mozilla or nothing), and if they install malware I consider that their fault and the above rule is applied.
Eventually they learn to accept the consequences of their mistakes.
Here we have a fine example of sloppy security design, where for wanting to speed things corners get cut, and the system turns out to be much less effective than it should be (namely because of the lack of concrete and ocean bottom).
Even assuming firefox has as many vulnerabilities as IE, there is still a matter of design that is advantageous to firefox (and detrimental to IE): Firefox is relatively isolated from the rest of the system, while IE is fully integrated. That allows a vulnerability in one part (say IE) to affect others (like Office or Outlook). It's not the first time a vulnerability in IE can be exploited via malicious e-mail. In the case of firefox, most of the damage tends to remain in the same place (firefox). Even if you somehow use firefox applied to incoming mail, a vulnerability would mostly leave the intruder/malware with firefox's capabilities and usually not with the MUA's.
Why would people replace their books with the same thing, but digital?
Not replace, but complement. I read e-books that I've fed into plucker, but that doesn't mean that I don't read paper books anymore.
For example, an electronic version is great is you want to carry your favorite books with you all the time, especially if you want to check something. It wouldn't make sense for me to carry a copy of 1984 with me all the time, but I do carry an electronic version in my PDA. It doesn't cost me extra to do it after all.
Ebooks have their place, but it's not the same as paper books.
Let's comment a little but about the article (Yes, I RTFA!).
First, the article highlight a few common points about the current state of e-books, but then it degenerates into some kind of rant (although it has some good points too).
First, I have a few things to say about the "properties" of e-books.
The reasons for...[the ebooks commercial failure]... are numerous and pretty easy to rattle off:
* E-books can be physically uncomfortable to read (whether you're sitting at a desk looking at a monitor or squinting at a tiny PDA screen).
Fine, that's true. That does not mean they are destined to be a failure. One just has to know the consequences of using one technology (ebooks) or another (paper).
I can carry more e-books in my PDA than I could possibly do with paper (about 20 books). I know perfectly that I'm forced to read from a tiny little screen, but that's something I know, that's the price I pay. If some day I wanted to read from a more "comfortable" medium, I could easily take a paper book from my home library. It's a matter of choices. It might be better for reading reference material, but that doesn't mean it's not workable.
* They're not portable if you have to read them on a desktop computer; if you read them on a laptop or PDA, you can't read if you run out of power.
This is related to the point above. You have to keep in mind that you cannot read a paper book either without power (cannot read in the dark). Okay, in the case of ebooks, you need TWO power sources.
* There's a number of often incompatible formats that the files come in.
He's right about that. That's why standards are important. We've got ASCII text as a las resort, though.
* And the user's ability to access the book's content is often restricted by various digital rights management technologies. (It's notable that the Baen Free Library, one of the more successful e-book outfits, gives away books that are DRM-free -- and, for that matter, free as in beer. I guess it's easy to be successful when you don't expect anyone to pay you!).
Cory Doctorow already talked about that. He's right on target. Most of the e-books I read are either:
Project Gutenberg books
Other public domain books
Downloaded from P2P apps
No need to say anything else.
About books and readers, even if there are no commercially available readers, that does not mean people wouldn't use one. People do read their reference material from somewhere. It would be great if they made that "electronic paper" cheap enough, but even if that level cannot be achieved that doesn't mean ebooks are not good.
Then he proceeds to bash some (IMHO stupid) ideas from marketing people. The author's right about this. Most of these ideas are about trying to sell books to people that wouldn't want to read them (like a video-game-in-a-book).
E-books are probably not successful because of the points mentioned in the first part, especially the DRM stuff. I think they would be a success, even with mediocre reader devices if people realised they have a place, not exactly as the paper versions, but as something not quite the same, more versatile (I'm starting to sound like Mr. Doctorow...).
I think the show stopper is the DRM, that causes that more versatile, yet inferior thing to lose its versatility (thus making it an overall loser), with lack of good reader devices a not so important cause.
North Korea might just be waiting for excuses to call America evil, but that's not the point. The thing here is that America is taking a more aggressive posture by saying that they will consider nuking "possible WMD supporting countries". NK might be calling the USA evil, and the USA just gave them a good reason. NK might not be capable of striking the USA right now, but after this you'd better be sure they'll start developing that capability FAST. And the same goes for anyone else that might have been scared by that little stunt. In fact, considering that the USA might nuke anyone just because (yeah, right, WMD, like the ones in Iraq....) reaching a point of MAD would probably be seen as a very good idea.
Ever player balance of power before? The USA just escalated things a little bit. Keep doing things like this one (even if you did not intend to start WW3) and see what happens......
By the way, since when does a tight loop lock up a machine? That thread would have 100% CPU utilization, but you can certainly context switch to a higher or equal priority task. Maybe Windows doesn't work that way (?), but I've never had this problem on my Linux box.
He does not mean a true lock up. He probably meant that the interface slowed to the point of making it almost unuseable (you can eventually gain control, but it takes a lot of patience). I have a single processor at work (W2k) and whenever that happens, it is a royal pain in the ass. At home I have two cores (dual athlon MP) and I barely notice anything when it happens, and when I do, I use the other processor to "convince" it to stop messsing around (SIGKILL does wonders).
Granted, you don't feel that so hard with linux (no wonder I use it at home, same for most unices I guess), but that effect can make a windows system a very unpleasant place to work. I've seen it at home though (looks like the SBLive driver installer does not like multiprocessors), and in that case (using w2k) you still keep the system under control.
I'd take a machine with two slower processors (or a dual core, I guess) than one with a fast one anytime. Dual processors are really "smooth" machines.
"CERT and other vulnerability watchdogs have noticed an continuous increase in new exploits which are released, almost synchronously, on the second Wednesday of each month." -- Phrak News
That is happening because crackers analyze the patches and learn what is the vulnerability being eliminated. There was an article about that topic on one of the major sites (securityfocus, I think). It's not a mystery, it's been happening a lot in the last 6 months.
I currently see the following problems around me, where corporate IT erects barries, that people go around. In most cases corporate IT should enable it in such a way it is safe, or explain very well why it is not allowed at the moment, or at all:
I work in a small software company and even though we do not apply all the measures you're talking about, I can understand why these measures are there. Since you asked explanations, mine follow.
- Banning of Instant Messaging
I do not disallow it (it's used for work here), but I'm pretty strict about sending keys and other secrets being sent via IM. That's probably one of the reasons why you're not allowed to do IM, the other being that some people waste enormous amounts of time chatting.
- Filtering of websites beyond porn
We do not filter, the two most probable reasons are malicious apps and company policy (and in that case IT is not to blame, they're following orders).
- Banning any Palm-like device, except the corporate one.
Not done here, but probably is something related to secrets and policy from above.
- disabling USB ports.
Not done here, but probably it's for the same reasons as the item above (palms).
- disabling Wifi
BECAUSE IT'S FUCKING INSECURE. Let's face it: it's not the same to have to enter the building in order to connect to the network than just connecting from the outside. I'd allow it if everyone had to go thru an IPSEC gateway that authenticates and encrypts everything that is broadcast (no WEP, WAP or whatever, only with GOOD TESTED protocols like ipsec). The bosses won't pay for that kind of security, though.
- banning alternative browsers and all kinds of utilities.
It probably has to do with unauthorized apps, not alternative ones. Mostly to prevent the user from shooting himself in the foot (and taking the network with him). Think spyware. It depends on the user, and we encourage the use of alternate (safe) browsers (hell, I'd get rid of IE in a second, given the chance).
- limiting the size of mailboxes
Space is limited, and even though most people say that disk space is cheap, it is not when you're supplying mailbox space for 50 users. The only chance of adding disk space for the mailserver is to replace one disk with another, there's no place to add another disk. And very very large disks are expensive (if we had an infinite budget it would be another story).
- disallowing or crippling desktop search
No problem with that, maybe the desktop search tool is unauthorized software?
- disallowing or crippling streaming media
Because it consumes a lot of (critical) network bandwidth. We can barely do VOIP here, someone streaming music or otherwise is a constant strain on the network that is easily felt and prevents other people from working (same as big downloads, we schedule them at night if possible).
- Creating lengthy processes for getting new software on your desktop
Mostly because new software has to be analysed before it is classified as good. Your new interactive desktop might be loaded with spyware, and it would be a hassle to everyone else (see item immediately above). We don't restrict installing here if you know enough, but we might order some software to be uninstalled if it turns out to be bad (and we're not tolerant about that, it's for the benefit of the network).
By the way, a too strict policy like the one in your place is not a good thing. It only encourages the users to avoid the measures in place. But not all IT people are the BOFH (although it look like the only way of dealing with certain kinds of user).
Well, C2 seems to want to tell you who they are. Either they are operating just barely within legal limits, aren't afraid of prosecution, or have obtained a bogus certificate.
What they probably want is to get their software accepted, identification is mostly a secondary effect.
When I saw signed spyware, I first though someone had compromised a key (it was a 512 bit RSA, so it could have been factored). Further investigation showed that the certificate was good and they were a spyware company.
The problem with the accountability is that it's worth nothing, mostly because there are no warranties on software, and the scum can always say that they showed an EULA or something that indicated "clearly" what the software was about.
Joe User would have thought the code was ok, I did not because I know better. It's a matter of education.
They're within legal limits, and it's true there's nothing we can do, just like most other "legal" spyware. If people were responsible for the software they create, it would be another story, though.
I don't want to even think about the price of tumbleweed itself....
What's so special about that software? It's certainly not more secure that PGP (I use GPG+Thunderbird+Enigmail myself). Customer service, I suppose. They appear to use S/MIME.
It has value, especially in the situation you're describing, but used as it's mostly used (and I mean signed activex) it's not useful at all.
In the example you're describing, the intended user is probably experienced so that the signature means something to him (admin, developer, etc). He probably knows that if he finds a piece of signed code, but has no verified public key, the signature is worthless. He knows of webs of trust and chains of certificates. Some code is in fact signed with OpenPGP in the way you're describing.
A user getting some signed code via IE has no way of knowing the details of the signing (how, why and for what purpose it was signed), he only knows that "Foo corp wants to install xxxx, do you trust Foo corp?" (good answer: "How in the hell should I know"). He doesn't know how the other party could get a validated signature (did someone check they were Foo corp?). He doesn't know what the signature means (he's thinking "Signed code = Good code"). Basically, the only thing he has to decide if he should accept it or not is the bunch of letters that spell "Foo corp" on the screen.
So, code signing is a sign of software good-faith. Everyone should show that they are distributing software as something more than an Anonymous Coward. It always disappoints me that major hardware manufacturers won't even sign their device drives.
Evidently you haven't seen some fine examples of C2 Media's good faith. I've seen spyware sent signed hoping that some gullible users will accept it thinking it's ok.
After seeing that I've confirmed what I always suspected: Microsoft's authenticode is 100% pure shit.
Bruce Scheier is right about code signing. There's an implicit association of signed code with good code, and the crooks are exploiting it.
Background: C2 media is a spyware company, I checked when they tried to download spyware to my machine.
Re:Yes, I sign everything
on
Do You Code Sign?
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· Score: 2, Informative
That's great you know!
In case there is an imposter Anonymous Coward, finally we've got a way to detect it!
You joke about that, but that's exactly what the authors of "Who wrote Sobig" did. They published anonymously, but put a public key in their text so no other "anonymous coward" could pretend to be them (or he, she or otherwise).
If you cannot trust the admin (or the system does not require two admins to cross check each other continuously) you are fucked beyond reproach anyhow.
Yes, sure. If you don't trust your admin, you're fucked up, but at least you know WHO fucked you up in the first place. If you share passwords, you might never know and end blaming the wrong person.
I work in a small business, not in the CIA or the DARPA, but those measures still make lots of sense. In that situation, you should not implement them exactly as written, but should serve as tips (in this case as "try not to share accounts").
The purpose of password protection is cheap prevention of malicious use of the system by either outsiders or regular employees. If there is any higher need of protection, separation of data and all sorts of far more sophisticated measures are required. Which is a completely different discussion.
I agree with that, but that doesn't mean that you should make the best out of what's available. Sometimes it's the only thing available (root passwords for console use only). In that case it's in your best interest to have the most secure passwords there. I'm not saying that the admin should be restricted by the system (it makes no sense in a small business), but not encouraging the admin to use other people's credentials (especially when his own would suffice) is a good idea.
Yea as long as you do not want to make any sort of changes to the user's environment without having to write software to manipulate the registry. Which is inevietable in a small business environment. We were talking business, small and otherwise, werent we? I do not recall mentioning the US Navy anywhere.
Usually, if I have to make some kind of troubleshooting, I ask the owner of the account to show me what the problem is. Only in rare cases I change the password to get into the account (and those events are usually noted by another admin). Sure, I could mess with the logs, but there's always the risk of leaving traces.
I might not be working for a top secret project, but it is useful to pretend you are. If you have everything organized, and have a reasonable (but strong) security policy, when an intruder penetrates (when, not if) you can deal with it better and quicker because you're better trained and tend to know what's right and what's wrong.
If you really have records of everyone's passwords, I hope you treat them as the important (and secret) data they are (PGP is cheap). It would be a REAL mess if those records were compromised. Me, I prefer not to take that chance.
(Granted, I'm the most paranoid of the admins here, that I'll admit)
This policy stipulated that passwords were only to be changed by the MIS department, and that all password requests must go through them.
Under most circumstances that is actually a very wise policy. Many products, MS Windows Terminal Services among others, do not allow the admin to access the user account without his password.
Requiring the admins to know the user password is NOT a wise policy. That policy mixes authentication and authorization. If two people need to know the password to an account to do something, you weaken security because you cannot be sure who used the system to do something and because you have doubled (or multiplied if more than two people know) the chance that the password might be disclosed (accidentally or maliciously).
If you do not share the keys (and needing the keys to do some administrative task is sharing), you can be sure who did what on the system, with the added benefit of being able to change the policy easily (revoking rights, for example).
A good way of dealing with passwords can be found in military manuals (don't remember which manual exactly, but I think it's in the NISPOM). To set a password, the user has to go see the security officer and request a change. Then the system chooses a random password and shows it to the user (but not the security officer). By doing this, the security officer knows all the necesary details, but does not know the password (so he cannot pretend to be the user).
Of course that does not prevent the user from writing a copy of it under the keyboard, only education helps with that.
By the way, I use MS terminal services also. I have my own account so it is known that it's me using the system (authentication) but my powers come from the fact that I belong to the administrators' group (authorization). Of course I cannot log in directly as another user, but that need is not very common either.
Slashdot Mirror
The Internet is not made solely of webservers.
WWW is just a service and should not be used as a sole indicator.
You will find some fine examples of this if you review the stories from the Sitefinder fiasco that happened a couple of years ago.
(Dont have a webserver, yet my SSH servers have more traffic than a few personal www sites)
I know nothing about "Watchmen", but "The incredibles" is nothing like the "Fantastic Four". They might have similar superpowers, but that's it. The similarities are there because it's pretty clear the idea of the movie is to spoof classic comic characters.
You've got to admit the plot is definitely NOT a copy.
Think about it. Four years ago you might see a new bomb and hate it, but ut would be a new script. Today, the only thing they show is remakes of old series or films. We have a TV channel specialized on old shows here (Retro, is you want to know). Watching that channel you can easily see two things:
Think about it.
Charlie and the cholocate factory: seen it when I was a child.
War of the worlds: remake, no need to comment more.
King Kong: (yet another) remake.
Bewitched: we can see it on retro here.
We just need "Get Smart" and "I dream of Jeannie" and we can make a retro movie festival.....
I really miss some original plots, like "The Incredibles" where ALL of characters are completely unknown.
The worst part of it is that those MPAA bastards are not only not doing anything, but they are also preventing everyone el from doing it.
So, basically, we're not barking up the wrong tree. People is so fed up that they're not bothering to go to the cinema anymore.
And that's not counting the way users were subverting the password scheme in order to be tolerable (yes, they were subverting it, with rules like that it always ends like that). You are probably safer right now.
What most people fail to realize is that password security cannot be too relaxed or too strict. Erring on the relaxed side you get stupid passwords, while on the opposite you get stupid passwords translated to 1337.
Personally, six months periods and random passwords are good enough. The root passwords are all random and changed periodically. So are the important passwords (like vpn access, we (the admins) choose them). As for other passwords, it's better not to try to force things. Just make sure that nobody does stupid things (post-it on monitor, etc) and an ocasional John the Ripper run is usually enough.
I do exactly the same as you do, except I run a similar program on my PDA. Pretty good idea, and the most often used password usually end memorized, minimizing the need to unlock the database. You should probably try random passwords also.
Regarding Password Safe, it's encrypted with blowfish. Unless the author (Schneier) made a design mistake your passwords should be safe. Tried to get it used at work, without success, though.
Another thing I also use is Mozilla's password manager (in FIPS mode). Easy to use, too.
I also complement things with OPIE (also known as S/KEY) for my root account, which I don't use unless necessary, and with SSH public keys and GPG (but that's another story).
You're right, Mr AC.
If you don't trust you terminal you should always assume the worst. You can apply some measures to minimize the exposure, though.
In my case I've set up my server to require SSH public keys for external logins and OPIE for root access everywhere except in the console. In the unfortunate event that the terminal I'm using is compromised, at most the intruders will get to the non-root account (if they manage to copy my private key and passphrase, nothing if they don't). They won't get root because a one time password can't be reused (and it is calculated on my PDA). That of course unless the terminal hijacks my session, so the best defense is not to use an unknown terminal if possible.
That means that I need a SSH key available at the terminal and my PDA on me whenever I need access. Then again, if those conditions are not met, it's usually because I shouldn't be logging in from there.
Yes, I'm pretty paranoid. I carry enough crypto in my PDA for World War III (Hey, crypto is a munition, go ask the USA).
And what would be the benefit of pwning a voyager probe?
If some government screwed one of the probes and told everyone how 1337 they are, do you think it would improve their reputation?
Being called "The bunch of idiots who ruined Voyager 1" wouldn't be precisely the publicity a government would like.
(I wonder from how many organizations their scientists would be kicked out for pulling a stunt like that)
I've been reading the posts in this thread and I've noticed that there are two types of posters here: the ones who got it 100% right, and the clueless ones (there appear to be little or no posters in the middle ground).
Now, the clueless ones are thinking of lots of "attacks" using this vulnerability, some of them really wrong. Since this has the potential of getting lots of people to do stupid things (like not trusting MD5 when they should), let's talk a little bit about the vulnerability and its effects.
First of all: this is not new. There was an article here explaining the same attack a few months ago (about x.509 certificate collisions and how to fake postscript orders, if you know what I am refering to, please post a link).
The attack goes like this:
You have a block B1 that is known to collide with another block B2.
You have some custom made code that looks like this:
-----BEGIN SNEAKY CODE---------------
If DATA[1] = DATA[2] then
do something good
else
do something bad
end
DATA[1]
DATA[2]
-----END SNEAKY CODE-----------------
The trick is that since there's a collision between B1 and B2 and MD5 makes the hash by reading sequentially, the hash for the whole program will be the same whether you fill DATA[1] and DATA[2] with B1 or B2 (in any combination). Since the code is DESIGNED to do different things depending on the collision area, by changing the contents of DATA[1] and DATA[2] you can have programs that do "good" or "bad" things, with the same hash. Please note it's been DESIGNED with that in mind.
From now on I'll talk on absolute terms, while in reality there is a very small probability of things being right for an attack without being planned that way, so keep in mind that before saying "but that's not the whole truth.....".
Now let's discuss what's possible to do and what's not:
1.Oh no! Now, someone will create a virus that has the same hash than my favorite app!
False: the app (or installer) would have to have been designed with that "feature" in advance.
2.MD5 is worthless and should not be used anymore.
False: MD5 is useless in the situation presented above. There are some very good uses of MD5 that are safe (like access control: this attack does nothing practical to you salted MD5 shadow file). MD5 should probably be watched for other undesirable properties, though. An alternate cryptographically secure function should be kept in reserve.
3.I'll use another hash function, I'll be invulnerable to this attack.
(somewhat) False: You'll be invulnerable until someone finds ONE collision in your new hash function (it might take a long time but....). Then you'll be vulnerable again. But now we all know what can be done with ONE collision. What you're thinking is probably good, but it's no silver bullet.
4.Microsoft will forbid the use of MD5 and DES, and use SHA-1 and AES. We should do the same.
(somewhat) True: Not for the reasons you're thinking though. If MS is really doing this, this attack is a lame excuse to do it. MD5 is still useable for some things, and SHA-1 is not much better than MD5 in the things related to this attack. IIRC these collisions were found using an attack derived from an attack on SHA-1. Right now, SHA-1 collisions can be found in 2^63 operations (and the clock is ticking). We should probably consider using a new hash function someday, but leave the decision to the cryptologists. About AES, it's about time. DES can be brute forced in reasonable time, and that's been like that for a few years. 3DES is slow. That's the reason for the AES contest, we should use since we have it.
5.Someone could distribute some sort of binary and the switch it so it does lots of damage to unsuspecting people.
True: That's exactly what the attack is about. Maybe you were wrong to trust [insert a name here].
6.Who should be doing what and when?
If you work in crypto, you probably k
You're not the only one thinking about that. A friend of mine considered the same scenario once. I think it wouldn't be too bad if someone released a killer worm. The insecure machines would be erased, while the properly secured ones would remain.
In fact, it's the standard policy at home: I let my folks do whatever they want with their PC, if it starts acting funny, though, it gets reformatted and reinstalled (with a previous DATA ONLY backup, strictly). I don't let them choose the basic software (mozilla or nothing), and if they install malware I consider that their fault and the above rule is applied.
Eventually they learn to accept the consequences of their mistakes.
See why computer security is so crappy?
Here we have a fine example of sloppy security design, where for wanting to speed things corners get cut, and the system turns out to be much less effective than it should be (namely because of the lack of concrete and ocean bottom).
Even assuming firefox has as many vulnerabilities as IE, there is still a matter of design that is advantageous to firefox (and detrimental to IE): Firefox is relatively isolated from the rest of the system, while IE is fully integrated. That allows a vulnerability in one part (say IE) to affect others (like Office or Outlook). It's not the first time a vulnerability in IE can be exploited via malicious e-mail. In the case of firefox, most of the damage tends to remain in the same place (firefox). Even if you somehow use firefox applied to incoming mail, a vulnerability would mostly leave the intruder/malware with firefox's capabilities and usually not with the MUA's.
It's just a matter of modular design.
Not replace, but complement. I read e-books that I've fed into plucker, but that doesn't mean that I don't read paper books anymore.
For example, an electronic version is great is you want to carry your favorite books with you all the time, especially if you want to check something. It wouldn't make sense for me to carry a copy of 1984 with me all the time, but I do carry an electronic version in my PDA. It doesn't cost me extra to do it after all.
Ebooks have their place, but it's not the same as paper books.
First, the article highlight a few common points about the current state of e-books, but then it degenerates into some kind of rant (although it has some good points too).
First, I have a few things to say about the "properties" of e-books.
Fine, that's true. That does not mean they are destined to be a failure. One just has to know the consequences of using one technology (ebooks) or another (paper).
I can carry more e-books in my PDA than I could possibly do with paper (about 20 books). I know perfectly that I'm forced to read from a tiny little screen, but that's something I know, that's the price I pay. If some day I wanted to read from a more "comfortable" medium, I could easily take a paper book from my home library. It's a matter of choices. It might be better for reading reference material, but that doesn't mean it's not workable.
This is related to the point above. You have to keep in mind that you cannot read a paper book either without power (cannot read in the dark). Okay, in the case of ebooks, you need TWO power sources.
He's right about that. That's why standards are important. We've got ASCII text as a las resort, though.
Cory Doctorow already talked about that. He's right on target. Most of the e-books I read are either:
No need to say anything else.
About books and readers, even if there are no commercially available readers, that does not mean people wouldn't use one. People do read their reference material from somewhere. It would be great if they made that "electronic paper" cheap enough, but even if that level cannot be achieved that doesn't mean ebooks are not good.
Then he proceeds to bash some (IMHO stupid) ideas from marketing people. The author's right about this. Most of these ideas are about trying to sell books to people that wouldn't want to read them (like a video-game-in-a-book).
E-books are probably not successful because of the points mentioned in the first part, especially the DRM stuff. I think they would be a success, even with mediocre reader devices if people realised they have a place, not exactly as the paper versions, but as something not quite the same, more versatile (I'm starting to sound like Mr. Doctorow...).
I think the show stopper is the DRM, that causes that more versatile, yet inferior thing to lose its versatility (thus making it an overall loser), with lack of good reader devices a not so important cause.
I think you didn't get it right.
North Korea might just be waiting for excuses to call America evil, but that's not the point. The thing here is that America is taking a more aggressive posture by saying that they will consider nuking "possible WMD supporting countries".
NK might be calling the USA evil, and the USA just gave them a good reason. NK might not be capable of striking the USA right now, but after this you'd better be sure they'll start developing that capability FAST. And the same goes for anyone else that might have been scared by that little stunt.
In fact, considering that the USA might nuke anyone just because (yeah, right, WMD, like the ones in Iraq....) reaching a point of MAD would probably be seen as a very good idea.
Ever player balance of power before? The USA just escalated things a little bit. Keep doing things like this one (even if you did not intend to start WW3) and see what happens......
The tsar bomba, as it was tested was one of the cleanest weapons fired.
The full bomb, however would have made a very big mess, though.
BTW, something that can cause third degree burns at 100km away is pretty impressive (even if that monster bomb was impractical).
He does not mean a true lock up. He probably meant that the interface slowed to the point of making it almost unuseable (you can eventually gain control, but it takes a lot of patience). I have a single processor at work (W2k) and whenever that happens, it is a royal pain in the ass. At home I have two cores (dual athlon MP) and I barely notice anything when it happens, and when I do, I use the other processor to "convince" it to stop messsing around (SIGKILL does wonders).
Granted, you don't feel that so hard with linux (no wonder I use it at home, same for most unices I guess), but that effect can make a windows system a very unpleasant place to work.
I've seen it at home though (looks like the SBLive driver installer does not like multiprocessors), and in that case (using w2k) you still keep the system under control.
I'd take a machine with two slower processors (or a dual core, I guess) than one with a fast one anytime. Dual processors are really "smooth" machines.
That is happening because crackers analyze the patches and learn what is the vulnerability being eliminated. There was an article about that topic on one of the major sites (securityfocus, I think). It's not a mystery, it's been happening a lot in the last 6 months.
I work in a small software company and even though we do not apply all the measures you're talking about, I can understand why these measures are there. Since you asked explanations, mine follow.
- Banning of Instant Messaging
I do not disallow it (it's used for work here), but I'm pretty strict about sending keys and other secrets being sent via IM. That's probably one of the reasons why you're not allowed to do IM, the other being that some people waste enormous amounts of time chatting.
- Filtering of websites beyond porn
We do not filter, the two most probable reasons are malicious apps and company policy (and in that case IT is not to blame, they're following orders).
- Banning any Palm-like device, except the corporate one.
Not done here, but probably is something related to secrets and policy from above.
- disabling USB ports.
Not done here, but probably it's for the same reasons as the item above (palms).
- disabling Wifi
BECAUSE IT'S FUCKING INSECURE. Let's face it: it's not the same to have to enter the building in order to connect to the network than just connecting from the outside. I'd allow it if everyone had to go thru an IPSEC gateway that authenticates and encrypts everything that is broadcast (no WEP, WAP or whatever, only with GOOD TESTED protocols like ipsec). The bosses won't pay for that kind of security, though.
- banning alternative browsers and all kinds of utilities.
It probably has to do with unauthorized apps, not alternative ones. Mostly to prevent the user from shooting himself in the foot (and taking the network with him). Think spyware. It depends on the user, and we encourage the use of alternate (safe) browsers (hell, I'd get rid of IE in a second, given the chance).
- limiting the size of mailboxes
Space is limited, and even though most people say that disk space is cheap, it is not when you're supplying mailbox space for 50 users. The only chance of adding disk space for the mailserver is to replace one disk with another, there's no place to add another disk. And very very large disks are expensive (if we had an infinite budget it would be another story).
- disallowing or crippling desktop search
No problem with that, maybe the desktop search tool is unauthorized software?
- disallowing or crippling streaming media
Because it consumes a lot of (critical) network bandwidth. We can barely do VOIP here, someone streaming music or otherwise is a constant strain on the network that is easily felt and prevents other people from working (same as big downloads, we schedule them at night if possible).
- Creating lengthy processes for getting new software on your desktop
Mostly because new software has to be analysed before it is classified as good. Your new interactive desktop might be loaded with spyware, and it would be a hassle to everyone else (see item immediately above). We don't restrict installing here if you know enough, but we might order some software to be uninstalled if it turns out to be bad (and we're not tolerant about that, it's for the benefit of the network).
By the way, a too strict policy like the one in your place is not a good thing. It only encourages the users to avoid the measures in place. But not all IT people are the BOFH (although it look like the only way of dealing with certain kinds of user).
What they probably want is to get their software accepted, identification is mostly a secondary effect.
When I saw signed spyware, I first though someone had compromised a key (it was a 512 bit RSA, so it could have been factored). Further investigation showed that the certificate was good and they were a spyware company.
The problem with the accountability is that it's worth nothing, mostly because there are no warranties on software, and the scum can always say that they showed an EULA or something that indicated "clearly" what the software was about.
Joe User would have thought the code was ok, I did not because I know better. It's a matter of education.
They're within legal limits, and it's true there's nothing we can do, just like most other "legal" spyware. If people were responsible for the software they create, it would be another story, though.
USD 8000 for an auto encrypt function?!!?!?!
I don't want to even think about the price of tumbleweed itself....
What's so special about that software? It's certainly not more secure that PGP (I use GPG+Thunderbird+Enigmail myself). Customer service, I suppose. They appear to use S/MIME.
At least it looks safe to use.
It has value, especially in the situation you're describing, but used as it's mostly used (and I mean signed activex) it's not useful at all.
In the example you're describing, the intended user is probably experienced so that the signature means something to him (admin, developer, etc). He probably knows that if he finds a piece of signed code, but has no verified public key, the signature is worthless. He knows of webs of trust and chains of certificates. Some code is in fact signed with OpenPGP in the way you're describing.
A user getting some signed code via IE has no way of knowing the details of the signing (how, why and for what purpose it was signed), he only knows that "Foo corp wants to install xxxx, do you trust Foo corp?" (good answer: "How in the hell should I know"). He doesn't know how the other party could get a validated signature (did someone check they were Foo corp?). He doesn't know what the signature means (he's thinking "Signed code = Good code"). Basically, the only thing he has to decide if he should accept it or not is the bunch of letters that spell "Foo corp" on the screen.
Without education, code signing is useless.
Evidently you haven't seen some fine examples of C2 Media's good faith. I've seen spyware sent signed hoping that some gullible users will accept it thinking it's ok.
After seeing that I've confirmed what I always suspected: Microsoft's authenticode is 100% pure shit.
Bruce Scheier is right about code signing. There's an implicit association of signed code with good code, and the crooks are exploiting it.
Background: C2 media is a spyware company, I checked when they tried to download spyware to my machine.
You joke about that, but that's exactly what the authors of "Who wrote Sobig" did. They published anonymously, but put a public key in their text so no other "anonymous coward" could pretend to be them (or he, she or otherwise).
Yes, sure. If you don't trust your admin, you're fucked up, but at least you know WHO fucked you up in the first place. If you share passwords, you might never know and end blaming the wrong person.
I work in a small business, not in the CIA or the DARPA, but those measures still make lots of sense. In that situation, you should not implement them exactly as written, but should serve as tips (in this case as "try not to share accounts").
I agree with that, but that doesn't mean that you should make the best out of what's available. Sometimes it's the only thing available (root passwords for console use only). In that case it's in your best interest to have the most secure passwords there. I'm not saying that the admin should be restricted by the system (it makes no sense in a small business), but not encouraging the admin to use other people's credentials (especially when his own would suffice) is a good idea.
Usually, if I have to make some kind of troubleshooting, I ask the owner of the account to show me what the problem is. Only in rare cases I change the password to get into the account (and those events are usually noted by another admin). Sure, I could mess with the logs, but there's always the risk of leaving traces.
I might not be working for a top secret project, but it is useful to pretend you are. If you have everything organized, and have a reasonable (but strong) security policy, when an intruder penetrates (when, not if) you can deal with it better and quicker because you're better trained and tend to know what's right and what's wrong.
If you really have records of everyone's passwords, I hope you treat them as the important (and secret) data they are (PGP is cheap). It would be a REAL mess if those records were compromised. Me, I prefer not to take that chance.
(Granted, I'm the most paranoid of the admins here, that I'll admit)