I think that we really need to get past the whole distinction between "authentic" and "fake," especially in terms of moral or aesthetic judgements.
It's just silly. "Authenticity" is itself a socially-contructed phenomenon. We determine authenticity by referencing authorities to which we assign the ability to place their stamp of approval on something. That stamp of approval is based on comparing the item in question to an abstract, socially-constructed ideal of what the "real" thing is supposed to be. Bauddrillard's work on the precession of simulacra is useful here.
I read a great interview with Negativland a while ago where they were discussing marketing and youth culture, and the increasing prevalence of things like prominent logos on clothing and mass-media pop culture references in casual conversation and so forth. They talked about how they had always tended to look at that sort fo thing as this horrible co-opting of youth culture and the evils of the corporate marketing machine, but they were starting to wonder if they were just making inappropriate value judgements and that this may not necessarily be bad, but instead it may just be different, a new sort of symbiosis of marketing and "authentic" pop culture that really makes the whole issue of authenticity or co-optation irrelevant. I think they were on the right track with that supposition.
i'm not in favor of forced sterilization, but i think knowingly transmitting genetic disorders should be frowned upon. as far as Stephen Hawking, i think the utility of Hawking the utility of not having to deal with known genetic disorders after a generation or two. i'd make that trade-off.
I also don't think the suicide bombers are interested in converting anyone. Their objective is different, and so it doesn't make as much sense to compare it to the evanglistic efforts of Christians.
This is important. Most media outlets misrepresent the activities of Islamic terrorists as being primarily religious, when they really aren't. Islamic terrorism needs to be understood as a primarily political tool of resistance to US/Israeli political and economic domination. Religion is what provides a sense of comfort and morale boost to jihadis, but it's not their objective to simply kill non-Muslims for religious reasons. It's their objective to overthrow what they perceive as political oppression (and, frankly, legitimately so) by the only tools available to them.
I would like a wife and kids (well, actually, one kid) at some point, but the person I'm most likely to marry thinks that diamonds are silly, too. She has proposed getting tattooed together instead.
The culture's changing. People are starting to question the value of rocks on rings.
The argument of those who are pro-choice is that a 1-week-old blastula is not a human entitled to civil-rights, and a 1-week-old child is. In most democracies we don't have various levels of human rights.
to be frank, in theory at least, this may be the problem.
the idea that one can draw a sharp dividing line between person and not-person is essentially unrealistic. a person is a person to the degree to which they interact with an environment and participate in a community with other persons. environmental interactions stimulate biology and allow a few cells to grow into a complex organism, and social interactions create an identity and push cognitive development.
the further we progress in science, the finer we find ourselves splitting the hair, and the more absurd the whole endeavor becomes. we are rapidly approaching the point (if we haven't already passed it) where are forced to concede that "not being a person/being a person" is not a binary change in state but a fluid process. a fetus is closer to being a full person than an embryo. an infant is closer still, but still not really there. there isn't some magic moment where personhood "happens," it gradually develops over time.
where does that leave us in practical terms? because our society relies upon statutatory law to function, we need a definite point to begin assigning rights, and because we find (at least theoretically) find value in formal egalitarianism for recognized persons, splitting up rights into different packages for different people is less attractive than assigning a universal set of rights to everyone who is recognized as a person. however, any definition of a single point at which someone becomes a person is, ultimately, arbitrary.
i think it's important to take a step back here and consider what it is that we're doing. part of the problem is that we're still trapped in an 18th century Enlightenment conception of recognizing "inherent" rights, struggling to look for the human person hidden inside the cell structure to see when he or she emerges and becomes "entitled" to rights.
that's a fundamentally flawed endeavor. the Declaration of Independence is basically wrong. rights are social constructions, conveyed by society, not some nebulous inherent quality of humanity that transcends social and political context.
simply put, people have whatever rights other people choose to consider them to have, and only to the degree that those other people act accordingly. we find it advantageous to live in a society which conveys many civil rights, partially because of the material benefits of an open society (innovation, commerce, political flexibility, etc), and also because we have been raised in a society which values those rights and we are psychologically habituated to find them fulfilling and comforting.
as a result, we're left with one realistic conclusion: we are forced by practical concerns to make an arbitrary distinction between "people" and "not people," even though such a distinction is fundamentally arbitrary, imperfect and philosophically flawed. however, as people have the rights which other people acknowledge them as having, so too are "people" whomever other people acknowledge as fellow people.
before anyone goes there: yes, in theory, this could be used to justify genocide. however, i think most of us would agree that genocide is an undesireable social outcome, and indeed quite a few of us would recognize that diversity (genetic, cultural, sexual, etc) is a crucial asset to be cultivated, and, to that end, we are most likely to be inclined to recognize as wide a range of people as is possible and convey as many rights as is practical. genocide simply doesn't appeal to most people having these discussions, and those who do seek to engage in genocide have separate value systems entirely and are unlikely to look to us for moral approval in any case.
so, optimally, who "should" we recognize as people, especially considering that we do requi
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suddenly, my hiptop seems almost inadequate.
I think that we really need to get past the whole distinction between "authentic" and "fake," especially in terms of moral or aesthetic judgements.
It's just silly. "Authenticity" is itself a socially-contructed phenomenon. We determine authenticity by referencing authorities to which we assign the ability to place their stamp of approval on something. That stamp of approval is based on comparing the item in question to an abstract, socially-constructed ideal of what the "real" thing is supposed to be. Bauddrillard's work on the precession of simulacra is useful here.
I read a great interview with Negativland a while ago where they were discussing marketing and youth culture, and the increasing prevalence of things like prominent logos on clothing and mass-media pop culture references in casual conversation and so forth. They talked about how they had always tended to look at that sort fo thing as this horrible co-opting of youth culture and the evils of the corporate marketing machine, but they were starting to wonder if they were just making inappropriate value judgements and that this may not necessarily be bad, but instead it may just be different, a new sort of symbiosis of marketing and "authentic" pop culture that really makes the whole issue of authenticity or co-optation irrelevant. I think they were on the right track with that supposition.
i'm not in favor of forced sterilization, but i think knowingly transmitting genetic disorders should be frowned upon. as far as Stephen Hawking, i think the utility of Hawking the utility of not having to deal with known genetic disorders after a generation or two. i'd make that trade-off.
I also don't think the suicide bombers are interested in converting anyone. Their objective is different, and so it doesn't make as much sense to compare it to the evanglistic efforts of Christians. This is important. Most media outlets misrepresent the activities of Islamic terrorists as being primarily religious, when they really aren't. Islamic terrorism needs to be understood as a primarily political tool of resistance to US/Israeli political and economic domination. Religion is what provides a sense of comfort and morale boost to jihadis, but it's not their objective to simply kill non-Muslims for religious reasons. It's their objective to overthrow what they perceive as political oppression (and, frankly, legitimately so) by the only tools available to them.
I would like a wife and kids (well, actually, one kid) at some point, but the person I'm most likely to marry thinks that diamonds are silly, too. She has proposed getting tattooed together instead.
The culture's changing. People are starting to question the value of rocks on rings.
I don't know that anyone can comment on the ethics and philosophy of science that they don't understand in any way that's useful.
The argument of those who are pro-choice is that a 1-week-old blastula is not a human entitled to civil-rights, and a 1-week-old child is. In most democracies we don't have various levels of human rights.
to be frank, in theory at least, this may be the problem.
the idea that one can draw a sharp dividing line between person and not-person is essentially unrealistic. a person is a person to the degree to which they interact with an environment and participate in a community with other persons. environmental interactions stimulate biology and allow a few cells to grow into a complex organism, and social interactions create an identity and push cognitive development.
the further we progress in science, the finer we find ourselves splitting the hair, and the more absurd the whole endeavor becomes. we are rapidly approaching the point (if we haven't already passed it) where are forced to concede that "not being a person/being a person" is not a binary change in state but a fluid process. a fetus is closer to being a full person than an embryo. an infant is closer still, but still not really there. there isn't some magic moment where personhood "happens," it gradually develops over time.
where does that leave us in practical terms? because our society relies upon statutatory law to function, we need a definite point to begin assigning rights, and because we find (at least theoretically) find value in formal egalitarianism for recognized persons, splitting up rights into different packages for different people is less attractive than assigning a universal set of rights to everyone who is recognized as a person. however, any definition of a single point at which someone becomes a person is, ultimately, arbitrary.
i think it's important to take a step back here and consider what it is that we're doing. part of the problem is that we're still trapped in an 18th century Enlightenment conception of recognizing "inherent" rights, struggling to look for the human person hidden inside the cell structure to see when he or she emerges and becomes "entitled" to rights.
that's a fundamentally flawed endeavor. the Declaration of Independence is basically wrong. rights are social constructions, conveyed by society, not some nebulous inherent quality of humanity that transcends social and political context.
simply put, people have whatever rights other people choose to consider them to have, and only to the degree that those other people act accordingly. we find it advantageous to live in a society which conveys many civil rights, partially because of the material benefits of an open society (innovation, commerce, political flexibility, etc), and also because we have been raised in a society which values those rights and we are psychologically habituated to find them fulfilling and comforting.
as a result, we're left with one realistic conclusion: we are forced by practical concerns to make an arbitrary distinction between "people" and "not people," even though such a distinction is fundamentally arbitrary, imperfect and philosophically flawed. however, as people have the rights which other people acknowledge them as having, so too are "people" whomever other people acknowledge as fellow people.
before anyone goes there: yes, in theory, this could be used to justify genocide. however, i think most of us would agree that genocide is an undesireable social outcome, and indeed quite a few of us would recognize that diversity (genetic, cultural, sexual, etc) is a crucial asset to be cultivated, and, to that end, we are most likely to be inclined to recognize as wide a range of people as is possible and convey as many rights as is practical. genocide simply doesn't appeal to most people having these discussions, and those who do seek to engage in genocide have separate value systems entirely and are unlikely to look to us for moral approval in any case.
so, optimally, who "should" we recognize as people, especially considering that we do requi