I had a mugging problem when I was in San Francisco.... I found that wearing a dirty shrunken wool jacket I got from goodwill, carrying extra bags, and yelling at people that wearen't there was a great way to avoid getting mugged
You don't say whether the laptop et al is yours or company property... so I'm assuming the former. In which case I think you can get homeowner's (alt. renter's) insurance that will cover these items.
Then make sure you back them up periodically.
And if there's anything sensitive on them, make sure you encrpyt it.
That should cover all the exigencies.
This is definitely a case of plan to fail gracefully b/c once you get tagged, it's a little out of your control...
I've done some group work with an individual who is a native of (South) Korea.
I found that his written English and ability to comprehend written English was much better than spoken.
We'd meet to discuss stuff and it didn't seem that we were effectively exchanging 20 words. But long, detailed, technical emails shot back & forth with no problem.
Glad to hear your PhD student turned out OK...
I know it's no excuse but some of those kids are under a LOT of pressure... the likes of which some of use here in there-are-only-second-chances America might have difficulty comprehending.
Doesn't it strike you as a little strange that *anyone* can vote on these?
And don't you wonder whether some selecting committee also votes and their votes are weighted?
I love having a voice in all of this and all but it strikes me that such decisions should be primarily made by those in a position to know; surely many slashdotters are same but the general public??
Check this out, too: If you would like to vote for the next [induction] class, this privilege is included with your active Membership in the Computer Museum of America.
So do you have to be a CMA member to vote or not?
There's very little information about the selection process here (read: none): http://www.computerhalloffame.org/
And this just leads you back to that:
http://www.computer-museum.org/home.shtml
Anyway, this just makes me think they don't take it all that seriously (i.e. as a vehicle to reward the truly deserving)...
Hmmm except for that pesky little shortest path first algorithm (developed by Dijkstra) that oh-by-the-way underlies the two most widely used interior routing protocols, IS-IS & OSPF.
Only one of the BEST authors of computer books around. I am sure he has other technical claims to fame but the man is probably responsible for more computer folks knowing What The Hell Is Going On than anybody.
His books (TCP/IP Illustrated Vols. 1, 2,... ; Advanced Unix Programming...) are works of ART. So well done.
It doesn't "all come down" to physical security at the end.
Sure you gotta have physical security but that doesn't obviate the need for other kinds of security; you gotta have it all!
And there is a fair measure of physical security at most POPs I've been to; different providers have their racks in different cages (which are locked); access requires that you be affiliated with someone who's got their equipment there... and who has arranged for you to be there and gain access to their cage and their cage only.
Inside jobs are the real risk, here, not outside jobs. Because inside jobs not only imply physical access but more importantly imply knowledge of the provider's network... and hence it's concentration points.
"Most people spend way too much time..."
The time "most people" spend focusing on attacks from the outside reflects the fact that... drumroll please... that's where most attacks come from!
Rent-a-guards on every box from here to eternity wouldn't buy you that much.
If the parent was trying to elliptically reference physical security at collo sites and what damage could be wrought at the hand of insider terrorists by knocking out a few BFRs, it's very much ON topic.
A & B check the integrity of the resulting OTP by Alice saying, "Ok, what do you have for the value for bit XXX" and do this for some # of bits. If A & B have the same values for those bits, then they know that those bits were not detected by Eve -- so presumably the rest of the bits were also undetected by Eve.
Bob uses one of two detectors to receive Alice's photons.
Alice & Bob speak and Bob says, "Alice, I first used this detector, then this one, then this one,..." and in each case Alice replies, "you used the correct detector" or "you did not use the correct detector." P(used_correct_detector) == 1/2.
Then Alice has implicitly told Bob which bits are correct without revealing the values of those bits.
Then A & B might check the integrity of the OTP (i.e. the resulting bit stream from their photon transmitting/measuring) and this is what would detect Eve's interference. (Of course the bits from the stream that they check would not be used again as the resulting OTP).
Because the man in the middle can't listen without being detected.
If Eve measured a photon (sent from Alice to Bob) then if she chose the wrong detector (P==1/2), she would alter the photon... and if A & B did error checking, they would detect Eve's tampering.
but quantum computers can crack conventional encryption in a single cycle. They make it trivial to factor things down to prime numbers, no matter how large. And since this is the basis of most current cryptography, they will obsolete our current cryptography.
It's helpful to couch the terms a little; quantum computers would be able to reduce RSA & discrete log (including elliptic curve cryptography) to poly time operations; however, symmetric key encryption schemes would not be as adversely effected.
For example, it's thought that the key lengths for AES et al would need to double in the face of quantum computers (so from 128 bits to 256) in order to retain their same current level of security -- not nearly as dire a prospect.
Slashdot Mirror
I had a mugging problem when I was in San Francisco. ... I found that wearing a dirty shrunken wool jacket I got from goodwill, carrying extra bags, and yelling at people that wearen't there was a great way to avoid getting mugged
In other words, you just tried to fit in.
The UK murder rates are increasing, BTW (ever since that handgun ban in '97!).
The US murder rates are decreasing.
You don't say whether the laptop et al is yours or company property... so I'm assuming the former. In which case I think you can get homeowner's (alt. renter's) insurance that will cover these items.
Then make sure you back them up periodically.
And if there's anything sensitive on them, make sure you encrpyt it.
That should cover all the exigencies.
This is definitely a case of plan to fail gracefully b/c once you get tagged, it's a little out of your control...
Interesting story.
I've done some group work with an individual who is a native of (South) Korea.
I found that his written English and ability to comprehend written English was much better than spoken.
We'd meet to discuss stuff and it didn't seem that we were effectively exchanging 20 words. But long, detailed, technical emails shot back & forth with no problem.
Glad to hear your PhD student turned out OK...
I know it's no excuse but some of those kids are under a LOT of pressure... the likes of which some of use here in there-are-only-second-chances America might have difficulty comprehending.
Ahhh but it's the asymmetry.
A would-be hacker just has to find one bug...
Ross Anderson describes it much better... -- *.pdf format
Doesn't it strike you as a little strange that *anyone* can vote on these?
And don't you wonder whether some selecting committee also votes and their votes are weighted?
I love having a voice in all of this and all but it strikes me that such decisions should be primarily made by those in a position to know; surely many slashdotters are same but the general public??
Check this out, too: If you would like to vote for the next [induction] class, this privilege is included with your active Membership in the Computer Museum of America.
So do you have to be a CMA member to vote or not?
There's very little information about the selection process here (read: none): http://www.computerhalloffame.org/
And this just leads you back to that: http://www.computer-museum.org/home.shtml
Anyway, this just makes me think they don't take it all that seriously (i.e. as a vehicle to reward the truly deserving)...
Hmmm except for that pesky little shortest path first algorithm (developed by Dijkstra) that oh-by-the-way underlies the two most widely used interior routing protocols, IS-IS & OSPF.
Not to mention his accomplishments in cryptography/info_theory...
...was the first to define perfect secrecy -- and show that the OTP provided it...
Only one of the BEST authors of computer books around. I am sure he has other technical claims to fame but the man is probably responsible for more computer folks knowing What The Hell Is Going On than anybody.
... ; Advanced Unix Programming...) are works of ART. So well done.
His books (TCP/IP Illustrated Vols. 1, 2,
It doesn't "all come down" to physical security at the end.
Sure you gotta have physical security but that doesn't obviate the need for other kinds of security; you gotta have it all!
And there is a fair measure of physical security at most POPs I've been to; different providers have their racks in different cages (which are locked); access requires that you be affiliated with someone who's got their equipment there... and who has arranged for you to be there and gain access to their cage and their cage only.
Inside jobs are the real risk, here, not outside jobs. Because inside jobs not only imply physical access but more importantly imply knowledge of the provider's network... and hence it's concentration points.
"Most people spend way too much time..."
The time "most people" spend focusing on attacks from the outside reflects the fact that... drumroll please... that's where most attacks come from!
Rent-a-guards on every box from here to eternity wouldn't buy you that much.
I don't think this is off-topic at all.
If the parent was trying to elliptically reference physical security at collo sites and what damage could be wrought at the hand of insider terrorists by knocking out a few BFRs, it's very much ON topic.
who care more about coffee brakes
Their English better be good cuz yours sucks.
Jesus.
Whoops - should have previewed.
A & B check the integrity of the resulting OTP by Alice saying, "Ok, what do you have for the value for bit XXX" and do this for some # of bits. If A & B have the same values for those bits, then they know that those bits were not detected by Eve -- so presumably the rest of the bits were also undetected by Eve.
Alice sends Bob a bunch of photons.
..." and in each case Alice replies, "you used the correct detector" or "you did not use the correct detector." P(used_correct_detector) == 1/2.
Bob uses one of two detectors to receive Alice's photons.
Alice & Bob speak and Bob says, "Alice, I first used this detector, then this one, then this one,
Then Alice has implicitly told Bob which bits are correct without revealing the values of those bits.
Then A & B might check the integrity of the OTP (i.e. the resulting bit stream from their photon transmitting/measuring) and this is what would detect Eve's interference. (Of course the bits from the stream that they check would not be used again as the resulting OTP).
Because the man in the middle can't listen without being detected.
If Eve measured a photon (sent from Alice to Bob) then if she chose the wrong detector (P==1/2), she would alter the photon... and if A & B did error checking, they would detect Eve's tampering.
Because to date most users think that because you clicked the EULA, you are bound to it.
...
Not for nothing do most users believe this; courts have backed up that impression.
ProCD vs. Zeidenberg
Black Snow Interactive vs. Mythic Entertainment
but quantum computers can crack conventional encryption in a single cycle. They make it trivial to factor things down to prime numbers, no matter how large. And since this is the basis of most current cryptography, they will obsolete our current cryptography.
It's helpful to couch the terms a little; quantum computers would be able to reduce RSA & discrete log (including elliptic curve cryptography) to poly time operations; however, symmetric key encryption schemes would not be as adversely effected.
For example, it's thought that the key lengths for AES et al would need to double in the face of quantum computers (so from 128 bits to 256) in order to retain their same current level of security -- not nearly as dire a prospect.