PCI / PCIe x1 are both ~1Gbps max throughput (not counting overhead, that's raw bus speed).
All the other PCIe's scale linerly, thus a PCIe x4 is 4Gbps bus speed.
After communications protocol over the bus that speed drops (not sure how much). There are other factors as well but what it all comes down to is PCI or PCIe can really handle only about 500Mbps per link.
-nB
Not quite. One lane of PCIe v1 is 250M/s, double that of PCI. One lane of PCIe v2 is 500M/s, double that of PCIe v1. So, a PCIe v2 4x slot would be able to push around 2G/s, or 16 Gbit/s, which is slightly more than the 500 Mbit/s you state.
Furthermore, given that built in gigabit ethernet ports on any motherboard built in the last 5 years or so are connected via PCIe, and I've never had an issue saturating the whole gigabit, it doesn't make a lot of sense to say that PCIe is limited to half a gigabit.
Same here, except starting 2-3 years ago they started emailing me once a month saying I have 5 days to confirm that the account is still active or they'll drop the DNS entry. Annoying, but not annoying enough to switch away or fork over some cash.
It might be different if you use an updater client thingie, but my IP never changes so I don't bother.
I'm sorry, but if you use Facebook, you have no expectation of privacy. Anything and everything you put into Facebook should be considered public knowledge.
Other people have brought up the issue of other people you know putting up information about you on the site, so I won't repeat that one.
However, I think even what you're saying is very dangerous. Sure, I understand the practical issues about why you should be skeptical that any information you put up on Facebook will remain private; let's call these the "well, duh" reasons you shouldn't expect privacy. These are things like the fact that Facebook make backups, that Facebook employees may look at info you don't want them to look, that Facebook may be subject to a security breach, etc. I'm sure we'll agree on nearly all of these.
What I still would be very, very wary about is that your comment can be read as a leap of logic that starts from the "well, duh" reasons for rejecting an expectation of privacy on Facebook, and ends up with some kind legally exculpatory rejection of the expectation of privacy. In other words, I'm worried about people using the reasons why it is unwise in practice to put private information on Facebook as a legal justification that Facebook should be able disclose and use that information to their hearts' will.
Another way of putting it: the exact same "well, duh" arguments about unreasonable expectations of privacy can be transplanted word-by-word to other cases where we do mandate an expectation of privacy. Say, for example, we could rephrase your comment this way to make the same argument about hospital emergency rooms (or any medical office, really):
"I'm sorry, but if you go to the hospital ER, you have no expectation of privacy. Anything and everything you tell to the ER personnel should be considered public knowledge."
The same kinds of reasons why it might be unwise in practice to reveal certain details about yourself to Facebook apply just as well to revealing facts about yourself to the hospital ER personnel. But doesn't follow that you have no legal expectation of privacy in your dealings with the hospital.
I sincerely hope that a conclusion as silly as that wouldn't fly. To take the same absurd line of reasoning even further, we should legalize murder, as everyone is going to die eventually, so why put it off?
I'm sorry, but if you use Facebook, you have no expectation of privacy. Anything and everything you put into Facebook should be considered public knowledge. This is why I do not use Facebook.
Technically [Wired Equivalent Privacy is] secured, but realistically it is as good as open for anyone with about 2 minutes and the right app (saw it demoed on the same Eee).
It also takes 2 minutes to sneak into the premises and find an open 100BASE-TX port. Sure, you could notice the burglar, but you could also notice the unfamiliar MAC number on your AP. That's why it's called wired-equivalent privacy. The point of weak security measures like WEP is to force an e-burglar to prove his intent to sneak onto your network, at which point you call the police and/or get your lawyer.
It also takes zero seconds to passively log all wireless communication. There's no physical presence to catch and no unknown MAC address in your AP. Even with WEP, it's trivial to decrypt the data after passively collecting a few days of traffic (substantially less time for busy networks).
Have things changed? Last time I tried Postgres (7.4), the default permissions were extremely liberal. IIRC, full read/write for all accounts on all databases, no passwords, and listening on all interfaces. Freaked me out until I fixed it.
No you don't, because they don't all need to fit on one command line. Find will chunk them into chunks much larger than 1, but smaller than the command line length limit. Trust me, I've used find \; and find + on directories with more than half a million files in them.
Encryption strength depends on the key, not the algorithm.
Actually they're both important. For example, XOR encryption is remarkably weak in most cases. Especially based on your further comments, I think what you really meant to say was:
Encryption strength depends on the secrecy of the key, not the algorithm.
So, how much does a support contract with unlimited incidents from Microsoft cost for Windows 2008 Slightly Less Artificially Crippled Edition (TM)? Keep in mind you need to buy the software too, and that starts around $1000 and does not come with any support whatsoever.
MD5 collisions actually don't help the attacker here, in fact, an MD5 collision would simply be a false positive for this case (the attacker thinks they've found the email address, but they haven't).
It's not, any hashing function would be subject to the same problem. If you RTFA you'll find that they just brute force combinations of the user name and common email domains.
To actually fix this would require not hashing (only) email address, you could mix in some secret salt with the email before hashing, or you could use encryption (with a secret key), or you could just hand out unique identifiers which are associated only in the Gravitar database. I don't know if any of these are feasible for this particular application though.
Not only does that not say that the data isn't stored indefinitely, all they say is they anonymize IP addresses after 18 months (which according to stories at the time simply means removing the least significant 8 bits). What they don't mention is what happens to the unique tracking cookies associated with all of your queries. Who cares about 18 month old IP addresses when you have the current IP address and every query the person's ever made?
Slashdot Mirror
Sure, and it's always wrong.
Windows doesn't play anything by default. Who cares?
FWIW:
PCI / PCIe x1 are both ~1Gbps max throughput (not counting overhead, that's raw bus speed). All the other PCIe's scale linerly, thus a PCIe x4 is 4Gbps bus speed.
After communications protocol over the bus that speed drops (not sure how much). There are other factors as well but what it all comes down to is PCI or PCIe can really handle only about 500Mbps per link.
-nB
Not quite. One lane of PCIe v1 is 250M/s, double that of PCI. One lane of PCIe v2 is 500M/s, double that of PCIe v1. So, a PCIe v2 4x slot would be able to push around 2G/s, or 16 Gbit/s, which is slightly more than the 500 Mbit/s you state.
Furthermore, given that built in gigabit ethernet ports on any motherboard built in the last 5 years or so are connected via PCIe, and I've never had an issue saturating the whole gigabit, it doesn't make a lot of sense to say that PCIe is limited to half a gigabit.
Same here, except starting 2-3 years ago they started emailing me once a month saying I have 5 days to confirm that the account is still active or they'll drop the DNS entry. Annoying, but not annoying enough to switch away or fork over some cash.
It might be different if you use an updater client thingie, but my IP never changes so I don't bother.
Other people have brought up the issue of other people you know putting up information about you on the site, so I won't repeat that one.
However, I think even what you're saying is very dangerous. Sure, I understand the practical issues about why you should be skeptical that any information you put up on Facebook will remain private; let's call these the "well, duh" reasons you shouldn't expect privacy. These are things like the fact that Facebook make backups, that Facebook employees may look at info you don't want them to look, that Facebook may be subject to a security breach, etc. I'm sure we'll agree on nearly all of these.
What I still would be very, very wary about is that your comment can be read as a leap of logic that starts from the "well, duh" reasons for rejecting an expectation of privacy on Facebook, and ends up with some kind legally exculpatory rejection of the expectation of privacy. In other words, I'm worried about people using the reasons why it is unwise in practice to put private information on Facebook as a legal justification that Facebook should be able disclose and use that information to their hearts' will.
Another way of putting it: the exact same "well, duh" arguments about unreasonable expectations of privacy can be transplanted word-by-word to other cases where we do mandate an expectation of privacy. Say, for example, we could rephrase your comment this way to make the same argument about hospital emergency rooms (or any medical office, really):
The same kinds of reasons why it might be unwise in practice to reveal certain details about yourself to Facebook apply just as well to revealing facts about yourself to the hospital ER personnel. But doesn't follow that you have no legal expectation of privacy in your dealings with the hospital.
I sincerely hope that a conclusion as silly as that wouldn't fly. To take the same absurd line of reasoning even further, we should legalize murder, as everyone is going to die eventually, so why put it off?
I'm sorry, but if you use Facebook, you have no expectation of privacy. Anything and everything you put into Facebook should be considered public knowledge. This is why I do not use Facebook.
And I want a pony! I hear they're quite tasty.
Most Universities don't teach any system administration. I don't know about you, but I picked it up hands on, by creating Game!.
Technically [Wired Equivalent Privacy is] secured, but realistically it is as good as open for anyone with about 2 minutes and the right app (saw it demoed on the same Eee).
It also takes 2 minutes to sneak into the premises and find an open 100BASE-TX port. Sure, you could notice the burglar, but you could also notice the unfamiliar MAC number on your AP. That's why it's called wired-equivalent privacy. The point of weak security measures like WEP is to force an e-burglar to prove his intent to sneak onto your network, at which point you call the police and/or get your lawyer.
It also takes zero seconds to passively log all wireless communication. There's no physical presence to catch and no unknown MAC address in your AP. Even with WEP, it's trivial to decrypt the data after passively collecting a few days of traffic (substantially less time for busy networks).
Also, some cars are bulletproof. However it's quite unusual and not the default.
How about the US just flat out denies all air travel to, from and/or through the US. It'd be far less inconvenient for everyone involved.
It can't have been all of them, I didn't get an email.
The P has always been PHP/Perl/Python.
Have things changed? Last time I tried Postgres (7.4), the default permissions were extremely liberal. IIRC, full read/write for all accounts on all databases, no passwords, and listening on all interfaces. Freaked me out until I fixed it.
No you don't, because they don't all need to fit on one command line. Find will chunk them into chunks much larger than 1, but smaller than the command line length limit. Trust me, I've used find \; and find + on directories with more than half a million files in them.
In the same vein, this:
is about a thousand times faster than what you suggested:
At least in this case, as touch accepts an arbitrary number of arguments.
I hate to break it to you, but Sharepoint isn't an HTTP server.
Encryption strength depends on the key, not the algorithm.
Actually they're both important. For example, XOR encryption is remarkably weak in most cases. Especially based on your further comments, I think what you really meant to say was:
Encryption strength depends on the secrecy of the key, not the algorithm.
So, how much does a support contract with unlimited incidents from Microsoft cost for Windows 2008 Slightly Less Artificially Crippled Edition (TM)? Keep in mind you need to buy the software too, and that starts around $1000 and does not come with any support whatsoever.
So play Game! instead, no Flash!
Not saying much. Getting punched in the face with brass knuckles is better than IE6.
MD5 collisions actually don't help the attacker here, in fact, an MD5 collision would simply be a false positive for this case (the attacker thinks they've found the email address, but they haven't).
A normal implementation of salt (with the salt in plaintext along with the hash) would not help in this case.
It's not, any hashing function would be subject to the same problem. If you RTFA you'll find that they just brute force combinations of the user name and common email domains.
To actually fix this would require not hashing (only) email address, you could mix in some secret salt with the email before hashing, or you could use encryption (with a secret key), or you could just hand out unique identifiers which are associated only in the Gravitar database. I don't know if any of these are feasible for this particular application though.
Not only does that not say that the data isn't stored indefinitely, all they say is they anonymize IP addresses after 18 months (which according to stories at the time simply means removing the least significant 8 bits). What they don't mention is what happens to the unique tracking cookies associated with all of your queries. Who cares about 18 month old IP addresses when you have the current IP address and every query the person's ever made?