Ironically, technical support for the Indian broadband customers will be provided entirely by low-paid Americans.
Re:Not only Google looks for big brains
on
Defining Google
·
· Score: 1
Damn it, apparently I'm smart enough to make a John Nash reference but I'm too stupid to check my math before I post it. Please refrain from any smartass comments about 99 + 0 + 1 + 0 + 1 not adding up to 100, I'm aware that Pirate 5's proposal is (98, 0, 1, 0, 1) and not (99, 0, 1, 0, 1).
Re:Not only Google looks for big brains
on
Defining Google
·
· Score: 1
There's a whole class of "people don't act this way and things don't work this way in the real world" arguments one could make about this problem and its solution as given. Such criticisms are valid and relevant, but for the sake of argument, set aside how things work in practice and examine the problem and solution strictly in terms of theory. As ludicrous as the concept seems, let's say that the pirates do agree to abide by the rules that they have set.
First off, there needs to be a clarification of the condition "assume they are very intelligent and extremely greedy (and that they would prefer not to die)." It must be explicitly stated that intelligence, greed, and self-preservation are the ONLY operative factors in the decision making process of the pirates. No other factors such as spite, "sour grapes", pride, bloodthirstiness or schadenfreude can hold sway. Otherwise, pirates 3 and 1 might very well decide that seeing pirate 5 killed is worth more to them than one lousy gold piece.
Also, the operative domain of "greed" needs to be restricted to the current situation only. Otherwise, pirates 3 and 1 might sacrifice their gold piece in the interest of furthering their gains in the long-term, their rationale being that other pirates will learn that they cannot be assuaged with a pittance.
If these limitations are imposed, then I'd say that the solution is absolutely valid. Pirates 3 and 1 can hem and haw all that they want, and even threaten to cause pirate 5's death by voting against him if they don't get bigger shares, but when it comes down to it, pirate 5 will propose a division of (99, 0, 1, 0, 1), a vote is going to be taken, and under the conditions given, pirate 1 and pirate 3 are going to have to vote yea in order to ensure that they get the most gold possible, even if that's only one GP. IANA game theorist, but it seems to me that the Nash Equilirbium of this game says that the given solution has gotta be so.
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In Soviet Russia, blog reads YOU!
Makes sense to me. Broadband is far more important than food.
In Soviet Russia, broadband pays $2.30 a month to rent YOU!
"Tunak Tunak Tun" must be Indian for "All Your Base Are Belong To Us"!
OMFG, that is just sikh. Er, I mean, sick.
Ironically, technical support for the Indian broadband customers will be provided entirely by low-paid Americans.
Damn it, apparently I'm smart enough to make a John Nash reference but I'm too stupid to check my math before I post it. Please refrain from any smartass comments about 99 + 0 + 1 + 0 + 1 not adding up to 100, I'm aware that Pirate 5's proposal is (98, 0, 1, 0, 1) and not (99, 0, 1, 0, 1).
There's a whole class of "people don't act this way and things don't work this way in the real world" arguments one could make about this problem and its solution as given. Such criticisms are valid and relevant, but for the sake of argument, set aside how things work in practice and examine the problem and solution strictly in terms of theory. As ludicrous as the concept seems, let's say that the pirates do agree to abide by the rules that they have set.
First off, there needs to be a clarification of the condition "assume they are very intelligent and extremely greedy (and that they would prefer not to die)." It must be explicitly stated that intelligence, greed, and self-preservation are the ONLY operative factors in the decision making process of the pirates. No other factors such as spite, "sour grapes", pride, bloodthirstiness or schadenfreude can hold sway. Otherwise, pirates 3 and 1 might very well decide that seeing pirate 5 killed is worth more to them than one lousy gold piece.
Also, the operative domain of "greed" needs to be restricted to the current situation only. Otherwise, pirates 3 and 1 might sacrifice their gold piece in the interest of furthering their gains in the long-term, their rationale being that other pirates will learn that they cannot be assuaged with a pittance.
If these limitations are imposed, then I'd say that the solution is absolutely valid. Pirates 3 and 1 can hem and haw all that they want, and even threaten to cause pirate 5's death by voting against him if they don't get bigger shares, but when it comes down to it, pirate 5 will propose a division of (99, 0, 1, 0, 1), a vote is going to be taken, and under the conditions given, pirate 1 and pirate 3 are going to have to vote yea in order to ensure that they get the most gold possible, even if that's only one GP. IANA game theorist, but it seems to me that the Nash Equilirbium of this game says that the given solution has gotta be so.