Think back to the Vietnam war protests. It started with a few 10's, 100's of students and then with conscription led to
Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
Once the upper middle class court cases start and very expensive, well educated Australian legal teams go to work on any new laws - the laws will be shown to be legal junk or more people in the public will start to ask questions.
No amount of ASIO/police infiltration, tame gov press, internet sock puppets can keep new internet laws from been publicly questioned and challenged in open courts.
Huge pressure from US media interests.
Huge pressure from established Australian distribution cartels.
Huge pressure from new firms offering ISP level deep packet inspection and other ip to file tracking in Australia.
Someone has convinced the Australian gov that they can now track ip (the user) and files without slowing ISP plans without any privacy/legal considerations.
New tracking and logging equipment costs will have to pass onto consumers.... some nice expensive hardware and software contracts in that.
Australia can then be held up on the international stage as some US friendly, studio friendly legal 'fix' for other nations to follow.
Smart people will just invest in monthly end to end encyrption with their Australian isp tracking ip and packets to and from a safe country @ 100's of gigs per month.
Less smart people will face an Australian court - hopefully with a good lawyer asking how/where/when/who surrounding the warrant to log daily internet use.
That will be the fun legal question - all use is tracked 24/7 and sites/p2p use reported by outside firms with no Australian legal standing?
A legal Australian warrant was then manufactured on the say so of a firm with no Australian legal standing? or:
All use is tracked 24/7 and sites/p2p use reported by a gov entity with Australian legal standing and daily reports of file movements generated?
Discovery by a good legal team in Australia will be fun for the poor telco/"isp" caught in between robust privacy laws, ip tracking security firms and any new Australian laws.
The Australian gov will then have to sate that it is tracking all files, allowing some 'firms' to track and report on files with legal standing or hide parts of trial from the public - all very new ideas to Australian law in open courts:)
Or go back to the "1970's" classic verballing: turn off the video recording during the 'interview' and a few hours later have the guilty person sign a typed statement.
If you 'film' in the classical term - your digital recording can be removed and "lost" - then it becomes 'your word' vs the gov and a tame pro gov jury.
With streaming your recording cannot be smashed, deleted, lost at the local physical level in a given time frame. You video exists on servers later to be uploaded by the individual, friends, supporters.
The main issue law enforcement faces is the written report of an event has to be submitted and be ready for legal use, lawyers... quickly.
24 hours or 48h later a video shows up totally contradicting written evidence of an event under oath -that can result in real national press attention.
The main wish of such new tech is to totally prevent the recording of local law enforcment via a signal that is 'on' at all times. Your fancy new recording device would shut off and stay off.
It also flows from various stages of life: higher education, car use, phone records, medical needs, unemployment insurance, buying books/internet use.
Most of that can be shared between govs once you become interesting or bought on the open market by govs to index and sort until they find you interesting.
Add in local mil mercenary data firms, contractors with clearances - all the classic privacy firewalls are gone between the public, private and a globally connected intelligence community.
The good aspect is the press and law reform groups 'finally' know what they are been subjected to and just get on with their reporting.
What can the State do? Show their parallel construction methods in court as a chilling method for the press? Sooner or later the 'free' press knows its working in a digital East Germany 2.0 with all the expectations of self-censorship.
You have the mil NATO side of many EU members who have totally connected their domestic telcos to the storage and computing power of 5 competing nations (and a few more).
Kind of hard for the EU to compete in a global marketplace if the US gov is given all data in realtime:)
Then you have the post WW2 refugee commitments and protection laws.
How does the EU make it all work out after Snowdens EU telco related whistleblowing?
"NSA inquiry: what experts revealed to MEPs" has some hints: http://cryptome.org/2014/02/eu... shows some of the EU thinking on Snowden, the NSA and tame telco staff in the EU.
page 16 and 17 show a simple overview of what the NSA did in the EU, onto transborder access, lack of encryption.
Page 26 has 'likely to originate from state entities acting on behalf of foreign governments or even from certain EU national governments that support them" i.e. staff been more helpful to the US than protecting their own govs?
In the face of junk encryption and useless open telco networks it seems the EU has a lot to thank Snowden for.
The good news is the crypto and networking information is out, governments and companies can fix their network use.
As for Snowden, Russia is safe. The press has the whistleblowing material. How the EU mil will work to stop any EU privacy reforms or quality encryption work will the fun to watch over time.
Cold re "decided many times in court, the Congress has passed laws authorising it, and the President(s) have authorised it" are basic color of law efforts that do not remove the 4th amendment protections.
US courts, Congress and other parts of the US gov cannot just bypass 4th amendment protections depending on their party political views, needs or wants any decade or term due to some issue.
The unConstitutional part covers all the aspect of color of law and other token legal efforts to get around the US Constitution.
The legal cover will fail in open court. The neat aspect is the open court arguments can be seen by all.
The US stands by its freedoms and rights or has to revert to using secret laws in secret courts - sooner or later good lawyers find out and it all surfaces in open court challenges again and again.
The only way for the US gov to undo its Constitutional aspects of law is to do so with secret parallel courts and hope the good US defence lawyers and skilled legal press never get to understand too much...
New secret security courts or open court, the full protection of the US Constitution is always with you:)
The good news is the open courts in the US can be great places to start good law reform: http://www.freedomwatchusa.org... https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying...
Skilled legal teams all over the USA are slowly working their way up the US court system exposing vast illegal domestic surveillance networks and the use of parallel construction.
It really depends on the legal system, part of the world, political and gov reaction to database/network entry in the 1980's to early 1990's.
Lots of countries had to drop cases due to that lack of any laws covering basic system entry and file transfer out of their system with logs been of little help.
So legal teams in many countries now face stiff new fines and very clear legal definitions regarding computer network access. The govs now have the experts, funding and political support to win.
Layer on legal systems that see the police spending time and cash looking into 'your' life as been something you have work your way out of legally - a legal system where you have to prove why your not guilty vs the gov having to show your guilty.
There is not 'exception to the rule' under UK law. You have to have some 'ok' from the gov to do this. The GCHQ staff understood that when they first collected all calls (domestic too) via their Intelsat efforts in the 1960's.
The Intelligence Services Act of 1994 offers a lot of new legal protections, then the Intelligence and Security Committee, SIGMod (sigint modernisation) followed in mid 2000 with more legal backing. Open court use of material is still under GCHQ veto, most is "passed" to other groups, MI5, ~ Special Branch.
The use of a "packet flood" back up would have been a new step beyond passive logging and longer term infiltrating efforts.
Some more at http://www.infosecurity-magazi... is6
"He received a fake LinkedIn invite from a non-existent person in the European patent office (Quisquater holds 17 patents). This dropped a variant of the MiniDuke malware which covertly opens a backdoor onto the infected computer."
and http://www.infosecurity-magazi...
A few details on http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dm...
"Belgian professor in cryptography hacked"
("This is an English summary of an article published in today's [01/02/2014] edition of Belgian newspaper De Standaard. The article concerns the hacking of the computer of professor Jean-Jacques Quisquater")
Note the German aspect too near the end of the article.
Well the gov internet searches seem to be for locations, names and further digital contacts as 1 - 2 - 3 hops to and from the press for example.
The vast illegal domestic surveillance system is built like an elint overflight of the Soviet Union collecting everything it can.
Its their network, every keystroke you make is kept, sorted, indexed, filed, read by a real person if your on a list...
Build on that - read up all you can on the side of politics you find interesting and write long detailed emails to members of the press working on the stories.
Link them to material you have found, others working on the same stories.. detail is good, use your own email, lots of good grammar and keep all the technical words in.
Material found in old newspapers, new searches - pack in the local/national political intrigue over years.
Start to attend protests, anything local on any issue - drive in your own car, park near the event and stay the duration to ensure your photographed ect..
If asked for your ID....
Overtime you name will filter up in a few local and national databases - you will make new 'instant' friends at events who seem to share a lot of the same interests...
Like a protester outside an East German Church watch the full power of the state in 2014 have to react to your walking around with a sign or HD camera or talking to the press...
The 'computer' was mentioned at 0.49 "drill out the hard disks" at 1.13 at 1.49 "computers"... I would guess some form of a working 'copy' on a desktop computer to be used with by staff in the room. From that internal redacted material could be made ready for publication vs the original material on laptops.
Re attempt at warning British whistle blowers what would happen if you cross the US.
This also happened in Australia with a book chapter on the Iraq and a hard-drive destroyed. http://www.igis.gov.au/annual_...
"After the sensitive elements were deleted (but only those elements), each concerned person was given the choice of having the copy of their hard-drive (on a government supplied disk) destroyed in front of them. In some instances this offer was accepted. The purpose of such visible destruction was, I am told, to provide assurance to the person that the government was not retaining any of the information the person had on their computers.
As you will note, the process was managed by the Attorney-General’s Department. That department is not within my jurisdiction."
The option is to be as chilling and direct - in the UK, Australia, the USA now hinting at
"Guardian journalists could face criminal charges over Edward Snowden leaks" http://www.telegraph.co.uk/new...
Your slowly seeing the same panicked mind set at the digital level of a 1980's Polish gov with issues they can no longer bribe, jail, control, spin, twist or sock puppet. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
Funding, staff trying it out as a small project in Canada, then getting to reach out for help with the NSA, showing Canada can create, work together, share and then develop a larger tool and skill set with the USA.
The tech may be flaky, never really work, only work in some ares, be expensive... but the creativity, funding and US/Canadian cooperation is priceless over generations of staff.
You had the air gaps aspect, "user ID" and later expanded to global tracking.
Re I wonder what their Russian counterparts' moral is like.
Depends on their tasks but from been surrounded with known issues like on other parts of the Russian mil:
I would guess very creative and never a slow day.
List of Russian military accidents http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L...
"A nuclear submarine had its electricity cut by an electricity company at a naval base due to unpaid bills. The submarine's cooling system ceased to function and the reactor "came close to meltdown""
The history of the US Navy and codes is complex, conservative (no sharing) vs the UK and US Army and understanding pre WW2 Japan.
During WW2 the US Navy had to/was ordered to share and you had the 1942 and 1944 Holden Agreement's with the UK.
During the Cold War you saw US Navy elint aircraft in the 1950's later NSA/US Navy efforts like Ivy Bells http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O...
The now US seems fixated with contractors, mercenaries, the private sector has vetting issues and a massive expansion of staff with skills but unknown backgrounds.
The US has the total global electronic high ground both in space, online and as basic global telco infrastructure/standards as well as setting/keeping global junk encryption.
China and Russia do not have the bases/location reach and are geographically isolated, contained.
The EU mil elite is subservient/dependant wrt the USA. What has changed after Snowden? The US color of law of parallel construction and a vast illegal domestic surveillance network is now understood.
Expect a lot more crypto hardware, software to be in use - more gov and private expansion to fix any internal issues and grow the NSA. Politically outpace the CIA and secure other US mil/gov crypto/cyber/war related funding.
Some people work to create codes, some work to break codes over their life. Thats the traditional war time race as presented in books and movies.
A cryptologist fully understands the tasks but brings many other skills.
How to interact with other working groups (in the US in the distant past Army, Navy efforts, private sector, education, other nations staff), other friendly nations and the political/funding/tech dynamics at any point in time.
In the way distant past in the US (1930's) you would face questions beyond just breaking codes, creating codes, looking after embassy and Army, Navy codes.
Do you look at nations outside Japan? So you have the skill set, cash and experts to look at nations outside Japan? Do US embassies have the staff to be trusted/skills to help break other nations codes outside Japan and not get caught or fail.
How do you get the US Army and Navy working together on basic code breaking? How much do you share with the UK? What can you swap with the UK? Can the US even trust the UK? How much US traffic can the UK break? What is on sale in the now EU area wrt to codes and staff needing a new home.
Traditionally the US cryptologist had the ability to take in the big international picture, focus very limited US finding and skill sets where needed. Try and get the UK sharing or warm of the UK messing in vital US interests....
Beyond WW2 you had the influx of German skills, ex Nazi staff, German ideas and other EU nations staff that worked with German or escaped Germany - what to do with their math/crypto/tech skills?
WW2 showed the US to be cash rich (crypto funding) but the skill set was low as in codes where unsafe, Army, Navy had their own ideas, the US global reach was poor.
Korea was the wake up - the US had nothing, the UK could bring some help, only well into Korea did the US finally skill up - but missed the China aspect.
Beyond that you finally had the Echelon expansion and now what we know into US crypto thinking thanks to Snowden after the Cold war.
Whats wrong with legal side of how we got months of insightful new crypto and tech news? Thanks to the efforts of Snowden the history of US/UK gov computer science spending can be filled in from 199x to ~200x. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/sn...
Without Snowden Slashdot would have been filled with years of the same old boring sock puppets. Bland, safe, bulk daily posting stories about trivial technical matters as they build mod points.
Now we understand the old talking points of:
Data sets are too big, telcos would never connect to govs, its only for foreign use, no vast surveillance of domestic groups, no parallel construction, the Constitution, private sector legal teams, press, political leaders, no cpu or cooling could cover that kind of sorting...
We now know nothing protected the public from a vast illegal domestic surveillance network over the years.
We now have news Snowden view of US legal protections for US contractors (as in computer specialist) who speak truth to power. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/... Many people have tried to stay in the US legal system but thats getting expensive and color of law seems to be getting re interpreted per case.
The good news is groups within the USA are working together in open courts and winning http://www.freedomwatchusa.org...
They will continue with their legal work in open court facing color of law efforts by the US gov.
Slashdot Mirror
Think back to the Vietnam war protests. It started with a few 10's, 100's of students and then with conscription led to
Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
Once the upper middle class court cases start and very expensive, well educated Australian legal teams go to work on any new laws - the laws will be shown to be legal junk or more people in the public will start to ask questions.
No amount of ASIO/police infiltration, tame gov press, internet sock puppets can keep new internet laws from been publicly questioned and challenged in open courts.
Huge pressure from US media interests. :)
Huge pressure from established Australian distribution cartels.
Huge pressure from new firms offering ISP level deep packet inspection and other ip to file tracking in Australia.
Someone has convinced the Australian gov that they can now track ip (the user) and files without slowing ISP plans without any privacy/legal considerations.
New tracking and logging equipment costs will have to pass onto consumers.... some nice expensive hardware and software contracts in that.
Australia can then be held up on the international stage as some US friendly, studio friendly legal 'fix' for other nations to follow.
Smart people will just invest in monthly end to end encyrption with their Australian isp tracking ip and packets to and from a safe country @ 100's of gigs per month.
Less smart people will face an Australian court - hopefully with a good lawyer asking how/where/when/who surrounding the warrant to log daily internet use.
That will be the fun legal question - all use is tracked 24/7 and sites/p2p use reported by outside firms with no Australian legal standing?
A legal Australian warrant was then manufactured on the say so of a firm with no Australian legal standing? or:
All use is tracked 24/7 and sites/p2p use reported by a gov entity with Australian legal standing and daily reports of file movements generated?
Discovery by a good legal team in Australia will be fun for the poor telco/"isp" caught in between robust privacy laws, ip tracking security firms and any new Australian laws.
The Australian gov will then have to sate that it is tracking all files, allowing some 'firms' to track and report on files with legal standing or hide parts of trial from the public - all very new ideas to Australian law in open courts
Or go back to the "1970's" classic verballing: turn off the video recording during the 'interview' and a few hours later have the guilty person sign a typed statement.
If you 'film' in the classical term - your digital recording can be removed and "lost" - then it becomes 'your word' vs the gov and a tame pro gov jury. ... quickly.
With streaming your recording cannot be smashed, deleted, lost at the local physical level in a given time frame. You video exists on servers later to be uploaded by the individual, friends, supporters.
The main issue law enforcement faces is the written report of an event has to be submitted and be ready for legal use, lawyers
24 hours or 48h later a video shows up totally contradicting written evidence of an event under oath -that can result in real national press attention.
The main wish of such new tech is to totally prevent the recording of local law enforcment via a signal that is 'on' at all times. Your fancy new recording device would shut off and stay off.
Depending on where you are in the EU:
We only ever share with the NSA.
We used to work for Moscow but we only share with the NSA.
It also flows from various stages of life: higher education, car use, phone records, medical needs, unemployment insurance, buying books/internet use.
Most of that can be shared between govs once you become interesting or bought on the open market by govs to index and sort until they find you interesting.
Add in local mil mercenary data firms, contractors with clearances - all the classic privacy firewalls are gone between the public, private and a globally connected intelligence community.
The good aspect is the press and law reform groups 'finally' know what they are been subjected to and just get on with their reporting.
What can the State do? Show their parallel construction methods in court as a chilling method for the press? Sooner or later the 'free' press knows its working in a digital East Germany 2.0 with all the expectations of self-censorship.
You have the mil NATO side of many EU members who have totally connected their domestic telcos to the storage and computing power of 5 competing nations (and a few more). :)
Kind of hard for the EU to compete in a global marketplace if the US gov is given all data in realtime
Then you have the post WW2 refugee commitments and protection laws.
How does the EU make it all work out after Snowdens EU telco related whistleblowing?
"NSA inquiry: what experts revealed to MEPs" has some hints:
http://cryptome.org/2014/02/eu... shows some of the EU thinking on Snowden, the NSA and tame telco staff in the EU.
page 16 and 17 show a simple overview of what the NSA did in the EU, onto transborder access, lack of encryption.
Page 26 has 'likely to originate from state entities acting on behalf of foreign governments or even from certain EU national governments that support them" i.e. staff been more helpful to the US than protecting their own govs?
In the face of junk encryption and useless open telco networks it seems the EU has a lot to thank Snowden for.
The good news is the crypto and networking information is out, governments and companies can fix their network use.
As for Snowden, Russia is safe. The press has the whistleblowing material. How the EU mil will work to stop any EU privacy reforms or quality encryption work will the fun to watch over time.
Yes up to each member, so that will have to be worked out by each country depending on their laws and mil dependance the USA.
Cold re "decided many times in court, the Congress has passed laws authorising it, and the President(s) have authorised it" are basic color of law efforts that do not remove the 4th amendment protections.
US courts, Congress and other parts of the US gov cannot just bypass 4th amendment protections depending on their party political views, needs or wants any decade or term due to some issue.
The unConstitutional part covers all the aspect of color of law and other token legal efforts to get around the US Constitution. The legal cover will fail in open court. The neat aspect is the open court arguments can be seen by all. :)
The US stands by its freedoms and rights or has to revert to using secret laws in secret courts - sooner or later good lawyers find out and it all surfaces in open court challenges again and again.
The only way for the US gov to undo its Constitutional aspects of law is to do so with secret parallel courts and hope the good US defence lawyers and skilled legal press never get to understand too much...
New secret security courts or open court, the full protection of the US Constitution is always with you
The good news is the open courts in the US can be great places to start good law reform:
http://www.freedomwatchusa.org...
https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying...
Skilled legal teams all over the USA are slowly working their way up the US court system exposing vast illegal domestic surveillance networks and the use of parallel construction.
It really depends on the legal system, part of the world, political and gov reaction to database/network entry in the 1980's to early 1990's.
Lots of countries had to drop cases due to that lack of any laws covering basic system entry and file transfer out of their system with logs been of little help.
So legal teams in many countries now face stiff new fines and very clear legal definitions regarding computer network access. The govs now have the experts, funding and political support to win.
Layer on legal systems that see the police spending time and cash looking into 'your' life as been something you have work your way out of legally - a legal system where you have to prove why your not guilty vs the gov having to show your guilty.
What the sock puppets seem to have missed was the complexity of:
"Anonymous unmasked: hacker ringleader turned FBI informant"
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/J...
"Jeremy Hammond: FBI directed my attacks on foreign government sites"
http://www.theguardian.com/wor...
http://arstechnica.com/tech-po...
There is not 'exception to the rule' under UK law. You have to have some 'ok' from the gov to do this. The GCHQ staff understood that when they first collected all calls (domestic too) via their Intelsat efforts in the 1960's.
The Intelligence Services Act of 1994 offers a lot of new legal protections, then the Intelligence and Security Committee, SIGMod (sigint modernisation) followed in mid 2000 with more legal backing. Open court use of material is still under GCHQ veto, most is "passed" to other groups, MI5, ~ Special Branch.
The use of a "packet flood" back up would have been a new step beyond passive logging and longer term infiltrating efforts.
Some more at http://www.infosecurity-magazi... is6
"He received a fake LinkedIn invite from a non-existent person in the European patent office (Quisquater holds 17 patents).
This dropped a variant of the MiniDuke malware which covertly opens a backdoor onto the infected computer."
and http://www.infosecurity-magazi...
A few details on http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dm...
"Belgian professor in cryptography hacked"
("This is an English summary of an article published in today's [01/02/2014] edition of Belgian newspaper De Standaard. The article concerns the hacking of the computer of professor Jean-Jacques Quisquater")
Note the German aspect too near the end of the article.
Thats may point to a local support network of staff knowing when to turn the malware or make it become passive again.
Well the gov internet searches seem to be for locations, names and further digital contacts as 1 - 2 - 3 hops to and from the press for example. .. detail is good, use your own email, lots of good grammar and keep all the technical words in. ...
The vast illegal domestic surveillance system is built like an elint overflight of the Soviet Union collecting everything it can.
Its their network, every keystroke you make is kept, sorted, indexed, filed, read by a real person if your on a list...
Build on that - read up all you can on the side of politics you find interesting and write long detailed emails to members of the press working on the stories.
Link them to material you have found, others working on the same stories
Material found in old newspapers, new searches - pack in the local/national political intrigue over years.
Start to attend protests, anything local on any issue - drive in your own car, park near the event and stay the duration to ensure your photographed ect..
If asked for your ID....
Overtime you name will filter up in a few local and national databases - you will make new 'instant' friends at events who seem to share a lot of the same interests
Like a protester outside an East German Church watch the full power of the state in 2014 have to react to your walking around with a sign or HD camera or talking to the press...
The 'computer' was mentioned at 0.49 "drill out the hard disks" at 1.13 at 1.49 "computers"... I would guess some form of a working 'copy' on a desktop computer to be used with by staff in the room. From that internal redacted material could be made ready for publication vs the original material on laptops.
Re attempt at warning British whistle blowers what would happen if you cross the US.
This also happened in Australia with a book chapter on the Iraq and a hard-drive destroyed.
http://www.igis.gov.au/annual_...
"After the sensitive elements were deleted (but only those elements), each concerned person was given the choice of having the copy of their hard-drive (on a
government supplied disk) destroyed in front of them. In some instances this offer was accepted. The purpose of such visible destruction was, I am told, to provide assurance to the person that the government was not retaining any of the information the person had on their computers.
As you will note, the process was managed by the Attorney-General’s Department. That department is not within my jurisdiction."
The option is to be as chilling and direct - in the UK, Australia, the USA now hinting at
"Guardian journalists could face criminal charges over Edward Snowden leaks"
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/new...
Your slowly seeing the same panicked mind set at the digital level of a 1980's Polish gov with issues they can no longer bribe, jail, control, spin, twist or sock puppet.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
Funding, staff trying it out as a small project in Canada, then getting to reach out for help with the NSA, showing Canada can create, work together, share and then develop a larger tool and skill set with the USA.
The tech may be flaky, never really work, only work in some ares, be expensive... but the creativity, funding and US/Canadian cooperation is priceless over generations of staff.
You had the air gaps aspect, "user ID" and later expanded to global tracking.
Re I wonder what their Russian counterparts' moral is like.
Depends on their tasks but from been surrounded with known issues like on other parts of the Russian mil:
I would guess very creative and never a slow day.
List of Russian military accidents http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L...
"A nuclear submarine had its electricity cut by an electricity company at a naval base due to unpaid bills. The submarine's cooling system ceased to function and the reactor "came close to meltdown""
The history of the US Navy and codes is complex, conservative (no sharing) vs the UK and US Army and understanding pre WW2 Japan.
During WW2 the US Navy had to/was ordered to share and you had the 1942 and 1944 Holden Agreement's with the UK.
During the Cold War you saw US Navy elint aircraft in the 1950's later NSA/US Navy efforts like Ivy Bells http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O...
The now US seems fixated with contractors, mercenaries, the private sector has vetting issues and a massive expansion of staff with skills but unknown backgrounds.
The US has the total global electronic high ground both in space, online and as basic global telco infrastructure/standards as well as setting/keeping global junk encryption.
China and Russia do not have the bases/location reach and are geographically isolated, contained.
The EU mil elite is subservient/dependant wrt the USA. What has changed after Snowden?
The US color of law of parallel construction and a vast illegal domestic surveillance network is now understood.
Expect a lot more crypto hardware, software to be in use - more gov and private expansion to fix any internal issues and grow the NSA. Politically outpace the CIA and secure other US mil/gov crypto/cyber/war related funding.
Some people work to create codes, some work to break codes over their life. Thats the traditional war time race as presented in books and movies.
A cryptologist fully understands the tasks but brings many other skills.
How to interact with other working groups (in the US in the distant past Army, Navy efforts, private sector, education, other nations staff), other friendly nations and the political/funding/tech dynamics at any point in time.
In the way distant past in the US (1930's) you would face questions beyond just breaking codes, creating codes, looking after embassy and Army, Navy codes.
Do you look at nations outside Japan? So you have the skill set, cash and experts to look at nations outside Japan? Do US embassies have the staff to be trusted/skills to help break other nations codes outside Japan and not get caught or fail.
How do you get the US Army and Navy working together on basic code breaking? How much do you share with the UK? What can you swap with the UK? Can the US even trust the UK? How much US traffic can the UK break? What is on sale in the now EU area wrt to codes and staff needing a new home.
Traditionally the US cryptologist had the ability to take in the big international picture, focus very limited US finding and skill sets where needed. Try and get the UK sharing or warm of the UK messing in vital US interests....
Beyond WW2 you had the influx of German skills, ex Nazi staff, German ideas and other EU nations staff that worked with German or escaped Germany - what to do with their math/crypto/tech skills?
WW2 showed the US to be cash rich (crypto funding) but the skill set was low as in codes where unsafe, Army, Navy had their own ideas, the US global reach was poor.
Korea was the wake up - the US had nothing, the UK could bring some help, only well into Korea did the US finally skill up - but missed the China aspect.
Beyond that you finally had the Echelon expansion and now what we know into US crypto thinking thanks to Snowden after the Cold war.
Whats wrong with legal side of how we got months of insightful new crypto and tech news? Thanks to the efforts of Snowden the history of US/UK gov computer science spending can be filled in from 199x to ~200x.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/sn...
Without Snowden Slashdot would have been filled with years of the same old boring sock puppets. Bland, safe, bulk daily posting stories about trivial technical matters as they build mod points.
Now we understand the old talking points of:
Data sets are too big, telcos would never connect to govs, its only for foreign use, no vast surveillance of domestic groups, no parallel construction, the Constitution, private sector legal teams, press, political leaders, no cpu or cooling could cover that kind of sorting...
We now know nothing protected the public from a vast illegal domestic surveillance network over the years.
We now have news Snowden view of US legal protections for US contractors (as in computer specialist) who speak truth to power.
http://cryptome.org/2013-info/... Many people have tried to stay in the US legal system but thats getting expensive and color of law seems to be getting re interpreted per case.
The good news is groups within the USA are working together in open courts and winning
http://www.freedomwatchusa.org...
They will continue with their legal work in open court facing color of law efforts by the US gov.