I understand there's no *net* wealth generated, but that's not what DWL refers to. For it to be a DWL, it must be the case that *no one* benefited. For example, stealing $X from me and giving it to you would have no net benefit, but it would not be called a DWL since my loss was your gain. In the example given in the original essay, the loss of the search engine manipulators and search engine users was the gain of the workers, who benefited from the money they got. That's a non-DWL in the same sense that the preceding "overpaying" example was a non-DWL.
In short, the flaw in trying to call this (or anything, IMHO) a DWL is that you have to ignore the person who was paid as a result of the futile competition.
The search-engine received all the benefits of the efforts, but those benefits cancelled each other out.
No, the SE didn't benefit (or at least not primarily). Rather, the workers they paid to game it, benefited. Thus it can't be a DWL by the definition -- the loss of some corresponded to the gain of those workers. It doesn't matter that there was a net loss after summing over all agents; that's not what DWL refers to. Hence my confusion with the concept.
So the real DWL is the "something vs. nothing", not the $10000, which are spent in either situation.
I agree you can use a more rigorous conception of tha DWL, but like with the other responders, that wasn't the definition the original author used. In that definition, what makes it a DWL was that there was a loss *not corresponding to any gain*. While the *net* gain (across all people) may be zero, or even negative, the people they paid to (futilely) improve the search engine ranking certainly did gain a benefit that corresponded to their loss. Hence, my confusion about the the common use of the DWL term.
in strict economics terms dead weight loss is the reduction in overall utility caused by any transaction that is not at the efficient price level or the efficient quantity level.
Okay, but what does that *mean*? The problem here is that the jargon is obscuring understanding of the concept of a DWL. What does it mean for one price or quantity level to be efficient? I think when you unravel the terms, you see it's basically circular. Try if you disagree.
the paying $5000 (lets just say it is all a direct bribe to the search engine) may be the efficient price for that transaction since it is agreed upon by both parties and the ammount is probably driven pretty close to some market value since every big site is trying to bribe the search engine. however it still creates an innefficient market because it constitutes what economists call 'rent-seeking behavior'
Okay, but now you're justifying its classification as a DWL on different grounds than the original author proposed.
which you can probably look up on wikipedia and get a clearer definition than I can give you,
No, I understand what rent-seeking is, and how it's wasteful. My point is just that it can't be attacked as being a DWL, because someone certainly does benefit -- the rent-seekers. Yes, there are other (very good reasons) that explain why it's bad, but when you start to appeal to the concept of a Paretian improvement/worsening, which is what the DWL does, you reach a contradiction and can't critique it on those grounds.
Well, no, that's not the theory, hence the problem. The definition of the DWL given in the essay (and in treatments of the topic) is a loss "with no corresponding benefit for another party". Whoever got the $5000 benefited; hence it cannot be a DWL. The loss of the search-engine-gamers was the gain of whoever they paid. It doesn't matter if wealth/useful-work has been produced or hasn't. Even in a zero-sum transfer, someone benefits. For it to be a true DWL (by the definition), it must be that no one benefits.
"The real losses caused by an inefficient search algorithm, are the efforts spent by companies to game the search results (e.g. paying search engine optimization firms to try and get them to the top Google spot), and the reluctance of new players to enter that market if they don't have the resources to play those games. If two companies each spend $5,000 trying to knock each other off of the top spot for a search like "weddings", that's $5,000 worth of effort that gets burned up with no offsetting amount of goods and services added to the world. This is what economists call a deadweight loss, with no corresponding benefit to any party."
This issue has long bugged me and it's hard to get answers about it. I don't understand how this is a deadweight loss (DWL) by his definition. Who got the $5000 worth of effort from each of them that they spent? That was the corresponding benefit to another party. How is this DWL different from the "non-DWL" example directly preceding, in which someone overpaid for hosting, but that was the hosting company's gain?
Does anyone have a rigorous DWL definition that can be backed up by a valid example?
I still don't see what great point you're trying to make that you can't put into a clear, coherent, complete sentence that wasn't already answered in my previous post...
What? What exactly is supposed to be the GH analog of having a machine gun fired at my feet? What is that supposed to mean?
So you say there are difficult modes in GH. I agree. There are also difficulty settings in DDR sufficient to make it "interesting". And there already is a mode where you play two pads simultaneously -- it's called "double" mode, which I play regularly. Go try The Legend of Max on heavy in doubles mode and tell me which is easier. I just hope your heart is up for it.
I "just don't like rhythm games"? Are you retarded? I average about an hour on DDR (with the pad) every day. Sorry, you're just gonna have to go with another theory there.
It's not simply playing DDR with a handheld controller. There is a rather large difference between working your fingers though chords and runs on a (fake) guitar and dancing around like a lunatic on a dance pad. If you can't see the difference then perhaps you need to get outside your box and look again.
Except that if you can recall the previous sentence you wrote at any given moment, you'd see I was comparing GH to [DDR with a handheld controller], not GH to [DDR with a dance pad]. The only difference *in gameplay* there is a) the grip, and b) the fact that you have to activate the notes with a strumming hand. Flame me all you want, but GH = cheater's DDR.
Hold on -- this is city driving, and this is from your personal measurements of "miles driven" vs. "fuel added to refill tank", rather than EPA estimates? Avalons are pretty large, and my tiny Ford Escort gets ~27, city. (And 36 highway, oddly enough...)
Sorry, that was my first reaction when I tried out GH at a store. Someone showed me how to play, and I was like, "WTF? This is just DDR played on a hand-held controller!" I didn't get what was so "rad" about it. I still don't. Yeah, it might be fun if you don't already think playing DDR with a hand-held controller is lame...
Oh yeah, it would definitely be doable to divvy up royalties at that price point so we can incentivize more eyeballs to part with their paycheck and sock away some serious bucks to buy the next version.
I propose we listen to people who understand the ethical and practical implications of various allocations of property rights and how to weigh the (often hidden) costs and benefits, rather than someone who thinks his scientific knowledge translates directly into that ability or who refuses to regard a pursuit other than his own field as more important.
The merit of gene patents depends primarily on economics and ethics, not the science of genetics. I know it sounds like a nitpick, but it's a serious error to think that, because e.g. you are intimately familiar with monkey genes, you are more qualified to say whether patents on monkey genes would promote innovation.
Re:Vague answers for overly-broad questions...
on
Why Do Games Sell?
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· Score: 1
Thanks for the summary. Looks like the article is almost as insightful as Malcom Gladwell's Blink, which offers the thesis that "You should trust your instincts except when they're wrong."
I understand, but I was saying was that, if e.g. garbage dumping became a common enough practice (for whatever reason), there would be nothing wrong with pre-empting the inevitable lawsuits by simply taxing the practice as it happened, and compensating the victims, and then anyone who thought that was insufficient could sue to recover the rest. The "tax" is thus justifiable as being, in essence, streamlined tort compensation.
The most general solution is quite often the best.
I agree, but that's exactly what's wrong with part of your plan. Why subsidize public transportation, which is just one of many solutions to congestion that people might prefer? Once the toll is in place, people can choose whatever method they like that is compatible with that cost. Some may carpool. Some may find it worth it to pay the huge toll. Some may use buses. Some may switch work hours.
But first of all, why try to tackle congestion with a pollution tax? You should tax pollution for polluting and congestion for congesting. Crossing them is counterproductive. If you have an enormous tax on gasoline, people can congest traffic just the same by switching to electric cars that get an effective 1000+ miles per gallon (due to most of their fuel coming from non-fossil-fuel sources).
I also would have to disagree that $4/gal will get people to stop driving to work. It's not even close. I estimate in my journal entry, it would have to get up to $30 each way to thin the traffic.
Yes and no. If you're referring to the practice of trying to prod people into doing stuff we think has some sorta-kinda long term benefit, like owning a home, or going to school, I agree. But if you're referring to making people pay for their torts through something called a "tax", I disagree. If someone e.g. dumps garbage on your lawn, they should pay for it. I see nothing wrong -- from a libertarian perspective -- of "taxing" "lawn garbage dumping" and applying the proceeds to its cleanup. (It would have to be high enough that the victim would just barely prefer having the garbage dumped.) Allowing people to dump costs on others without paying is as bad as tax, and undesirable for the same reasons.
If CO2 emissions perform that function (and that's the mother of all if's), then it's not unreasonable to assess emittors an amount equal to their quotal share of the minimal cleanup cost, after discounting for time and the uncertainty of the science. But I seriously doubt that once you did the calculation, most environmentalists would consider it "high enough".
I think you misunderstand. My point was that a tax on the desired output you want to reduce is the most efficient and least inconvenient way to solve the problem, if your primary goal is to protect the environment. The extent to which environmentalists almost universally reject this approach in favor of banning specific inputs (like incandescents) suggests a different prioritization.
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I understand there's no *net* wealth generated, but that's not what DWL refers to. For it to be a DWL, it must be the case that *no one* benefited. For example, stealing $X from me and giving it to you would have no net benefit, but it would not be called a DWL since my loss was your gain. In the example given in the original essay, the loss of the search engine manipulators and search engine users was the gain of the workers, who benefited from the money they got. That's a non-DWL in the same sense that the preceding "overpaying" example was a non-DWL.
In short, the flaw in trying to call this (or anything, IMHO) a DWL is that you have to ignore the person who was paid as a result of the futile competition.
I didn't know 60 mph was close to c. Maybe for large values of 60? ;-)
The search-engine received all the benefits of the efforts, but those benefits cancelled each other out.
No, the SE didn't benefit (or at least not primarily). Rather, the workers they paid to game it, benefited. Thus it can't be a DWL by the definition -- the loss of some corresponded to the gain of those workers. It doesn't matter that there was a net loss after summing over all agents; that's not what DWL refers to. Hence my confusion with the concept.
So the real DWL is the "something vs. nothing", not the $10000, which are spent in either situation.
I agree you can use a more rigorous conception of tha DWL, but like with the other responders, that wasn't the definition the original author used. In that definition, what makes it a DWL was that there was a loss *not corresponding to any gain*. While the *net* gain (across all people) may be zero, or even negative, the people they paid to (futilely) improve the search engine ranking certainly did gain a benefit that corresponded to their loss. Hence, my confusion about the the common use of the DWL term.
To be honest, AC, it doesn't help.
in strict economics terms dead weight loss is the reduction in overall utility caused by any transaction that is not at the efficient price level or the efficient quantity level.
Okay, but what does that *mean*? The problem here is that the jargon is obscuring understanding of the concept of a DWL. What does it mean for one price or quantity level to be efficient? I think when you unravel the terms, you see it's basically circular. Try if you disagree.
the paying $5000 (lets just say it is all a direct bribe to the search engine) may be the efficient price for that transaction since it is agreed upon by both parties and the ammount is probably driven pretty close to some market value since every big site is trying to bribe the search engine. however it still creates an innefficient market because it constitutes what economists call 'rent-seeking behavior'
Okay, but now you're justifying its classification as a DWL on different grounds than the original author proposed.
which you can probably look up on wikipedia and get a clearer definition than I can give you,
No, I understand what rent-seeking is, and how it's wasteful. My point is just that it can't be attacked as being a DWL, because someone certainly does benefit -- the rent-seekers. Yes, there are other (very good reasons) that explain why it's bad, but when you start to appeal to the concept of a Paretian improvement/worsening, which is what the DWL does, you reach a contradiction and can't critique it on those grounds.
Well, no, that's not the theory, hence the problem. The definition of the DWL given in the essay (and in treatments of the topic) is a loss "with no corresponding benefit for another party". Whoever got the $5000 benefited; hence it cannot be a DWL. The loss of the search-engine-gamers was the gain of whoever they paid. It doesn't matter if wealth/useful-work has been produced or hasn't. Even in a zero-sum transfer, someone benefits. For it to be a true DWL (by the definition), it must be that no one benefits.
This issue has long bugged me and it's hard to get answers about it. I don't understand how this is a deadweight loss (DWL) by his definition. Who got the $5000 worth of effort from each of them that they spent? That was the corresponding benefit to another party. How is this DWL different from the "non-DWL" example directly preceding, in which someone overpaid for hosting, but that was the hosting company's gain?
Does anyone have a rigorous DWL definition that can be backed up by a valid example?
Actually, you were trying to be hip. "Doable"? Come on.
Okay ...
I still don't see what great point you're trying to make that you can't put into a clear, coherent, complete sentence that wasn't already answered in my previous post...
What? What exactly is supposed to be the GH analog of having a machine gun fired at my feet? What is that supposed to mean?
So you say there are difficult modes in GH. I agree. There are also difficulty settings in DDR sufficient to make it "interesting". And there already is a mode where you play two pads simultaneously -- it's called "double" mode, which I play regularly. Go try The Legend of Max on heavy in doubles mode and tell me which is easier. I just hope your heart is up for it.
I "just don't like rhythm games"? Are you retarded? I average about an hour on DDR (with the pad) every day. Sorry, you're just gonna have to go with another theory there.
It's not simply playing DDR with a handheld controller. There is a rather large difference between working your fingers though chords and runs on a (fake) guitar and dancing around like a lunatic on a dance pad. If you can't see the difference then perhaps you need to get outside your box and look again.
Except that if you can recall the previous sentence you wrote at any given moment, you'd see I was comparing GH to [DDR with a handheld controller], not GH to [DDR with a dance pad]. The only difference *in gameplay* there is a) the grip, and b) the fact that you have to activate the notes with a strumming hand. Flame me all you want, but GH = cheater's DDR.
My small 1995 Toyota Avalon gets about 25 mpg.
Hold on -- this is city driving, and this is from your personal measurements of "miles driven" vs. "fuel added to refill tank", rather than EPA estimates? Avalons are pretty large, and my tiny Ford Escort gets ~27, city. (And 36 highway, oddly enough...)
Sorry, that was my first reaction when I tried out GH at a store. Someone showed me how to play, and I was like, "WTF? This is just DDR played on a hand-held controller!" I didn't get what was so "rad" about it. I still don't. Yeah, it might be fun if you don't already think playing DDR with a hand-held controller is lame ...
Actually, Guitar Hero is fun because it's the best cover story for playing DDR without a dance pad.
GH = DDR with the controller in your hands
Oh yeah, it would definitely be doable to divvy up royalties at that price point so we can incentivize more eyeballs to part with their paycheck and sock away some serious bucks to buy the next version.
See? I can be hip, too.
I propose we listen to people who understand the ethical and practical implications of various allocations of property rights and how to weigh the (often hidden) costs and benefits, rather than someone who thinks his scientific knowledge translates directly into that ability or who refuses to regard a pursuit other than his own field as more important.
I'm interested in matchmaking ... but not for games :-/
The merit of gene patents depends primarily on economics and ethics, not the science of genetics. I know it sounds like a nitpick, but it's a serious error to think that, because e.g. you are intimately familiar with monkey genes, you are more qualified to say whether patents on monkey genes would promote innovation.
Thanks for the summary. Looks like the article is almost as insightful as Malcom Gladwell's Blink, which offers the thesis that "You should trust your instincts except when they're wrong."
Or ... you could just go to the Zelda:TP page and click on the "Game Script" link under "In-Depth FAQs".
(Do not interpret this post to mean I regularly visit gamefaqs.com)
I understand, but I was saying was that, if e.g. garbage dumping became a common enough practice (for whatever reason), there would be nothing wrong with pre-empting the inevitable lawsuits by simply taxing the practice as it happened, and compensating the victims, and then anyone who thought that was insufficient could sue to recover the rest. The "tax" is thus justifiable as being, in essence, streamlined tort compensation.
That's kind of unfair. If you look carefully at the banner the ship actually put up, you'll note it *really* said:
this specific ship's MISSION has been ACCOMPLISHED
The most general solution is quite often the best.
I agree, but that's exactly what's wrong with part of your plan. Why subsidize public transportation, which is just one of many solutions to congestion that people might prefer? Once the toll is in place, people can choose whatever method they like that is compatible with that cost. Some may carpool. Some may find it worth it to pay the huge toll. Some may use buses. Some may switch work hours.
But first of all, why try to tackle congestion with a pollution tax? You should tax pollution for polluting and congestion for congesting. Crossing them is counterproductive. If you have an enormous tax on gasoline, people can congest traffic just the same by switching to electric cars that get an effective 1000+ miles per gallon (due to most of their fuel coming from non-fossil-fuel sources).
I also would have to disagree that $4/gal will get people to stop driving to work. It's not even close. I estimate in my journal entry, it would have to get up to $30 each way to thin the traffic.
Yes and no. If you're referring to the practice of trying to prod people into doing stuff we think has some sorta-kinda long term benefit, like owning a home, or going to school, I agree. But if you're referring to making people pay for their torts through something called a "tax", I disagree. If someone e.g. dumps garbage on your lawn, they should pay for it. I see nothing wrong -- from a libertarian perspective -- of "taxing" "lawn garbage dumping" and applying the proceeds to its cleanup. (It would have to be high enough that the victim would just barely prefer having the garbage dumped.) Allowing people to dump costs on others without paying is as bad as tax, and undesirable for the same reasons.
If CO2 emissions perform that function (and that's the mother of all if's), then it's not unreasonable to assess emittors an amount equal to their quotal share of the minimal cleanup cost, after discounting for time and the uncertainty of the science. But I seriously doubt that once you did the calculation, most environmentalists would consider it "high enough".
I think you misunderstand. My point was that a tax on the desired output you want to reduce is the most efficient and least inconvenient way to solve the problem, if your primary goal is to protect the environment. The extent to which environmentalists almost universally reject this approach in favor of banning specific inputs (like incandescents) suggests a different prioritization.